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HMS Wakeful was a W-class destroyer of the Royal Navy, built under the 1916–1917 Programme in the 10th Destroyer order. Wakeful was assigned to the Grand Fleet after completion, and served into the early years of the Second World War. Wakeful was torpedoed and sunk during Operation Dynamo by a German E-Boat on 29 May 1940. Wakeful was selected to support Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of allied troops from Dunkirk, on 26 May 1940. On 27 May 1940 Wakeful embarked 631 Allied troops. While returning them to Dover Wakeful came under air attack and received minor damage below the waterline. Despite the near miss Wakeful returned to Dunkirk to continue the evacuation, embarking 640 Allied troops on 28 May 1940. While carrying this out Wakeful was torpedoed by the German E-Boat S-30. The destroyer was struck by two torpedoes, one hitting the forward boiler room. Casualties were heavy, only four of the 640 Allied troops – Sapper Michael Frazer of the Royal Engineers, Mr Stanley Patrick of the Royal Army Service Corps and Mr H.F.R. Ruddell of the Royal Army Service Corps and Mr James 'Jim' Kane of the Royal Tank Regiment [1] plus 25 of Wakeful's crew survived. A number of ships stopped to pick up the survivors, but one of these, the destroyer Grafton, was then in turn sunk by a German U-boat. Winser, John de D. (1999). B.E.F. Ships Before, At and After Dunkirk. Gravesend, Kent: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-91-6. 29 May: HMS Grafton, HMS Grenade, Lorina, Mona's Queen, HMS Wakeful 30 May: Fenella, Bourrasque, HMS King Orry, Normannia, HMS Cambrian 31 May: Siroco, U-13 29 May: HMS Bideford, HMS Montrose
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Source: Lloyd’s Register Foundation, Heritage & Education Centre, Lloyd’s Register of Yachts 1939, digitised via Internet Archive. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Images have been converted, resized and watermarked for web display; machine-generated table OCR has been added.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947 3303
GRAFTON she was in danger of being tor- the French minefields hi the Ruytingen and
pedoed. At that moment, 0250, GRAFTON Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy
was torpedoed, COMFORT was lifted in the M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the with-
air, and Captain of WAKEFUL washed over- drawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow
board. COMFORT was going full speed and as up.
she came round in a circle "LYDD and In the evening it was reported that there was
GRAFTON opened fire on her, evidently think- no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at
ing she was an enemy ship. It is believed that La Panne. The force at La Panne was accord-
COMFORT crew, except one, and WAKEFUL ingly reinforced as ships became available.
survivors, except four, were killed. LYDD
then bore down on COMFORT, rammed and 29. An additional beach party of seven
sank her. officers and a number of ratings under
Previously GRAFTON, who was proceeding Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
to Dover with troops, had observed a ship tor- 1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who
pedoed, and lowered her boats to pick up sur- had already visited Dunkirk and was aware of
vivors, subsequently ascertained by signal to the general conditions, was sent to HEBE as
LYDD to be WAKEFUL. A small darkened S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was
vessel, thought to be a drifter, was signalled and placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the
told to pick up survivors. Within a few seconds coast.
of this, GRAFTON was torpedoed. The bridge 30. At about 1600 a heavy air attack com-
was also hit, either by a shell or grenade, and menced on the East Mole Pier, Dunkirk har-
the Captain killed instantly. LYDD then tried bour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted
to come alongside but after hitting starboard continuously for more than two hours. At
side sheered off, and appeared to ram a vessel the same time, other air attacks took place on
on port quarter. This was COMFORT. ships lying off Bray. Attacks were renewed
GRAFTON opened fire under .the impression from time to time up till after 2000, not only
LYDD had rammed the M.T.B. Target was on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the
then shifted to another vessel further away on Zuydecoote Pass and those in the Southern end
port quarter, and vessel was observed to blow of X Route. These attacks were to have a
up with a bright flash. This may well have disastrous result on the evacuation arrange-
been the enemy M.T.B. ments at Dunkirk. There were present along-
side the inner side of the Eastern Arm two
28. During the forenoon JAGUAR, destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, three
GALLANT and GRENADE were dispatched trawlers ahead of the GRENADE and
via the new Middle Route X to test the opposi- JAGUAR, three more trawlers ahead of them
tion by shore batteries prior to introducing this with CANTERBURY in the next berth, and
route as an alternative to the long Northern a French destroyer ahead of the CANTER-
route. GRENADE arrived Dunkirk, reported BURY. Outside the harbour on the outside
no fire from shore batteries, but that she had of the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA
experienced heavy bombing. These three des- was berthed opposite the GRENADE and
troyers were attacked by dive bombers when JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite
approaching Dunkirk at about noon, and the six trawlers. In addition, the MALCOLM
GALLANT was damaged. At least six attacks and VERITY were also in the harbour but fur-
were carried out, one enemy aircraft was ther inside. This presented a very good target
brought down by gunfire and others by fighters. and the ships were soon hit and embarkation
An hour .-later MALCOLM reported Dunkirk of troops ceased for the time being. CANTER-
heavily bombed with a large number of air- BURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded
craft and during the afternoon this bombing in leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs
extended up the coast to ships off Bray. During and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching
the afternoon the Middle Route X was brought Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed part
into use for destroyers, but small ships were still of the way and was subjected to many attacks
routed round the Northern route to Zuydecoote on passage. CANTERBURY reached harbour
Pass. LOCUST and MOSQUITO joined Dover at 2115 and disembarked 1,950 troops but was
Command and were dispatched to work on the sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used
beaches during the afternoon. Shortly after again in these operations. To return to Dun-
noon enemy shore batteries near Nieuport began kirk, FENELLA was lying alongside on the
to bring Zuydecoote Pass under spasmodic gun- outside of the pier,n and was hit and sunk.
fire and the state was being reached whereby GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the
the new Middle Route would become the only East side were hit and the trawler sank in the
practicable daylight approach to Dunkirk and fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire had to
the beaches. At noon, CALCUTTA, who was be abandoned and appeared to be about to
able to get across to La Panne beach to receive sink in the fairway. A trawler was detailed to
troops by small boats, embarked 1,200 troops tow her clear. VERITY, who witnessed this
from the minesweepers and then sailed for Sheer- occurrence • was continuously straddled by
ness, the minesweepers remaining to load up bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the
again. At 1606, the New Route X having been pier having ceased, she cast off, and skirting
fully swept, all ships were ordered by the Vice the burning GRENADE and trawler, proceeded
Admiral to use Route X, exercising navigational out of harbour, grounding: slightly on a sunk
caution, and those from Dover were instructed drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING
to proceed by Route Z, the South route, pro- ORRY arrived to find the harbour occupied
vided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy only by burning and sinking ships, with no
and Dunkirk be made in darkness. sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South- in the harbour. She was immediately subjected
Westward of the extreme N.E. point of the to heavy bombing attacks, having previously
Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy had her steering gear put out of action by^ a
M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by dive bombing attack when about half mile
33^4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947
unceasingly without relief or rest, exposed to distinguishing between the uniforms of such
incessant air attacks, for seven days. The officers as were present and those of other ranks.
work of these officers and men was of the It was soon realised that it was vitally necessary
greatest value and contributed largely to the to despatch Naval Officers in their unmistakable
success of the undertaking. uniform with armed Naval beach parties to take
charge of the soldiers on shore immediately
113. As regards the bearing and behaviour prior to embarkation. Great credit is due to
of the troops, British and French, prior to and the Naval officers and Naval ratings for the
during the embarkation, it must be recorded restoration of some semblance of order. Later
that the earlier parties were embarked off the on when troops of fighting formations reached
beaches in a condition of complete disorganisa- the beaches these difficulties disappeared.
tion. There appeared to be no Military officers
in charge of the troops, and this impression Dover,
was undoubtedly enhanced by the difficulty in 18.6.40.
APPENDIX I TO F.O. DOVER'S DESPATCH
List of H.M. Ships, Personnel Ships and Hospital Carriers taking part, showing those lost or damaged
(by bomb, gunfire, mine or collision)
A.A. Cruiser CALCUTTA
Destroyers
BASILISK (sunk 2gth May) HAVANT (sunk ist June)
GRAFTON ( „ „ „ ) KEITH ( „ „ „ )
GRENADE WAKEFUL
ANTHONY ... (damaged soth May) SABRE (damaged 30th May
EXPRESS ... ( >? jISl ,, ) and 2nd June)
GALLANT ... ( 29th „ ) SALADIN ... ( „ 29th May)
GREYHOUND ( „ 29th „ ) SCIMITAR ... ( „ 3ist „ )
HARVESTER ( 3ist „ ) VENOMOUS ( „ ist June)
ICARUS ( 3ist „ ) VIMY ( „ ist „ )
IMPULSIVE ( 3ist „ ) VIVACIOUS ... ( „ ist „ )
INTREPID ... ( 29th „ ) WHITEHALL ( „ ist „ )
IVANHOE ... ( „ ist June) WINDSOR ... ( „ 28th May)
JAGUAR ( „ 2gth May) WOLFHOUND ( „ 29th „ )
MALCOLM ... ( „ 3ist May WOLSEY ...
and 2nd June) WORCESTER 30th „
MONTROSE ( ,, 29th May)
BLYSKAWICA (Polish) MACKAY WHITSHED
CODRINGTON SHIKARI WILD SWAN
ESK VANQUISHER WINCHELSEA
JAVELIN VERITY
Total 41, of which 6 were sunk and 23 damaged.
Sloops and Gunboats
BIDEFORD ... (damaged ist June) MOSQUITO .. (sunk ist June)
LOCUST
Corvettes
KINGFISHER ... (damaged ist June) GUILLEMOT
Guardships and Armed Boarding Vessels
KING ORRY (damaged 27th May and sunk 30th May) LLANTHONY
MONA ISLE ( „ 27th May and ist June) LORMONT
Minesweepers
BRIGHTON BELLE (sunk 28th May) SKIPJACK . (sunk ist June)
DEVONIA ( „ 3Ist „ ) WAVERLEY ( „ 29th May)
GRACIE FIELDS ... ( „ 28th „ )
3298 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947
embarkation staff or organisation a strong naval 14. CO-OPERATION OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
party was required to form up and embark the French warships and other vessels were
troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced employed evacuating French troops from
when troops of fighting formations were en- Dunkirk Harbour, and on the last three nights
countered. Difficulty was experienced in con-- from the beach i£ miles eastward from Dunkirk.
trolling some French 'troops, whilst others were Details are given in Appendix IV.
so rigidly bound by discipline and tradition that
they would not embark except by complete 15. BASE ORGANISATION.
formation under their own unit officers. In
either case the rate of embarkation was much An operation of this magnitude involving the
slower than with British troops. maintenance and movements of close on 900
vessels and boats could not have been conducted
12. INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING without the wholehearted and unceasing efforts
OFFICERS AND SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL. of the base establishments at Dover and
A most satisfactory feature of the operation Ramsgate, as well as those at Sheerness and
>was the high degree of initiative shown by Harwich in the Nore Command. At all these
Commanding and Subordinate Officers of units places officers and men, Naval and civilian,
operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. laboured unceasingly throughout the Operation.
Destroyers to commandeered motor boats. The In particular I wish to acknowledge the great
majority of officers and ratings in command assistance received from the Commander-in-
were in situations requiring independent action Chief, Nore, Admiral the Hon. Sir Reginald
in extremely difficult conditions. Often the A. R. Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, K.C.B.,
easiest course was to be satisfied with work D.S.O., who in many cases anticipated my re-
already achieved and to return to the United quests for assistance through his constant watch
Kingdom with a final load of troops. The on the progress of the Operation.
reverse action was invariably executed, namely, The prompt and unfailing assistance afforded
continued operation off the coast as long as by the Chatham Depot in providing personnel
there were both -troops ashore to be evacuated for .the numerous small craft, working parties
and vessels offshore to receive them. If the and beach parties, was a feature essential to the
craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew in- successful outcome of the Operation.
variably seized some other boat to continue The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate,
their efforts. Captain W. R. Phillimore, R.N., by taking
Unaware of the military situation ashore and over the servicing and control of the great
often forced to move westward by bombard- majority of the small craft of the inshore
ment from German artillery or even by rifle flotillas relieved Dover of an immense volume
fire from advancing German forces, the majority of work which it would otherwise have been
of these boats, commanded often by stokers or impossible to handle.
" hostility only " seamen, had only one object It was also brought to my notice that at
an view, to lit from the beach any, and all Harwich an exceptional Naval and Military
troops, British or Allied, within sight of the system was in being for assisting those ships
water's edge. which called there to make a quick turn round,
On their return to the United Kingdom when relieving the tired ships' companies of the work
asked to report their proceedings it was only of cleaning and clearing their vessels.
in answer to direct enquiry that it would trans- 16. SERVICES OF STAFF, INCLUDING OFFICERS
pire that these young men had been subjected TEMPORARILY APPOINTED.
in many cases, to an unparalleled bombard- I was fortunate in having the services of
ment from the air. They appeared to consider Roar Admiral W. F. Wake-Walker, C.B.,
that this was part of the day's work requiring O.B.E., as Flag Officer afloat off Dunkirk, and
no comment. Captain W. G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O., as
13. LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION. Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk on shore.
It is a distressing fact -that many ships were Admiral Wake-Walker was responsible for
sunk or damaged on the return voyage when supervising the embarkation afloat and Captain
laden with troops. But it is fortunate that in Tennant for organising embarkation from the
most of such cases the majority of troops were shore, keeping touch with the French Naval
saved owing to the large volume of traffic that Authorities and the staff of the British
was coming and going between Dunkirk and Commander-in-Chief.
the United Kingdom. Exceptions to this were I cannot conclude this despatch without
due to the rapidity with which certain ships reference to the splendid work of my staff under
sank after having been bombed or torpedoed. the guidance of my Chief Staff Officer, Captain
Such cases are as follows: — L. V. Morgan, C.B.E., M.V.O., D.S.C.
Augmented by additional officers, including
WAKEFUL. Torpedoed. Ship broke in both Army and Royal Air Force, especially
half and only those on the upper deck were appointed for the occasion, their task of
saved. About 600 troops were below. organising and operating the large and varied
CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and collection of H.M. Ships continued without a
then beached in a burning condition. Only pause day and night .throughout the 10 days
about 300 saved out of 600 on board. that the Operation lasted, and I can never
SKIPJACK. 250-300 troops on board, testify adequately to the excellence of their
most of whom, unfortunately, went down work, upon the efficiency of which successful
with the ship when she sank. results depended.
WAVERLEY. 600 troops were on board Finally I would like to pay tribute to the
before ship was abandoned in sinking condi- valuable support and assistance which I received
tion, but only 200-300 were picked up. throughout the whole course of the evacuation
In all it is regretted that about 2,000 troops from Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville,
must have been lost through these and similar K.C.B., D.S.O., who was appointed to H.M.S.
disasters on the return voyages to England. LYNX for special service in connection with
3302 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947
uncertain, 2 power boats, at least 2 skoots, every prospect of the weather improving and
CALCUTTA, GALLANT, WAKEFUL, the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless,
VERITY, and GRAFTON, using what survived an increased number of H.M. Ships was'
of their own whalers and motor boats. This ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel
force was reinforced by 2 minesweepers at vessels, though it was feared that an accumula-
2115. Later reports of concentrations of troops tion of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk
on the beaches were received, particularly at by day might well invite intensive air attacks.
La Panne and Bray. Craft approaching the Subsequently, 'this fear was fully to be
coast were directed accordingly. Naval Officer- justified.
•in-Charge, Ramsgate, was requested to main- 24. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt
tain a continuous evacuation service by skoots as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had
between Margate and Ramsgate and the beach, been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk
and take over responsibility for servicing those commencing the previous evening. The first of
vessels. Meantime CALCUTTA, who was off these was due back at Dover about 0300, but
La Panne, reported that conditions for embarka- by 0900 nothing had been sighted or reported.
tion there were very bad owing to heavy surf, But at 0700, S.N.O. Dunkirk had reported that
but that they might improve with the rising the embarkation there was going on at the rate
tide. of 2,000 an hour, so it was presumed that the
Shortly after midnight CALCUTTA was in- transports had failed to enter the harbour during
formed that the Third Corps of the B.E.F. and darkness, had waited outside, and had com-
the Commander-in-Chief were all now at La menced to enter in succession at dawn. The
Panne. She was directed to make every necessity for continuous fighter protection in
endeavour to concentrate all destroyers and view of the exposure of these unarmed ships
light craft at that end of the beach with the while at Dunkirk and during the daylight pas-
object of embarking that force as soon as sage through coastal waters, was obvious. Con-
possible. stant touch was maintained with the R.A.F.
19. As regards enemy activity, this day the Commands to obtain continuous fighter protec-
Germans contented themselves with bombing tion during the hours when the Vice-Admiral,
the town and port of Dunkirk, but on a small Dover, estimated the largest concentration of
scale compared with that to be experienced vessels would be present, it being realised that
later, probably because of increasing R.A.F. the R.A.F. resources were not sufficient to pro-
air cover and also due to the fact that a heavy vide continuous air cover, and to dispense with
pall of smoke from the burning town covered •full cover at less important periods.
the operation most of the day. 25. At 0930 the belated return of the per-
sonnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and
Wednesday 2gih May. proceeded steadily through the day. In addi-
20. The Northern Route Y having been tion to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
swept, it was arranged to sail personnel ships Admiralty were informed of the -necessity for
to Dunkirk at daylight and to continue to sail X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to
throughout the day; this route would take ships increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A
clear of the artillery fire on shore. Personnel Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use
ships accordingly started at 0230. on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was
sent to Dunkirk.
21. Much consideration had been given to
the practicability of building piers on the 26. The considerable alarm as to the imme-
beaches using lines of barges. Reports from diate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the even-
ships that worked off the beaches showed, ing and early night of the 28th, which caused
however, that owing to the very gradual shoal- all available resources to be immediately
ing of the water at all states of the tide such a concentrated on the French Coast, eased during
barge pier to be effective, would have to be of the 29th. But emergency measures taken late
very great length, beyond the resources avail- on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly
able. organisation for evacuation so (necessary if effec-
tive measures were to be devised and put in
22. Information was received that the per- force.
sonnel vessels with their Mercantile Marine
crews were having 'difficulty in making the 27. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th,
entrance to Dunkirk Harbour in the face of 'the an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the
navigational difficulties caused by a heavy loss of H.M. Destroyers WAKEFUL and
smoke pall over the entrance and in face of GRAFTON, and the danlayej COMFORT.
bombing and shelling encountered en route and WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray,
whilst alongside. Nevertheless it subsequently sailed for Dover at 2300/28 by the Zuydecoote
transpired that at Dunkirk there had been a Pass and North Channel. Approaching the
good number of ships throughout the night, at Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships
times exceeding the influx of troops. was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every
four minutes was started. At 0045 two torpedo
23. S.N.O. Dunkirk, and other Senior tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the
Officers on the Coast reported during the early other hit amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half
hours that surf on the beaches was retarding and. the two portions sank in 15 seconds, each
boat work. S.N.O. Dunkirk, at 0709, asked remaining standing with the midship end on
for all ships to go to Dunkirk. The Vice- the bottom. All the troops on board went down
Admiral could not accept this as it was essential with the ship; certain of the crew floated clear.
to maintain lifts off the beaches as well as from After about half-an-hour motor drifters
Dunkirk Harbour, both from the aspect of the NAUTILUS and COMFORT arrived and
military situation and from the fact that Dun- started to pick up survivors, later joined by
kirk was limited by a bottleneck, formed by the GOSSAMER. Captain of WAKEFUL was in
narrrw gangway along the East Pier to the the COMFORT. GRAFTON and LYDD were
poinf= ?f embarkation. Furthermore, there was close and Captain of WAKEFUL warned
Movements recorded for WAKEFUL during the evacuation period, as plotted on the Operation Dynamo map.
| Departed | Route | Arrived | Troops | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 May 1940, 18:00 | Dover → English Channel | 29 May 1940, 05:00 | — |
Attempt
Assumed inbound journey inferred from a dated loss; departure time is not logged
|
Wikipedia: List of ships at Dunkirk — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_at_Dunkirk |
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