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On 4 June 1940, Shikari was the last ship to leave Dunkirk. On the outbreak of the Second World War, Shikari was re-armed and from January 1940 carried out convoy escort operations.[5] At the end of May 1940, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was trapped by German forces at Dunkirk, and it was decided to launch Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk, and Shikari was one of the destroyers that took part in the operation,[19] carrying out her first evacuation trip on 28 May, making a second trip on 29 May.[20] On 29 May, Admiral of the Fleet Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, ordered the withdrawal of modern destroyers from the Dunkirk operations owing to the high losses, putting greater pressure on old destroyers such as Shikari.[21] On 1 June, the steamer Prague was badly damaged by near misses from German artillery and bombing. Shikari, along with the sloop Shearwater and the paddle minesweeper Queen of Thanet, took off Prague's load of 3,000 French troops before Prague beached herself on the Sandwich Flats. Shikari herself was damaged by German bombing on 1 June.[22][23] Shikari continued to make evacuation runs and at 03:40 on the night of 3/4 June 1940 was the last ship to leave Dunkirk.[23][24] In total, Shikari made seven trips to Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, embarking 3349 troops.[25] After Dunkirk, Shikari returned to escort work, and on 4 July, when the cargo ship Dallas City was damaged by German dive bombers and then collided with Flimstone, Shikari took off the crew of Dallas City before the cargo ship sank, surviving unscathed when attacked by German bombers.[26] On 24 July, the French troopship Meknès, repatriating French sailors after the French armistice with Germany, was torpedoed by the German Schnellboot S.27, and Shikari, together with the destroyers Sabre, Viscount and Wolverine rescued the survivors.[27] Winser, John de S. (1999). B.E.F. Ships Before, At and After Dunkirk. Gravesend, Kent: World Ship Society. ISBN 0-905617-91-6.
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Source: Lloyd’s Register Foundation, Heritage & Education Centre, Lloyd’s Register of Yachts 1939, digitised via Internet Archive. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Images have been converted, resized and watermarked for web display; machine-generated table OCR has been added.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947 33"
executing a series of round trips without inter- enemy and though the fog made navigation
mission tor several days under navigation con- extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to
ditions of extreme difficulty and in the face shield the Armada from enemy aircraft.
of unparalleled air attack.
The Vice Admiral accordingly represented to 91. When the count was taken later in the
the Admiralty that the continuance of the de- day it was ascertained that 27,000 troops had
mands made by evacuation would subject a been evacuated as a result of the night's opera-
number of officers and men to a test which, tion and Admiral Nord agreed that the opera-
might be .beyond the limit of human endurance, tion should be considered as completed, observ-
and requesting that fresh forces should be ing that all ammunition at Dunkirk had been
used if evacuation had to be continued after expended and that the numbers left behind
the coming night, with the acceptance of any were small consisting principally of non-
consequent delay. combatant troops. This decision was agreed
to by the French Admiralty at uoo, and the
87. The evacuation plan was communicated operation " Dynamo " terminated by Ad-
to Units taking part at 1440 and was briefly as miralty Message 1423/4.
follows: —
Commence 2230/3, withdraw 0230/4. From 92. It was realised that in all probability
East Pder evacuation by Personnel Vessels, there might be a number of open boats, barges,
Destroyers and Paddle Minesweepers. From etc., drifting a'bout in the Channel with troops
West Pier, new outer port, by other Milne- on board. It was accordingly decided to
sweepers, Corvettes, Skoots and French vessels. have an air reconnaissance over the Channel.
Drifters and smaller craft into the inner har- It was reported that a Transport was lying
bour, LOCUST remaining outside entrance re- on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines
ceiving loads ferried out 'by small boats. Tugs and also a barge east of the Goodwins with
available outside entrance to assist ships in survivors on board.
berthing and in leaving. C. in C. Nore despatched 2 M.T.B.s to find
the transport with no avail. On the 5th the
88. In the evening the Vice Admiral was R.A.F. speedboat did a sweep south of a line
informed by the B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was Goodwin/Boulogne and recovered 33 French
estimated 30,000 French remained and that troops and two Naval ratings. In addition
the French Admiralty agree that evacuation French troops were picked up by patrols and
should be terminated that night if possible. brought in to Dover, Margate and Ramsgate.
Force -used was to consist of nine Personnel Troops also arrived in French and Belgian
Vessels with one in reserve, nine Destroyers Trawlers totalling in ail some additional 1,100.
(maximum, number available), four Paddle Air reconnaissance was also carried out on
Minesweepers, seven Fleet Minesweepers, nine the morning of the 5th but nothing was re-
Drifters, LOCUST, two Corvettes, four French. ported.
Destroyers and a -number of organised motor
boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate REMARKS ON THE INSHORE FLO-
and Dover, together with a large number of TILLAS AND NAVAL SHORE
French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting PARTIES,
capacity of this force, if used to the full, was 93. About 400 small craft, ranging from
more than 30,000 but it was certain that the Dutch Skoots to 30 ft. Motor boats, set out at
facilities within Dunkirk could not .permit more various times to the Flanders Coast. In addi-
than a'bout 25,000 to be embarked in the time tion scores of pulling boats, merchant ship
available, and this number only if the French lifeboats, Naval cutters and whalers, were sent
troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all off in tow. Only a proportion—particularly of
points of embarkation. This point was im- the pulling boats—succeeded in reaching the
pressed upon the French Liaison Officers and a coast and taking active part in the evacuation.
number of French officers and ratings added Fewer still were able to remain off the coast
to the augmented pier parties which were de- for more than one period. Nevertheless, these
spatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the small craft, in conjunction with the pulling
evacuation force. and power boats of HjM. Ships off the coast,
were responsible for lifting more than 100,000
89. The movements commenced according to Allied troops direct off a stretch of open beach
plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, in shoal waters between 1600/27/5 ano^
although favourable as regards tide were ad- 0400/2/6. Further, a large number of the
verse with a north easterly wind tending to •power boats operated within Dunkirk Harfbour
blow Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the on the last three nights, working principally in
vital East Pier making berthing difficult. The the inner harbour, which was continually
MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship due under artillery fire, ferrying a further large
to sail failed to sail, and her place was taken uncounted number out to the comparative
by the ROYAL SOVEREIGN. safety of ships lying off.
Tuesday, qkh June. 94. Throughout the period all these craft
90. At midnight when the earlier vessels had of the inshore flotillas were subjected at one
commenced the return voyage fog was reported time or another to intense attack from the air,
in mid-channel and off the Thanet coast and both by bombing and machine gun, and a
a number of ships had to anchor before enter- large proportion also to sporadic bombard-
ing harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI ment by German artillery. Under this fire
were the last ships to leave Dunkirk at 0318 no case occurred of boats ceasing work as long
and 0340 and carried approximately 1,000 as troops w'ere in sight on shore, and move-
troops and the British pier parties. Except ments of boats westward away from the fire
for an air attack on SHIKARI this final pass- zone only occurred as dictated by the military
age was made without interruption by the situation ashore.
33^4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947
unceasingly without relief or rest, exposed to distinguishing between the uniforms of such
incessant air attacks, for seven days. The officers as were present and those of other ranks.
work of these officers and men was of the It was soon realised that it was vitally necessary
greatest value and contributed largely to the to despatch Naval Officers in their unmistakable
success of the undertaking. uniform with armed Naval beach parties to take
charge of the soldiers on shore immediately
113. As regards the bearing and behaviour prior to embarkation. Great credit is due to
of the troops, British and French, prior to and the Naval officers and Naval ratings for the
during the embarkation, it must be recorded restoration of some semblance of order. Later
that the earlier parties were embarked off the on when troops of fighting formations reached
beaches in a condition of complete disorganisa- the beaches these difficulties disappeared.
tion. There appeared to be no Military officers
in charge of the troops, and this impression Dover,
was undoubtedly enhanced by the difficulty in 18.6.40.
APPENDIX I TO F.O. DOVER'S DESPATCH
List of H.M. Ships, Personnel Ships and Hospital Carriers taking part, showing those lost or damaged
(by bomb, gunfire, mine or collision)
A.A. Cruiser CALCUTTA
Destroyers
BASILISK (sunk 2gth May) HAVANT (sunk ist June)
GRAFTON ( „ „ „ ) KEITH ( „ „ „ )
GRENADE WAKEFUL
ANTHONY ... (damaged soth May) SABRE (damaged 30th May
EXPRESS ... ( >? jISl ,, ) and 2nd June)
GALLANT ... ( 29th „ ) SALADIN ... ( „ 29th May)
GREYHOUND ( „ 29th „ ) SCIMITAR ... ( „ 3ist „ )
HARVESTER ( 3ist „ ) VENOMOUS ( „ ist June)
ICARUS ( 3ist „ ) VIMY ( „ ist „ )
IMPULSIVE ( 3ist „ ) VIVACIOUS ... ( „ ist „ )
INTREPID ... ( 29th „ ) WHITEHALL ( „ ist „ )
IVANHOE ... ( „ ist June) WINDSOR ... ( „ 28th May)
JAGUAR ( „ 2gth May) WOLFHOUND ( „ 29th „ )
MALCOLM ... ( „ 3ist May WOLSEY ...
and 2nd June) WORCESTER 30th „
MONTROSE ( ,, 29th May)
BLYSKAWICA (Polish) MACKAY WHITSHED
CODRINGTON SHIKARI WILD SWAN
ESK VANQUISHER WINCHELSEA
JAVELIN VERITY
Total 41, of which 6 were sunk and 23 damaged.
Sloops and Gunboats
BIDEFORD ... (damaged ist June) MOSQUITO .. (sunk ist June)
LOCUST
Corvettes
KINGFISHER ... (damaged ist June) GUILLEMOT
Guardships and Armed Boarding Vessels
KING ORRY (damaged 27th May and sunk 30th May) LLANTHONY
MONA ISLE ( „ 27th May and ist June) LORMONT
Minesweepers
BRIGHTON BELLE (sunk 28th May) SKIPJACK . (sunk ist June)
DEVONIA ( „ 3Ist „ ) WAVERLEY ( „ 29th May)
GRACIE FIELDS ... ( „ 28th „ )
3304 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947
outside of the entrance. She remained in sole 35. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded
occupation of the harbour until shortly after from Dover in ESK at about 1900 for passage
midnight 2Qth/30th, when her Captain rightly to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry
decided to take the ship out of harbour before out the duties of S.N.O. Dunkirk in charge
she also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and of all embarkation arrangements, taking over
safeguarding the channel from 'being blocked. from Captain Bush who had been working in
Little information of these disasters filtered HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
through to Dover, except that it was known He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
that Dunkirk was under heavy air bombard- 36. As a result of the heavy casualties and
ment and that the destroyers there were being losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly
hit soon after 1600. the misfortunes which befell those of the larger
31. At 1906 the Vice Admiral promulgated and more modern types, a consultation was held
the plan for 'the night by signal as follows: between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral
which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers
" Evacuation of British troops to continue at of the " H ", " I " and " J " Classes from
maximum speed during the night. If adequate " Dynamo ". All destroyers of the " G " Class
supply of personnel vessels cannot be main- were already out of action.
tained to Dunkirk East Pier, destroyers will
be sent there as well. All other craft except There remained available for " Dynamo "
hospital carriers to embark from beach which 15 destroyers: —
is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk ESK WORCESTER
to one mile East of La Panne. Whole length EXPRESS WINDSOR
is divided into three equal parts referred to ANTHONY VERITY
as La Panne, Bray, Malo, from East to West KEITH VANQUISHER
with a mile gap between each part. La Panne CODRINGTON SABRE
and Bray have troop concentration points each MALCOLM SCIMITAR
end and in middle, Malo at each end. These WHITEHALL SHIKARI
points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass WINCHELSEA
the message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T Excluding any casualties, this number of
as .opportunity offers." destroyers might be expected to maintain a
flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast
32. About 1900 a telephone message was and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
received from La Panne Military Headquarters 37. The day closed with a formidable list of
through the War Office and the Admiralty to ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in
the effect that Dunkirk Harbour was blocked the number of destroyers available and with
by damaged ships, and that all evacuation failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation
must therefore be effected from the beaches. hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in Eng-
About the same time a corrupt message from land during the 24 hours, but the effect of the
S.N.G. Dunkirk;, was receded stating con- day's occurrences was to be more marked next
tinuous bombing, one destroyer sinking, one day when instead of some 50,000 to 60,000
transport with troops on board damaged and which had been calculated as the probable
impossible at present to embark- more troops, achievement only 48,000 odd were in fac^ trans-
though pier undamaged. ported.
Thursday, ^oth May.
33. In this confused situation the Vice
Admiral, Dover, at 2128, ordered all ships 38. As an example of the difficulty of any
approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk
but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to and the beaches during the night, at 0300/30
collect troops from the shore, and 'the drifters the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that
and minesweepers which were about to be he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time,
despatched to Dunkirk Harbour were also all available destroyers, namely 10, in the
diverted to the beaches. Dover Command, were either on, or on passage
to or from, the coast, and the remaining five
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the were at Dover discharging troops, embarking
use of Dunkirk Harbour would be denied to ammunition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail
us except possibly to the small ships. within the next four hours.
Signals addressed to S.N.O. Dunkirk, Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that
HEBE, VERITY, who were known to be in the beaches were well organised, the troops in
the vicinity of Dunkirk, „ were sent requiring good heart, and there had been no bombing
information as to the accessibility of the since dark, but that there was still a great
Eastern pier for personnel vessels. Admiral shortage of small craft, urgently required. This
Nord was also informed that Dover was out last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral,
of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked Dover.
whether it was still possible for transports to 39. Commander-in-Chief, • Nore, was re-
enter the harbour and berth alongside. quested to send as much towing hawser as
No reply to these enquiries could be expected possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as possible,
until after midnight. for supplying the skopts, to haul boats off
34. In the event only four trawlers and a the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to
yacht entered Dunkirk during the hours of compensate for the shortage of boats, which
darkness, and as enemy activity was much re- would continue for at least another 24 hours.
duced only two bombing attacks being made, 40. At 0500 the seven modern destroyers
it subsequently transpired that a good oppor- remaining with Vice Admiral, Dover—
tunity had been missed. It is probable that ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVAN-
ships to lift some 8,000 to 10,000 troops could HOE, HARVESTER, HAVANT and
have been made available for Dunkirk during JAVELIN—sailed to Sheerness in accordance
the night at little loss to embarkation from the with Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE
beaches. and MACKAY sailed for repairs.
Movements recorded for SHIKARI during the evacuation period, as plotted on the Operation Dynamo map.
| Departed | Route | Arrived | Troops | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| — | Dunkirk | — | — |
Stationary
HMS report explicitly names this location; a complete dated movement is unavailable
|
TNA ADM 116 4649, page 68 |
| — | La Panne | — | — |
Stationary
HMS report explicitly names this location; a complete dated movement is unavailable
|
TNA ADM 116 4649, page 68 |
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