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EXPRESS (H.61) 20th Destroyer Flotilla Capt. (D) J.G.Bickford,
D.S.C.
28th May
0600
Express Portsmouth. and dr. Esk arrived at
1415
2000
Arrived Dover.
Sailed for Dover, Esk in company.
2040
Express and Esk, in company with
Malcolm and Scimitar proceeded via
Zuydcoote Channel.
29th May
0130
Arrived off Bray beach. Lowered boats
1250
and embarked troops. One whaler lost.
Air attack on Dunkirk.
1400
Transferred S.N.O. Dunkirk from Malo
to La Panne. With about 500 troops
on board, proceeded into Dunkirk.
1530
About to secure alongside dr. Grenade.
Dive bomb attack; near misses ahead
and astern; proceeded out of harbour
[Grenade was sunk by bombs at 1800].
dr. Jaguar sighted, stopped and
disabled, drifting on to a wreck.
Express towed her clear and took off
some of her troops and about 45 wounded
1800
Towed Jaguar astern.
1830
Tow parted. Transferred the remainder
of Jaguar's troops and proceeded,
leaving a trawler to escort Jaguar.
2400
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 650 troops.
30th May
0920
Proceeded by route Y.
1245
Alongside Dunkirk pier. Embarked about
800 troops.
1315
Proceeded.
1650
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 1,067
troops. (1).
1800
Proceeded by route Y.
2130
Off La Panne beach. Embarked troops.
31st May
0250
Embarked R.A. Dover and his staff from
dr. Worcester.
0700
R.A. Dover transferred to the dr. Keith.
Embarked more troops, including
Major General Thorne. Proceeded with
about 600 troops.
1115
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 467
1st June
Made good small defects.
2nd June
2200
Left Dover.
3rd June
0200
Entered Dunkirk. The pier was devoid
of troops. Ordered by R.A. Dover to
return in company with dr. Codrington
0500
Dover.
2200
Left Dover. Ran into fog.
4th June
0230
Arrived Dunkirk. An unknown ship
[i.e. blockship Gourko] seen to sink,
presumably to mined. the pier. Embarked beach 600
French Secured troops and the British
party.
(1) D.R.
303

Details

COSSAMER (continued)
31st liay
2207
(contd.)
nchored 4 cables 1 mile west of La
Phipps, from the shore. Panne,
Handy R.N. searched the S/L. M.
2300ca
to his Billie, hails. but received shore no answer in
Thousands the of troops now massing abreast
ship. The dr. Ivanhoe
troops. a M/B to assist in the embarkation lent of
1st June
0200ca
[Lt. Cdr. J.W. McClelland, R.N. (1)
swam off from the shore with a
The troops, forced out of La Panne,
situation report for R.A. Dover(2)]
were marching west. Among those
Gossamer embarked was a major, the
2nd in Command of the 2nd Bn.
Coldstream Guards.
Continued to embark troops and some
wounded. [Ivanhoe was also embarking
troops]. A Paddle minesweeper
[probably the Oriole] beached herself
to facilitate embarkation.
0500
Machine-gunned by low-flying aircraft.
0600
Captain (D) (Codrington) ordered
Gossamer to Dunkirk to "fill up".
Proceeded there with 675 troops
on board. En route went alongside
M/S Skipjack who required medical
in
supplies.
Berthed on Dunkirk east arm. Embarked
170 French troops.
0800
Proceeded. Air attack. dr. Ivanhoe
hit by bomb.
0906
Near 5 W buoy, attacked by 5 Ju.87
dive bombers; they were followed
by 9 or 10 more. The dr. Havant
received a bomb hit. Five misses
near Cossamer; the troops between
decks could not tell whether the
ship was hit or not. P.O. Stwd.
Hockney calmed them; he eat on the
ladder to the mess deck and sang
to the French soldiers.
0915ca
1345
Arrived Sheerness. Disembarked 845
R.A.F. fighters passed the ship.
troops
2nd June
A was made this night to Dunkirk and
p.m.
harbour trip and 470 troops embarked
landed at home. (3)
3rd June
A trip was made this troops night to
p.m.
final harbour and 490 were
Dunkirk embarked and landed at home. (4)
(1) S.N.O., A, B and C. beaches, La Panne, from 1600/31 to
(2)
(3) (4) D.R. does says not mention Dover"disembarkation.
Car.00/18 "V.A.
D.R. gives 400.

Details

KINGFISHER
Corvette (Portsmouth
Command)
Lt.Cdr. G.A.M.V.
Harrison, R.N.
30th May
1317
Left Dover for Dunkirk by route X,
with "large motor boat 'Sambra''
[1.e. the ex-Belgian canal boat
Sambre] in tow.
-
Magnetic mine exploded by minesweeper,
1 mile ahead of the Kingfisher,
in swept channel 3 miles east of
Dover.
1930
Arrived Malo beach. Embarked troops,
using the M/B, the whaler and the
Sambre.
2300
Proceeded with 180 British troops on
board.
31st May
0510
Arrived Ramsgate. Disembarked 180
troops. (1)
(Had to wait for the tide before
going alongside Ramsgate pier).
0533
Proceeded back to Dunkirk.
0800
Arrived Malo beach. Embarked troops
with M/B and whaler. No other boats
available.
1100
It was nearing low water, and a small
ship [1.e. the Sk. Sursum-Corda]
which had been beached, and which the
boats had been using as a jetty was
of no further use. [The C.O. and
ship's company of the Sursum-Corda,
which was unable to refloat, trans-
ferred to the kingfisher(2
The Kingfisher proceeded with 80
troops, 1 serious casualty and
20 French.
1440
Arrived Margate pier. Disembarked 91
troops. (3)
1518
Proceeded back to Dunkirk.
1835
Arrived Malo beach. Few troops, but a
number of tugs and small boats waiting
off. Proceeded to Dunkirk harbour,
but had to wait for a berth.
1900
High level bombing raid. Kingfisher
considers she shot down one
aircraft 4).
2010
Secured alongside east pier. Ambarked
troops.
2105
Proceeded with 180 British troops.
let June
0005
Anchored off Margate.
0133
Alongside Margate pier. Disembarked
157 troops. (5)
0700
Proceeded to Dunkirk.
1000
Alongside Dunkirk east pier. Embarked
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry].
and the Battn. H.Q. of the 2nd Battn.
troops [among them Major Joslen
Almost continuous high level bombing
in progress.
(1) D.R. report gives 268 for the
"Kingfisher, gives 268. and Ramsgate Laroc, and the lighter F.W.23".
(2) Not mentioned by Kingfisher.
(3) Margate report.
(4) Not mentioned in D.R.
(5) Margate report.

Details

I
LOCUST - Continued
31st May
0340
The tow parted. Locust again
1200
secured alongside.
Both ships entered Dover harbour.
1300
Disembarked 620 troops.
1840
2240
The Locust sailed for Dunkirk.
Entered Dunkirk harbour, which was
devoid of ships or troops.
Proceeded to Malo beach. Dive bombed
while leaving harbour. One bomber
2400
on fire and losing height.
Anchored off Malo.
1st June
0045
Embarked troops in ship's whalers.
No power boats.
0400
150 troops embarked during air attacks.
0415
Proceeded and entered Dunkirk harbour.
Embarked 500 troops from the east
pier during air attacks.
0610
Proceeded.
1015
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 620
troops. (1)
2000
Ordered to proceed to vicinity of Bray
to lend support and covering fire.
2nd June
0100ca
Off Bray. Poor visibility. Fired at
by shore guns. Returned the fire
with apparently good results.
0300
Ceased fire and proceeded.
0350
The tug Fossa, aground, signalled for
assistance. Water too shallow for
the Locust to close the Fossa.
Transferred 51 troops from a M.L.C.
[i.e. M.L.C.21] and S ent her to
rescue the crew and troops in the
Fossa.
0450
Locust proceeded.
0545
Overtook a small armed yacht in charge
of a major R.A., carrying 28 troops.
Transferred the troops to Locust.
The major stated that Locust's
covering fire had been effective.
1005
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 93 troops( 1)
1820
Proceeded to Dunkirk.
2223
Secured alongside east pier.
Embarked British troops.
2302
Sailed with 650 British and 70 French
troops.
3rd June
0408
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 800
troops. (1)
1845
Proceeded to Dunkirk.
2300
Anchored off Dunkirk mole and embarked
troops from motor boats.
4th June
0015
Sent Lieut. Holdsworth with a demolition
party to blow up the wreck of the G/B
0205
The Mosquito. demolition party returned, havi ng
blown off the fore and after parts
of the wreck.
0235
Proceeded with 200 French troops.
0635
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 196 troops(1)
16th
Total 2329
(1) D.R.
180

Details

2
M.A/3.B.6 - Continued.
31st May
2400ca
(contd.
On return to the Keith, General Leese
was embarked and instructions were
given to collect Lord Gort from the
M/S Hebe and return to England.
1st June
0030ca
By the time the Hebe was reached, Lord
Gort had gone over to the Keith;
M.A/S.B.6 therefore returned to the
Keith.
0304
Sailed for Dover with Lord Gort and
General Leese.
0547
Arrived Dover. Disembarked Lord Gort
and General Leese.
2nd June
1201
Left Dover to search for the dfr.
Girl Gladys (reported broken down
7 miles east of Dunkirk) and also
for about 30 soldiers in an open
boat (reported by aircraft to be 3
miles off Dunkirk).
1330
3 miles off Dunkirk, collected 5
Spaniards and about 6 troops from 2
open boats. Then went alongside a
Thames barge( 1) (containing about 220
troops including 2 colonels, an
artillery major and some wounded),
which was endeavouring to sail to
England. An attempt to repair the
barges diesel engine was unsuccessful.
M.A/S.B.6's First Lieutenant,
S/Lt. T.E.B. de Hammel, R.N.V.R. was
transferred to the barge with
instructions to sail the barge to
M.A/S.B.6 Dover. continued unsuccessfully to
search for the Girl Gladys.
Two miles to the east, M.A/S.B.6
When east of La Panne, abandoned the
picked up 18 troops from an open boat.
search for the Girl Gladys, and set
to intercept the barge.
When course out of sight of land, M.A/S.B.6 was 20
1720ca
attacked by about 7 dive bombers.
50 ahead and M.A/S.B.6 passed
to yards of the ship. One exploded
30 bombs were dropped within 10 to
through just the splash. Two casualties.
Arrived Dover. Sent out a tug to troops search
Proceeded to Dover.
1922
for the barge. Disembarked 24
The and barge 5 was found by the tug(2) about.
Spaniards.
[2100
10 miles fron Dover.]
Total 26(3)
Authority - R.O.II, pp. 391, 468.
(1) Not identified.
(2) Not identified
(3) Not mentioned in D.R.
253

Details

NIGER - Continued
1st June
0500
(contd.)
Aircraft made machine gun attacks
0610
on ships and beaches.
With about 330 troops, Niger proceeded,
the M/S Sutton in company. A
message was received from Major-
General Montgomery, through the M/S
Salamander, that troops had been
ordered to proceed to Dunkirk.
Arrived Ramsgate. Disembarked 310
troops. (1)
1800
2215
Sailed for Dunkirk, Sutton in company.
The Niger anchored off Malo. The
Sutton proceeded into Dunkirk.
2225
No boats being worked from the heach.
The Niger lowered her M/B, one
whaler and a boat which had been
borrowed from the Sk. Vrede in Dover.
2230
The boats were sent in, in charge of
Lieut. Hichens. 5 cables to the
westward he found some French troops
and embarked 50 of them.
2nd June
0000
British troops were then embarked some
6 cables further eastward.
0255
Proceeded with about 300 troops.
-
Arrived Ramsgate. Disembarked 300
troops. (1)
2055
Sailed for Dunkirk.
3rd June
0015
Secured alongside Dunkirk east pier.
Embarked about 700 French troops.
0120
Slipped, whilst turning, an unknown
French craft crossed Niger's bows
and was rammed. The Skipper came
on board. A few minutes later the
French craft came back and rammed
the Niger.
-
Arrived Folkestone. Disembarked 700
French troops. (2)
The Skipper of the French craft was
turned over to the military
authorities.
2100
Sailed for Dunkirk.
2233
Dense fog; speed 8 knots.
4th June
0030
Visibility unimproved. Passage
abandoned.
0135
Anchored 3 miles from N. Goodwin
Light.
Total 1,515
Authority - R.O.I., p.313.
(1) D.R.
(2) D.R. states 430.
344

Details

M/B (Owner F. Bridge)
PEGGY IV
S.H. Hughes, Skipper.
Reported by Mr. Bridge.
company
with
the
soth [Date?] gay
The Peggy IV went to Dunkirk.
0200ca
31st usy
She did 2 trips from the shore to a
1000ca
motor boat - carrying about 150
troops.
On the 2nd trip, the boat was over-
crowded and shipped a lot of water.
After the troops had been transferred
to the motor boat, the Peggy IV
was abandoned. She did not return
to England.
and broke the steering.
Closed the dr. Woroester, about 1]
miles off-shore. Ordered by the
Worcester to abandon ship. An effort
Authority - TC.9144/40.
TO.9436/40.
to sink the ship during on of attack
was unsuccessfal,
1st June
0500ca
The Pellag II was found adrift by a
party of Royal Engineers, which under
Major M.C.A. Henniker R.E., had left
Dunkirk in rowing boats. They boarded
the yacht and managed to got the
engines running.
0545
The G/B Locust closed the Pellag IL.
transferred her troops and took her
in tow. Shortly afterwards the tow
parted. Two further attempts were
made to tow, but as enemy aircraft
were in the vicinity, it was events-
ally decided to abandon her. An
attempt to sink the Peling II by
gunfire was not DDS she
may have
Nill
Perried 33 troops.
Additionalty R.O.II, 241.
H.O. Case 6256.
Not 1dentiried. (England) B.K.
Vilson Ltd
not -

Details

Portland Harbour
PELLAG II
Defence Yacht.
Lieut. F.W.R. Martino,
1400
R.N.V.R.
30th May
Left trawlers Dover in company with
"F.Y" and "B.K. "(1) the
0200ca
31st May
"Made the the coast" - "unable to find
beach.
1000ca
Arrived Dunkirk.
Left to within trawlers off shore and
attack. 3 cables of the beach. proceeded Air
-
Using On dinghy, embarked about 33
tow stuck on the mud. In trying trawler
"F.Y" leaving the beach, found the troops.
and broke the steering.
her off, burnt out engine clutches to
Closed the dr. Worcester, about 1 1/2
miles off-shore. Ordered by the
Worcester to abandon ship. An effort
to sink the ship during an air attack
was unsuccessful.
1st June
0500ca
The Pellag II was found adrift by a
party of Royal Engineers, which under
Major M.C.A. Henniker R.E., had left
Dunkirk in rowing boats. They boarded
the yacht and managed to get the
engines running.
0545
The G/B Locust closed the Pellag II,
transferred her troops and took her
in tow. Shortly afterwards the tow
parted. Two further attempts were
made to tow, but as enemy aircraft
were in the vicinity, it was eventu-
ally decided to abandon her. An
attempt to sink the Pellag II by
gunfire was not successful, and she
may have fallen into enemy hands. (2)
Nil
Ferried 33 troops.
Authority - R.O.II, p. 241.
R.O. Case 6256.
(1) (2) Not 1dentified. (Ingland) B.K. =Berwick-on- Tweed
not F.Y. shown = as Fowey sunk in D.R.

Details

VIVIANA
Trawler (11th A/S Group
Harwich).
G.L.Olesen, Skipper(1)
28th May
0430
1230
Operation Dynamo.
Shown in D.R. as having taken part in
There is no information available about
the movements of this vessel.
Dunkirk, as from
German hunda",
"The B.B.O. news 00
guidence, nor could I get any
information from other ships
1400
50 I eventually sailed with Reiger
at 1400, with the idea or complying
with sailing orders if the situation
permitted".
2300
The Vrede grounded at the inshore end
of Suydcoote Paso, Wolked for the
flood tide.
29th May
0030
A large merchant ship was seen "to
encounter two ships leaving She
blew 3 short blests and went astern.
Shortly after there VIS a doll
explosion, Without any flame, and wha
the water and spray had subsided,
nothing could be seen of the ship".
0400
The Vrede refloated. Drifted to a safe
enchorage where the air bottles could
be recharged. A destroyer approached
and hailed an order to proceed
inshore and embark troops.
0500
Anchored close inshore. The ship's
dinghies co-operated with Margate
pleasure boats (manned by their
Margate crewe) and ferried troops
to ships. In this menner come 150
troops were embarked, "including a
Belgian major with whom we had some
difficulty owing to the impossibility
of drying his corsets".
0930
The motor launches were now withdrawn,
and one of the dinghies had been
wrecked. Proceeded to Dunkirk.
1030
Secured alongside Dunkirk east pier.
Embarked troops to capacity - about
500.
Proceeded for Ramsgate, but making
the entrance too late for the tide,
proceeded to Dover.
30th May
0400ca
Entered Dover. Disembarked 473 troops
1100
Sailed with a tow of motor boats. Two
miles out, the engines broke down.
Bent the tow back and enchored.
31st May
Towed to Dover by the Sk. Rika.
Total 473.
Authority R.O.II, 147,
(1) According to the June 1940, Navy List.
Not identified.
288
9

Details

Skoot
VREDE
Lt. Cdr. R.T. Lampard, R.N.
Lt. J.K. Hamilton, R.N., 1st Lieut.
0430
28th May
Sailed from Sheerness.
1230
Anchored in the Downs. The Sk.
Reiger reported that she had been
turned back off the N. Goodwin L.V.
by one of 4 skoots returning from
Dunkirk, as that part "was in
German hands".
"The B.B.C. news bulletin gave no
guidance, nor could I get any
information from other ships present,
so I eventually sailed with Reiger
1400
at 1400, with the idea of complying
with sailing orders if the situation
permitted".
2300
The Vrede grounded at the inshore end
of Zuydcoote Pass. Waited for the
flood tide.
29th May
0030
A large merchant ship( i) was seen "to
encounter two ships leaving. She
blew 3 short blasts and went astern.
Shortly after there was a dull
explosion, without any flame, and when
the water and spray had subsided,
nothing could be seen of the ship".
0400
The Vrede refloated. Drifted to a safe
anchorage where the air bottles could
be recharged. A destroyer approached
and hailed an order to proceed
inshore and embark troops.
0500
Anchored close inshore. The ship's
dinghies co-operated with Margate
pleasure boats (manned by their
Margate crews) and ferried troops
to ships. In this manner some 150
troops were embarked, "including a
Belgian major with whom we had some
difficulty owing to the impossibility
of drying his corsets".
0930
The motor launches were now withdrawn,
and one of the dinghies had been
wrecked. Proceeded to Dunkirk.
1030
Secured alongside Dunkirk east pier.
Embarked troops to capacity - about
Proceeded 500. for Ramsgate, but making
the entrance too late for the tide,
proceeded to Dover.
30th May
0400ca
Entered Dover. Disembarked 473 troops
1100
Sailed with a tow of motor boats. Two
miles out, the engines broke down.
Sent the tow back and anchored.
31st May
Towed to Dover by the Sk. Rika.
-
Total 473.
Authority - R.O.II, pp.123, 147.
(1, Not identified.
289

Details

Details

Details

Details

Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                 ^5901
was provided at these river crossings. The             certain French technical troops continued to
weather was fine throughout the whole period of        work in the sector under the command of the
the move.                                              French Commander of the Defensive Sector
   The first stage was one hundred and                 of Lille, Colonel (now General de Brigade)
twenty miles. An average of five hundred               Bertschi.
vehicles moved daily over each stage of the route,        While defences continued to develop on the
maintaining a distance of one hundred yards            lines of the original plan, based on the close
between each vehicle as a precaution against           defence of the frontier, it was also necessary to
air attack. A halt of one day for maintenance          organise the position.
purposes was made after the first day's move.             The priority of work envisaged the eventual
   In the initial stages of the move, the Provost      construction of three positions in the forward
service were responsible for the regulation of         area, and a Corps reserve position was sited
traffic, but on entering the French Zone des           across the base of the Lille salient formed by
Armees, columns came under the direction of            the frontier. Further in rear, a second position
the French road control (Regulatrice Routiere)         had been sited, following the line of the Haute
organisation, which gave valuable help in              Deule, Sense"e and La Basse"e canals.
marking detours and in directing traffic through          The whole scheme involved the immediate
towns. A French-speaking British officer was           construction of field defences and the duplica-
established in Amiens to ensure liaison between        tion of the anti-tank obstacle in the forward
my headquarters and the French authorities.            zone.
   Breakdowns and accidents were few, which               It was consequently necessary to construct
reflects great credit on the drivers, who were         at an early stage reinforced concrete " pill-
unaccustomed to long hours at the wheel and            boxes " to afford protection to those weapons
to driving on the right-hand side of the road.         which formed the backbone of the fire defence
Among the many important lessons which were            throughout the whole depth of the position.
learnt during the largest road movement ever           In order to save time standard designs were
undertaken with motor transport by any British         prepared to accommodate both British and
Army were the need for early reconnaissance of         French weapons.
staging areas, for control at the dispersal points,
and for allowance for unforeseen delays.                  13. Work on these " pill-boxes " was begun by
                                                       the Royal Engineers, assisted by other arms.
   11. The move forward continued without              Early in November a specially constituted force
incident or interruption, and on the agreed date,      composed of twelve field companies of the
3rd October, ist Corps took over from the              Royal Engineers drawn from Territorial Army.
French the sector Maulde-Gruson on the Belgian         Divisions at home, and known as " X Force,"
frontier. This sector lay between that of the          arrived in the British Expeditionary Force
 ist French Army and of the i6th French Corps,         area. This force had its own transport and
with 2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd)           special plant for the construction of reinforced
on the right and ist Division (Major-General           concrete " pill-boxes" by mass production
Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander) on the left.               methods. It was accompanied by companies of
   General Headquarters opened in and around           the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps.
Habarcq (8 miles west of Arras) on 2nd                    A special Excavator Company, equipped with
October.                                               mechanical excavators of various types, arrived
   On I2th October, 3rd Division of 2nd Corps          at the same time as X Force. It has been
 (Major-General B. L. Montgomery) moved                employed in digging anti-tank ditches, burying
into the line between Bouvines and Lannoy,             signal cables, constructing breastworks, and
relieving the left brigade of ist Corps and the        other tasks.
right regiment of the French 5ist Division.               A creation of such a defensive system
4th Division of the same Corps (Major-General          demanded a quantity and variety of engineer
D. G. Johnson, V.C.) was located in General            stores far exceeding pre-war anticipations.
Headquarters reserve.                                     Bad weather in October and November, and
   The initial occupation of the line by the British    a succession of frosts later, considerably delayed
Expeditionary Force was thus completed arid            the work, but by the end of the period covered
the organisation of the position was undertaken         by this despatch the position had been developed
at once.                                               in considerable depth. A large number of con-
                                                       crete " pill-boxes" had been completed and
The Organisation of the British Positions.             many others were under construction ; new wire
   12. In allotting sectors the geographical fea-      had been erected and existing wire strengthened,
tures of the pronounced salient occupied by the        buildings had been reinforced, and many miles
British Expeditionary Force had to be con-             of anti-tank ditch dug.
sidered. East of the Tournai-Orchies road
the country is flat, much wooded and inter-             The Saar Detachment.
sected by small streams. Further to the north             14. In November, 1939, I arranged with
lies open and undulating agricultural land which        General Georges that a British infantry brigade
lends itself to artillery observation and to the       should take its place in the line on the Saar
movement of armoured fighting vehicles.                front, under the command of a French Division.
Further north again the sector is for the most            The brigade took over the sector from the
part on the fringe of a highly industrial and          French 42nd Division on the 4th December
mining district.                                       without enemy interference and during the
   When ist Corps arrived in the sector assigned       period under review conditions were quiet.
to the British Expeditionary Force in the first           Since that date infantry brigades of the
week in October, an almost continuous anti-            British Expeditionary Force have successively
tank obstacle already existed in the form of a         completed short tours of duty in this sector, and
ditch covered by concrete blockhouses built to         junior leaders have thus had valuable training
mount anti-tank guns and machine guns. In              in their day to day duties when in contact with
accordance with plans prepared in peace time           the enemy.


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                      5909
  the Belgian Government were wedded. The                     Both these plans were worked out in the
  French authorities were never in a position to          greatest detail, and orders and instructions
  obtain reliable and accurate details of the plans       kept up to date as new divisions arrived and
  of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of         the role of divisions changed.
  their country in the event of an invasion by                The Escaut plan was by far the simpler of
  Germany; staff conversations were out of the            the two; it involved sending armoured car
  question, yet plans had to be framed in such a          reconnaissances to the river Dendre to be
  way that they could be put into instant opera-          relieved by divisional cavalry, who were later,
  tion in the event of Belgium asking for military        if necessary, to fight a delaying action back-
  assistance from France or Great Britain when             wards to the Escaut; demolitions were provided
  invasion had taken place or was imminent.                for on both rivers; for the remainder of the
     Such slender contact as existed between the           force, however, the advance appeared likely
  British and Belgian Military authorities was             to be an easy one, well within a day's march
  maintained through the Military Attach^ at His           on foot. The Dyle plan, on the other hand,
  Majesty's Embassy at Brussels and General               involved an advance of some sixty miles, carried
  Van Overstraeten, Military Adviser to the King           out at a time when every moment was of value
  of the Belgians.                                         over roads not previously reconnoitred, perhaps
                                                           crowded with refugees moving counter to the
       15. Three alternative plans were decided on         allied armies. Much, too, depended on the
    by the French High Command during October             resistance which the Belgians, and perhaps the
    and November 1939, and I had agreed with              Dutch, were able to offer to the enemy, who at
    General Georges on the part to be played in           such a time would certainly be making every
    each of them by the B.E.F.                            effort to pierce the line of the Meuse and the
                                                          Albert Canal.
       The first alternative was to occupy the frontier
    defences, pushing forward mobile troops to the             16. The plans made in advance for the advance
    line of the Escaut, while the French 7th Army           to the Dyle position actually worked to schedule
    on my left were to delay the enemy on the line          in almost all respects. It may therefore be
    of the Messines Ridge and the Yser Canal.               convenient to summarise them here.
   This plan was soon discarded in favour of the
    second alternative, which was to secure and               The Allied forces were to advance to the line
   hold the line of the Escaut itself, from the point       Namur—Wavre—Louvain—Antwerp, of which
   at which it crosses the frontier at Maulde               the B.E.F. Sector extended from Wavre to
   northwards to the neighbourhood of Ghent                 Louvain, both inclusive. On our right was to
   where it was intended to effect a junction with         be the French ist Army (General d'Armee
   Belgian forces.                                          Blanchard) under whose command was the
                                                            French Cavalry Corps, and whose task it was
       Later, however, as information became avail-        to delay the arrival of the enemy on the Dyle
   able regarding the defences of the Belgian Army,        position and to block with its main forces the
* and its readiness for war, the French High               Gembloux gap, with the Cavalry Corps pushed
   Command formed the opinion that it would be             forward to the line Eghezee (8 miles north of
   safe to count on the Belgian defence holding            Namur)—Tirlemont. On our left the French
   out for some days oh the Eastern frontier, and          7th Army (General d'Armee Giraud) was to
   the Albert Canal. It was also ascertained that          advance to the general area Antwerp-Ghent,
   the Belgians were preparing a de Cointet anti-          with the object of supporting Belgian resistance
   tank obstacle running southwards from Wavre             north of Louvain. The plans of this Army
  towards Namur.                                          included a possible advance into Holland as
      The line of the river Dyle was from the military     far as the line Turnhout-Breda, and this was
  point of view a better one than that of the Escaut.      actually carried out. It had been ascertained
  It was shorter, it afforded greater depth and its        that a portion of the Belgian Army, if forced to
  northern portion was inundated. In addition,            withdraw from their frontier defences would
  it represented smaller enemy occupation of              come into line on the left of the B.E.F. on the
  Belgian territory.                                      general line from Louvain exclusive, thence
                                                          northward to the fortified area of Antwerp,
      On the other hand, it involved the B.E.F.           known as the National Redoubt.
  in a forward move of some sixty miles against
  time, while it also necessitated the holding by             The British front was to be occupied initially
  the French on our right of the Gembloux gap             with ist Corps (Lieutenant-General M. G. H.
  which contains no natural anti-tank obstacle.           Barker, who had recently taken over command
  This plan was twice discussed by General Georges        from General Sir John Dill), on a two-division
  with me on I3th October at my headquarters              front, on the right, and 2nd Corps (Lieutenant-
 at Le Cauroy and again on i6th November at               General A. F. Brooke, now Sir Alan Brooke)
 Folembray the headquarters of the French First           on the left, on a front initially of one division.
 Group of Armies; on this occasion there were                 The advance was to be made in four periods.
 also present General Billotte, who commanded             In the first, i2th Royal Lancers (Armoured
 the Army Group, and Generals Blanchard and               Cars) were to move to a general line some eight
 Corap, Commanding the French ist and gth                 miles beyond the Dyle in observation of the
 Armies. At this conference it was agreed that            approaches from the east; they were to be
 the frontage of the B.E.F. on the Dyle position          relieved by cavalry regiments of ist and 2nd
 was to be from Wavre to Louvain, both places             Corps when they arrived.
 inclusive, and a formal instruction to this effect           Behind them were to come, from right to left,
 was issued to me by General Georges on the               2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) and
 following day. From this time onward, Com-               ist Division (Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G.
 manders and Staffs were studying simultaneously          Alexander) of ist Corps, and 3rd Division
 two alternative plans for advances to the Dyle           (Maj01-General B. L. Montgomery) of 2nd
 or the Escaut; these became known as plans               Corps. The whole of the move of these three
 DandE.                                                   divisions was to be made by motor transport,


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

and troop carrying companies were allotted to                OPERATIONS—FIRST PHASE
Corps in such a way as to complete the move                          (ioth-i6th MAY)
in 90 hours.                                          Belgium calls on Allies for assistance: advance
    At the same time 44th Division was to march         to the River Dyle by British and French
to an area north-west of Audenarde, with a              Armies: the Belgian anti-tank obstacle is
view to organising the defence of the Escaut in        found to be sited further forward than had
this area.                                              been expected. The enemy penetrates the front
    Movement in the first phase was to be con-          of French gth Army and crosses the Meuse.
tinuous by day and night. The French had                Action by Royal Air Force. General Billotte
decided to restrict the movements of their main         appointed to co-ordinate action of British,
bodies to the hours of darkness, but I judged           French and Belgians. The Dutch lay down
the time factor to be of paramount importance                arms.
and accepted the risk that our air support might      loth May—The enemy invades Holland and
be insufficient to prevent enemy interference              Belgium.
with the move. Events proved that the risk
was justifiable.                                         18. The tension which had been increasing
                                                      during April had lessened somewhat during the
    In the second period, to be completed by the      early days of May; during this period I had
end of the sixth day, 48th Division (Major-           received reports of enemy activity from several
General A. F. A. N. Thorne) and 4th Division          sources of varying degrees of reliability, culmin-
 (Major-General D. G. Johnson, V.C.) were to          ating in a report from the Hague, but it was not
move by march route and motor transport into          until the night of 9th-ioth May that information
 ist and 2nd Corps reserve respectively, while        was received of exceptional activity on the
 ist Army Tank Brigade consisting of two              frontiers of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.
battalions was to move chiefly by rail into           The weather was set fair, and with the exception
 ist Corps area.                                      of some heavy thunderstorms which had no
    The third period was to be completed by the       effect on operations, remained so to the end of
tenth day, and included the movement of soth          the month. At about 4.30 a.m. on loth May,
Division to 2nd Corps reserve, while 4th Division     enemy aircraft appeared over my headquarters
moved into the line on the right of 3rd Division.     at Arras and bombs were dropped on aero-
    The fourth period included the forward            dromes hi the neighbourhood and on a number
movement of 3rd Corps. 5th Division (Major-           of towns including Doullens and Abbeville.
General H. E. Franklyn) was to move to                At 5.30 a.m., a message was received from my
positions in G.H.Q. reserve, along the river          mission with General Georges ordering " Alertes
Dendre, north and south of Grammont; 42nd             i, 2 and 3," namely, instant readiness to move
and 44th Divisions to the line of the river           into Belgium. I at once sought, and obtained,
Escaut around Tournai and to the south of             the release of the 5th Division from War Office
Audenarde respectively, to organise bridgehead        reserve, and henceforward it was employed
positions pending orders for a further advance.       under my orders. At about 6.15 a.m. I received
                                                      instructions to put Plan D into effect.
    Detailed instructions had also been issued           It was ascertained that I2th Royal Lancers
 for the preparation of defences on the three         could be ready to cross the frontier at i p.m.,
 river lines of the Dyle, Dendre and Escaut, as       and accordingly I laid down this time as zero
 also for the necessary demolitions and inunda-       hour.
 tions. Special arrangements had been made
 for the control of traffic, including refugees for      At i p.m. I opened my command post at
 whom routes had been allotted; definite bodies       Wahagnies, midway between Douai and Lille.
 of troops were detailed for these tasks.                ist and 2nd Corps experienced some delay
                                                      in moving, due largely to the fact that owing
                                                      to the short notice received, preliminary moves
The Belgian Anti-Tank obstacle                        of transport had not taken place; apart from
    17. Late in April and early in May, I received    this, moves on this day proceeded according to
reports regarding the siting of the Belgian           plan; very little interference was experienced
anti-tank obstacle; it appeared that, without         either from enemy aircrait or refugees and
informing either the French High Command or            i2th Lancers reached the Dyle unopposed at
myself, they had sited the obstacle much               10.30 p.m.
further to the east than had originally been             The French armies on our light and left were
planned, namely on the line Namur-Perwez-             reported as advancing on time.
Louvain: furthermore the obstacle was not                The Belgian population received the allied
as yet by any means completed. The matter             armies in the most cordial manner, and in
was discussed with General Georges.                   particular the leading troops were loudly cheered.
    On the British front, the river Dyle was so
far superior as an anti-tank obstacle to any           Operations between nth and i$th May.
artificial work further east which the Belgians           19. On nth May, enemy air action increased
might be preparing that I had no hesitation in         somewhat, but did not interfere with the forward
urging adherence to the existing plan for the          movement of troops, and during the afternoon
defence of the Dyle position.                          and evening, the leading infantry brigades
    On the front of the French ist Army the            reached the Dyle, refugee traffic being
 situation was different: the absence of a natural     handled successfully. The original arrange-
 obstacle forced them to rely on.that prepared         ments, of which the Belgian Government were
 by the Belgians. To clear the matter up,              aware, included the use by the B.E.F. of roads
information was demanded as to the true site          'passing through the northern and southern
 of the artificial obstacle. These negotiations        outskirts of Brussels, but not through the
 were begun through our Military Attache1 on           centre of the city. A series of requests was
 8th May, but they were not destined to be             however received to discontinue the use of these
 concluded.                                             roads on the ground that Brussels had been


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

declared an open town and that British troop         Air Force to impede the enemy advance; but
movements would prejudice its safety, but no         such opportunities were of a fleeting character,
adequate alternative routes to the Dyle were         since the enemy established strong anti-aircraft
available and I was therefore compelled to           defences soon after his arrival, particularly in
adhere to the original plan of using the outskirts   towns at which roads converged. Tactical
of the city.                                         reconnaissance became virtually impossible
    The 3rd Division, on arrival, reported that a    without fighter support, and the demands made
 Belgian division was holding the bridgehead at      on the fighter group of the Air Component were
 Louvain, although I had assumed that this           extremely heavy. They had been met with
 should be a British responsibility. 2nd Corps       unfailing skill and courage, and with marked
 therefore took up a narrow front on their right     success, but by now the group was reduced to
 with a strong reserve in rear of Louvain.           some 50 aircraft, and although I had asked for
    5th Division, which was training in the area     four fresh squadrons from home, only one had
 south-west of Amiens, was ordered to proceed        arrived. In three days' operations, the British
 by march route so as to shorten the move by         Air Force in France had firm reports of the
 motor transport in a later phase, and later         destruction of 101 enemy aircraft, mostly
 occupied a position on the Senne.                   fighters, against a loss of 78 of our own.
    The news from the Belgian army, of which            That afternoon a conference was held at the
 King Leopold had assumed command on the             Chateau Casteau, near Mons which was attended
 outbreak of war, was not good. Belgian cyclist      by the King of the Belgians, General Van
 troops from east of the Meuse were falling back     Overstraeten, M. Daladier, Generals Georges
 on Huy. At Maastricht, it was reported that         and Billotte, and my Chief of the General Staff
 they had been forestalled by enemy action from      (Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall), as my
 the rear and had been unable to demolish            representative in my absence. The primary
 important bridges over the : Albert Canal and       object of the conference was to achieve
 the Meuse across which the enemy had                some measure of co-ordination in the
 begun to move. Air bombing was requested            Belgian theatre of war. General Billotte's
 and was extremely effective, but could not          command included the French ist and
 altogether deny the passage of the water            7th Armies, between which lay the Belgian
 obstacles to the enemy. On my right the             Army under the independent command
 French Cavalry Corps had reached their              of their King, and the B.fe.F. which, though
 position on the line Huy—Hannut—Tirlemont           under the command of General Georges, was not
 and reconnoitred the Belgian anti-tank obstacle.    under that of General Billotte. Whatever the
 They reported that, as I had supposed, there        nature of the operations, a common doctrine
 was no effective obstacle on the Gembloux line      was clearly necessary and when General Georges
 and that the obstacle on the Perwez line was        enquired if the King of the Belgians and I
 not only unfinished but badly sited on a forward    would be prepared to accept co-ordination by
 slope. I thereupon conveyed to General Georges      General Billotte as bis representative, General
 a confirmation of my objections to pushing          Pownall said he was sure that I would agree.
 forward so as to make use of the obstacle in its    The King of the Belgians likewise agreed.
 unfinished state, notwithstanding the Belgians'      . 21. On I3th May I moved my Command Post
 anxiety that I should do so. Later that day I       forward to Renaix; no event of major impor-
 was informed that he had decided that the main      tance occurred during the day, but some small
line of resistance was to be on the Gembloux         infantry attacks developed on the British sector.
 line as planned, but that the French were to        These were easily held. Movements of the main
 push out advanced troops to the line of the         bodies of the French ist and 7th Annies con-
obstacle. He expressed the hope that the B.E.F.      tinued in accordance with their plans, and units
would conform, and ist and 2nd Corps                 of the latter were by now north of Antwerp on
 accordingly      reconnoitred   the     anti-tank   the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming
obstacles reported to exist round the forest of      increasingly evident that they would be unable
Meerdael with a view to pushing forward              to prevent the enemy occupation of Walcheren
detachments with anti-tank guns. They found          and Zuid Beveland which was developing from
them complete only in places.                        the north-east.
    20. The first phase of Plan D was successfully      During the day and the following night the
completed by i2th May, and the French ist            Belgian forces were in process of withdrawing
Army on my right then accelerated the pro-           their northern forces to the general line Louvain-
gramme governing their forward movement by           Antwerp, and the Staff of the Belgian G.Q.G.
moving by day as well as by night. The enemy         expressed concern lest the simultaneous with-
progress across the Albert Canal had up to now       drawal of their Cavalry Corps and that of the
been relatively small, due to a successful           French, north-west and south-west from their
counter-attack by the French Cavalry Corps at        junction point at Tirlemont, would create a gap.
St. Trend, but larger concentrations were now        There appeared to me to be little danger, but
reported north of the Albert Canal. Disquieting      nevertheless I ordered I2th Lancers to watch
news was received from the Ardennes, where a         the situation, assisted if need be by divisional
German thrust was reported as developing on          cavalry regiments.
the front of the French gth Army, with at least         22. On I4th May I went to Brussels, where at
two armoured divisions.                              12 noon I met the Commanders of ist and 2nd
    On this date I requested the War Office to       Corps at the British Embassy. The Commander
expedite the despatch of the ist Armoured            of 2nd Corps reported that the Belgian ist
Division to the greatest extent possible. I also     Corps was now reforming in 4th Division
asked that they should be shipped to the nearest'    area. I also discussed the organisation of the
available port and loaded tactically with a view     second position on the Senne canal and of a
to operations as soon as possible after landing.     Corps reserve line east of Brussels. 5th and 48th
    The day was one of great activity in the air,    Divisions were ordered to reconnoitre the Senne
and afforded great opportunities for the Royal       position on I5th May. That afternoon at 3 p.m.


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                      59*3
vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve units           23rd Division moved to their positions during
of ist and 2nd Corps on protection and traffic         I7th May; they were provided with about forty
control of main routes in Belgium. Railheads,          field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from
which had been advanced on i3th May to the             ordnance reserves.
general line Enghien—Ninove, were now moved                The enemy break-through was now offering
back across the frontier.                              an imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to the
   During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawal         communications over the Somme at Amiens
to the Senne positions began, and was success-         and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet
fully completed by the afternoon of the lyth.          this, every available man and weapon was
Some enemy tanks and motor cycle units had             collected and orders were issued to the
been reported on the right flank of ist Corps,         commander, Lines of Communication Area, for
west of the forest of Soignies, and as a precaution,   the remainder of I2th and 46th Divisions to be
part of the ist Army Tank Brigade, which had           despatched to the forward zone. One brigade
started to withdraw for entrainment, was                (36th Infantry Brigade of I2th Division)
turned about to meet the thrust.                       arrived during the day, and the leading
    By the time the tanks reached their entraining     battalion was despatched with four field guns
stations railway difficulties prevented the trucks     to cover the north-western exits from PeYonne,
being moved, and the remainder of the move             while engineer parties, organised by the
was carried out by road; this gave rise to             Commander, G.H.Q. Troops, were sent to
inevitable mechanical trouble later on. *              prepare for demolition the crossings over the
                                                        Canal du Nord between the river Somme and
    By.the early morning of iyth May the situation     the right of 23rd Division at Ruyalcourt.
in the south had become grave, and enemy                The remainder of 36th Infantry Brigade were
 armoured and mobile forces were reported to            moved forward to Albert, and the other two
 have crossed the Oise. At St. Quentin the              brigades of I2th Division ordered to the Abbe-
 situation was obscure, and though by this time         ville area. These latter, however, arrived too
 General Giraud, lately commanding the French           late to come under my effective command, and
 7th Army, had been ordered to take command             their operations on the Somme were carried
 of the forces in that region, it was clear from        out under the Commander Lines of Communi-
 reports and from visits of liaison officers that       cation Area.
 he had not yet succeeded in establishing effective        Elsewhere in the area between Corps rear
 control. A gap of at least twenty miles existed        boundaries and the Somme, local defence
 south of the Forest of Mormal in which there           schemes were put into operation under the
 appeared to be no organised resistance. Later          orders of the Commanders of G.H.Q. Troops
 in the day information was received from the           and of " X " Lines of Communication Sub-Area*.
 French that ten enemy armoured divisions were          Few if any of these units or their commanders
 engaged in the battle.                                 had any experience in fighting, but their
    During the whole of this period, communi-           determination was beyond all praise.
 cation with my liaison officer at General Georges'         A mobile bath unit, for example, took part
 Headquarters was maintained so as to keep in           in the defence of St. Pol, while, both now and
 touch with events as they developed. However,          later, the General Construction Companies of
 I received no infoimation thiough this channel         the Royal Engineers, and many units of the
 of any steps it was proposed to take to close the      Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to
 gap, which might have affected my own                  place their localities in a state of defence and
 command.                                               manned them until they were overwhelmed,
    It was not till later, on the night of iqth/zoth    relieved or ordered to withdraw. Wherever
 May, that General Billotte informed me of the          possible, transport was collected or requisitioned
 action which was being taken to this end by            to enable parachute detachments to be dealt
 the French Armies in the south.                        with.
                                                           These many small delaying actions all contri-
 The defence of rearward areas.                         buted to gain the time required for the.with-
   25. Rear G.H.Q. at Arras had intensified the         drawal of the main forces.
precautions already being taken against sabotage           The defence of the town of Arras itself was
and air landing units, but on the early morning         entrusted to the O.C. ist Bn. Welsh Guards
of I7th May a telegram was received from                who had under his command some units of the
General Georges ordering 23rd Division to move          Royal Engineers, an Overseas Defence battalion
at once to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord,         (gth West Yorks), and various details including
on a frontage of fifteen miles from Ruyalcourt          an improvised tank squadron.
(10 miles north of Pdronne) to Arleux (6 miles
south of Douai).                                            Orders were issued for all administrative troops
                                                        not required for defence to move forthwith north
   The division, which, like the I2th and 46th          of a line Orchies-Lens-Fre'vent.
Divisions had joined the B.E.F. for work in
rearward areas, consisted of eight battalions only         At the same time to guard against a more
with divisional engineers, but no artillery, and        immediate threat to my right flank a force was
signals and administrative units in no more than        organised consisting of I27th Infantry Brigade
skeleton form. Its armament and transport was           of 42nd Division, ist Army Tank Brigade,
on a much reduced scale and training was far            a Field Artillery Regiment and the Hopkinson
from complete.                                          Missionf, all under the command of Major-
                                                        General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, my Director
   Nevertheless, troops of these three divisions
fought and marched continuously for a fortnight,         * This Sub-Area had been formed to deal with units
and proved, were proof needed, that they were          which, remained in the old G.H.Q. and Corps areas
composed of soldiers who, despite their                when the B.E.F. moved into Belgium.
inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold           f The Hopkinson Mission, under the Command oi
                                                       Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Hopkinson, had been formed to
their own with a better found and more numerous        secure certain information for the R.A.F. and for
enemy.                                                 G.H.Q. immediately on entry into Belgium.


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59^4          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
of Military Intelligence. The force was known         occupied by the French. It was not however
as Macforce and its task was to cover the            practicable to move the 23rd Division again
crossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3          and G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet,
miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It began         by next morning no French troops had appeared
to assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7th      either on the right of 23rd Division or to relieve
May.                                                 them. Later in the day, however, an order was
                                                     received by which the commander of the French
Withdrawal to the Escaut begun.                      2nd Region was ordered to fill the gap. En-
   26. It had now to be decided whether or not       quiries by a liaison officer at Amiens, where the
the withdrawal from the Senne to the Dendre          staff of the French 7th Army was in process of
was to begin on the night of 17/18 May, and the      taking over from the 2nd Region, established
situation in the South was such that I felt that     that no troops would be likely to arrive for
to spend a day on the Senne would be to risk         twenty-four hours at least.
being outflanked on the right and so imperil            By the afternoon, however, some enemy had
the force under my command to no good purpose.       reached Pe"ronne, and were in contact with
General Billotte had issued orders for withdrawal    36th Infantry Brigade.
to the Dendre that night, but I had also seen           On this day Major-General R. L. Petre,
an order from General Georges which envisaged        commanding the I2th Division, was given
remaining on the Senne for a further twenty-         command of the troops engaged on this flank,
four hours. I therefore sent a liaison officer to    namely 23rd Division, 36th Infantry Brigade
General Billotte to represent my views. In           and the garrison of Arras.*
the result, General Billotte's orders stood             In the meantime an order issued by the French
confirmed.                                           First Group of Armies had laid down the
   By 4 p.m. on i7th May therefore ist and 2nd       boundary between the French ist Army and
Corps were on the Senne with 5th, ist and 4th        the B.E.F. through Maulde, Orchies, Raches
Divisions in line right to left. 48th Division       and He*nin Li6tard. Arras was thus excluded
was covering the right flank from Enghien to         from the zone of the B.E.F., but its defence
Lembecq. 5oth Division was on the Dendre, to         was necessarily continued by British troops.
which line 2nd and 3rd Divisions were now            All troops not required for defence left on the
withdrawing,, whilst 3 Corps was in position on      igth, including rear G.H.Q. which moved in two
the Escaut with 42nd Division (less one infantry     echelons to Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accord-
brigade) and 44th Division.                          ance with plans prepared on i7th May when
                                                     the threat to Arras became serious.
   27. On i8th May I held a conference at the
headquarters of ist Corps at which were settled         On the evening of i8th May I moved back
the details of the withdrawal to the Escaut.         my command post from Renaix to its previous
This line was to be held with six divisions, right   location at Wahagnies.
to left ist Corps (48th and 42nd Divisions, less     Moves of the Royal Air Force.
one infantry brigade, with 2nd Division in              29. On this day also, the bulk of the Advanced
reserve), 2nd Corps (ist and 3rd Divisions with      Air Striking Force moved from the neighbour-
50th Division in reserve), 3rd Corps (4th and 44th   hood of Rheims to Central France and the Air
Divisions), on a front from the bridge over the      Component moved one of their main operational
Escaut at Binaries to Audenarde, both inclu-         aerodromes from Poix to Abbeville. On the
sive. 5th Division was in G.H.Q. reserve.            evening of I9th May enemy action obliged them
   There was little pressure during the day on       to evacuate this aerodrome also. The Ah*
the British front or on that of the Belgians to      Officer Commanding the Air Component then
the North. Owing to the late arrival of orders       moved his headquarters to England, but an
the Belgian Army had started their withdrawal        advanced landing ground was maintained at
after the B.E.F.; they had therefore asked for       Merville until 22nd May.
and received protection to their right flank at         From the 2 ist May onwards all arrangements
Brusseghem up to 7 a.m. and Assche up to             for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made
8 a.m. on i8th May. On withdrawal they               by the War Office in conjunction with the Air
effected a junction with the B.E.F. on the           Ministry at home. The air liaison work was
Dendre at Alost.                                     carried out in England at Hawkinge and the
   Southward from their junction with the            targets selected in accordance with telephone
B.E.F. the French line ran through Mons and          or telegraphic requests from the B.E.F. so long
Maubeuge, and enemy tanks were attacking             as communications remained open, supple-
the front of the French Corps on my immediate        mented by information received from the Royal
right. Enemy air action had by now intensified       Air Force, and other sources.
on the front of the B.E.F. and continuous fighter
support was necessary during the hours of day-       Alternative plans considered.
light, both to enable our reconnaissances to take       30. On the night of 18/19 May, the ist, 2nd
place and to hold off enemy bombers. The             and 3rd Corps completed then: withdrawal to
enemy did not confine bis attention to troops        the line of the Escaut without interference, and
but attacked the long columns of refugees            prepared to defend the line of the river. Soon
which continued to move westwards.                   after arrival, however, the level of the water
                                                     became dangerously low, at places less than
The position on the Canal du Nord.                   three feet deep. It looked, therefore, as if, apart
   28. The position on the Canal du Nord had         from the unusually dry weather, some of the
caused some anxiety, partly on account of con-       sluices in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes had
tradictory orders received. Shortly after orders     been closed in order to produce inundations
had been issued on I7th May for the occupation       in the low lying ground in that area, even if
of the position by 23rd Division, an order was       at the expense of the water on the front of the
received from G.Q.G. allotting to the B.E.F.         B.E.F.
the sector Pe'ronne-Ruyalcourt instead of the          * Major-General Petre's command was known as
sector Ruyalcourt-Arleux which was now to be                            Petreforce.


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17. OCTOBER/1941                                  "59*5
    The enemy had, during the previous day,           the abandonment of large quantities of equip-
 penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica-     ment. It would obviously be unwelcome to
 tion with the bases was severed' at that'point.      the Belgians who would be faced with the
'Communications by road and rail over the             alternatives of withdrawing with us and aban-
 Sorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igth      doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter of
 May and the town was being placed in a state         their own, or seeking an armistice.
 of defence with such resources as were available,       So far as I am aware, the French High
 mainly, units of I2th Division. However, there       Command had never suggested such a move-
 was little doubt that enemy armoured forces          ment up to that date and it is doubtful whether
 in'that area, which at the time I estimated at       even had they, decided on immediate withdrawal
 five armoured divisions, would shortly break         as soon as the French gth Army front on the
 through to the coast.                                Meuse had been penetrated, there would ever
    The force could then no longer be supplied        have been sufficient time for the troops in the
 through the ports south of the Somme, and the        north to conform.
 great bulk of the reserves, which were in the           Thirdly there was the possibility of with-
 rearward areas, would • shortly cease to be          drawal north-westwards or northwards towards
 available to the force for the purposes of main-     the Channel ports, making use of the successive
tenance or replacement. Several days' reserve         river and canal lines, and of holding a defensive
 had, however, for some time past been maintained     perimeter there, at any rate sufficiently long to
 north of the Somme.                                  enable the force to be withdrawn, preferably in
    The prospect of securing the reinforcement of     concert with the French and Belgians. I
 the Armoured Division had likewise become            realised that this course was in theory a last
 remote/ I had been advised that two Armoured         alternative, as it would involve the departure
 Brigades, of this division would disembark at        of the B.E.F. from the theatre of war at a time
 Havre on i6th May, and were to concentrate at        when the French might need all the support
 Bolbec, and I had therefore sent instructions by     which Britain could give them. It involved
 the hand of a staff officer to the Commander         the virtual certainty that even if the excellent
 (Major-General R. Evans). He was to move the         port facilities at Dunkirk continued to be
leading brigade on disembarkation with all            available, it would be necessary to abandon
 speed to secure, the crossings of the Somme west     all the heavier guns and much of the vehicles
 of Amiens, from Picquigny to Pont Remy, both         and equipment. Nevertheless, I felt that in
inclusive, with a view to .the concentration of the   the circumstances there might be no other
 remaining -brigade behind the Somme and the          course open to me. It was therefore only
 move of his division to join the main body of        prudent to consider what the adoption of such
 the B.E.F. However, in the meantime, orders          a plan might entail. On this day therefore at
 had been issued locally to concentrate the           about 1.30 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff
 Division south of the Seine, and the plan to         telephoned to the Director of Military Opera-
 cross the Somme and join the B.E.F. proved           tions and Plans at the War Office and discussed
 impossible to execute. The division therefore        this situation with him.
 remained in the Lines of Communication Area
 and never came under my effective command.           The Position of the French ist Army and the
    About midnight on the iSth/igth May,                   British right flank reinforced.
 General Billotte came to see me, and gave me            31. The French ist Army had by igth May
 an account of the situation as he saw it. He         completed its withdrawal and was in touch
 also told me of the measures which were being        with the right of ist Corps. On the night of
 taken to restore the situation on the front of       i9/20th May they took up positions on the line
 the French Qth Army, though clearly he had           of the Escaut as far south as Bouchain ; but at
 little hope that they would be effective. Reports    that point, instead of continuing to hold that
 from the liaison officers with French formations     river towards Cambrai (which according to my
.were likewise not encouraging ; in particular        information was not held in strength by the
 I was unable to verify that the French had           enemy) they had drawn back westwards along
 enough reserves at their disposal south of the       the river Sensee. Thus in the quadrilateral
 gap to enable them to stage counter-attacks          Maulde—Va-lenciennes—Arleux—Douai, some
 sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation       nineteen miles by ten, there was assembled the
 that the gap would be closed.                        bulk of the French ist Army, amounting to
    Thus, in my opinion, there was an imminent        three Corps of two divisions and two divisions
 danger of the forces in the north-eastern area,      in reserve—a total of eight divisions. The
 that is to say the French forces next to the sea,    Commander of the French 3rd Corps, General
 the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of         de la Laurencie, remained that night in close
 the French ist Army on our right, being              touch with General Mason-MacFarlane, at the
 irretrievably cut off from the main French           headquarters of Macforce.
 forces in the south.                                    Further west the French Cavalry Corps was
    There were three alternative courses of action    assembling at Oppy, north-east of Arras.
 open to the northern forces under General               None of these forces were being seriously
 Billotte : first, in the event of the gap being      pressed at this stage, but since the enemy had
 closed by successful counter-attacks made            already penetrated, so deeply further south, I
 simultaneously from north and south it would         felt it necessary, without more delay, to
 in theory be possible to maintain the line of the    strengthen the dispositions for the defence of
 Escaut, or at any rate the frontier defences,        what had become the bastion of Arras. It was
 and thence southwards on one or other of the         also necessary to secure crossings westwards
 canal lines.                                         from the right of Macforce, along the line
     Secondly, there was the possibility of a with-   Carvin—La Basse"e.
 drawal to the-line of the Somme as far as its           I therefore ordered soth Division, then in
 mouth. This plan had the attraction that we          G.H.Q. reserve, to send one Infantry Brigade
 should be falling back on our lines of communi-      (25th) to take up positions on the Canal on the
 cation and if it was successful would not entail     line La Bassee—Carvin under the command of


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-SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON~GAZETTE; 17 OCTOBER, 1941

south-west was' entirely impossible until the              •covered" had -already far e'xceeded the estimated
situation had been retrieved on the front of the            life of the tracks which were now beginning to
French ist Army.                                            break through wear.
                                                               It v/as clear therefore that the attack of
   33. 5th Division was therefore "ordered .to              Frankforce would not maintain its momentum
join 5oth Division in the Vimy area, and its               .unless it was reinforced and supported by the
commander, Major-General Franklyn, was placed               French on its left. • During 22nd May, therefore,
in command of all the British troops operating              .General Franklyn held his ground, and pro-
in and around Arras. Frankforce, as it was to               longed his right flank westwards, while the
be known, consisted of 5th and 5oth .Divisions             -French Cavalry Corps took up a position at
(each of two brigades only), ist Army Tank                 •Mont St. Eloi. All day long pressure increased
Brigade* (previously with Macforce) together                round his right flank, and an observation post
with Petref orce. and the force under O.C. i2th             of i2th Lancers on Mont St. Eloi could see at
Lancers. Petreforce was by this time very tired             one moment as many as 48 enemy tanks.
and widely dispersed.                                      • Next day (23rd May) the enemy advanced
   My immediate instructions to General Franklyri           steadily north-eastwards from the high ground
were to. occupy the bridgeheads on the Scarpe,              of the Lorette ridge, and by evening they were
east of Arras and thus to relieve the remains of            reconnoitring the' southern outskirts of Bethune
23rd Division. He would then be suitably                    and the road from Lens to Carvin. It was clear
disposed to advance south and south-east of                 that Frankforce was becoming dangerously
Arras on the following day in conjunction with              hemmed in. Two roads were still available for
the French.                '                                their extrication and at about 7 p.m. I decided
   It will be convenient to conclude the story              that .there was no alternative but to withdraw
of Frankforce here.                                         Frankforce. This withdrawal had necessarily to
                                                            be in an easterly direction. 5th and 5oth
   During the evening of 20th May, General                 Divisions had been engaged with the enemy all
Franklyn completed his reconnaissances for an               day and had inflicted very severe losses ; they
attack on the following day to secure the line              were now ordered to withdraw to the area
of the rivers Scarpe and Cojeul: his intention              around Seclin, where they would be well placed
was to exploit success by moving on 22nd May                to take part in any further counter-attack to
to the Sensee and thence towards Bapaume                    the southward which might be staged. Petre-
and Cambrai. In these plans he had the full                 force was withdrawn to an area north of Seclin.
co-operation of General Prioux, Commander of
the French Cavalry Corps, but the light                        Thus concluded the defence of Arras, which
mechanised divisions were much" reduced in                  had been carried out by a small garrison, hastily
strength and probably had no more than one                  assembled but well commanded, and determined
quarter of their tanks fit for action.                      to fight. It had imposed a valuable delay on a
                                                            greatly superior enemy force against which it
   However, one of these divisions was ordered              had blocked a vital road centre.
to advance on each side of Frankfbrce, while
12th Lancers watched the right flank on the                2ist May — The Organisation of the Canal line.
Arras—St. Pol road. The hope was not realised,
however, that the French 5th Corps would also                 34. The time had now come to organise, as
attack southwards from Douai with two divisions            soon as possible, the further defence of the
in co-operation with Frankforce on the 2ist.               south-western flank of the force.
A conference had been arranged at 6 p.m. on                " The enemy advance beyond Arras had hitherto
the 20th at General Franklyn's headquarters but            been carried out almost entirely by armoured
no representative from that Corps attended.                forces, supported by motorised infantry which
Finally, at 12.30 p.m. on the 2ist I received a            was doubtless increasing in numbers every day.
letter from General Blanchard to say that the              The situation regarding the enemy's normal
Corps Commander, General Altmeyer, thought'he              infantry divisions was still uncertain. It was
could move on the 22nd or the following night.             therefore of first importance to reinforce the
   Tim;, however, was vital. General Franklyn              organisation of the line of the canals from the
adhered to his plans, and at 2 p.m. attacked with          Escaut to La Bassee, and to continue it to
ist Army Tank Brigade, I5ist Infantr,y Brigade             St. Omer and the sea. These canals offered the
of 5oth Division and I3th Infantry Brigade of              only anti-tank obstacle on this flank. They were,
5th Division all under General Martel. The                 however, crossed by numerous bridges, many of
French ist Light Mechanised Division co-                   which had already been prepared for demolition
operated, though its movements did not develop             by our own engineers under my Engineer-in-
so widely to the flanks as General Franklyn                Chief (Major-General R. P. Pakenham- Walsh),
had hoped.                                                 the Commander of Macforce, and the French
                                                           Commanders' of the fortified sectors of Lille and
   The opposition was stronger than had been               Flanders (Qene'raux de Brigade Bertschi and
expected. Objectives for the day were reached,             Barthdiemy).
and in the evening there were heavy dive-                     It had been proved that even weak garrisons
bombing attacks by the enemy. Enemy tanks                  holding important road centres, such as Arras
had been put to flight: over 400 prisoners had             and Doullens, were of much value in imposing
been captured: a number of enemy had been                  delay, for the initial advances of the enemy
killed and many transport vehicles destroyed.              always followed the main roads. It was therefore
   The tank brigade had, however, begun to                 decided to continue the policy of organising
suffer severely from mechanical trouble ; the              such " stops," not only along the canals but at
tanks had been on the road continuously since              all possible centres whether north or south of
 they detrained -at Brussels, and the mileage              the canal line.
                                                              Macforce, which had been formed on
   * At this time their strength was reduced to approxi-   May, had been augmented on i8th and igth by
mately 65 Mark I and 18 Mark II tanks. By the end of
the withdrawal from Arras there remained 26 Mark I          I38th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) which
and 2 luark II tanks.                                      went into line on the canal between Raches and


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' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
  Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry        near Maulde on the front of ist Division a
  Brigade of the same division joined the force.         number of enemy had crossed the river dis-
  On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the        guised as refugees, but had been detected and
  42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse          driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com-
  to St. Amand was handed over to the French.            manders all felt that they could hot how hold
     Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major-           on for more than .twenty-four hours. We
  General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, to           discussed a withdrawal to our old frontier
  take command of the sector of the canals between       defences, where advantage could be taken of the
  Aire and Carvin. General Curtis' force was             existing blockhouses and trenches, and of tha
  known as Polforce, and was to.consist of four          anti-tank ditch. This move would have little
  battalions - of 46th Division, 25th Infantry           effect on the French on our right since it would
  Brigade of 5.oth Division (in line between La          pivot on the junction point, where the Escaut
  Bassee and Carvin) and one field battery,              crossed the frontier, but "would seriously affect
  together with a number of engineer and other          the Belgians, who now held the line of the
  units o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been moving         Escaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of the
  northwards and .were collected on the Canal.          canal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen.
  It had originally been intended that part of this         I had also to consider the pressing need to
  force should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion,        stiffen the defence of the canal line westwards to
  but the railway trains in which were the remain-      Gravelines and to form a new reserve to replace
 ing three battalions of 46th Division failed to        the divisions now committed to counter-attacks
 reach that town in time and remained south of          southward from Arras.
 the Somme. The defence of these localities south          A provisional decision was therefore reached
 of the Canal had therefore to be abandoned.            to withdraw to the frontier defences on the night
     Further to the north-west the defence of the       of 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I had
 canal line was being organised by Brigadier            reached agreement with the French and the
 C. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi-          Belgians.
 cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported that             General Weygand had visited General Billotte
 the enemy had already reached the left bank of         during the day and the latter indicated that an
 the river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer.          attack was being planned for the following day
 23rd Division had been ordered to move to this         (22nd May), northwards from the direction of
 area and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards)     Roye, with the object of closing the gap. At
 arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher therefore       8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where in
 held the right bank of the river from St. Omer to      the Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the King
 Gravelines with this battalion and five batteries      of the Belgians and General Billotte. There
 of heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction   were also present General Van Overstraeten,
 with certain French troops of the Secteur             General Champon, the head of the French
 Fortifie des Flandres.                                Mission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownall
    The front of Macforce was covered by the           and others.
 French, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were still            I explained the situation which was developing
 in their quadrilateral on the line of the Escaut      on the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi-
 and the Sensee. Here, however, information            culty of maintaining positions there since the
 was frequently lacking and could only be obtained     water in the river was so low as no longer to
 by reconnaissance.                                    form an obstacle. It was then agreed that on
    Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupied     the night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should be
in the sense that the whole of the length of 85        abandoned and that the Allied armies should
miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse        occupy a line from Maulde northwards to
 (West of St. Amand) was divided into sectors          Halluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai and
 for each of which a British commander was             Ghent.
responsible. The total strength of the troops              I discussed the possibility of reserves. It
 on the Canal line did not on this day exceed          appeared that the available divisions of the
 10,000 men, and the number of anti-tank               French ist Army were all too tired to take part
 weapons was barely adequate to cover all the          in offensive operations in the immediate future.
 crossing places: certainly there could be no          It was therefore agreed that the French should
 question of being able to keep an effective           take over a further sector of the defensive
 watch against small parties of infantry crossing      positions northwards from Maulde, so that the
the canal between the bridges. The barges,             2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn into
however, had almost all been moved away or             reserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,,
 at any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy,      French took up these positions on 22nd May.
.and bridges were fast being prepared for              On the north, 44th Division on withdrawal
demolition.                                            from the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- -
                                                       Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgian
2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front.           formation would relieve them on the night of
   35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three        23rd/24th May.
Corps Commanders. I told them what had                     When these moves were complete the Allied
happened on the southern flank and how, in             line would run slightly west of north to Halluin,
-order to take the initiative and encourage the        and then almost at right angles, north-eastwards
French ist Army to do likewise, I had gone to          along the Lys. It was evident that sooner or
the length of committing practically the whole         later the Belgian army would have to swing
of my reserve.                                         back to a line in rear, pivoting on their right
   From the Corps Commanders I learned that            of Halluin. Accordingly at the end of the
the line was thinly held and that attacks had          conference General Billotte asked the King of
taken place at several points. At Petegem on           the Belgians whether if he were forced to with-
the front of 44th Division the enemy had secured       draw he would fall back on to the line of the
a bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of            Yser. His Majesty agreed, though evidently
3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French       with some regret, that no alternative line existed.


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SUPPLEMENT to THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                        5919
   On return from the meeting, orders were issued           evacuation was carrie.d out under the orders of
 to implement these decisions, and that evening            the War Office, being completed on the night
 I moved my command post to the Chateau de                 of 23/24th May.
 Premesques, midway between Armenti&res and
 Lille.                                                     The Administrative Situation.
                                                               37. During the whole of this period I had
 The final severance of the L. of C. and the invest-        been kept in the closest touch with the adminis-
     ment of Boulogne.                                      trative situation by the Quarter-Master-General
      36. During the gist May the enemy penetra-            (Lieutenant-General W. G. Lindsell). Up to
   tion into the rearward areas increased and com-          i6th May the administrative arrangements
  munication across the Somme was finally                  which formed part of Plan D had worked well,
   severed. Since the I7th May the Commander                and although enemy air action steadily intensified
   of the Lines of Communication Area (Major-               during the period, there was no serious inter-
   General P. de Fonblanque) had been taking               ference with the maintenance of the force.
   energetic steps for its defence, in so far as it was        On i7th May, however, the Quarter-Master-
  possible with the few and scattered troops                General decided, in view of the situation south
   available.                                              of Arras, to discontinue the use of the railway
      These consisted, apart from Armoured                 from the regulating station at Abancourt via
  Division and 5ist Division now returning                 Amiens and Arras, and to switch all traffic via
  from the Saar, of those portions of I2th and             Eu and Abbeville to Bethune. He also ordered
  46th Divisions (some nine battalions in all)             forward every available trainload of ammunition
   which could not be despatched forward, three            to the Hazebrouck area.
  unbrigaded infantry battalions and the contents              On igth May, directly after the C.G.S. had
  of the reinforcement depdts, together with               spoken to the War Office as to the possibility
  troops of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps           of enforced withdrawal, the Q.M.G. telephoned
   and of the administrative services.                     to the War Office to discuss the opening of new
      On '23rd May, however, the War Office                bases. On the same day, one of his staff officers
  appointed Lieutenant-General- Sir Henry                 .left for London to arrange an emergency ship-
  Karslake to command the defences on the Lines            ment programme for supplies and stores to
  of Communication and I was not concerned in              the ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. It
  the operations which ensued. Nevertheless,               was to prove none too soon, for the railway
  I did not immediately abandon hope of the                at Abbeville was cut on 2ist May. A new plan
  Armoured Division breaking through, and I                had to be put into operation at once for the
  urged the War Office to use their best endeavours.       maintenance of the fcfrce north of the Somme,
  to this end and to prevent its being used piece-         estimated at 250,000 men and requiring a daily
  meal in local operations at the request of the           lift of ammunition, supplies and petrol, of some
  French Command.                                          2,000 tons.
      At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2ist May, I received          The petrol situation, fortunately, gave no cause
  information that an enemy column of all arms             for concern since, although the dumps forward
  was approaching Boulogne. The rear element               of the Somme had been destroyed on evacuation,
  of G.H.Q., consisting largely of the Adjutant-           together with a large civil storage plant near
  General's Branch and of headquarters of                  Douai, there still remained a large army bulk
  Services, which had been sent to that town on            filling station near Lille.
  I7th and i8th May, had been moved to Wimereux               The supply situation was however, bad, and
  on 20th May as a result of enemy bombing.                on 2ist May, Corps had only three days
  * All possible steps had been taken to put               R.A.S.C. supplies in the forward area. Matters
  Boulogne in a state of defence with the troops           might, at any time, have become serious had it
  available, consisting of labour units and the            not been for the success of the measures taken
  personnel of rest camps. On igth May, an                 between 23rd and 26th May, to organise the
  endeavour was made to bring up troops from               supplies in Lille belonging to the Expeditionary
  beyond the Somme, to hold the line of the Canche;        Force Institutes and to civilian firms.
  but the time for this was past and the troops               The decision to maintain the force through
  could not get beyond Abbeville. The hospitals            the northern ports was finally taken on 2ist
  in the Etaples area were now evacuated, and on           May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area
  2ist May a party of Engineers, supervised by             established at Dunkirk, together with a section
  my Director of Works, Brigadier W. Cave-                 of Q.M.G's staff, in close touch with the British
  Browne, demolished most of the bridges over              and French Naval authorities.
  the Canche.                                                 Rail communication in the area was by now
      As soon as the news of this new threat was           precarious, and plans were worked out on the
  received, the War Office was asked for bomber            basis of establishing dumps, one in each Corps
. support, which was at once forthcoming. Enemy            area, which could be wholly maintained by
  tanks were located and bombed at Hesdin and             road. The position was, by this time, greatly
  Fruges, but no good targets were obtained on            complicated by the numbers of improvised
  the coast road. The War Office was also asked           forces which the quickly changing situation
  to send a detachment of Royal Marines for the           had made necessary: most of these, like the
  defence of Boulogne but had already done                three divisions for pioneer duties, had no proper
  so. Early on the 22nd May, 2oth Guards                  administrative echelons. Some were within
 Brigade (Brigadier W. A. F.' L. Fox-Pitt) of             reach of Corps, but others were not and these
 two battalions with an anti-tank battery                 had to be dependent on fortuitous sources of
.landed, thus establishing the defence of the             supply, or else live for a time on the country.
 town and enabling those troops who were not                  The situation had" grown even worse by
  required for the defence to be evacuated in             22nd May, when the ports at both Boulogne
 good order.                                              and Calais were out of action, and the greater
     By the evening of 22nd May, the enemy                part of the Railhead Mechanical Transport
 armoured forces were within nine miles of Calais.        Companies had been captured. Furthermore
                                           if-g   final   a^ reconnaissance of Ostend had shewn that the


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                   5921
as it turned out, fatally injured in a motor             These moves left only four divisions on the
accident returning from the conference which he      frontier defences and made'it possible to with-
and I had attended at Ypres on the night of          draw the headquarters and Corps troops of
2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him in         3rd Corps for employment on the Canal line
command of the French First Group of Armies,         where they were badly needed. This was done
and presumably succeeded to the function of          at 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with
co-ordination although this was never officially     42nd and ist Divisions and 2nd Corps with
confirmed.                                           3rd and 4th Divisions.
                                                         2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions tcame under
out                                                  3rd Corps and that night made a' march west-
of three different nations, and that I personally    wards. I had decided to employ 2nd and 44th
could not undertake any measure of co-ordina-        Divisions on the Canal line facing west, but their
tion in the forthcoming operations as I was          move required a farther twenty-four hours to
already actively engaged on my Eastern and           complete.
Southern fronts and also threatened on my                Meanwhile the canal defences required stiffen-
Lines of Communication.                              ing as much as possible. And accordingly,
   Nevertheless, I saw General Blanchard and         Polforce temporarily assumed control of the
proposed to him that to implement our part of        whole front between St. Omer and Raches,
the Weygand plan, we should stage an attack          and two regiments of 2nd Armoured Recon-
southwards with two British divisions, one           naissance Brigade were placed under its com-
French division and the French Cavalry Corps.        mand. Polforce also undertook the responsi-
So far as we were concerned the attack could         bility for demolitions as far north as Watten
not take place till the 26th at the earliest owing   including no less than 43 bridges.
to the.reliefs which were in progress, and the           The sector eastward from Raches was now
need to assemble 5th and 5oth Divisions. I           handed over to the French, the British
also asked General Blanchard to enquire from         demolition parties being left on the bridges at
G.Q.G. how such an operation could be syn-           the disposal of French 3rd Corps.
chronised with the attack from the line of the           Macforce, now comprising four field batteries,
Somme which was said to be in process of             half an anti-tank battery and one battalion,
preparation. These negotiations, as will be seen,    withdrew from the line Carvin-Raches on
were later continued by Sir Ronald Adam on           23rd May and was moved to a rendezvous in
my behalf. I emphasised, both to the Secretary       the. eastern end of the Forest of Nieppe where
of State and'to General Blanchard, that the          it was joined by Headquarters and one. regiment
principal effort must come from the south, and       of ist Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade.
that the operation of the northern forces could      i39th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) continued
be nothing more than a sortie.                       to hold the sector from Carvin to Raches until
   I never received any information from any         26th May.
source as to the exact location of our own or           .The situation on the canal line deteriorated
enemy forces on the far side of the gap; nor         during 23rd May and the enemy established
did I receive any details or timings of any          bridgeheads at Aire, at St. Omer (which seems
proposed attack from that direction.                 to have changed1hands twice during the day)
                                                     and near Watten. His tanks were reported as
 zyrd May—Further development of the Canal line.     harbouring in the forest of Clairmarais, and
    39. On 23rd May the organisation- was con-       during the day his armoured fighting vehicles
 tinued of " stops " behind the Canal line.          came within three miles of Hazebrouck. ,By
    At Hazebrouck, where the organisation of         the evening, however, these movements nad
 defences had been begun on 2 ist May by the         been checked and steps taken to keep. the
 staff of the Major-General R.A. at G.H.Q.           enemy out of the Forest of Nieppe.
 the garrison was now about 300 strong and             . The enemy had also been active that day on
 included eighteen French light tanks and some       the canal line at Be'thune, where they had been
 Belgian machine gunners.                            driven off and had then moved towards Carvin.
    Cassel was occupied by i3/i8th Hussars, less     Here the defenders had been reinforced by
 one squadron, and on the same afternoon (23rd)      further artillery under C. R. A. 2nd Division
 Brigadier Usher's force took over the defence of     (Brigadier. C. B. Findlay), and the crossings
 Bergues.                                            were firmly held.
    On the night of 22/23rd May the withdrawal-          On 23rd May Calais was finally isolated. Its
 to the frontier defences had been carried out.      garrison; had been reinforced under the orders
 The French had taken over the sector northwards     of the War Office, by 3oth Infantry Brigade
 from Maulde and the right boundary of the           (Brigadier C. Nicholson) and 3rd battalion
.B.E.F. was now Bourghelles-Seclin both inclu-       Royal Tank Regiment—a cruiser tank regiment.
 sive to the French.. This change of boundary did    I had intended to move the latter within the
 not however affect the dispositions which the       canal line, but it was already too late-. After
 B.E.F. had taken on the Canal line by which         two attempts they were driven back into Calais,
 the rear of the French positions was protected.     with the. exception of three tanks which
    On the left of the B.E.F. the Belgians, who      eventually reached Dunkirk by way of Grave-
 had previously agreed to relieve the 44th           lines. The remainder of the gallant defence
 Division after withdrawal to the Lys on the         of Calais was conducted under the orders of the
 night of 23rd/24th May, ordered one of their        War Office. It-was finally concluded on the
 divisions to occupy the sector Halluin-Courtrai     night of 26/27th May.
 on the night of 22nd/23rd May. 44th Division            Information received at this time indicated
 was concentrated in G.H:Q. reserve on the           that two enemy armoured divisions were
 morning of 23rd May.                                converging on Calais and two more,- supported
    On the right, 2nd and 48th Divisions passed      by a motorised. S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) division,
 through the French on the night of 22nd/23rd        on St. Omer. A fifth armoured division appeared
 Mav and also concentrated in G H.O reserve.         to he mnvincr rm


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                    5923
   The remaining infantry brigade of 48th             Cavalry Corps for this attack. Therefore, even
Division (i43rd) was later placed under 2nd           if no British divisions could be made available,
Corps, and a pioneer battalion sent to begin          the possibility of carrying out the operation
preparations for the defence of Ypres in case         would not be entirely precluded. I did realise
Belgian measures for the purpose should prove         however that the French Were unlikely to take
inadequate.                                           the offensive unless British support was forth-
   The Belgians had at this time one division         coming.
in reserve between Menin and Ypres, and this             Even so, however, the situation on my northern
was ordered to counter-attack at 2 p.m. "How-         flank was deteriorating so rapidly that I was
ever it is doubtful whether it was found possible     convinced that there was no alternative but to
ever to launch this counter-attack. Orders were       occupy, as quickly as troops could be made
also issued for the Belgian ist Corps to come         available, the line of the Ypres-Comines canal
into line on the right of their 4th Corps between     and the positions covering Ypres. I therefore
Ghelewe and Ledeghem; this move was carried           issued orders to 5oth Division to join 2nd
out on the 26th May.                                  Corps at once, and shortly afterwards I ordered
   Sir John Dill (who had now become C.I.G.S.)        5th Division to follow. 2nd Corps placed
and whom I had asked to visit me, 'arrived on         5th Division on its left flank northwards
the morning of 25th May, and I explained the          from Halluin along the Ypres-Comines canal
position to him. He then telegraphed to the           with 5oth Division on its left around Ypres. At
Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State,         this time also, the greater part of the medium
that there could be no disguising the seriousness     and lieavy artillery of ist and 2nd Corps was
of the situation. He added that in his opinion        grouped under 2nd Corps, and the successful
the proposed counter-attack to the south could        defence of the positions on the Ypres-Comines
not be an important affair in view of the enemy       canal and around Ypres, which was maintained
attacks which had penetrated the Belgian              during the next three days; was greatly assisted
defences.                                             by these artillery units, which remained in
   General Blanchard arrived during Sir John          action till they had fired all their ammunition.
Dill's visit and took part in our discussions.            The Commander of 3rd Corps, who was no
   During the day the Belgians continued to           longer required to take part in the attack
withdraw in a north-westerly direction under           southwards, was now ordered to take over the
enemy pressure. Reports also indicated that a          command of the front from St. Omer to Raches
fresh enemy attack would take place next day           from Major-General Eastwood, whom he relieved
on the northern end of the Lys position.               on 26th May. .
                                                          I immediately communicated my decision to
                                                       the headquarters of the French First Group of
       OPERATIONS—THIRD PHASE                          Armies, but I was unable to get-into personal
                                                       touch with General Blanchard that evening as
                 26th-3ist MAY                         he was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges.
The decision taken, in agreement with the French,      However, I went to see General Blanchard at
  to withdraw behind the Lys. H.M. Covernment          his headquarters at Attiches early next morning
  authorises withdrawal to the coast. The Dunkirk      (26th May), at a moment when the enemy was
  perimeter organised by Sir Ronald Adam.              attacking at Carvin and had penetrated the
   The Belgians ask for an armistice. General          front of a North African Division near Bois
  Blanchard at first determines to remain in           d'Epinoy. I found that General Blanchard also
  position but later French yd and Cavalry Corps       feared the collapse of the Belgian Army and felt
  withdraw to Dunkirk. Occupation of perimeter         that the time for a counter attack southwards
  completed. Problems of embarkation of British        was past. Indeed he had already decided that
  and French troops. Withdrawal of 2nd and             the situation on both flanks made it necessary
  yd Corps. G.H.Q. closes and C.-in-C. embarks         to withdraw.
  for England.                                            After an hour's discussion, we arrived at a
                                                       joint plan for the withdrawal of the main bodies
The decision to Withdraw.                              behind the line of the Lys. These arrangements
  43. By 6 p.m. that night (25th May) I was            were subject to there being no further deteriora-
convinced that the steps I had taken to secure         tion in the Belgian situation.
my left flank would prove insufficient to meet            With this decision, there vanished the last
the growing danger in the north.                       opportunity for a sortie. The layout of the
  The pattern of the enemy pincer attack was           B.E.F. was now beginning to take its final
becoming clearer. One movement from the                shape. Starting from what could be described
south-west on Dunkirk had already developed            as a normal situation with Allied troops on
and was being held; the counterpart was now            the right and left, there had developed an
developing on the Belgian front.                       ever lengthening defensive right flank. This
   The gap between the British left and the            had then become a semi-circular line, with
Belgian right, which had been threatening the          both flanks resting on the sea, manned by
whole day, might at any time become impossible         British, French ' and Belgians. Later the
to close : were this to happen, my last hope of        position became, a corridor in shape. The
reaching the coast would be gone. At this              southern end of this corridor was blocked by
tune, it will be recalled, I had no reserves beyond    the French ist Army; and each side was
a single cavalry regiment, and the two divisions       manned, for the greater part of its length, by
(5th and 5oth) already earmarked for the attack        British troops. Next to the sea were French
southwards.                                            troops on the west, and French and Belgian
   The French ist Army, which was not                  troops on the eastern flank.
affected in the same way as the B.E.F.^                   The immediate problem was to shorten this
by the situation which was developing on               perimeter. British and French forces were
the Belgian front, had, it will be remembered,         together holding a front of 128 miles of which
agreed to provide three divisions and the               97 miles were held by British troops, though


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                  5925
  makes it impossible to extend our boundaries,       was likely to prove an exacting one: work
  which were notified yesterday, further to the       had to begin at once, and my own headquarters
  right.                                              were fully occupied with the withdrawal of the
      We must therefore, with regret, say that        forward troops.
  we have no longer any forces available to               I therefore appointed Lieut-General Sir Ronald
  fill the gap in the direction of Ypres.              Adam to undertake this duty, and sent with
     As regards the withdrawal to the Yser the.        him my Quarter-Master-General and other
  idea must be ruled out since it would destroy        staff officers from G.H.Q. He was to take
  our fighting units more quickly than the             command of the troops already in the area,
  battle now in progress, and this without loss        make arrangements for the troops of ist, 2nd
  to the enemy."                                       and 3rd Corps who would be withdrawing into
   On receipt of this information, on the morning      the bridgehead and arrange for the embarkation.
of 26th May, I asked the Secretary oi State to         He was to act in conformity with the orders of
bring strong pressure on the Belgian Govern-           General Fagalde, provided that these did not
ment to withdraw their Army westwards and              imperil the safety and welfare of British troops-
to maintain touch with the B.E.F. I also                  Sir Ronald Adam accordingly handed over
communicated in the same sense to Sir Roger            command of the 3rd Corps to Major-General
Keyes, but his reply never reached my                  S. R. Wason (till then Major-General R.A. at
Headquarters.                                          G.H.Q.), and took up his duties on the morning
                                                       of 27th May.
26th May—The Southern and Western fronts.
                                                          At 7 a.m. that morning he attended a con-
   46. On the remainder of the front 26th May          ference at Cassel as my representative. At
was marked by heavy air action everywhere.             this conference there were present Admiral
The enemy attack on the French North African           Abrial and General Fagalde from Dunkirk,
division at Carvin which was in progress when          General Blanchard, General Prioux, now in
I visited General Blanchard at Attiches, was           command of the French ist Army, and General
driven back by the • prompt action of two              Koeltz who was representing General Weygand
battalions of 5oth Division which were deployed
behind the French troops. 2nd and 44th                    Sir Ronald Adam and General Fagalde
Divisions reacted against the enemy and both           arrived early, and before the conference began
succeeded in advancing some distance west-             they had the opportunity to -reach general
wards from Merville and Hazebrouck respec-            'agreement on the organisation of the bridgehead
tively towards the Canal.                              position.
   Further north, the French had completed the            The perimeter was to extend from Gravelines
relief of all our troops on the river Aa from          south-eastwards to the Canal de la Colme,
St. Momelin northwards But had themselves              along the canal to Bergues and thence by Furnes
begun in places to withdraw towards the.               and Nieuport to the Belgian coast. In fact,
Mardyck Canal. It therefore became the more            the French were by now evacuating Gravelines
necessary to strengthen further the defences           and the western part of the perimeter, and in
of Bergues, and this was carried out under the         process of going back to the line of the Mardyck
orders of 48th Division.                               Canal from the sea to Spyker, on the Canal
                                                       de la Colme. The French were to be responsible
 Plans for final withdrawal.                           for the defence of the western half of the peri-
    47. On this evening (26th May), I put in hand      meter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the
 my plans for a final withdrawal. I was uncertain      British for the eastern half. By this time, the
 how far I should be successful in withdrawing         position of the Belgian Army was so obscure
 the whole of the B.E.F. within the bridgehead         that the possibility of its being included in
 at Dunkirk, nor could I judge how much fighting       the bridgehead was not taken into account,
my troops would have to undertake during the           though the perimeter could of course have been
withdrawal.                                            extended eastwards to include them if necessary.
    I had, therefore, asked the War Office whether        Sir Ronald Adam then explained to General
 it would be possible to send out an infantry          Fagalde his plan for Corps boundaries, assembly
 brigade of the ist Canadian Division so as to         areas and the layout of beaches. He specially
 provide a nucleus of fresh and well trained           stressed the importance of avoiding traffic
 troops on the bridgehead position. ~ This request   .congestion in the perimeter and said that he
 was at once agreed to, and orders were given          had decided to allow no British transport
 to despatch the Brigade to Dunkirk on the             north of the canals except such as was strictly
 night 26th/27th May. These orders were,               necessary for tactical, supply or medical pur-
 however, cancelled on 28th May.                       poses. He urged General Fagalde to issue
                                                       similar orders to the French troops under his
    The contraction of the B.E.F. area and the         command. He also suggested that the French
 shortening of its Lines of Communication was          troops entering the bridgehead position should
 now making it possible to dispense with a             all be located in the'western part of the peri-
 number of the rearward units. I had already           meter. However, it appeared that these orders
 issued orders for the embarkation of a number of      did not reach all the French troops, who brought
 key personnel who could be spared so as to ease       a quantity of transport into the sector.
 the supply situation which was becoming acute;
 I now ordered the withdrawal of all units which          These matters were later reviewed at the full
'were not required to continuejihe battle. This        conference, but the principal business was the
 policy involved leaving most of the fighting          issue by General Koeltz of an order of the day
 troops until the last, but if full use was to be      by General Weygand.
 made of the shipping available, and congestion           This enjoined a resolute attitude on the part
 avoided on the beaches, no other course was            of every leader, and the counter-offensive
 possible.                                             wherever possible. General Koeltz then pro-
    The task of organising a bridgehead at Dun-         ceeded to urge Generals Blanchard and Fagalde
 kirk, and of arranging the details of embarkation      to attempt the recapture of Calais and, though


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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                  5933
 creation of a road control organisation under                      APPRECIATIONS
 the Quarter-Master-General, on the linos of that           The Royal Navy; the Royal Air Force;
 in use in the French Army, had already been                       Commanders and Staffs
 submitted, but unfortunately too late for more
 than preliminary results to be achieved.               The Royal Navy.
                                                           70. I have already referred to the embarkation
 Security.                                              of the Force from Dunkirk and its transport to
    67. Akin to the foregoing problem is that of        England which evoked the wholehearted admira-
 security/ Until loth May the work of the               tion of the Army. The operation was carried out
 Intelligence Service in this respect had been          in accordance with the finest traditions of the
 heavy and constant, but when operations began,         Royal Navy. The plan involved the use of
 it 'assumed almost unmanageable proportions.           hundreds of privately-owned small craft, and
 This was due to the opening of the Belgian             was put into execution at short notice and at a
 frontier, the mass movement of refugees, and           time when Naval resources were severely
 the arrival of enemy saboteurs and agents by           strained by demands elsewhere. It was carried
 parachute/                                             through regardless of danger and loss by enemy
                                                        bombing. My deep gratitude is due -to all
    The troops, however, soon became aware of           concerned, particularly to Vice-Admiral Sir B. H.
 the danger and realised the importance, of             Ramsay, Vice-Admiral at Dover, Rear-Admiral
 security measures and the paramount need for           W. F. Wake Walker, who superintended the
 discretion.                                          • actual embarkation and Captain -W. G. Tennant,
                                                        R.N., the senior naval officer ashore. Nor can
 Supply and Transport.                                  the Army forget the sterling work of all those
    68. As has been already indicated in this           members of the Merchant Navy and the civilian
 Despatch, the operations showed clearly how            owners of small craft, in many instances
 complete reliance cannot be placed on any one          volunteers, who unhesitatingly and regardless of
 channel of movement or maintenance. Enemy              dangers gave their services to the British
 action by mobile forces or by air may put              Expeditionary Force.
 important road or railway routes out of action
 for hours or days at a time, or even completely       The Royal Air Force.
 sever communications with the bases.
                                                          71. Successful operations on land depend more
    The proportion of reserves held forward, and       than ever before on the closest co-operation
 under load, on rail or on lorry, must therefore be    between aircraft and troops on the ground, and
 high, despite the resultant extravagance in trans-    the B.E.F. owes a deep debt of gratitude to the
port. The War Office had provided Lines of             Royal Air Force for their work throughout the
Communication Railhead Companies, R.A.S.C.,            operations. Pilots returned to the air again and
to operate in the event of a railhead being out of     again to carry out essential tasks for both French
 action for a time, and these units fully justified    and British Armies, when they were long overdue
their existence.                                       for rest and sleep.
   During the final phases of the operations, the         The embarkation of the Force would have
civilian employees pf the French and Belgian           been well-nigh impossible but for the fighter
railways were often not to be found, and the           protection afforded. The toll taken* of the
 Railway Operating Companies, R.E., had to take        enemy aircraft on this and earlier occasions has
over the working of the trains at short notice.        once again established the individual superiority
   The change of bases made necessary after            of the British airman in the air.
20th May was a fine example of quick decision,            I wish specially to record my thanks to Air-
flexible administration, and the power of the          Marshal A. S. Barratt (now Sir Arthur Barratt),
administrative staffs at home and in France to         Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Air
improvise at short notice.                             Forces in France, and to the Air Officer- Com-
                                                       manding my Air Component, Air-Vice-Marshal
 The Behaviour of the Troops.                          C. H. B. Blount.
    69. Most important of all, the Campaign has
 proved beyond doubt that the British Soldier          Commanders and Staffs.
 has once again deserved well of his country.            72. The course of operations in May afforded
 The troops under my command, whatever their '        very unequal opportunities for the several
 category, displayed those virtues of steadiness,      branches of the Staff, Services and departments
patience, courage and endurance for which their        to show thek efficiency, and it would, therefore,
corps and regiments have.long been famous.            perhaps, be invidious to deal with their work in
    In addition to the fighting troops, the rear-      detail to a .greater extent than I have already
ward units, as well -as the three divisions sent to    done in this Despatch. Some, however, were
France for pioneer duties, all found themselves,      required with their Staffs to bear a specially
 at one time or another, engaged with the enemy       heavy and prolonged strain of responsibility
although often incompletely trained and short         and I wish to refer particularly to the valuable
of the proper complement of weapons.                  services of my Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-
                                                      General H. R. Pownall), my Quarter-Master
   Time and again, the operations proved the.         ^General (Lieut.-General W. G. Lindsell), and my
vital importance of the good junior leader, who       Engineer-in-Chief (Major-General R. P. Paken-
has learned to encourage, by his example, the         ham Walsh), my Signal Officer-in-Chief (Major-
men whom he leads, and whose first care is the.       General R. Chenevix-Trench), and my Military
well-being of the troops placed under his com-        Secretary (Brigadier Sir Colin Jardine, Bart.).
mand. Firm discipline, physical fitness, efficiency      From the narrative of events, it will be evident
in marching and digging, and'skill at arms, old-      how great is the debt I owe to the Commanders
fashioned virtues though they may be, are as
important in modern warfare as ever they were            *On one day, 77 enemy machines were shot down at'
in -J-hp nact                                         the loss of only 16 of our own.


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5902          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

   The fortifications of the Maginot Line in the     under my command from the dates of the dis-
sector concerned continued to be manned by           embarkation of their ground units. Later other
French fortress troops, the British battalions       units were added, and the Air Component now
being disposed in depth in advance of the            comprises, in addition to Headquarters, one
fortified line. The enemy positions were on the      Fighter Group Headquarters, eight Wings, a
average one thousand five hundred yards distant      Communication Squadron, and certain adminis-
from our foremost posts.                             trative and other detachments.
   The British Army contains to-day very few            The ground echelons were moved in advance
regimental officers and other ranks who fought       of ist and 2nd Corps to the aerodromes in the
in the last war; much that was common know-          region to be occupied. In the early stages they
ledge and accepted practice then, must therefore     were largely dependent on the assistance given to
be learned again. Nevertheless, events on the        them by the French Region Aerienne under the
Saar front have proved beyond doubt that             command successively of General Jeauneaud
the young officer and his men, once they have        and General Armengeaud.
had experience of active service, will be in every      On I4th and 15th September, the anti-aircraft
way worthy of their predecessors.                    units disembarked at the base ports and, in
                                                     conjunction with fighter units of the Royal
The Completion of the First Contingent.              Air Force, undertook the task of protecting
   15. During October and November, i5th and         the disembarkation of the two Corps and their
I7th Infantry Brigades were sent from home,          forward moves.
and placed under command of ist and 2nd                 Once the concentration was complete, the
Corps respectively. i3th Infantry Brigade was        available anti-aircraft resources were divided
also relieved on the Lines of Communication          between forward defences and Lines of Com-
by 25th Infantry Brigade.                            munication. Besides the normal provision for
   On ist and 2nd December, the French               the defence of headquarters and railheads,
5 ist Division was relieved by 4th Division and      arrangements were made to protect certain
i7th Infantry Brigade, and withdrawn from my         important French installations in the British
command : I was sorry to part with them and          zone and a searchlight zone was also established
with their commander, who at all times gave          as a protection against enemy night bombing.
me loyal support.                                       On all occasions, the Air Officer Commanding
   The plans for the despatch of the Force had       has been greatly helped by General d'Astier,
envisaged that two divisions of the Territorial      commanding the French Air Forces with the
Army would be sent from home as soon as they         northern group of French Armies.
were sufficiently trained. Since three regular          During the period under review, enemy air
infantry brigades had by now arrived, however,       activity has been almost entirely confined to
I decided on 27th October to form the 5th            reconnaissance flights at great heights.
Division under the command of Major-General
H. E. Franklyn. On the night of 2gth-3oth            Air Reconnaissance.
December the division took over a sector on the         17. The strategical plans for air reconnais-
left of the 4th Division.                            sance were worked out in conjunction with the
   At this time the five divisions of the British    Air Ministry and with General Mouchard,
Expeditionary Force were all in the line.            commanding the Air Forces with the French
   During the month of January the 48th              Armies of the North East.
Division (Major-General A. F. A. N. Thome)              In accordance with these plans many recon-
arrived in France, and by 23rd January had           naissances have been carried out both by day
completed its move forward. It was placed            and night. Much photography has been
under ist Corps, but held in G.H.Q. reserve.         undertaken with useful results, both in informa-
   By the end of January the Force, therefore,       tion obtained and in experience gained in
consisted of two corps, each of three divisions,     photographic and survey methods.
with corps and army troops. The first stage             The work of the units of the Royal Air Force
in the development of the Force was thus             engaged in air reconnaissance deserves the
concluded.                                           highest praise, since it has been performed, as a
   The strength of the British Expeditionary         rule, in the face of enemy opposition. Pilots
Force at the end of January stood at two             have often been called on to carry out flights to
hundred and twenty-two thousand two hundred,         the full limit of the range of their aircraft,
all ranks, not including the men of the Air          flying over long and circuitous routes to avoid
Component and of other units of the Royal Air        neutral territory; this rigorous duty has been
Force for whose maintenance I am responsible.        boldly and cheerfully undertaken.
                                                     The preparation of Aerodromes.
Air Forces and Anti-Aircraft Defence.                  18. It had been decided, before mobilisation,
   16. Although development of the Air Forces        that the maintenance and construction of all
and of the Air Defence organisations proceeded       aerodromes used by the Royal Air Force in
simultaneously with the despatch of the Force        France, as well as their signal communications,
and with its subsequent moves, I have thought        should be the responsibility of the British
it convenient to describe this development           Expeditionary Force.
separately.                                            Many aerodromes and landing grounds had
  The composition of the Force included a            been placed at our disposal by the French
Component of the Royal Air Force under the           authorities, but it soon became evident that the
command of Air Vice-Marshal C. H. B. Blount,         problems of construction and maintenance
Royal Air Force, consisting of two Army              were far greater than had been contemplated
Co-operation Wings, one Fighter Wing and one         before the war. A new policy had, therefore,
Bomber Reconnaissance Wing.                          to be formulated and comprehensive plans
  The aircraft were flown to France according        prepared. In most parts of France, permanent
to plan at the outbreak of hostilities and came      pasture does not exist, and this fact, in view of


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5904          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

    The initial scheme provided for the formation    The Welfare of the Force
 of temporary maintenance dep&ts near the ports         23. The health of the Force has been good
 of Brest and Nantes, but it was soon evident        and the number of troops in the care of medical
that, with so long a line of communication,          units has never exceeded 2-8 per cent, of the
an advanced base was required.                       strength of the Force, despite the unusually
    The use of the port of Havre had at first        severe weather conditions in December and
 been considered undesirable owing to certain        January.
geographical and technical difficulties in the          I wish to express my appreciation of the work
 air defence of the docks. These were, however,      of the Royal Army Medical Corps under my
overcome in mid-November, and an Advanced            Director of Medical Services, Major General
 Base area is now being established near this        J. W. L. Scott.
 port with the co-operation of the French               The arrangements for leave came into force
 authorities, while Field Supply Depdts are being    on i8th December. The numbers permitted
set up further forward. By mid-December,            to be absent on leave at any one time are based
the staff of the Movement Control were working       on the percentage of strength which can be spared
some ninety stations, while fourteen ports were      from the Force. By the end of January ten
in use for landing personnel, animals and stores.   days' leave home had been granted to some sixty
Through these ports, a quarter of a million men,    thousand of all ranks and compassionate leave
forty-five thousand mechanical vehicles and a       had also been granted in deserving cases.
monthly tonnage varying from sixty to one
hundred thousand tons of stores of all kinds            The question of leave was worked out in
were imported and distributed to their various      great detail by the Adjutant General, Lieutenant
areas and reserve dep6ts.                           General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, and the members
                                                    of his staff.
    Works projects of great magnitude have been
in progress from the outset, and the problems           The Expeditionary Force Institutes have now
of accommodation have been many and complex.        established some ninety institutes open on the
An extensive programme of building and hutting      Lines of Communication and bulk stores have
for depdts, hospitals and reinforcement camps       been established in forward areas to enable units
was put in hand, together with installations for    to replenish their own canteens. The same
electric light and power, the bulk storage of       organisation is providing concert parties and
petrol and so on. A vast amount of minor            mobile cinemas, and a proportion of the troops
work in connection with accommodation has           are able to visit each week one of the enter-
been carried out by the Royal Engineers.            tainments provided by the Entertainments
                                                    National Services Association.
    Railway construction at depdts and aero-
dromes has been undertaken by the Trans-                I am likewise grateful to those organisations
portation Services under very adverse weather       which have co-operated so whole-heartedly with
conditions.                                         the Royal Army Chaplains Department in
                                                    attending to the welfare of the troops.
   The complicated nature of modern military
equipment has added greatly to the work of the         Amongst these are the Catholic Women's
Royal Army Ordnance Corps, as regards both          Guild, The Army Scripture Readers' Association,
storeholding and repair. Great difficulty has       The Church Army, The Church of Scotland,
been experienced in finding suitable accommo-       Toe H, The Salvation Army, The Young Men's
dation for depdts and workshops at the bases,       Christian Association, and the Young Women's
more especially since the whole of the resources    Christian Association.
of France are engaged at high pressure on her           The despatch and delivery of mails takes place
own war industries. New installations have          with regularity, and more than nine thousand
therefore been planned and are now under            bags of mail have been handled in one day by
construction.                                       the Postal Service. The necessity for censor-
   The maintenance of mechanical vehicles has       ship is fully realized, but there has been no
received constant attention and the number of       delay in the time taken in the transit of mail
road accidents, and consequently of repairs,        for an ever increasing force.
has been greatly reduced through measures              The great distances between forward troops
taken by the Provost Service to enforce road        and the base made it necessary to depart from
discipline.                                         the old established procedure whereby the 2nd
   The labour problem bids fair to become one       Echelon of the Adjutant General's Branch has
of great magnitude, and its solution may be         always been located in the theatre of war.
difficult. As no adequate labour force was          This office is now established in Margate,
available on mobilisation, the gap was filled       and the move has been fully justified by the
by the temporary use of cavalry and infantry        increased speed with which matters are now
reservists. Later, the Auxiliary Military Pioneer   handled.
Corps absorbed the various labour units already
in France. This Corps has carried out cheer-        Training and Organisation.
fully and efficiently the important, but often         24. The absence of fighting has -afforded
unexciting tasks allotted to its units.             opportunities to continue the training of the
    I am grateful to the Government of India        Force. Weapon training has been possible for
for the high standard of the animal transport       almost every unit, and thanks to the co-opera-
units sent to France, which have proved their       tion of the French Army, artillery practice
usefulness on many occasions.                       camps have been held and other training
   Major General P. de Fonblanque, General          facilities provided. Exercises with troops in-
Officer Commanding, Lines of Communication          volving road movement on a large scale have
Area, has under his command the greatest part       been held and much progress has been made
of the undertakings described above. They           in the technique of co-operation with the Royal
now cover almost one third of France, stretching    Air Force.
from Dunkirk to Brest and from Cherbourg to            About eight hundred and fifty officers and
Marseilles.                                         non-commissioned officers have been sent home


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5906          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

                           SECOND DESPATCH f
(Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendix
covering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June).

   | i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and other
records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, including
those of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commanders
and staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of the
General Staff at G.H.Q. are only partially complete for the period loth—i8th May, owing to some
papers having been destroyed at Boulogne, and a portion of the records for 3ist May lost at sea.
Some records of less importance were burnt at Hazebrouck to avoid possible capture and others
were destroyed in a lorry which caught fire near Cassel on or about 24th May.
     2. The Appendix contains an account of the operations at Dunkirk from 6 p.m., 3ist May, to
midnight 2nd/3rd June, which may conveniently be appended to this despatch, though they were
not carried out under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It has been compiled by the General
Staff at G.H.Q., from sources similar to those used for the despatch itself.


                               London,               Arrival of yd Corps in France.
                                   25 July, 1940.       3. 3rd Corps (Lt.-General Sir Ronald F.
Sir,                                                 Adam, Bt.), consisting of 42nd Division (Major-
   1. I have the honour to submit a report on        General W. G. Holmes), 44th Division (Major-
the employment of the British Expeditionary          General E. A. Osborne) and 5ist Division
Force, and on the part which it played in             (Major-General V. M. Fortune) was due for
operations in France and -Belgium from ist           despatch to France in February and March, and
February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, on which          5 ist Division arrived during early February.
date I gave up Command of the Force.                 The 5oth (Motor) Division (Major-General G. le
                                                     Q. Martel) arrived in France at the same time
   The period under review may be divided into       and was allotted to 2nd Corps. It had been
two distinct and sharply contrasting phases,         arranged that the front of the B.E.F. should be
namely, before and after loth May, on which          extended northwards to Croix de Poperinghe on
date active operations began. The active             the Belgian frontier, two miles north-east of
operations themselves can be divided geo-            Bailleul, and that 3rd Corps should go into the
graphically into two distinct parts ; on the east,   line on the left of the B.E.F. taking over 5th
the advance to the River Dyle, and the with-         Division from 2nd Corps, and relieving 53rd
drawal to the frontier; on the west, the defence     French Division, between Armentieres and Croix
of Arras and the organisation of the Canal line.     de Poperinghe, with 5ist Division. The Com-
Later, the two parts merged into one whole in        mand of the new sector had passed to the
the final phase of the withdrawal and embarka-       B.E.F. at midnight 3ist Jan./ist February, and
tion of the Force.                                   the relief of the French troops was to take
   No such clear definition can be made in terms     place about I2th February.
of time; furthermore, the two operations, on            At this time, however, owing to the situation
the east and on the west, were closely inter-        elsewhere in Europe His Majesty's Government
dependent, and the same reserves had to serve        found it necessary to postpone the despatch of
for both. For this reason the accounts of the        3rd Corps (excepting 5 ist Division) and also of
operations on the two fronts cannot but be           certain anti-aircraft, administrative and labour
intermingled at certain points in the narrative.     units. I was also instructed to earmark one
Broadly speaking, however, three distinct phases     division for withdrawal from the B.E.F. if
can be distinguished. First, the advance to the      required ; for this I selected 5th Division. It
Dyle from ioth-i6th May; then from i7th-26th         was evident that the programme of shipments of
May the withdrawal from the Dyle to the              ammunition and other war material to France,
Escaut, the defence of the Belgian frontier and      on which I had counted to make up the serious
of the southern and western flanks ; and finally     deficiencies in stocks, would be severely curtailed
the withdrawal and embarkation of the Force          in February and March.
from 27th-3ist May.
   2. The narrative in my first despatch dated          4. These changes entailed a delay in the
25th April, 1940, concluded with the completion      development of the Force which was naturally
of the first contingent of the Force.                disappointing; moreover, it became impossible
   I had been informed that the expansion of the     for me to take over the new sector to Bailleul,
Force was to be continued by the despatch of         and at the same time to retain a proper propor-
3rd Corps during the early months of 1940;           tion of divisions in reserve. I was, therefore,
the Armoured Division was to follow in May,          obliged to obtain the consent of the French to
and a fourth Corps, with ist Canadian                the indefinite postponement of the relief, and to
Division, during the late Summer ; furthermore,      accept the resulting congestion in the area of
it had been decided that the Force should be         the B.E.F.
divided into two Annies, as soon as the number          5oth Division was temporarily accommodated
of divisions in the field, excluding the Armoured    in an area south-west of Amiens in G.H.Q.
Division, rose above eleven.                         reserve.
   Preparation for this expansion, which had            At the end of March, however, the 3rd Corps
been proceeding since the previous autumn,           was finally despatched to France ; 5ist Division
continued steadily until loth May.                   duly relieved the French in the new sector on


Details

5908          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

   There were also deficiencies in technical          units, including anti-aircraft. My Adjutant-
apparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements,       General's branch, in conjunction with the
such as Kenison Predictors, signal lights,            Adjutant-General's branch at the War Office,
technical and specialised vehicles of many            had in hand plans for the more economical use
types and a number of smaller items. The same         of man-power, the elimination of fit men from
difficulties in provision of equipment were no        sedentary or base duties and the reduction of
doubt the cause of delays in the despatch of new      tradesmen in War Establishments. Investiga-
units to the B.E.F., particularly armoured and        tions made by the War Office, which had my
anti-aircraft units, and while it is to some extent   full co-operation, were directed towards a more
true that the shortness of the campaign pre-          economical and more flexible system of replace-
vented the full effect of the shortages being felt,   ment and repair of vehicles and equipment in
it is I think, justifiable to assume that the         the Force.
presence of the Armoured Division and of a
complete Army Tank Brigade would have been             The Royal Air Force.
an invaluable aid in the difficulties with which          13. On I5th January, 1940, Air Marshal A. S.
we were faced in meeting enemy armoured                Barratt had assumed command of the British
formations.                                            Ah- Force in France, including the Air Com-
                                                       ponent which, however, was to remain under my
 The Administrative Situation.                         operational control. Under this arrangement,
    11. The development of the rearward installa-     in my opinion, the control of available air forces
 tions had been proceeding systematically.             was better allocated to meet the needs not only
    The medical base installations had been            of the British but also of the French Army for
 extended and a hospital area was in course of         whom considerable aerial reconnaissance was
 rapid development near Boulogne in addition           being carried out. The development of the
to the original medical base sub-area at Dieppe.       Allied Central Air Bureau and of its communica-
                                                       tions to the headquarters of higher formations
    The British Army requirements in the port of       in France and to the Royal Air Force at home,
 Brest, a French naval base, had been sub-             was likewise to prove its worth in the 4^ys to
 stantially reduced by the use of other ports          come as an organisation for co-ordinating
 such as St. Malo and Caen ; by May, seventeen        information and requests for air action.
ports in all were being operated and 2,500 tons
of stores were being despatched to railheads              At the same time I felt that the resources of
daily.                                                the Air Component would prove insufficient for
                                                      the requirements of the Force during operations ;
    At the same time, the construction of semi-        so long, therefore, as this state of affairs existed
permanent dep6ts of all kinds in the neighbour-       it was of prime importance that the machinery
hood of Nantes, Rennes and Rouen was in                for obtaining the allotment of additional bomber
progress; this would later on have led to more         and fighter support should be as simple and as
efficient and economical working than was             swift in operation as it could be made.
possible in the temporary accommodation,
taken up in September, 1939. By loth May,                 Throughout the period, construction of new
seven ammunition depdts were open, in addition        aerodromes, landing grounds and communica-
to railhead dumps ; all these were intended, in       tions for the British Air Force in France was
time, to be rail served; while the construction of    proceeding as fast as resources would permit,
the regulating station at Abancourt, by French        concrete runways being constructed in the
railway troops on behalf of the B.E.F., was well      early part of the year until the season allowed
advanced. It opened on a limited scale in the         for the sowing of grass. Upwards of 10,000 men
first week of May. A supply dep6t was being           were employed on this work, and forty-seven
constructed close by so as to relieve the             aerodromes and satellites (including 19 new
dangerous congestion at the ports of Rouen            aerodromes) were under development or con-
and Havre.                                            struction. By I5th May eight of the nineteen
                                                      new aerodromes were capable of use, and at
    The progress of all these undertakings was        least 50,000 tons of concrete had been laid.
adversely affected by the shortage of labour, to      Constructional work was also undertaken on
which I referred in my first despatch, and it         behalf of the Air Ministry at other R.A.F.
was decided, in March, to send three Divisions        installations in central France.
to France to undertake labour duties and
at the same time continue their training, albeit       The Dyle and Escaut Plans.
slowly. The Divisions selected were I2th
(Major-General R. L. Petre), 23rd (Major-                14. Very shortly after the arrival of the B.E.F.
General W. N. Herbert) and 46th (Major-               in their positions on the Belgian frontier I had
General H. O. Curtis). These arrived in April;        been invited by General Georges, commanding
23rd Division was allotted for work on aero-          the French Front of the North East, under
dromes in the forward area, and the remaining         whose Command I was, to study the part to be
two to the Lines of Communication area.               played by the B.E.F. in the event of an advance
                                                      into Holland and Belgium, or into Belgium
                                                      alone. The question of such an advance was
Organisation.                                         one of high policy with a political as well as a
   12. The absence of actual operations up to         military aspect; it was therefore not for me to
 loth May gave opportunities to make a number         comment on it. My responsibilities were con-
of changes in organisation.                           fined to ensuring that the orders issued by the
   Divisional cavalry regiments were grouped          French for the employment of the British
into Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades and the         Expeditionary Force were capable of being
Lines of Communication area was re-organised          carried out; and indeed events proved that the
into two districts.                                   orders issued for this operation were well within
   Infantry battalions were filled up to the new      the capacity of the Force.
and higher establishments, and action was                The subject presented difficulties greatly
initiated to raise the establishment of artillery     complicated by the policy of neutrality to which


Details

5920           SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

 port could not be worked for military require-             execution has hope of restoring the situation.
 ments at short notice. A certain amount of                Weygand reports French VII Army is advanc-
 rations and small arms ammunition was sent                ing successfully and has captured Peronne,
 by air up to 23rd May, but from then onwards              Albert and Amiens. While realising fully
 it became impossible for aircraft to land. On             dangers and difficulties of your position which
 23rd May therefore, on the advice of the Q.M.G.,          has been explained to Weygand it is essential
 I decided to place the B.E.F. on half rations.            that you should make every endeavour to
    Dunkirk, though its water supply was                   co-operate in his plan. Should however
 destroyed, remained available for unloading               situation on your communications make this
 supplies till 26th May, but constant air raids            at any time impossible you should inform us
 imposed a well nigh unbearable strain on the              so that we can inform French and make
 stevedore battalions. However, they remained              Naval and Air arrangements to assist you
 at duty until, in the end, all the quays and cranes       should you have to withdraw on the northern
 were put out of action. Thereafter supplies               coast."
 could only be landed on the beaches. Lighters             It will be noted that, according to the telegram
 arrived to embark troops loaded with a portion         General Weygand informed the Prime Minister
 of supplies, ammunition and water, and these           that Peronne, Albert and Amiens had- been
were unloaded and distributed by Corps. The             recaptured. It later transpired that this in-
delivery of supplies to Corps was maintained,           formation was inaccurate.
albeit irregularly, up till 30th May when the              The Weygand plan, as it came to be known,
last convoy went forward from the supply depdt          was for a counter offensive on a large scale.
on the beach at La Panne.                                  From the north the French ist Army and the
    By 20th May all the General Hospitals had           B.E.F. were to attack south-west at the earliest
been cut off from the forward area and                  possible moment with about eight divisions
improvised arrangements had to be made for              and with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting
the evacuation of casualties. Some of the               the British right.
Casualty Clearing Stations had to be diverted             The newly formed Third French Army Group
from their normal function and used as Hospitals.      was reported to be organising a line on the
Hospital ships continued to berth at Dunkirk            Somme from Amiens to Peronne with a view to
till the night 3ist May/ist June and casualties        attacking northwards.
were evacuated to them by road and by rail.
Ambulance trains were running as late as 26th             A new cavalry Corps was assembling south of
May.                                                   the Somme near Neufchatel and was to operate
            *                                           on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, in
Further proposals for an attack Southwards.            'touch with the British Armoured Division on
   38. On 23rd May the French ist Army                 their left.
pushed forward some elements southwards                    I fully appreciated the importance of attacking
from Douai. On the same day, 5th and 5oth               early before the enemy could bring up his
Divisions, which had attacked two days before,          infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced.
were themselves being attacked on the Scarpe            The 5th and 5oth Divisions were on this day
and had already lost most of their tanks through        (23rd May) still closely engaged with the enemy,
mechanical wear.                                        and 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions, would not be-
                                                        come available for a further 48 hours, since the
   The threat to their rear was increasing hourly       French and the Belgians> though they had
and they were thus unable to make any further           arranged their relief, could not complete it
advance or to assist the French, except in so far       earlier. The ammunition immediately available,
as they were able to engage troops who might -          to the B.E.F. .was of the order of 300 rounds
otherwise have threatened the right flank of            per gun and with communications cut with the
the French advance. The French approached               main base, the prospect of receiving any further
the outskirts of Cambrai meeting with little           supply was remote.
opposition but withdrew later on being attacked
by dive-bombers.                                          The French light mechanised divisions and
                                                        our own armoured units had already suffered
   On the same day I received a copy of a               serious losses in tanks which could not be
telegram from the Prime Minister to M. Reynaud,        replaced. Such information as I. had received
which read as follows:—                                of the Belgian cavalry did not lead me to take
      " Strong enemy armoured forces have               an optimistic view of the prospect of their
   cut communications of Northern Armies.              being able to engage, at short notice, in a battle
   Salvation of these Armies can only be obtained      forty miles away and on French soil.
   by immediate execution of Weygand's plan.              Experience had already shown the vital
   I demand that French Commanders in North            importance of close co-ordination of the allied
   and South and Belgian G.Q.G. be given most           armies in any operation. General Billotte had
   stringent orders to carry this out and turn         been appointed the co-ordinator at the con-
   defeat into victory. Time vital as supplies         ference at Mons on I2th May, but in practice,
   are short."                                         the measure of co-ordination fell far short of
   I was not sure whether the situation which          what was required if the movements of the
was developing for the allied armies in the            three allied armies were to be properly controlled.
north could be accurately appreciated except              Except for the issue of orders to retire from
on the spot. I therefore telegraphed to Sir            the Dyle (obtained only after I had sent Major-
John Dill asking him to fly over that day.             General Eastwood to General Billotte's head-
   The next day, however (24th May), the Prime         quarters to represent my views), I received no
Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and           written orders from the French First Group of
General Weygand in Paris, and I received the           Armies, though at the meetings between
following telegram from the Secretary of State         General Billotte and myself which took place
describing that conference :—                          from time to time, we always found ourselves
      " Both are convinced that Weygand's plan         in complete agreement. Unfortunately, how-
   is still capable of execution and only in its       ever, General Billotte had been seriously.-and.


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5922          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

2qkh May. Preparations for counter attack and            the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose
    strengthening of canal defences.                     command included Boulogne, Calais and
    40. During 24th May, I had simultaneously            Dunkirk. Under his authority the command
to prepare for a counter-attack southwards on            of military forces in these areas was assumed on
the 26th and also to press forward with the              24th May by General de Corps d'Arme'e Fagalde,
strengthening of the canal line.                         commanding the French i6th Corps which up
    To make the detailed arrangements for the            to now had been fighting on the left of the
counter-attack I appointed the Commander of              Belgian Army.
the 3rd Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald                The French defences of Dunkirk were based
Adam, who, on my behalf, continued negotia-              on the peace time organisation of the Secteur
tions with General Blanchard, and with the               Fortifie des Flandres, and extended only as
Commander of the French 5th Corps, General               far as the Belgian frontier. They comprised
Altmeyer.                                                an inner and an, outer sector, the inner on the
    The final plan was for a counter attack with         line of the old Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence
three French and two British divisions under             by Bergues to the frontier and so to the sea;
the command of General Altmeyer. As a                    the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer
first stage, on the evening of 26th May, bridge-         thence by Cassel and Steenvoorde to the
heads were to be established south, of the               frontier. General Fagalde had at his disposal
Scarpe, and the main attack was to start the             certain regional troops in numbers equivalent
following morning, with the objective Plouvain—          to a weak division, who were located in the
Marquion—Cambrai. Sir Ronald Adam with                   outer sector from Grayelines to the Forest of
three divisions (two British and one French)             Clairmarais and whose dispositions had been
was to advance east of the Canal du Nord, and            roughly co-ordinated with those of Brigadier
General Altmeyer with two French divisions               Usher. About this time the 68th French
to the west of the Canal du Nord, his right being        Division arrived at Dunkirk from Belgium and
covered by the French Cavalry Corps. This                took over the inner sector.
attack was never carried out for reasons which              On the 24th and 25th May the British posts
will presently appear.*                                  on the river Aa were taken over by the French,
    On the same day, I issued orders to dissolve         who also began to operate the inundations,
the various improvised forces on the Canal               which formed part of the defence scheme of
line, and their units were absorbed by the               Dunkirk and extended each side of Bergues and
 formations in the areas of which they now were..         as far as the Belgian frontier north of the
 I appointed Major-General Eastwoodj to take             Bergues—Furnes canal.
 command of the defences on the Canal line,               2$th May—Attacks on the Canal Line and on
and he assumed command early on 25th May.                        the Belgian Army.
    The position on the Canal line was consider-              42. On 25th May, enemy activity intensified.
 ably strengthened -during 24th May. 44th                  Two enemy Corps were reported to be attacking
 Division began to move into the line between             the French in the area Denain—Bouchain ; the
the forest of Clairmarais and Aire, with 2nd               enemy was also across the canal at St. Venant,
 Division on its left between Aire and La Bassee,          and was developing the bridgeheads between
 and 4&th Division (lately Polforce) from La              that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, whilst
 Bassee to Raches. It was not till the evening             further north the situation on the river Aa was
 however that 2nd and 44th Divisions gained                still obscure.
 contact with the enemy and for most of the day               At about 7 a.m. on 25th May, news was
 the defence of the sector still remained under            received that in the late evening of 24th May
 the Commanders of Macforce and Perforce.                  the enemy had attacked the Belgian 4th Corps
    Fighting of a somewhat confused character              on the Lys with a force reported to be of four
 went on for most of the day in and south of               divisions, supported by tanks. The attack
 the Forest of Nieppe, and the enemy also began            penetrated to a 'depth of i| miles on a front of
 heavy bombing and shelling of Cassel. The                 13 miles between Menin and Desselghem.
 remainder of Macforce, which included field                  It was fast becoming a matter of vital
 and anti-tank artillery, was therefore sent               importance to keep open our line of communica-
 to reinforce the i3/i8th Hussars.                         tion to the coast through a corridor which was
     48th Division (with under its command part            hourly narrowing. It was no longer possible
 of 23rd Division in the area Gravelines—St.               to count on using the main road Estaires—
 Omer) was ordered to send one "infantry brigade         • Cassel—Dunkirk, while the news which had
 to Dunkirk and one to Cassel and Hazebrouck.              just been received made it certain that before
  I45th Infantry Brigade completed its relief              long, the whole area east of the Yser canal
 of the improvised garrisons of the two latter             would be in the hands of the enemy, since there      <•
 places on 25th May, but General Thome found               was, in fact, no satisfactory defensive position
 that the French had already made complete                 between the Lys and the Yser canal. There
 dispositions for Dunkirk, and had informed                seemed, therefore, to be a serious risk of the
 the British Base Commandant. He therefore                 Belgian right becoming separated from the
 decided to send I44th Infantry Brigade to                 British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army
 Bergues and Wormhoudt. He established his                  being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather
  H.Q. at Bergues, which he- rightly regarded as           than in a westerly direction. I considered it
 the vital point of defence.                               vitally urgent to prolong the British front
The French reinforce Dunkirk.                              without delay northwards to Ypres, along
                                                           the old Ypres—Comines canal, now practically
  41. The local defences of Dunkirk, in                    dry, and round Ypres itself to the line of the
accordance with French practice, were under                Yser canal.
   * See pars.. 43.                                           As an immediate step, I2th Lancers were
   f Major-General T. R. Eastwood had recently             sent off early on 25th to .watch the left flank of
arrived in France to take command of a division, and,      2nd Corps on the Lys, and gain touch with the
pending a vacancy, was attached to the Staff of G.H.Q.     right flank of the Belgians.


Details

5928          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

   ist and 2nd Corps were to withdraw on the .         on the historic ground of the Ypres-Comines
night of 28th/29th May to a horse-shoe position        Canal, Zillebeke and the eastern outskirts of
on the line Proven-Poperinghe-Ypres-Bix-               Ypres, and on these positions, the infantry, well
schoote, with outposts on the line Ypres-              supported by the artillery, had stubbornly held
Godevaersvelde. The position of 3rd Corps was          their ground in the face of strong and deter-
more difficult and obscure. 2nd Division, now          mined attacks by the enemy.
reduced to less than the strength of an infantry          ist Corps also ordered ist Division to move
brigade, had fought hard and had sustained a           into their sector of the perimeter; on the same
strong enemy tank attack. It was already in            day ist Corps was ordered to reinforce the
process of withdrawing from the line and orders        garrison of Bergues with one battalion. This
were issued for it to fall back in the direction of    order could not be carried out that day, but
Beveren and Proven, prolonging the right flank         next day (29th May) a battalion of 46th Divi-
of ist Corps. 48th and 44th Divisions were in'         sion (9th Foresters) was sent there.
contact with the enemy on a front of over twenty
miles from Bergues through Cassel to Vieux                During this time it had been, a constant
Berquin, in touch with the French ist Light             anxiety to G.H.Q. lest those enemy forces
Mechanised Division, west of the latter place.         released by the Belgian armistice should fore-
The French ist Army had 3rd and 4th Corps in           stall our occupation of the perimeter. There
line between Merville and Sailly-sur-la-Lys,           had been no time to lose. Early on the 28th
but were out of touch with their 5th Corps.            the leading enemy mobile troops and tanks had
   The orders to 48th Division were to stand           reached Nieuport, and they would have arrived
for a few hours longer. They withdrew that             there unopposed had it not been for the work
night under pressure from the enemy, with the           of a troop of i2th Lancers. The state of the
assistance of the armoured vehicles of the             roads, congested as they were with refugees and
Hopkinson Mission. The garrison of Worm-               Belgian troops, must also have played their
houdt was extricated together with such portions       part in delaying the enemy. Throughout the
of the garrison of Cassel as could disengage from      day, however, the defensive positions were
the enemy. 44th Division was also ordered              improved and a number of additional troops
to disengage that night, and to move north- '          from various units, chiefly Royal Artillery, were
eastwards towards the old frontier defences.           collected and organised to occupy them.
46th Division, which had moved on the night               On 29th May, troops of I2th Infantry Brigade
26th/27th May from the Seclin area to Steen-           and Corps Artillery began to arrive; that
vorde, was to move into the Dunkirk perimeter.         night 4th Division relieved the mixed detach-
   Before he received this order, the Commander        ments which up to now had been holding the
of 44th Division (Major-General Osborne) had           sector. Throughout the 29th May the enemy
visited headquarters of the French 4th Corps,          had been attempting to cross the canal between
where he learned of the Belgian armistice ; and        the French-Belgian frontier and Nieuport.
heard that General Prioux had orders to stand          At the latter place, where the bridge had not
his ground. He, too, had endeavoured to                been blown, they established a bridgehead in
convince General Prioux that the only hope             the town. Everywhere else they were driven
for his army lay in withdrawal.                        back. Some attempted to cross in rubber boats;
                                                       others were disguised as civilians, even as nuns,
   Later, on 28th May fresh orders were issued         and attempted to cross with the refugees, horses
by the French ist Army. They were to the               and cattle. On this day enemy forces advancing
effect that General Prioux himself would               near the coast were shelled by H.M. ships.
remain with the 4th Corps in its present position,        Thus, once again the enemy had been fore-
and that General de la Laurencie, with his own         stalled just in the nick of time, and the prompt
3rd Corps and the Cavalry Corps, would with-
draw so as to arrive within the Dunkirk peri-           and gallant action of the troops on the spot had
meter on 3oth May. No copy of this order               gained the few vital hours which were to make
reached General Osborne, who learned of the            it possible, against all expectation, to embark
change*of plans when, at 10.30 p.m. that night,        practically the whole force.
he visited the headquarters of the French ist              54. On the afternoon of 28th May, I moved
Army. As General de la Laurencie had decided           my headquarters from Houtkerque to La
to begin his move at 11.30 p.m., General Osborne.       Panne, which was in direct telephonic com-
had some difficulty in conforming, but succeeded        munication with London. On arrival I heard
in doing so. I was genuinely very glad to learn         reports from Sir Ronald Adam and the Quarter-
that part, at any rate, of the French ist Army          Master-General.
would now be sharing in the withdrawal, how-               These reports were not optimistic. No ships
ever great the difficulties might be.                   could be unloaded at the dock§ at'Dunkirk, and
                                                      . few wounded could be evacuated. There was
Occupation of the Perimeter Completed.                  no water in Dunkirk and very little on the
   53. ist and 2nd Corps were now free to pro-          beaches. The naval plans were not yet in full
ceed with the occupation of their sectors of the        operation, and some 20,000 men were waiting
Dunkirk perimeter, and both Commanders met              to be taken off the beaches, 10,000 having been
Sir Ronald Adam on 28th May. 2nd Corps                  taken off in the last two days, chiefly from
had, that morning, ordered Headquarters, 2nd            Dunkirk. The area was congested with French
Armoured Reconnaissance. Brigade, to take over          and Belgian troops and their transport, as well
the sector from Fumes exclusive to the sea at           as with refugees.
Nieuport, and now ordered 4th Division to move             They gave it as their opinion that, given a
from the line of the Ypres-Comines Canal to             reasonable measure of immunity from air attack,
relieve them. 3rd Division was to follow as             troops could gradually be evacuated and
soon as possible and take over the sector               supplies landed. If, however, intensive enemy
between the French-Belgian frontier and Furnes.         air attack continued, the beaches might easily
   These two divisions had been in the line at          become a shambles within the next forty-eight
Ypres since 25th May. They had held positions           hours.


Details

5930          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
   On the evening of 2gth May, therefore, the            -I judged that it would be imprudent to con-
organisation of the perimeter was complete, and        tinue to maintain our position on the perimeter
Sir Ronald Adam's task was successfully                outside the permanent defences of Dunkirk
accomplished. He himself embarked that night.          for more than twenty-four hours longer, and I
   By 3oth May, there remained in the area, at         therefore decided to continue the evacuation
an estimate, 80,000 British troops for evacuation      by withdrawing 2nd Corps on the night of
and I had now to complete the plans for the            3ist May/ist June.
final withdrawal of the Force. I had received a           Orders were accordingly issued for 2nd Corps
telegram from the Secretary of State, which            to withdraw 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions to the
read as follows :—                                     beaches and Dunkirk. 5oth Division was to fall
      " Continue to defend present perimeter to        back to the French defences on the Belgian
   the utmost in order to cover maximum                frontier, and come under command of ist Corps,
   evacuation now proceeding well. . . . If we         together with the British Base staff at
   can still communicate with you we shall send        Dunkirk. These moves began to take place on
   you an order to return to England with such         the morning of 3 ist May; by this time there
   officers as you may choose at the moment            had been a general thinning out of the whole
   when we deem your command so reduceduthat           force, and I felt that, however the situation
   it can be handed to a Corps Commander.              might develop, valuable cadres had been with-
   You should now nominate this commander.             drawn which would enable the fighting units of
   If communications are broken you are to hand        the B.E.F. to be quickly reformed at home.
   over and return as specified when your effective
   fighting force does not exceed equivalent of
   three divisions. This is in accordance with           58. The remains of the B.E.F., on being with-
   correct military procedure and no personal          drawn inside the area of the French defences, now
   discretion is left to you in the matter. . . .      came under the orders of Admiral Abrial, and
   The Corps Commander chosen by you should            the time had therefore arrived for me to hand
   be ordered to carry on defence and evacuation       over my command, in accordance with the
   with French whether from Dunkirk or                 instructions I had received, and to embark for
   beaches. . . ."                                     England. I invited Generals Blanchard and
   The problem was to thin out the troops, while       de la Laurencie to j oin me on the j ourney. To my
maintaining a proper defence of the perimeter,         regret they were both unable to do so, though
yet at the same time not to retain a larger            1 was able to arrange for some of the staff of
number of men than could be embarked in                General de la Laurencie's 3rd Corps to sail with
one lift.                                              that of G.H.Q.
   I had received orders from home that French            I had selected Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G.
and British troops were to embark in equal             Alexander to remain in France in command of
proportions. Thus it looked at one time as if          ist Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 men
the British would have to continue holding a           in all. On the afternoon of 3ist May I gave him
perimeter, either the existing one or something        his instructions, which were based on those I had
smaller, at least another four or five days, to        myself received from H.M. Government. He
enable all the troops to embark. Yet the enemy         was to operate under the orders of Admiral
pressure was increasing and there was no depth         Abrial, and to assist the French in the defence
in our position. A line on the dunes could only        of Dunkirk. At the same time he was to occupy
be held during the hours of darkness to cover          himself with arrangements for the evacuation of
the final phase of the withdrawal.                     his command, and I stressed the importance of
   I discussed the situation with the Commanders       the French sharing equally in the facilities which
of ist and 2nd Corps on 3oth May. Embarkation          were provided for evacuation.
had gone well that day, especially from Dunkirk,
but enemy pressure had increased at Furnes and           I agreed with Major-General Alexander on
Bergues and it was plain that the eastern end          the night 2nd/3rd June as a provisional date for
of the perimeter could not be held much longer.        evacuating his force.
The enemy had begun to shell the beach at                  That evening, therefore, at 6 p.m., my head-
La Panne. I was still concerned lest the arrange-       quarters closed, and after handing over command
ments for embarking the French should for any           to Major-General Alexander,* I embarked in
reason prove inadequate. I therefore motored            H.M.S. Hebe, and sailed for England about
to Dunkirk to inform Admiral Abrial of my               2 a.m. on ist June. At this time the withdrawal
views and to assure myself that the arrangements        of 2nd Corps was proceeding according to plan,
for embarking British and French troops in              but under increasing enemy pressure by land
equal proportions were working smoothly.                and air; the troops were moving to their places
    The Admiral assured me of his agreement            "on the beaches steadily and in good order. The
about the evacuation of the sector, and we then         plans made by the Admiralty to provide small
 discussed the problem of embarkation.                  craft were by now in full operation; embarka-
    I had already agreed with General de la             tion was proceeding far more smoothly than it
 Laurencie to evacuate 5,000 picked men from his        had yet done, and was favoured by a calm sea
 3rd Corps, which had fought alongside us and           that night.
 of the fighting value-of which I had a high             In all, 211,532 fit men and 13,053 casualties
 opinion. However, the Admiral told me that            were embarked at Dunkirk and the beaches, in
 he had had orders from General Weygand that           addition to 112,546 allied troops, f
 the personnel of the Cavalry Corps were to be
 embarked in priority to others. The matter
 was settled in a most friendly atmosphere and           * An account of events after Major-General Alexander
 I satisfied myself, so far as it was possible, that   assumed command is given in Appendix I.
 no trouble was likely to arise in practice over         f These figures have been obtained from the-War
                                                       Office.
 the sharing of the berths at the Dunkirk mole.


Details

5934         SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

of my three Corps. Lieut.-Generals Sir Alan          Honours and Awards.
Brooke, M. G. H. Barker and Sir Ronald Adam,            73. I am submitting separately the names of
Bart. The sudden turn of events on iyth May          officers and other ranks whom I wish to recom-
threw a violent and unexpected strain on the         mend for reward or to bring to your notice for
Commander, Lines of Communication Area (the          gallant or distinguished service.
late Major-General P. de Fonblanque), and I
wish to record my sincere appreciation of his                        I have the honour to be
good and devoted work during the time that he
was serving under my command.                                                       Sir,
   Finally, I desire to express my thanks and                              Your Obedient Servant,
good wishes to all those officers in' the' French                                 GORT,
Army whose duties brought them into contact
with the British Expeditionary Force, and whose                                        General,
goodwill, understanding and personal friendship
 did so much to foster the good relations which                              Commander-in-Chief,
existed between the two armies.                                          British Expeditionary Force.


                  APPENDIX TO SECOND DESPATCH OF C.-IN-C., B.E.F.

OPERATIONS OF IST CORPS FROM 6 P.M.                   artillery fire. It was therefore evident that the
ON 3isT MAY TO MIDNIGHT SND/SED JUNE,                 force could not be evacuated completely on the
                 1940                                 night ist/2nd June. Major-General Alexander
                                                      therefore agreed on a modified plan with Admiral
   Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander,          Abrial and General Fagalde at 8 a.m. on ist June.
on taking over command of ist Corps, handed           He arranged to hold his present line till
over command of the ist Division to Brigadier         midnight ist/2nd June; thus he would cover
M. B. Beckwith-Smith. He then proceeded to            Dunkirk and so enable the French to evacuate
Dunkirk to see Admiral Abrial, who informed           as many of their troops as possible. He would
him that he intended to hold the perimeter till       then withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk
all the troops were embarked. A French Corps          with all available anti-aircraft and anti-tank
on the right was to hold the sector from Grave-       guns and such troops as had not yet embarked.
lines to Bergues (Gravelines however had not              During the ist June, heavy enemy attacks
apparently been in French hands for some days)        developed on the British sector, supported by
and a mixed French and British Corps under             bombing and artillery fire. The garrison of
command of Major-General Alexander was to             Bergues (ist Loyals) were forced to withdraw
hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres, and           to the line of the canal north of the town, and
thence to the sea.                                     to the west, 46th Division, i26tH Infantry
    Major-General Alexander at once • told the         Brigade of 42nd Division and ist Division
Admiral and General Fagalde that in his view           were forced back north of the canal for about
this plan did not take account of the true naval       1,000 yards. 5oth Division had also to meet
and military situation which was serious and           enemy penetration from the east, but by
deteriorating rapidly. The fighting condition of       nightfall on ist June the enemy advance had
the tro'ops was now such that prolonged resist-        been checked on a line Bergues-Uxem-Ghyvelde,
 ance was out of the question and the present          thence due east to the frontier and along the
front could riot in his opinion be maintained          frontier defences to the sea.
 after.the night ist/2nd June : furthermore the
 line to be held was so close to the beach and to         Embarkation was temporarily stopped at
 Dunkirk that the enemy might soon stop all            3 a.m. on 2nd June to prevent casualties in
 further evacuation by short range artillery fire.     daylight; by that time there remained in the
 He gave the same opinion to the Secretary of          Dunkirk area about 3,000 men of various
 State and received a reply that the British force      artillery and infantry units, with seven anti-
 should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible on a       aircraft guns and twelve anti-tank guns. They
 basis of equal numbers of British and French           held the outskirts of Dunkirk throughout
 continuing to be embarked from that time            - 2nd June with little interference save heavy
 onward. This he showed to Admiral Abrial               shelling and bombing of the beaches.
 and General Fagalde informing'them that he                By midnight on 2nd/3rd June, all the remain-
 would hold the sector allotted to him till mid-        ing British troops had been embarked. Major-
 night ist/2nd June and then withdraw under             General Alexander, with the Senior Naval Officer
 cover of darkness. They agreed that in the.            (Captain W. G. Tennant, R.N.) made a tour of
 circumstances no other plan was feasible.              the beaches and harbour in a motor boat and
    The naval situation had by now grown worse,         on being satisfied that no British troops were
 and the Channel from Dunkirk was under direct          left on shore, they themselves left for England.


                                              LONDON
          PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
       To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
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Details

Page69
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. WHIPPINGHAM - Lieutenant Eric Reed, R.N.R.
from Dunkirk harbour on the 1st June,
Embarked troops from Dunkirk beach on 31st May and
Recommendations.
Le
RATING.
'd
Chief Mechanician Arthur Frederick Ford, P/K. 21534.
When the ship was alongside the pier overladen
and straddled by enemy gunfire, troops rushed to
port and the ship took a list of 20 degrees. Ford
CE
checked the rush and moved the troops back to starboard OF
thus preventing a major disaster.
Ford again showed powers of leadership above the
ordinary in pressing troops into service for getting
in the brows, cutting the moorings and getting the
ship away from the pier. Afterwards he went below
to take the ship out.
Recommended for mention.
y
an
D
y
S
as
ons
After
inteer
troop
ontinu
was
time
ip
to
hours
........

Details

Page 70
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
being bombed and machine-gunned on the way across. While May,
This vessel proceeded to Bray beach on the 29th
bombing attack took place. The ship was struck on the
off the beach embarking troops in the evening, the third
blown away, No.2 gun put out of action and the 0.5 machir
quarter deck, about 40 feet of stern being completely
gun platforms wrecked, in addition to much other damage.
In spite of the damage done, of the fact that the ship
was grounded aft and of the casualties suffered (3 office
and 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men wounded), BIDEFOR
continued to embark troops during the night, and when
eventually towed off and home, carried 400 troops to
England on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS,
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
eventually carried 400 to England.
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan. M.B.. B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he dealt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteer
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troop
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther on said he would remain in BIDEFORD and continu was
his work there, knowing full well that BIDEFORD time
very it was considered highly improbable that the to
severely damaged and aground; and at that ship
would reach England, but he gave up his chance
Carried get away out his voluntary duties for all but 48 hours
in order to tend his wounded comrades.
continuously in a most efficient manner.

Details

Page 146.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
BASE STAFF (continued).
OFFICERS:
Captain William Vesey Hamilton Harris, M.V.O., D.S.C.,R.N. (Retd.)
This officer was solely responsible for the
organisation of the minesweeping vessels which took part
in the operation. These ships not only evacuated
troops from Dunkirk but also maintained routine sweeps
under most difficult circumstances. By his cheerful
leadership and tireless efforts, this officer was able
to maintain his entire force at my disposal, and thereby
contributed largely to the success of the enterprise.
Recommended for mention.
Commodore John Stewart Gordon Fraser, D.S.O., R.N. (Retd.).
For tireless zeal, energy and good judgment in
dealing with the largely increased demand for repair and
maintenance arrangements of the Port during the operation
With limited facilities, the organisation built up by
Commodore Fraser met all requirements, and the arrange-
ments for which this officer was responsible contributed
in a major degree to the success of the enterprise.
Recommended for decoration,
Commander Francis John Lambert, D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.).
For exceptional zeal and devotion to duty. This
officer, as King's Harbour Master, had to control and
berth large numbers of ships, transports, skoots, and
small vessela, and direct their movements for the
purposes of repairs, fuelling, coaling, etc. To do
this Commander Lambert was almost continuously on duty
day and night throughout the operation, and his untiring
efforts contributed materially to the success of the
enterprise.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Commander (E) Weston Smith. R.N.
This officer worked throughout the operation with
exceptional and tireless energy and enthusiasm when in
charge of repairs and making good damage caused to
ships and boats. His skill as an Engineer Officer and
intelligent improvisation and adaptability in all
respects proved of inestimable value. His cheerful
bearing and leadership during the long hours by day and
night were an inspiration to all with whom he came in
contact, and contributed largely to the success of the
operation.
Recommended for decoration.
Surgeon Captain Arthur Rowland Fisher, R.N. (Retd)
This officer was faced with the difficult problem those of
dealing with casualties out of all proportion to

Details

Page 150
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICERS.
The work done by the Sea Transport Officers
throughout the Operation of Dynamo, entailed an
enormous amount of labour, which was carried out
in a highly efficient manner.
Commodore Jukes-Hughes was in charge at Dover,
and it was entirely due to his organisation and
smooth working that enabled nearly 181,000 to be
disembarked at Dover without any hitch whatsoever,
and at Folkestone, nearly 32,000.
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Hughes.,R.N. (Retd.)
As P.S.T.O. was responsible for the successful
disembarkation of troops, and the greatest credit
is due to the capable and efficient way in which
the troops were disembarked and able manner in
which he was able to arrange for the quick turn
rounds of the various transports that came into
harbour.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Allan Raymond MacKewn, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out the ordinary duties
of Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant MacKewn went
in command of an armed party to the ST. SEIRIOL,
where the Master had refused to sail, thereby
showing great devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out his ordinary duties,
this officer volunteered to take over the duty of
Chief Officer of Transport, Canterbury, as there
was no relief available, thereby showing great
devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson, R.M.
During the period of the operation he was in
almost constant attendance at the office and was
only absent for very brief periods for sleep. His
local knowledge was of great assistance to the
P.S.T.O., and a great deal of the success of the
organisation is due to his great devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant/

Details

Wt. 20906/9711 40M 8/39 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671
Register No.
Min 1)
Minute Sheet No.
Captain Eric Fitzgerald Wharton, R.N. (Retd.) (Lent from
Admiralty S.V.P.)
Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander John Wissett Edelsten, R.N.R.
(Secretary to N.O. in C.)
Lieutenant-CommanderSt. John George Hanson Pitt, R.N., (Retd.)
(Maintenance Lieutenant-Commander MERRIE ENGLAND)
Temporary Paymaster Sub-Lieutenant Maxwell Kerr Hamilton, R.N.V.R.
(Assistant Secretary)
Engineer Captain John Lewis Deacon, R.N., (Retd.), M.V.O.,
(Base Engineer Officer)
Sick Berth Petty Officer Wilfred Harry Groves, C/MX.48183,
Chief Yeoman of Signals Lawrence Hamer Hanson, P.229251
Stoker Petty Officer Frederick George Charman, KX.75070
Petty Officer Alexander Hood Bruce Ireland, J.6530
Surgeon-CommanderWilliam Gordon Fitzpatrick, R.N.
Sick Berth Petty Officer Harry Munro Hawkins, C/M.37726,
Sick Berth Petty Officer (R) Rupert Arthur Lockwood, C/MX.49872
Sick Berth Petty Officer (R) George Robert Wright, X.6227
Sick Berth Attendant (R) Alfred Bassford, X.8080
Captain John George Lawrence Dundas, R.N.
Commander Frederick John Walker, R.N.
Commander Lewès George Gardner, R.N., (Retired)
Mr. William Pearce, Commissioned Signal Boatswain, R.N.,
(Retired)
VAV
Chief Yeoman of Signals John William Baker, P.29166,
Chief Yeoman of Signals Francis George Ward, C/J.31094
Captain Lionel George Dawson, R.N., (Retd.)
Lieutenant-Commander William Canning Eykyn, R.N., (Reted.)
Paymaster Commander Cecil John Leary, R.D., R.N.R.
Commander Desmond Adair Stride, R.N., (Retd.)
N
Captain William Vesey Hamilton Harris, M.V.O., D.S.C., R.N.,
(Retd.)
Commodore John Stewart Gordon Fraser, D.S.O., R.N., (Retd.)
Commander Francis John Lambert, D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.)
Lieutenant-Commander (E) Weston Smith, R.N.
Surgeon Captain Arthur Rowland risher, R.N., (Retd.)
Surgeon Lieutenant Godfrey Fraser Carey, R.N.V.R., M.B., CH.B
M.R.C.S., M.R.C.P.
Surgeon Lieutenant George Atherton Hart, R.N.V.R., M.B., B.S.,
M.R.C.S., M.R.C.P.
Captain John Fawcett, R.N., (Retired)
Lieutenant-CommanderRobert Glen Wardrop, R.N.R., (Retired)
Regulating Petty Officer F.J. Phillips, C/X.39981
Acting Engine Room Artificer 4th Class Hugh Duffie, X.2957, E.A.
Regulating Petty OfficerG. Stapley, C/M.39658
Chief Electrical Artificer Edgar James Lovell (Pensioner),
P.N.11998, P/M.27540
Leading Sick Berth Attendant Norman Clyde Martin, C/MX.49373
Mr. William Ferguson, Naval Store Officer
Mr. R.W.W. Corbitt, Assistant Naval Store Officer
Mr. Bakewell, Victualling Store Officer
Mr. D.J. Woods, Armament Supply Officer
Lieutenant A.A. Raymond MacKewn, R.N.RSea Transport Officer
Major Lieutenant-Commander Steele Wilkinson, R.M. Sea Transport Officer
Allan Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
Signalman James Walter, R.N.V.R., C/LDT.4178
Lionel S. Duffy, R.N.V.R., C/TDX.1412
Lieutenant Signalman Ronald Charles H. Edward Stoker, R.N.R. Sea Transport Officer
Petty office Edward Bastable, PIJX. 127305.
X
Chief office John William Ailwyn Jones. Hospital Camer DINARD.
Stewardess has A. Goodrich.
Chief Enjures Norman Smith
5r

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SECRET
9
6
Subject.. Personnel. Recommendations for Services in Action.
From
The Commanding Officer. H.M.S. BIDEFORD.
Date
June 6th. 1940. No
To
The Vice Admiral Commanding. Dover.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following report on
the conduct of my officers and ships company during the
period May 29th - May 31st. 1940.
2. The general behaviour of the personnel was
excellent. There was a feeling of great satisfaction throughout
the ship when the orders td proceed to Dunkirk were recieved,
3. The behaviour of the men under fire was exemplary.
There were no signs of panic or fear; orders were
passed and recieved clearly, and were executed rapidly and
correctly. All did their duty calmly and efficiently.
4. Great credit for the general organisation of the
ship to meet emergencies is due to the late Lieutenant PAUL
ALISTAIR STEWART R.N., the Executive officer and Gunnery
officer of the ship.
5. No acts of exceptional gallantry were observed,
but I wish to bring to your special notice the two following
cases of very great devotion to duty :-
I. Surgeon Lieutenant JOHN JORDAN. MB. B.Ch. R.N.
This officer by his conduct, zeal and unswerving
devotion to duty throughout the period May 29th - May 31st.
was an outstanding example to us all. His Sick Berth Attendant
seriously wounded; with limited resources, he competed with some
fifty casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded. He performed several major operations; he organised
his limited resources to their utmost,; throughout the period
$
he attended his patients continuously, and at all times display-
ed great ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him, no call was left unanswered; he was completely
selfless. He upheld the traditions of the Royal Navy and of his
profession in a most worthy manner. It is considered that he WO
would be the very worthy recipient of a decoration in recognition
of his services.
GEORGE
II. No.7354480. Private/WILLIAM CROWDER.
6th. Field Ambulance. 'B' Company.
This man wasembarked from Bray Beach for passage to
England. After the ship was struck by bombs he volunteered
immediately to assist the Surgeon in tending the wounded, About
an hour later H.M. Kellett came alongside to take off all troops
embarked, because this was considered most advisable. Crowder
promptly said he would remain in H.M.S. Bidefoed and continue
tending the wounded. He did this knowing full well thatH. M.S.
Bideford was very severly damaged and aground; that at that time
it was considered highly improbable the ship would reach
England

Details

159
3
164
Engineer left. Officer. There was very little H.A. ammunition
t.June. 10. Immediately were dischar ed at Margate I
sailed again for Dunkerque. On the way there I passed
H.M.S.HAVANT, in distress behind Dyke Shoal. "HAVANT"
was on fire for'd SO I jettisoned my depth charges, placed
ARGATE
my stern under her bows and took er in to: on my sweep
wires. Only very slow speed could be made as her helm
UNKERQUE.
WAS over and she paravaned over to the side and pulled
my stern over. During this time the ship was subject
to frequent and savy bombing and machine gun attacks -
at one time there very 40 aircraft OV rhead. Many salvoes
of bombs fell near to the shipp mostly on the starboard
quarter and port bom, some were within 30 feet of the
M.S.
ship. Most of the bombs were small but some were large.
AVANT.
Splinters from the bonbs and sprayfrom their splach fell
on board fret uently. It Was very nociteable that nearly
all the splinters were very small and far too light to do
damage, although the force of the explosion burst open
the wheelhouse doors and shattered the windows which are
protected by splinter mats. I believe most of the larger
splint THE passed ever the ship, there trajectory
presumeably being nearly vertical on bursting, them
fanning out and coins further than the light ones. This
Dombing completely upsat ay compass. Machine run attacks
Mere also experienced, also from the starboard quarter
and port bow. These were attempts to rake the ship fore
and aft, but were all aimed too hi h; very faw bullets
were found on board fterwards, all being ni ses over.
The enemy made three mistakes during each attack.
1. He estimated the course Oil & line through "HAVANT"
and "SALTASH". Actually "HAVAME" was abo 10°
on the quarter.
2. its over estimated the speed.
3. He over estimated the hight of our decks above
water.
Had he been correct in 1. he would a Ve scored nany hits
with bombs, and if correct in 8. would have caused many
casualties on deck. No casualties were xperienced and
no major damage was done. During this time I believe
the "HAVANT" was also subjected to attack. I had now
only two round of H.A. high explosive left, a few shrapnel
and six pans of lewin gun ammunition. 4 in. L.A. sun
was used against low flying aircraft, but without any
noticeable affect. 12 pdr. and levis gun seemed to
disturb the enemy.
11.
Later the Commanding Officer of H.M.S.HAVANT decided
to abandon ship, as sue appeared to be codus to turn over
at any moment. In my judgment, also, she was bound to
had several large holes in her side near the deak level.
capsize shortly and then would inevitably sink, as she
channel and sink in a dangerous position, or, more
As, after capsimin and micht possibly drift towards the

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226
SECRET²⁴¹
Subject.. Personnel. Recommendations for Services in Action.
From.....
Date
The Commanding Officer. H.M.S.BIDEFORD.
June 6th. 1940. NO.....
To
The Vice Admiral Commending. Lover.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the following report on
the conduct of By officers and ships company during the
period May 29th - May 31st. 1940.
2. The general behaviour of the personnel was
excellent. There was a feeling of great satisfaction throughout
the ship when the orders to proceed to Dunkirk were recieved,
3. The behaviour of the nen under fire was exemplary.
There were no signs of panic or fear; orders were
passed and recleved clearly, and were executed rapidly and
correctly. All did their duty caluly and efficiently.
4. Great credit for the general organisation of the
ship to meet emergencies is due to the late Lieutenant PAUL
ALISTAIR STEWART R.N., the Executive officer and Gunnery
officer of the ship.
5. No acts of exceptional gallantry were observed,
but I wish to bring to your special notice the two following
cases of very great devotion to duty :-
I. Surgeon Lieutenant JOHN JORDAN. MB. B.Ch. R.N.
This officer by his conduct, zeal and unswerving
devotion to duty throughout the period May 29th - May 31st.
was an outstanding example to us all. His Sick Borth Attendant
seriously wounded; with limited resources, he competed with some
fifty casualties, many horribly autilated or dangerously
wounded. He performed sever 1 major operations; he organised
his limited resources to their utmostn; throughout the period h
he attended his patients continuously, and at all times display-
ed great Dility, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him, no call was left unanswered; he was completely
selfless. He upheld the traditions of the Royal Navy and of his
profession in a most worthy nanner. It is considered that he TO
would be the very worthy recipient of a decoration in recogniti
of his services.
GEORGE CROWDER
II. No.7354480. Private WILLIAM CROWDER.
6th. Field Ambulance " Company.
England. After the ship was struck by bonbs he volunteered
This man wasembarked from Bray Beach for passage to
an hour later S.M.S.Kellett came alongside to take off all troops
immediately to assist the Surgeon in tending the wounded, About
promptly said he would remain in H.W.S.Hideford and continue
embarked, because this was considered most advisable. Crowder
Bideford the very severly damaged and aground; at that time
tending wounded. He did yhis knowing full well that thatH.M.S.
it was considered was highly improbable the ship would England. reach

Details

II.
26y
(NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING
283
OPERATION DYNAMO)
Friday 31st May (contd) During the mornang one of the Beachmasters
came off to me and endeavoured to persuade ae to beach the ship
(HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was
so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots
now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I
was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards
became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HKBE came
off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large
motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside no and transferred
256 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space
was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a
destryer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from
me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared
I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed.
Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet
Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover.
By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about
5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low
cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably
500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns.
The bomb fell on my Port quarter batween ate and the Drifter.
Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently
shaking both ships no ajur major damage was done. The force of
the explosion caused my compans to jump out of its gimbals.
Certain damage was done to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room.
After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled
by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided
to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks 80
as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as
possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick
fog was encountered at about 1830.
On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered
that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass.
During the cassage through the Downs the tow parted on several
occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels.
At about 0100 on Saturday lat June I was about 1
cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again.
This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very
near miss only wetted the troops on the port aide aft. There
were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured
alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and
secured for the night for which I was very grateful an we had
been running continuously for over three days and I had had no
sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were At effected 1700
to the and provisions and water ware embarked.
where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner
I proceeded Engine to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving Harbour. at 2000,
Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively
permanent On were effected to the Engine in and Capatan. they were When
all repairs brought to immediate notice case
required skoots were it was decided that FRISO Harbour. was not sufficiently
reliable again and so was left in the Inner
I and on Friday were in the Boats at the time
cannot speak too highly of ay crew for 7/4 who hours worked
continuously, The 0 nly men being onboard and myself. were
without my First & Lieutenant break. one seamen and the B.R.A.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
VICE
ADMIRAL
Your obedient servant,
JUN1940
DOVER
Lieutenant.
Royal Navy.

Details

Page 1.
NARRATIVE.
290
SIGNALS.
Scorth Goodwin Light in company with "Dundalk", signal
to "Niger" be used to was carry given. out ferry service between Sheerness
Informed V.A.D. and R.A.D. Time of arrival La Panne 0700.
ered both whalers and motor-bost and sent them inshore.
Teach. 1 considerable surf was running. There was no one
soon as the boats arrived in they were seized by soldiers.
overleaded and capsized.
R.A.D. from "Niger"
regarding the final evacuation wa s received giving the
1. V.A. D's 0357 intend to
dezvous and time. As "Niger" then scareely any troops
fill up with troops now
to R.A.D. in "Keith" with the Idea of saving time.
and If unable to make 20
but R.A.D. instructed yachts to fill up "Niger" first.
-ndervous in time tonight
1045 "Niger" had over 200 troops on board when it was
will ask him to supply
spare ship.
Sheerness in order to save Before sailing
1. "Niger" from R.A.D.
R.A.I In consequence Lieutenant Hichens R.N.V.R.
You should leave in time
two yachts as pantoons, secured grass lines to the
to make rendezvous tonigh
Manised the boats pulley-haldy on these lines. I was
work made the most tremendous difference to the rate of
-$ whether full or not.
Spart from making it comparatively safe and avoiding the
/3. R.A.D. from "Higer"
aldiers which was extremely high in the early morning,
I have one officer who
frequently.
has volunteered to stay
at Admiralty pier.
ashore and assist on the
beach. He is confident
4 Sailed immediately.
that with a grass line
and a yacht suchored in
in 38 fathoms. "Niger" and group 3 were to westward.
close he will get all
lowered as the evacuation was timed for 0030 and it was
soldiers off quickly. I
last shore motor boats would be used.
have great confidence in
him and intend to leave
Time off with some 30 soldiers under the commend of Sub.-Lieut.him behind.
had been towed by tug Tanya. Sub.Lieut. Byggott who had
4. Nost immediate.
Shumb reported that there were 150 soldiers abreast the ship
F.0.Dover.S.N.0.Dunkirk
moved to the westward to Bray. two whalers and the motor
from V.L.D.
gred and sent in. A fairly heavy surf was still running.
tray wishes to commence
evacuation 2030. Instruct
.v.r. (Name anknown) from THE San nill. anda off from beach
A B if 100 1
motor-boat in and another a shipse boat boat and were that aground there were with about some 50 60 more sold
beaches at this time.
off returned 30 empty about this time orders and reported to that they
The They Cox'n reported later that the left. boats had got off before
were at once sent in with tow the other boats
Sand that there were no soldiers
of came alongside with
hander Brigadiers the orders Robb and that to move all the further other to
Balso eastward seen from the shore and from troops
the troops of were me. Shortly afterwards this our boats time onwards returned with
off Bray. I
larly but slowly.
large took a
numbers were seen to be floats. on the These beach and
ers transport, but towed were also sent in and
was on nearly and swam low off. water, "Niger" was about three cables from the
continously u from Nieuport throughout the night.
ried out machine-gun attacks on the ships and beaches. Several
N.O.1/c Ramage let
330 troops on board "Niger" weighed and proceeded, from Major "Sutton" General @th,5th,6th Nore, Speedy M.S.F.C.IN N.O.1/c Shee C
Salamander* troops that the troops had been ordered to
remained and a message was received proceed to
-rness from V.A.D.
All available ships
operating under V.A.Dove:
ceeded "Sutton" in company, in accordance with' shore. signal In No.45 acc-
and M.S.F.s' addressed
are required to evacuate
tonight Saturday. Ships t
from
chor 1 instructions 1 mile east from of Dunkirk, Admirel's 3.5 motor cables boat, "Sutton" proceeded
-0 sail to arrive off
beaches between Dunkirk
and a point It miles Eas
abark troops.
-t at 2200/lst June.Ship
worked a ship's from boat the borrowed beach, the from motor S.S. boat Vren was in Dover, lowered the together other whhler-s sail.Ships equipment which have are report not not D.G. to
forth
ded in the ashore morning. Lieutenant Hichens, R.P., and R.N.V.R. no other in boats charge. being Licutensnt worked. heto with comply.A be whether shown dimmed shoreward they lightis can
occeded no troops along on the the beach beach towards waiting Dunkirk. About 5 He cables endeavoured westward to gewhen in 1510/1/6. position.
chments start emberkation of French troops but had drawn considerable up on the difficulty. beach. Finally he found

Details

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised Dynamso ds. 356
October, 1935.)
te
ECRE
$5
10
55
1
An
Dynam
349
lasman
60
355
65
TER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
DNI
n
70
7010
3347
4
during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with
an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the
boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might
be the boat for which we were searching. To make sure we
proceeded to Dunkirk where two open boats and a Thames
barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from
the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spaniards,
the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French and
English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at
approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 320
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and
various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England
but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor
motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charts on board. The air compressor motor was
made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left 1st Lieut., Leiut. Dehammel with instructions
opened the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
to sail the my barge to Dover; and proceeded along the coast having
About two up miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to within
of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter
approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward
could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course
was set to intercept the Thames barge.
by approximately eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 were the dropped
At 1720 when out of sight of land bombs we were attacked
The fell at to attack in pairs out dive of the sun
and eight six distances or varying from 10 to 50 yards of and ship.
having bombers appeared their bombs continued their endeavour firing to machine- miss
guns. the Course was appeared to explode after entering water,
released altered frequently in an the
some bombs. Some the surface and & certain number appeared ahead and not the to
explode at all. the splash. A certain amount who were exposed was
on striking One exploded under the bow right of discomfort ship
passed through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to
experienced the by eyes for the next twelve manning
Able-Seaman Power of the soldiers in the fore to peak. return to Dover now had
splash in the was wounded in the leg when As I the port
wounded on board ask for assistance for barge sailing
turret also one I considered it advisable the barge. A tug was
forthwith and approximately to 2100 and found the Deut. Dehammel well
sent out at from Dover. I consider Sub. bombing to
performed a very subjected had caused leaks for that night's the
about 10 miles creditable operation. The to the hull which and
petrol the ship tank had and been the ship was not used again
operation.

Details

CONFIDENTIAL
320c. (For use with S. 1320b).
NAVAL MESSAGE.
(Revised Dyrams. & S. 356
October, 1935.)
te
ECRE
$5
100
55
1
An
Dynam
355
349
Ahel Tasman. 60
65
TTER OF PROCEEDINGS - EVACUATION.
a
70
353
during daylight. About half-way across a French trawler with
an open boat in tow was hailed. He reported having picked the
boat up with soldiers off Dunkirk and it was thought this might
be the boat for 14 ich we were searching. To make sure we
proceeded to Dunkirk where - two open boats and & Thames
barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from
the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards,
the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French
and English. No then went alongside the Thanes barge at
approximately 1330.
This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and
various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England
but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, ⑉ note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new platon to the air compressor
motor while the let.Lieut. and myself trimed the sails.
They had no charge on board. The air compressor motor was
made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my 1st,Lieut., SublLient. Delhamel with instructions
to sail the barge to Dover, and proceeded along the coast having
opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing
approximately three miles of the coast alightly to the eastward
of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter
could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course
was set to intercept the Thanes barge.
by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bomba were dropped
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attached
The bombers at appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and
and fell distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
having released their bombs continued their dive firing machine- to
guns. Course was altered frequently in an endeavour miss
the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water,
at on striking exploded under the box right discomfort
a ome the surface and a certain,appeared ahead and not the to ship explode
passed all. One the splash* A certain amount who of were exposed was
the experienced by the x eyes for the next twelve manning the
through myself and members of the crew hours or 80. to
splash in wounded in the leg when part
Able-Seaman Power of was the soldiers in the fore to peak. return As to Dover I now had
wounded on board ask for assistance for the the barge. barge sailing well was
turrets also one I considered it advisable A tug
sent forthwith out and to 8100 and I consider found Sub.Lieut, Delfammel
about performed 10 a very creditable subjected had operation. caused leaks The for to bombing the that bull night's to which and the
the petrol ship tank had and been the ship was not used again
operation.

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358
364
Page II
proceed at slow speed. "Express" arrived at midnight and troops
a trawler to escort "Jaguar" who was later able to
were performance. disembarked, the number of wounded making this a slow
Having completed with fuel "Express" left
Dover by route Y at 0920 30th May,arrived alongside Dunkirk
pier at 1245 and with about 800 troops onboard sailed at 1315
arriving Dover 1650. Ship sailed again by route Y at 1800
and arrived off La Panne beach at 2130 and commenced embarking
troops by ships and other small boats.
At 0250 31st May Rear Admiral Dover Straits
and staffembarked and later "Express" acted as desired by the
Rear Admiral who transferred to "Keith" at 0700/31. More troops
were embarked and having got about 600 onboard including Major-
General Thorne I proceeded to Dover arriving at 1115.
"Express" sailed again by route Y at 1215.
While passing 511 buay the ship came under fire from Gravelines
batteries and was straddled. This fire was returned.
On arrival off Dunkirk roads all ships
present engaged enemy aircraft intermitiently who were carrying
out bombing attacks and the prospect of going alongside the
Eastern side of Dunicirk Pier was investigated. At about 1700 dive
bombing attacks on Destroyers off Bray was particularly heavy.
Two attacks were carried out on "Express",one salvo was a near
miss ahead, and the other straddled, five depth charge type bomba
falling close all round the ship. Aircraft were heavily engaged
and no damage was sustained except for small breakages. At 1830
"Express" again entered Dunkirk and embarked about 700 troops
sailing at 1900.
Shortly after a large number of enecty bonbers
and fighters attacked ships approaching Dunkirk including a large
number of small craft. Several aircraft were seen to be destroyed
as a result of our aircraft attacking.
After disemberking troops at about 2300/31
"Express" proceeded to oil and at about 0400 1st June secured to
buoy and made good small defects including severed Coll.
At 2200 2nd June "Express" left Dover and
arrived off Dunkirk where there was considerable congestion
and I was unable to get wires secured - the bonhardment appeared
alongside. Ship entered at 0200/3 but the pier una eapty of troops
this time. The Rear Admiral accordingly
to return to Dover in company with "Codrington"
and ships arrived there at 0500.
into North Goodwin which persisted until to buay. sink
"Express" proceeded at 2200 3rd June aya and ran
as Dunkirk at presumed mine. explosion. "Express" British Beach
Arrived thick fog off 0230/4 where an unknown ship was seen secured to
party. pier and embarked appeared to be not quite after passing on
the a result of a 600 French Proops and the 80 heavy as
the previous The bombardment night. ht. The ship mailed at 0300 and through
rog in the Downa arrived Dover at 0610.
At 1200 "Express" and "Windsor" sailed for
Portamouth.
About 3500 troopa had been whichet transported.
red to be
mailed at
at 0610.

Details

From
Lieut: WykehamH Martin.
Dynam.
223.
Alulol
1352
1st Ideut: of "Alice', D.B.2.
15
Date 7th June 1940.
TO V.A. Dover.
Report on Dynamo Operation.
15
Alice left Southampton at 2030/26/5/40
and at Dover was directed to beach herself at
La Panne, to fac litate unloading of cargo of
250 tons of provisions.
This operation was carried out at
0800/28 by Alice and Kaap Falga, the former
having rescued Pilot Sergeant T.BOYD 516716
of 213 Fighter Squadron, who had descended
by parachute.
Two hours later he was transfered
to Able Tasman, also beached at La Panne as
it was thought that she would be the first
to return, Alice and Kaap Falga having received
orders to refloat as soon as possible and beach
themselves again after dark at Bray Beaches,
there to land some provisions and evacuate soldiers
before daylight.
Lieut: Slater (C.O. Alice ) and Lieut
Beale (C.O. Kaap Falga) landed to make definità
arrangements with G.H.Q. for the evening's
operation.
Whilst they were ashore four bomb
and Machine gun attacks were carried out against the
three ships beached and the Military ashore
About 1400/29 ,Major P.De Havilland, of
at
unea
G.H.Q. four soldiers, himself being wounded, with instructions
(D.A.Q.M.G.) arrived on board Alice with
29
for me to try and get in touch with a destroyer cut
immediately, and he wished to report to the War Office
as his communications had been the
28
seriousness of the situation.
stated that Germans would be occuppying evening
Dunkirk and He advancing along the coast that
due to the capitulation of Belgian Troops for
told him of the intentions he had the
evening evacuation Bray Beaches, where the provisions were
I and he told me that troops
falling just come back from on La Panne, and that
were no longer required mentioned there. that the beach Channel. at Bray
was under He also was the Zudycote he said
fire ,as
Two naval leg. and one
had taken been to hit one the
Military From his description Slater I (Alice)
conclusion that it was Lieut: Beale (Kaap Falga)
who who I spoke was was KIlled wounded. to Lieut and Slater Lieut: was I was also over wrong; unharmed. the phone, since on and June6th he assured
me but that due Lieut Efforts Beale were made bullets the to
aircraft of the engine, up.

Details

II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood all ballsst the is
I the tide rose.
recognition giving signal the tables and the route the
secured the charts and burnt
boarded KaapFalga where I took over command
before order to abandon ship, order, then
refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett .Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there
was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was
still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne
over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that
the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead
prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping
to receive our message. The destroyers were,
however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk., and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there
would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard,
which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the
proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still
underlivered.
.Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons
and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers
took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination
service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to
the Dynamo Operation Room.
which was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
During operation the unloading one Army Stevedore drowned.
off the in the dark and was made.)
( A separate jetty report has already been
stand to At Dunkerk leaving there of evacuation. later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered not to
than 0300/2 by go to this was the last night throttle
as two hours funning at a to
asphyxiating the engine room fumes and gaoke This coming pipe from was a red pipe
After had to be evacuated due
leading off the silencer. close past the ready used use fuel
hot tanks and and since pump it only led slow speed of fire. could be
owing to Ship the serious anchored at danger anchor off Ramsgatea all effect night at repairs about as even if
2130/1 expert and aid remained could be obtained reach to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it capable to engine, officers was block now which of the from The I maintaining impossible was maximum running for speed to was Dover and 5 imformed I next afternoon empty 50 the reckoned to silencer 70 ship. me degrees KaapFalga that were Engineer not the badly wishing
centigrade
coked up'.
Kaap above Falga normal, was not therefore employed that

Details

21
21
19
FICER-TROLLA
WE
Lieut. H.R.Wykeham-Nartin, R.N.
( 1st. Lieut. 'Alice')
MADate 1940
05
31
29/5/40
OUTHRMPTO
F.O.I.C., Southampton,
Report
Dynamo Force 28/5/40 (Dutch vessels 'Alice', 'Caap Falga',
(store ships) and'Able Tasman' (aminition ship).
Proceeded from Southampton 26/5/40 and thence received instruct-
ions at Dover to proceed to La Panne and beach these ships to
facilitate unloading cargo. This operation was carried out at
0800 28/5/40 by 'Alice' and 'Caap Falga', the former having
rescued aSgt. Pilot who had descended from a disabled Spitfire
by parachute, he was afterwards transferred to 'Able Tasman'.
Com. Crick landed to report to G.H.O. He returned at 0900 with
'Able Tasman (Lt. Com. Crick) arrived earlier at 0600 when It.
orders to refloat 'Alice' and "Caap Falga' and send then to Beary
Beaches where provisions were required and certain Army units
were to be evacuated.
ded Falga Lt, Sclater to R.N. (Capt. of'Alice) and Lt. Beale from R.N. G.H.O. (Capt. and of request *Caap
that boats acertain definite requirements 'Alice'and'Caap Falga' at Bray Beach
being inadvisable might be to sent beach to their ships again owing to the appares
Meanwhile ent existance of enemy aircraft there. attacks were made on these
ships and the four bomb and machine-gun after which Major P.de Havilland soldiers,
arrived ashore, on board 'Alice' with four and get in
with the instructions to the try situation to the
Genermans were his communications Dunkirke having and, that forces at Bray were
with a destroyer immediately to report been cut. He stated that
Beaches were advancing from on La Panne and that provisions evacuation
no longer required falling or bach possible to land as complete
.00
He was Lt. reported anticipated that Lt. Sclater had been killed and had near been him taken and to that the
Military Hospital had been
Beale
wounded
in
the
leg
The
See/orer.

Details

First Lieut. then abandoned Alice and took his crew and Major De Haviland (wounded)
25
and 4. soldiers to Kaap Falga where 1st. Lieut. Alice took command. Major De.
Havilland of G.H.Q came on board with instructions for Kaap Falga to go to sea
25
and try and intercept a destroyer so that he could report by m/t to the War Office
the seriousness of the situation. No. Destroyer would stop so Kaap Falga returned
to the Downs and reported arrival. Then to Dover where stores were cleared by 09.00
1st. Kaap Falga's engines were badly coked up and in attempting to return to
Dunkirk at 22.00 1st. they overheated to such an extent that the Ship could not
make suffient speed to reach Dunkirk by 03.00 2nd. the latest hour that ships had been
ordered to stay off Dunkirk.
Due to the possibility of this defect Kaap Falga was not used on the night of June 2nd.
the last night of the evacuation.
Sailed for Poole 14.30/3 arrived 12.00/5
PACIFIC
A
Lieut. Comdr. .Skrine R.N. Lieut. Triscott R.N.R.
Sat.25th. May Crews for Dutch Skoots proceeded from ortsmouth to Poole where
they arrived about noon and were detached for these vessels.
Pacific proceeded at 14.00 leaving discharged dutch crew at Brownses Island. Was
ordered to anchor at Yarmouth for the night.
Sun. 26th. May. Weighed at 0.430 and proceeded for Portsmouth Harbour at 09.3.0
Being Senior officer of the Party I went ashore and arranged for stores and swinging
etc. No sailing orders were obtainable until about 19.00 when we were ordered
to complete swinging as soon as possible and sail at once for Newhaven. Accordingly
sailed at dark with Amazone Atlantic Zeus & Pascholl in company (wega and San Antonio)
has broken down)
Monday 27th. May. Arrived off Newhaven at 04.00 and was ordered to anchor outside
Lay at anchor all day awaiting orders. At dark received orders to sail for downs
in company with a party of skoots that had previously arruved Newhaven. Weighed and
Proceeded
Tues. 28th. May Arrived Dover about 08.00 and berthed alongside 09.00. Went ashore
and having ascertained the possible nature of the operation made arrangements for
sandbags first aid outfits etc., to be supplied to my party of Skoots by noon
However an air raid warning intervened and none of these stores had been received
13.00 received orders to sail forthwith. Sailed about 13.00 and took over a large
lifeboat at sea from one of the slower skoots who was dropping behind. Pacific
gradually overhauled the other four skoots and I think was the first of this party
to reach La Panne.
From No. 6 E Buoy we proceeded at slow speed 180 straight for the beach where in
answer to our hail a shout was raised by the soldiers on the beach. The intention
waswas to turn to Port and anchor off. However partly due to the fact that the
larger ships were closer in than I anticipated but mainly due to my leadsman failing
to obtain any sounding at all we grounded on a bank of sand before we had turned
90° This occured at 23.00 We sent the large Lifeboat ashore with 3 of our 5 hands and
instructed them to take off men to other ships as with the wind blowing inshore it was
not certain that we should get off, With the remaining two hands we laid out a kedge
on our Port quarter. By going full astern and heaving on the kedge we got afloat
when the tide rose at 02.00
29th. May. The ships lifeboat and skiff was then sent inshore and 1 officer and
7 men were brought off to Pacific before the boats lost touch with her in the dark
They did howver bring several par ies off to other ships. Verbal orders had been
received before leaving Dover to leave shore before03.3 being anxious to recover
boats and men Pacific remained inshore till daylight finally sailing at 04.30
when it seemed liekly that the boats and crews had been embarked by other ships.
Rerurned to Dover by route Y arriviving about 16.30 and disembarked troops. No
orders were immediately available but verbal orders were subsequently received
to embark water and provisions and sail about 22.00 Application was made for the
balance of complument and I was informed that I should be sent 3 hnds from
Montvera. These did not arrive until 02.40 at which time Pacific sailed for Dunitirk.
30th. May. The morning of 30th May was misty at about 08.20 when crossing Le Dyck bank
there was a violent underwater explosion about two cables on the Starboard bow
No aircraft was about and it is supposed that it was a torpedo which had exploded
on the Bank. No vessel was in sight Arrived off the beach 09.00 about 1 mile E
of Dunkirk and anchored close in. We had no boat of our own but collected two from
a skoot that was just leaving, conditions as regards surf were pretty good but boats
very waterlogged and no boat was obtainable all day. By 16.00 my crew were exhausted
by pulling those boats in and out from the hore all as I had 30 Officers and 620
men aboard I decided to sail. We might have had many more in half the time
if a motor boat had been available. Accordingly sailed at 16.00 When crossing the
Inner Ratel Bank attacked by by two of a flight of three fighters with machine
guns. They scored was & few hits on the ship and injured noñody. Had nothing but a pistol
with which to reply.

Details

II.
62
(NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING
61
OPERATION DYNAMO)
Friday 31st May (contd) During the moráing one of the Beachmasters
came off to me and endeavoured to persuade me to beach the ship
so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots
(HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was
now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I
was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards
became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HEBE came
off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large
motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside me and transferred
250 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space
was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a
destryyer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from
me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared
I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed.
Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet
Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover.
By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about
5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low
cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably
500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns.
The bomb fell on my Port quarter between me and the Drifser.
Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently
shaking both ships no xjer major damage was done. The force of
the explosion caused my compass to jump out of its gimbals.
Certain damage was dome to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room.
After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled
by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided
to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks so
as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as
possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick
fog was encountered at about 1830.
On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered
that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass.
During the oassage through the Downs the tow parted on several
occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels.
At about 0100 on Saturday 1st June I was about 1
cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again.
This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very
near miss only wetted the troops on the port side aft. There
were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured
alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and
secured for the night for which I was very grateful as we had
been running continuously for over three days and I had had no
to the Engine and provisions and water were embarked. At 1700
sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were effected
where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner Harbour.
I proceeded to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving at 2000,
On Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively
permanent repairs were effected to the Engine and Capatan. were When
all skoots were brought to immediate notice in case they
required again it was decided that FRISO was not sufficiently
reliable and so was left in the Inner Harbour.
I cannot speak too highly of my crew who worked
without a break. The o nly men being onboard at the were
continuously, and on Friday were in the Boats for 7½ time hours
my First Lieutenant one seamen and the E.R.A. and myself.
I have the honour to be,
VICE ADMIRAL
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
*
*
DOVER
Gene Lymmus.
Lieutenant.
To the Vice Adminal
Royal Navy.
Dorn.

Details

289.
-
83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air
pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of
being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the
result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed
owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action
the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and
major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that
as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was
taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to
arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots
with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence
in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it
failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent
inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might
have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from
the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place
with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a
for
minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some
higher revolutions were obtained, and I rmoceeded another 5 miles
towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was
only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept
moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised
in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my
way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs
were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed
by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Raviei
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.
R

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115
112
secure one on embark atim.
The flow of hoops ceased at
about 0200 a despite ever effect to obtain
more men, I was unable to Burbark have than
c few odd parties. Dawn being due better
moments, ch was decided to Cast off as no
more men were with coming heat. Commanded
Clements RN.R. "f"Tilly" informed me that he
was unable to have as his S Crew was shill
F
fene. I apred to low him ont of harbur 7,
of necessary, bach to Ingland.
I lashed him almpide with
W
fore Mbach spring knoking on a double bach.
spring, mandwred both issues against the
wind 1 clear of the geth Minall out of harbond
Here "Tilly" reversed engines & cleaning her
propellor, was able to proced under her uhn power
I should like to place on
record here the lach of assistance fiven by
military officers of all Tanks from major
downwards, in controlling twops during
embarkation full brunt coming on the lender.
officered a manned havel vesseh.
may 29th
arrived D ones at 0845 9
was instructed to pureed marfate
to disemberd the 280 men about I was able
to do this at 1430. after watering, stining i
fulling, sailed at 1530 for Ramsjali, to embark
en
Lewis funs, wires for kedge Is, v uplace my
Carswain Ldq Leaman Haffai was embailed
n this hands conduct ton.o. I.S. Rainsfate /
in this capacity I subsuently made a uport
uconmended him you some recognition, which I
hope will be futh coming

Details

"VREDE"
Page 8.
150
144
From
8. On-closing the Naval Control Service cutter off Southend
Route Instructions and Sailing Orders were received to arrive
off Marte les Bains, 5 miles East of Dunkirk, not before 2300.
As there was time in hand "Vrede" was anchored in the Downs in
company with several other commandeered schoots at 1830.
9. I was informed by the Commanding Officer of "REIGER" that the
N.C.S. trawler off the North Goodwin Light Vessel had told him
to turn back, the trawler having been told by another schoot
that Dunkirk was in enemy hands. The B.B.C. news bulletin
gave no guidance, nor could I get any information from other
ships present, so I eventually sailed with "Reiger" at 1400
with the idea of complying with sailing orders if the situation
permitted.
IO. Owing to the darkness and to the failure of several light
buoys "Vrede" took the ground at the inshore end of the
ZUYDECOOTE PASS . Attempts to refloat her proving abortive it
was decided to wait for the flood tide.
II. During this time many ships were seen entering and leaving
within two cables of where "Vrede" lay aground and at 0030 &
large merchant ship was seen to encounter two ships leaving.
This first ship blew three short blasts and went astern. Shortly
afterwards there was a dull explosion, without any flame,and
when the resultant water and spray subsided nothing could be
seen of the ship. As it was impossible to assist from where
"Vrede" lay aground, and as other vessels were in the vicinity,
no action was taken.
I2. At 0400 "Vrede" was refloated by the tide and allowed to
drift to a safe anchorage where the air bottles might be
recharged. While at anchor an unidentified destroyer approached
and hailed an order to proceed inshore to the beach as soon as
possible and embark troops.
I3. At 0500 "Vrede" was anchored as close inshore as the shelving
nature of the beach permitted. Both dinghies were lowered and
sent to cooperate with several motor launches which proved to be
Margate pleasure boats manned by their Margate crews. These men
were absolutely tireless and cheerful under the most trying
conditions, receiving troops from the dinghies and ferrying
them to the ships. In thes manner some I50 officers tiredbut
cheerful officers and men were embarked, including a Belgian
major with whom we had some difficulty owing to the impossibility
of drying his corsets. The motor launches were withdrawn had by
been wrecked and it was impossible to get nearer to the beach
other authority at about 0930 and as one of the dinghies
than about 3/4 mile I decided the operation could best be served
by embarking troops from Dunkirk, whence many other ships were
proceeding.
I4. I alongside the eastern breakwater. Approximately
entered Dunkirk harbour at I030 Wednesday 29th. May and 500
secured full capacity, were embarked during which operation obtained
troops, several minor our bombing attacks took place, none of which
hits nearer than the central pier.
I5. As only

Details

260
650 Troops.
June.
ntd)
At 2000 received orders (F.O.C. Dover Most Secret Memorandum No. 246
A.14/0/40.) to proceed to vicinity of Bray to lend support and
covering fire. Owing to low visibility and necessity for oiling
before starting "Locust" was one hour late in position. Took
ship close inshore but coast was very misty and no targets could
be seen. Heavy small arm firing was heard in Bray, which was also
being shelled from apparently the village of Furnes. After some
waiting "Locust" was fired at by machine guns from a position
approximately half way between the foreshore and Adinkerke. This
was replied to by 0.5 machine gun fire from "Locust". Further
fire was directed at the ship from the direction of La Panne,
and this was answered with 4" H.E.
I then attempted to silence shore batteries which were shelling
Bray from Furnes, and 30 rounds of 4" H.E were fired. This ap-
parently achieved some result as the firing died down, and several
explosions causing fires were observed.
d
June. 0300. Ceased firing and proceeded.
0350. Tug "Fossa" signalled she was ashore and required assist-
ance. In attempting to close, "Locust" took the ground but same
off again, and I decided it was impracticable to close "Fossa".
A Motor Landing craft was therefore hailed and brought alongside
and her troops, 51 in mumber were transferred to "Locust", and the
M.L.C was sent to rescue the crew of the Tug, and any troops she
may
had on board.
0450. Proceeded, and at 0545 overtook a small armed yacht in the
charge of a Major R.A, who had 28 mén with him. Party was trans-
ferred to "Locust", and Major gave information that covering fire
of "Locust" had been effective.
1005. Arrived Dover, and disembarked 79 Troops.
1820. Slipped and proceeded to Dunkirk Harbour.
2223. Went alongside East Mole, Dunkirk and commenced embarkation
of British Troops.
2302. Sailed with 650 British and 70 French Troops.
June. 0408. Arrived Dover.
1845. Slipped and proceeded.
2300. Anchored off Dunkirk Mole and commenced embarking troops
from Motor boats.
June.
0015. Demolition party consisting of Lieutenant Holdsworth and
6 men left by Motor boat for wreck of "Mosquito". On arrival
it was found that the wreck was submerged to the level of the
battery deck, and despite repeated efforts of Lieut. Holdsworth
who attempted to enter the Captain's Quarters, the forward charge
had to be placed in the wheelhouse. The after charge was placed
in the after magazine. The demolition party were working under
great difficulties due to the movement of the wreck in the swell,
and to the darkness, and great initiativewas displayed by P.T.O. Lieut.

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- 4
472
an open with soldiers off hailed. He reported having picked with the
during daylight. boat in tow was About half-way across a French trawler
boat up boat for in ich Dunkirk and it was thought this might
be the we were searching. To make sure we
barge with sail set were found approximately three miles from
proceeded to Dunkirk where хихаря two open boats and a Thames
the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards,
the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French
and English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at
approximately 1330. This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and
various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England
but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor
motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charys on board.
The air compressor motor was
made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my lst.Lieut., SublLieut. Dehammel with instructions
to sail the barge to Dover,and proceeded along the coast having
opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing
approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward
of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter
could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course
was set to intercept the Thames barge.
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attacked
by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bombs were dropped
and fell at distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
The bombers appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and
having released their bombs continued their dive firing machine-
guns. Course was altered frequently in an endeavour to miss
the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water,
some on striking the surface and a certain appeared not to explode
at all. One exploded under the bow right ahead and the ship
passed through the splash. A certain amount of discomfort was
experienced by myself and members of the crew who were exposed. to
the splash in the M eyes for the next twelve hours or 30.
Able-Seaman Power was wounded in the leg when manning the port
turrett also one of the soldiers in the fore peak. As I now had
wounded on board I considered it advisable to return to Dover
forthwith and to ask for assistance for the barge. A tug was
sent out at approximately 2100 and found the barge sailing well
about 10 miles from Dover.
I consider Sub ,Lieut, Dehammel
performed a very creditable operation. The bombing to which
the ship had been subjected had caused leaks to the hull and the
petrol tank and the ship was not used again for that night's
operation.
on passage to Dunkirk.
0115 Arrived Dunkirk and embarked C.O's
of block-ships and Captain Dangerfield.
Carried out reconnaissance of the harbour.

Details

Details

1
96
CONFIDENTIAL.
NL
Oa 27/26 AB/40
11387
25th September, 1940.
1940
Enquiry into the loss of
H.M. Armed Yacht PELLAG II
in Operation "Dynamo"
CENTRAL
(27 SEP 1940
Sir,
REGIS
In accordance with Admiralty Letter N.L.6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report
resulting from an enquiry held into the loss of H.M. Armed Yacht PELLAG II
in Operation "Dynamo".
2. Temporary Lieutenant F.W.R. Martino, R.N.V.R. was interviewed on
3rd September, 1940.
3. When PELLAG II was approaching Dunkirk at about 1000 on 31st May,
1940, she went to the assistance of a trawler which was aground. In her
efforts to tow the trawler off, the clutch of Diesel Engine burnt out and
the wire cable of steering gear parted. Effort to tow was then abandoned.
4. The hand tiller was rigged but could not be efficiently operated
on account of the depth charge davit which prevented it passing the
midship position. The ship could only proceed very slowly and the
Commanding Officer asked WORCESTER to take her in tow.
5. WORCESTER was leaving Dunkirk heavily loaded with troops and as
she was being subjected to bombing attack and PELLAG II's defective
steering made towing very difficult, WORCESTER took the Commanding Officer
and men on board and cast PELLAG II off. An effort to sink the yacht was
unsuccessful on account of aerial bombardment.
6. PELLAG II was, at 0600 on the 2nd June, found adrift by a party
of Royal Engineers which, under Major M.C.A. Henniker, R.E., was making
its escape from the French Coast in rowing boats. They boarded the yacht
and managed to get the engines running. PELLAG II was making slow progress
when at 0515 on 2nd June H.M.S. LOCUST closed and examined her. As the
engines and steering gear were found to be defective, officers and other
ranks were taken on board LOCUST and PELLAG II was taken in tow. Shortly
afterwards, the tow parted. Two further attempts were made to tow her
but as enemy aircraft were in the vicinity the Commanding Officer of
LOCUST decided to abandon her. An attempt to sink her by gun-fire was
not successful, and the Commanding Officer of the LOCUST, states, in a
written report he has sent to me;-"with the prevailing set of wind and
"tide it is Klams that she may have subsequently fallen into the hands of"
"the enemy."
7. S.P.'s and Charts were transferred to WORCESTER.
8. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander A.J. Cubison, D.S.C.,R.N.,
and Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H. Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
SE
Secretary
a Sesford
of the Admiralty.
VICE-ADMIRAL.

Details

tions of Commander
k.
der Dove, Sub Lieutenant
N.V.R. The object was to erect
7th June, 1940.
rt of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
atsuki" on May 2000 with 200
-Admiral Sir James
ut. Field and Sub Lieut Addis
Somerville, K. C.B., D.S.O., .
taul". On instructions from
took command of the Drifter
On the orders of Commander Yates, we
iled from Dover 6345 Friday
the honour to submit the following
es for the demolition party, 4
ort on the activities of Commander
officer Major Russell, 1 Army
e's party at Dunkirk.
3 signal ratings. After an
Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
We have the honour to be, Sir,
rogress. We noted then, and for
that in spite of the courage and
Your obedient Servants,
the great majority of their
targets. We immediately entered
J.L. Field Subtient RNVILE
the South Quay.
R.G.addis Subtient RMVR.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the
nent which had recommenced. We
emolition party that we had
afterwards made contact with
portion of a demolition party.
re-enter the harbour and took
CS.
threatening to block completely
a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
y. The, "Gervaise" was man-
a side to avoid the risk of her
ion in the fairway. Ammunition
nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
y primersor detonators for the
a two hospital ships which were
$
The attached papers have been
ng these was just put in hand
seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
* available at any time during
for his list of personnel recommendations.
himself and with help of his
the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely,
ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
e situation in Dunkirk was so
he opportunity nor the facilitie
hadch Cress
rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th
old Cdr Dove that there was no
ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to
rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found
property and personnel was
il tanks on the south side of the
atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
scene appear far worse than
evening the work of loading ship
eady a large number of noncom-
our besides an increasing number
quay. The night was quiet
planes sincleithe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early
ho had been instructed by Cdr.
for safety, reported that magnet
mines nad Deen 1814 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year. ,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis
left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover, .Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army
liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an
uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for
the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and
persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their
salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered
the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the
nent which had recommenced. We
emolition party that we had
afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took
threatening to block completely
a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her
ion in the fairway. Ammunition
nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe,
y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been
a two hospital ships which were
seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
ng these was just put in hand
for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during
himself and with help of his
the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely,
ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so
he opportunity nor the facilitie
hadch Cres
rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th
old Cdr.Dove that there was no
ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to
rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found
property and personnel was
il tanks on the south side of th
atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
scene appear far worse than
evening the work of loading shi
eady a large number of noncom-
our besides an increasing number
quay. The night was quiet
planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early
ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet
mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove
sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis
left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army
liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an
uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for
the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and
persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their
salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered
the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the
harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We
then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had
brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took
in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely
the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have
been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel
ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was man-
eeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her
being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition
medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who
up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the
depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were
in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand
inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during
our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his
officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and
personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so
grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie
to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a re-
grettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no
water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought
sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still
open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found
that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was
surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th
town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber
yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of
smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than
reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi
went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncom-
batant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet
except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early
next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet
mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen
had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Details

Ship sailed from Dover at 0850 on 29th May, did a days minesweeping
and arrived off Dunkirk, lit by the red flames of the burning oil tanks
at 0040 on 30th May. On this occasion troops were embarked off BRAY
DUNE in our own boats and canvas punts. There were no incidents of
note, and we sailed at 0515, arriving at Dover at 1015 on Thursday
morning. All boats were left on the beach by order from Rear Admiral
Dover.
Third trip. Sailing from Dover at 1330 with a party of signalmen
for LA PANNE, we arrived off BRAY at 1830. Admiral Wake Walker came
on board for passage to LA PANNE, where we transferred him to H.M.S.
"WORCESTER" and enchored at 1930. I can recall no. features of this
trip, which was eclipsed by the incidents of the following one.
we
proceeded at 0118 and arrived at Dover at 0600.
Fourth trip. In order to comply with Vice Admiral Dover's
0446/30 12 hours were spent at Dover.
A
smallamotor-boat,
the
"Handy
Billy! was requisitioned. We left at 1800 and anchored as ordered,
one mile west of LA PANNE and 4 cables from the shore, at 1207.
Sub-Lieutenant M.Phipps proceeded to search the shore in "Handy Bill
and reported no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the
situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship.
UI called for more boats by searchlight up and down the immic coast,
and eventually was much assisted by H.M.S. "IVANHOE" who lent me a
motor-boat. The vital need now was for more boats. About this time
Lieutenant-Commander McLelland swam off from shore with a message for
Dover which he was just able to gasp out before collapsing. The
troops had been forcedout of LA PANNE and were marching West.
We
also embarked a Major, 2nd in Command 2nd Coldstream Guards, and on
his advice ordered the bulk of the troups to move West on Dunkirk in
small groups.
I decided to remain where I was and to embark the wounded and such
troops as refused to move on. "IVANHOE" remained with me.
At this time a paddle minesweeper most gallently grounded herself
close inshore to save as many as possible. I do not know har name.
At 0500 as I had expected a flight of Messerschmidt 109's appeared
from Eastward, flew low over the beaches and sprayed ships and men
with machine-gun fire. The silvery tracer bullets were clearly
visible in the morning light. Our fire did something to disperse
these machines and casualties did not appear to be heavy.
At 0600 Captain D in H.M.S. "CODRINGTON" asked me my intentions
End as I had 675 troops on board I replied I was proceedingt He
ordered me to Dunicirk to "Fill up".
On our way there we went alongside H.M.S. "SKIPJACK" who required
8oz.
chloroform. We then berthed on East Arm just beyond the break,
and very quickly embarked some 170 French troops. The enemy was now
bombing the town and massing off the harbour entrence. As I went
astern "IVANHOE" was hit as she steamed full speed past the pierhead.
We set course west, and were about to turn North at 5W Buoy when we
were attacked by some five Junkers 87 dive bombers. These were
followed by nine or ten otheres the a few minutes later. It was
at
this time that H.M.S. "HAVANT" was hit. During these
attacks
I
attribute our escape to the coolness and precision with which Lieut-
enant .Menisty and Yeoman of Signals J.Young ( C/J X 131436
observed each aircraft as it turned to the attack, and assisted me in
handling the ship. The salvoes sonbanneck of four small bombs and
one large one fell very close; on two occasions it was only our swing
during the flight of the bombs that saved us. The 0.5" machine-gun
fired until all the feree springs fell off. The 4" guns were hamp-
ered by the swing of the ship.
This was a most trying time for the troops between decks who could
not tell whether or not we were hit. A great deal was done to calm
them by P.O. Std. A.Hockney ( L 14824 ) who actually sat on the ladder
to the messdeck and sang to the soldiers.

Details

copy
she
That Your Majesty may be pleased to approve
the award of the following Honours and Decorations to
officers and men of Your Majesty's Ships for service in
connection with the evacuation of the Allied Forces from
Dunkirk
Knight Commander of the Bath (Military)
Vice-Admiral Bertram Home Ramsay, M.V.O.,
Flag Officer Commanding, Dover.
Companion of the Bath (Military)
rd
Rear-Admiral William Frederick Wake-Walker, O.B.E.,
Rear-Admiral, Dover.
Captain William George Tennent, M.V.O., Royal Navy.
Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk.
es
Captain Michael Maynard Denny, Royal Navy.
,
Also in charge of evacuation arrangements
at Dunkirk breakwater and beaches.
7
Distinguished Service Order.
ions 10
Captain Thomas Edgar Halsey, Royal Navy, H.M.S. MALCOLM.
-
Captain George Frederick Stevens-Guille, D.S.O.,O.B.E.,
Royal Navy, H.M.S.CODRINGTON. (Bar).
Commander Guy Oakley Maund, Royal Navy (Retired).
Commander Renfrew Cotto, Royal Navy.
Commander Villiers Nicholas Surtees, Royal Navy.
Commander Ralph Lindsay Fisher, Royal Navy, H.M.S.WAKEFUI
Commander John Hamilton Allison, Royal Navy.
H.M.S. WORCESTER.
Major A.E.M. Walter, B.A., Royal Engineers.
Captain L.E.L. Wright, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant Commander James Coverley Stopford, Royal Navy.
6th June, 1940.

Details

CONFIDENTIAL.
WE.C.
Canel
lerry. 53.
FROM.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
Macclesful.
DATE
4th. JUNE 1940.
No. B23/862/40.
TO
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY.
Distinguished Service Cross (Contd.)
ith,
rs
Temporary Skipper Alfred Manning Lovis, R.N.R.
W.S.3397. H.M. Drifter PAXTON.
rthy
S.
Captain Gordon Dyer Walter, Master, MAID OF ORLEANS.
N
Captain George Johnson, Master, ROYAL DAFFODIL.
:ward
Captain Thomas Aldis, Master, ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
from
DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL.
Petty Officer Thomas A. Topley, C/J. 112800.
names
.e
Yeoman of Signals Geoffrey Piper, C/JX. 132686.
lese
are
Able Seaman Alexander C. Moore, C/JX. 129026.
may
Able Seaman James G. Owen, R.F.R. B.20977.
lations to
Able Seaman Joseph I. Turner, C/SS. X.24037.
e
:
Able Seaman Walter F. Cox, R.F.R. B.22716.
us
Able Seaman Gilbert Rose, J.X151776.
Able Seaman Francis H. McLaughlin, C/J.X146012.
3
5.30
Ordinary Seaman Andrew McKay H. Miller, C/JX.174079.
TLIN
Ordinary Seaman William J. Edward Burrows, C/JX.154411.
Ordinary Seaman Sydney V. Genner, C/JX.150954.
O.B.E. (Military)
Acting Commander Philip Brian Martineau, Royal Navy (Retd.)
Major A.E.M. Walter, B.A., Royal Engineers.
Captain L.E.L. Wright, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant Commander James Coverley Stopford, Royal Navy.
6th June, 1940.

Details

ENCLOSURE NO.1 TO DOVER LETTER 10.B23/862/40 dated 4th. JUNE
1940.
Page 3.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OFFICERS FOR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH
THE EVACUATION OF THE ALLIED FORCES FROM DUNKIRK.
(contd)
CAPTAIN MICHAEL MAYNARD DENNY, ROYAL NAVY,
OBE(M)
CB
ACTING COMMANDER PHILIP BRIAN MARTINEAU, ROYAL NAVY, (RETIRED),
MAJOR (TEMPORARY) A.E.M.WALTER, B.A., ROYAL ENGINEERS, wo OBE
(Deputy Assistant Director of Transport
Dafer,
JAMES LEONARD KEITH, ESQUIRE, MINISTRY OF SHIPPING,
CAPTAIN (TEMPORARY) L.E.L. WRIGHT, ROYAL ENGINEERS, we: OBEM,
(Reserve of Officers).
For distinguished service in organising the sailing of
the very large number of ships and vessels of all classes
employed for the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force
and the French Army to the number of 307,218, between the
breakwater and beaches at Dunkirk and British ports, under
circumstances of unprecendented difficulty.
CB
also
For
Norwa
SNO audabus
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES COVERLEY STOPFORD, ROYAL NAVY,
OBE(M)
wait Martincan.
i/ashi
For distinguished service in establishing and
maintaining essential W/T communications with the Naval,
part
Military, and French Authorities respectively in Dunkerque,
and with the large number of small vessels employed during
the evacuation under circumstances of great difficulties,
thereby contributing very materaially to the success of the
operation.
OFFICERS OF THE MERCHANT NAVY.
3
D.S.A
CAPTAIN GORDON DYER WALTER, MASTER, 'MAID OF ORLEANS',
D.S.A
CAPTAIN GEORGE JOHNSON, MASTER, 'ROYAL DAFFODIL',
CAPTAIN THOMAS ALDIS, MASTER, ROYAL SOVEREIGN'.
ok Foley.
For distinguished service while serving in His Majesty's
Transports carrying Troops from Dunkerque to Dover.
The transports of necessity provided a vulnerable and
easy target for enemy aircraft, but were required to make
their passages while subject to constant bombing attacks,
and frequently under shell fire.
They were required to berth in darkness in a confined
harbour obstructed by wrecks, and crowded with small craft
under way.
VICE ADMIRAL.

Details

Page69
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. WHIPPINGHAM - Lieutenant Eric Reed. R.N.R.
from Embarked Dunkirk troops harbour from on the Dunkirk 1st June. beach on 31st May and
Recommendations.
RATING.
Chief Mechanician Arthur Frederick Ford, P/K.21534.
When the ship was alongside the pier overladen
and straddled by enemy gunfire, troops rushed to
port and the ship took a list of 20 degrees. Ford
checked the rush and moved the troops back to starboard,
thus preventing a major disaster.
Ford again showed powers of leadership above the
ordinary in pressing troops into service for getting
in the brows, cutting the moorings and getting the
ship away from the pier Afterwards he went below
to take the ship out.
E/DSM
Recommended for mention.
ring
tere
vor
as
hom
adol

Details

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. Page
70
H.M.S. BIDEFORD This - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
being off the bombed beach vessel and proceeded machine-gunned to Bray on beach the on the 29th May
bombing blown was quarter gun In spite platforms grounded away, deck, attack of No.2 the aft embarking wrecked, about took damage and gun 40 place. put of done, feet in the troops out addition casualties of The of of stern in the action ship the to fact being was much evening, way and that struck other completely the across. the 0.5 the on damage. ship machi While the third
and continued 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men suffered (3 BIDEFO offic
eventually England towed off and home, carried 400 troops and when to
to embark troops during the night, wounded),
on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
D.S.C
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
eventually carried 400 to England.
M
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan, M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
D.S.O. D.S.C.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
DSM.
(D.M)
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
was Office
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troop
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteer
on said he would remain in BIDEFORD and continu was
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther work there, knowing full well that BIDEFORD time
his severely damaged. and aground, and at the that ship
very considered highly improbable that to
would it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades. chance
Carried get away out his voluntary duties for all but hor
in order to tend his wounded 48
continuously in a most efficient manner.

Details

Page
Page 14%
Page 146.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
E STAFF (continued).
ICERS:
Captain William Vesey Hamilton Harris, M.V.O., D.S.C.,R.N. (Retd.)
This officer was solely responsible for the
organisation of the minesweeping vessels which took part
in the operation. These ships not only evacuated
troops from Dunkirk but also maintained routine sweeps
under most difficult circumstances. By his cheerful
leadership and tireless efforts, this officer was able
to maintain his entire force at my disposal, and thereby
contributed largely to the success of the enterprise.
M
Recommended for mention.
Commodore John Stewart Gordon Fraser, D.S.O., R.N. (Retd.).
For tireless zeal, energy and good judgment in
dealing with the largely increased demand for repair and
)
maintenance arrangements of the Port during the operation 545n
With limited facilities, the organisation built up by
Commodore Fraser met all requirements, and the arrange-
1
ments for which this officer was responsible contributed
in a major degree to the success of the enterprise.
M
Recommended for decoration.
Commander Francis John Lambert, D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.).
For exceptional zeal and devotion to duty. This
officer, as King's Harbour Master, had to control and
berth large numbers of ships, transports, skoots, and
small vessels, and direct their movements for the
L).
purposes of repairs, fuelling, coaling, etc. To do
128)
this Commander Lambert was almost continuously on duty
day and night throughout the operation, and his untiring
efforts contributed materially to the success of the
enterprise.
M
air
Recommended for decoration.
no
Lieutenant Commander (E) Weston Smith, R.N.
This officer worked throughout the operation with
exceptional and tireless energy and enthusiasm when in
,EA
charge of repairs and making good damage caused to
ships and boats. His skill as an Engineer Officer and
40.
intelligent improvisation and adaptability in all
73.
respects proved of inestimable value. His cheerful
bearing and leadership during the long hours by day and
night were an inspiration to all with whom he came in
contact, and contributed largely to the success of the
M
operation.
Recommended for decoration.
Surgeon Captain Arthur Rowland Fisher, R.N. (Retd)
ion.
M
This officer was faced with the difficult problem of,
dealing with casualties out of all proportion to those

Details

pt. C.W. 29685
40
Page 150
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
3.
SeaTransport
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICERS.
adminal Shipway
The work done by the Sea Transport Officers
throughout the Operation of Dynamo, entailed an
enormous amount of labour, which was carried out
in a highly efficient manner.
0/
Commodore Jukes-Hughes was in charge at Dover,
ing
and it was entirely due to his organisation and
smooth working that enabled nearly 181,000 to be
disembarked at Dover without any hitch whatsoever,
8
and at Folkestone, nearly 32,000.
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Mughes. R.N. (Retd.)
As P.S.T.O. was responsible for the successful
disembarkation of troops, and the greatest credit
is due to the capable and efficient way in which
the troops were disembarked and able manner in
d
CBE
which he was able to arrange for the quick turn
rounds of the various transports that came into
ion
harbour.
h
and
in
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Allan Raymond MacKewn, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out the ordinary duties
of Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant MacKewn went
in command of an armed party to the ST. SEIRIOL,
where the Master had refused to sail, thereby
showing great devotion to duty.
n,
Min
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out his ordinary duties
this officer volunteered to take over the duty of
Chief Officer of Transport, Canterbury, as there
was no relief available, thereby showing great
is
devotion to duty.
ly
Mit
Recommended for decoration.
m
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson, R.M.
During the period of the operation he was in
almost constant attendance at the office and was
only absent for very brief periods for sleep. His
0
local knowledge was of great assistance to the
alty
P.S.T.O., and a great deal of the success of the
organisation is due to his great devotion to duty.
this
in
on
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant/
td.

Details

Page69
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Porsonnol.
H.M.S. WHIPPINGHAM - Lieutenant Eric Reed, R.N.R.
Embarked troops from Dunkirk beach on 31st May and
from Dunkirk harbour on the 1st June.
Recommendations.
d B
RATING,
Chief Mechanician Arthur Frederick Ford, P/K. 21534.
in
When the ship was alongside the pier overladen
and straddled by enemy gunfire, troops rushed to
ce
port and the ship took a list of 20 degrees. Ford
OR
checked the rush and moved the troops back to starboard
thus preventing a major disaster.
Ford again showed powers of leadership above the
ordinary in pressing troops into service for getting
in the brows, cutting the moorings and getting the
ship away from the pier. Afterwards he went below
to take the ship out.
DSM
Recommendod for mention.
or
are
ope
rs

Details

Page 70
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
This vessel proceeded to Bray beach on the 29th May,
being bombed and machine-gunned on the way across. While
off the beach embarking troops in the evening, the third
bombing attack took place. The ship was struck on the
quarter deck, about 40 feet of stern being completely
blown away, No.2 gun put out of action and the 0.5 machin
gun platforms wrecked, in addition to much other damage.
In spite of the damage done, of the fact that the ship
was grounded aft and of the casualties suffered (3 office
and 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men wounded), BIDEFOR
continued to embark troops during the night, and when
eventually towed off and home, carried 400 troops to
England on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he
continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
D&C eventually carried 400 to England.
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan. M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty
throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an
outstanding example to all. His sick berth
attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously
wounded, and performed several major operations,
having organised his limited resources to their
DSD.
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients
continuously and at all times displayed great
ability, patience and understanding. No effort was
too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions
of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most
worthy manner.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
= Dsmandard byour
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After
to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troops
the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteere
board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther on said he would remain in BIDEFORD BIDEFORD and continue
his severely damaged and aground, and that at the
work there, knowing full well that that time was
very considered highly improbable chance ship to
would in order to tend his wounded for all but
it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades.
get away out his voluntary duties manner. 48 hours
Carried continuously in a most efficient

Details

Page 146.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
STAFF (continued).
ERS:
Japtain William This Vesey officer Hamilton Harris, M.V.O., D.S.C.,R.N.
organisation the operation. of the was for the took (Retd part
in troops from Dunkirk which
under most routine evacuated sweeps
leadership to maintain officer his cheerful
contributed largely to force the success at my disposal, of the enterprise. was and able thereby
Recommended for mention.
Commodore John Stewart Gordon Fraser, D.S.O., R.N. (Retd.).
dealing with the largely increased demand for in
For tireless zeal, energy and good judgment
With maintenance arrangements of the Port during the repair operation and
limited facilities, the organisation built up by
)
Commodore Fraser met all requirements, and the arrange-
45
ments for which this officer was responsible contributed
in a major degree to the success of the enterprise.
Recommended for decoration.
Commander Francis John Lambert, D.S.C., R.N. (Retd.).
For exceptional zeal and devotion to duty. This
officer, as King's Harbour Master, had to control and
berth large numbers of ships, transports, skoots, and
small vessels, and direct their movements for the
purposes of repairs, fuelling, coaling, etc. To do
this Commander Lambert was almost continuously on duty 8)
day and night throughout the operation, and his untiring
efforts contributed materially to the success of the
enterprise.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Commander (E) Weston Smith, R.N.
worked throughout the operation when with in
exceptional and and making good damage Officer
This officer tireless energy and enthusiasm caused to
i.A
charge of repairs His skill as an Engineer in all and
adaptability cheerful
bearing and to all the with long whom hours he by came day of in the and
night contact, were and an contributed inspiration largely to the success
operation.
Recommended for decoration.
Surgeon Captain Arthur Rowland Fisher, R.N. (Retd). difficult
problem
of
dealing This with of all the proportion to those

Details

Page 150
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Recommendations of Personnel.
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICERS.
The work done by the Sea Transport Officers
throughout the Operation of Dynamo, entailed an
enormous amount of labour, which was carried out
in a highly efficient manner.
Commodore Jukes-Hughes was in charge at Dover,
and it was entirely due to his organisation and
smooth working that enabled nearly 181,000 to be
disembarked at Dover without any hitch whatsoever,
and at Folkestone, nearly 32,000.
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Hughes.R.N. (Retd.)
As P.S.T.O. was responsible for the succes
disembarkation of troops, and the greatest cre
is due to the capable and efficient way in whi
the troops were disembarked and able manner in
which he was able to arrange for the quick tur
rounds harbour. of the various transports that came into
CBE
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Allan Raymond Mackewn, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out the ordinary dut
of Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant MacKewn wen
in command of an armed party to the ST. SEIRIOL,
where the Master had refused to sail, thereby
showing great devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out his ordinary duti
this officer volunteered to take over the duty 03
Chief Officer of Transport, Canterbury, as there
was no relief available, thereby showing great
devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson, R.M.
During the period of the operation he we
almost constant attendance at the office and
only absent for very brief periods for sleep.
local knowledge was of great assistance to the
P.S.T.O., and a great deal of the success of th
organisation is due to his great devotion to du
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutens

Details

M.
3256
(Revised-June, 1983.)
940
-51.
DATE
The contents of this letter have been
FROM WHOM
who communicated was the Sea to Major Claude Attwood, R.M. (Retd.)
R.m. Woolfenden.
30.6.40
Calais. Transport Officer in Charge
reply. It is presumed that M. will initiate at the
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Angt Shiping
Rear-Admiral,
Expression at aralitude for work
Naval Assistant to the
Director of Sea Transport.
will
5th July, 1940.
IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION,
32, GROSVENOR GARDENS,
CENTRAL
LONDON, S.W.t.
29 JUNI940
REGISTRY
M.
3235
29th June 1940.
1940
Sir,
I am directed by the Imperial War Graves
Commission to state that they have been informed of the
great help and kindness shown to their staff during the
evacuation in the latter part of last month by the Sea
Transport Officer at Calais.
I am to ask that an
expression of the Commission's warm thanks and appreciation
may be conveyed to that Officer.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Lieut.Colonel.
The Secretary,
The Admiralty,
S.W.1.

Details

VESSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
FAIRWIND
E. Hutton
A.P.S.
FAITH
T. Lloyd
No report received from list of
MA JC
missing vessels.
FALCON II
Dr. Firth
Returned to owner?
MAJOR
FEDELMA II
Per Crouch Eng. Co.
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MALDO
FELICITY
T. Davis
T.98 - damaged. Returned to owner.
FERRY NYMPH
C.H. Harvey
T.98. Returned to owner 19/6.
MALVI
FLEET WING
Watercraft, Ltd.
A.P.S.
MOLLY
FLOSS HILDA
Bond's Boatyard
Returned to owners 31.5.40.
MARE 1
FOLKESTONE BELLE
MARCH
Mr. Spraggs
T.98. Returned to owner.
FORMOSA
J. Mears
Returned to owner.
MARGHE
FORTUNA
H.H. Salmon
Returned to owner 19/6.
FORTY TWO
MARINA
N. West
A.P.S.
MARSAY
FRANCIS (99B)
Recketts R.F.
Returned to owners.
FRAM
MARINA
Mr. South
A.P.S.
FLOTSAM
Dorset Yacht Co., Ltd.
Prepared but not used for Dynamo.
MARICEI
FLYING FISH
W. Brazier
Returned to owners 30.5.40. Not
required.
ARY
FIREFLY
A. Newell
Returned to owner.
ARY HO
FAVOURITE SM 225
B. Allen
Returned to owner.
ARY IR)
ARY ROS
RY SPE,
GAVINE
F.A. Cooper
T.98. Returned to owner.
RY SPE/
GAY CRUSADER
A. Foster
T.98. Re-allocated to A.P.S.
GAY FLY
ILDA
Noll Gay
Returned to owner.
GAY VENTURE
D.L. Brisult
A.P.S.
GERTRUDE
BELLE
Morgan Jones
GIPSY KING
T.98. Returned to owner, 6.6.40.
G. Riley
FLOWER
GIRL MARTON
Butchers
Returned to owner 2.6.40.
GIRL NANCY
F.C. Mitchell
Did not go for Dynamo.
DER
GIRL VINE
W. Light (6A)
Returned owner 19/6.
AIDEN
GOLDEN LILY
Lt. E.V. Cullen
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy. Service.
Returned to owner.
EY
GOLDEN SPRAY II
F. Roberts
Reported lost.
ANT
GONDOLIER KING
Poole & Swanage Co.
T.98. Returned to owners.
GONDOLIER QUEEN
Poole & Swanage Co.
T.98. Returned to owners.
LICENT D.
GONDOLIER III
Poole & Swanage Co.
Now on service with M/S Officer Poole.
GOODHOPEY
Bond's Boatyard
No report received from list of missing
vessels.
USA
GOOD LUCK
C.A. Simmons
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy. Service 6A.
IKOI
GRACE
A. Brown
T.98. Returned to owners.
GRACE DARLING IV
C.E. Cundy
Returned to owner.
DRU II
GRACE DARLING (E.36)
Sayers Bros.
Returned to owners.
GWEN EAGLE
D.W. Hudson
TAUR
(Littlehampton List). No trace of
return from Dunkirk.
GALILEE (wY68)
E. Verrill
GWENNY
W.G.S. Crouch
Prepared, but did not go to Dunkirk.
RASOL
Returned to owner.
GWENYTH
Walter Llewellyn & Sons
Repaired, Fuelled, Floated, but not
08
taken over.
GERBERA
Chas. Hill
MADGE
Returned to owner.
MING
MODESTY
PAH
NA
RCH
ROSE
Motor Boat
Motor Boat
vior 1.2 Torpedo I
tor Ferries (
SME

Details

ESSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
KING
J.Mears
Returned to owners 11.6.40.
KING FISHER
R.D. Gerans (6A)
Re-allocated to Spl.Admy.
Service.
MA JO
KINGWOOD
J.Mears
Returned to Owners.
KINTAIL
W.E. Turner
A.P.S.
MAJOR
KIT KAT
J.Swain
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MALDOI
KITTY
L.Basso & Co.
Returned to Owners 2.6.40
KONGONI
Comd. Hare
A.P.S.
MALVII
KESTREL R7
S.Rowden
Returned to Owner
MOLLY
LADY CABLE
C.W.Mott
Damaged Returned to Owners
MARE N
LADY HAIG
H.Meskins
Returned to Owners 2.6.40.
MARCHI
LADY ISABELLE
T.Westhead
Returned to Owners
MARGHE
LADY KAY
c/o WATERCRAFT
Returned to Owners.
LADY RITA
S.L.Bullock
To A.P.S.
MARINA
LAMOUETTE
P.C. Allen
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MARSAYI
LANSDOWNE
V.Messum
No report received from list
MARINA
of Missing Vessels.
LARK
A.Fayers
No trace of return from
ARICEL
Dunkirk. Presumed lost.
ARY
LATONA
S.M.Wood
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
ARY HOW
LAZY DAYS
Mr.Lazarus
Re-allocated A.P.S. 1.6.40.
ARY IRE
LEACH'S ROMANCE
Bob Leach & Sons
Released 3.6.40. Re-allocated
SPL. ADMY. SERVICE (6A)
ARY ROSI
LEADING STAR
E. Breeds, Senr.
Re-allocated to Spl.Admy
Service 6A
LENT LILLY
RY SPEA.
Jubilee Fishing
Released 3.6.40. Re-allocated
RY SPEA1
Co.
Spl. Admy. Service (6A).
LETITIA
"ILDA
W.E. Browning
Abandoned.
LETITIA
A.Dench
No damage reported. Returned
to Owner.
BELLE
LIBERTY
K.C.Frisby
Returned - unsuitable
PLOWER
LEILA 4
Burnay
LIEBERSTRUM
Being returned to Owner.
H.C.Hunt
LITTLE MAYFLOWER
T.98 Returned to Owners 19/6.
DER
F.G.Barton (6A)
Re-allocated to Spl.Admy
AIDEN
Service.
EY
LITTLE O'LADY
Bob Leach & Sons
Released 1.6.40. Re-allocated
ANT
Spl. Admy. Service (6A)
LIBERTY II
W.C. Craske
Returned unsuitable to Owners.
LICENT D.
LORNA DOONE
c/o Toughs
A.P.S.
LADY NANCY
Mr.Richmond
Returned to Owners.
LIJNS
C.O. Powis
Returned to Owners.
OSA
LURLINE
E.W.Monkhouse
T.98 Re-allocated to A.P.S.
IKOI
LEANDER
J.T.Phelps
Returned to Owner. Prepared
did not go.
DRU II
LAVINIA
A.Hurley
A.P.S.
LITTLE ANN
C.A.Turnour
Reported by S.V.P. Presumed
TAUR
lost.
LADY BE GOOD
S.W.Langthorn
Prepared for dynamo but did
not go.
RASOL
LADY ROSEBERRY
Sem. West Ltd.
Reported lost at Dunkirk.
LITTLE ADMIRAL LN 85
C.A.Pegg
Returned to Owners.
US
LAUREL LEAF
Cosens & Co.
Pre-Dynamo Requisition.Returned
MADGE
to Service.
B MING
LYDIE SUZANNE
Eversert Presper
Lost at Le Havre.
B MODESTY
PAH
NA
RCH
ROSE
MADAME POMPADOUR
Lt. Col. H. E. Day
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
Motor Boat
MAGNET
Mr. Melmore
Broke down and did not go.
MAID OF HONOUR
H.Sands
Motor Boat
T.98. No. information of return
from Dunkirk.
2 or Torpedo E
top Ferries G
MA JOIE.
SME
Barber
Ramagate.
Returned

Details

KIL KVL
1'Nesse
REMARKS
Sn 2.0. If copy
OWNER
VESSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
MA JOIE
Mrs. L.Clarbour
T.98 Abandoned off Dunkirk
N.S.C.O. Thames 27.7.40.
O.
RSOU
MAJOR
B.R.Bunn
Now A.P.S.
ROSA
MALDON ANNIE
Col. Lamount
T.98 No information of return
RUBY
from Dunkirk.
IVU
MALVINA
R.E. Cooper
To V.A. Dover
HAS
MOLLY
E.Thomas
Returned to owner
WOR
MARE NOSTRUM
B.C.Kirby
Returned to owners 19/6
KOU
MARCHIONESS
J.Mears
Returned to owners 11.6.40.
6.40.
SOU
MARGHERITA
J.Mears
No information of return from
er
OH
Dunkirk.
RO
MARINA
A.Jacobs
Returned to owners.
MARSAYRU
C.Wyatt
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
RI
MARINA
J.T.Phelps
Returned to owner prepared did
MARICEL
not go.
.S.
a
C. Robinson
Repaired, fuelled, floated, but
MARY
not taken over.
to A.P.S.
Danish
ARY HOWARD
Mr.McKenzie
Survived. Returned to Weymouth
Dule from
ARY IRENE
Unable to sail
H.Cartridge
.P.S.
T.98. Returned to owners -
irk.
ARY ROSE
5.6.40.
Dives
S.
T.98. No report received from
RY SPEARING
W.G.S.Crouch
"Missing Vessels" List.
RY SPEARING II
If
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
ILDA
Chelsea Yachts &
Returned to owners.
ers
Boat Club Co.
BELLE
Returned to owners.
:0 Owners.
D.Robinson
LOWER
C.Adams
Returned to owners did not go.
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy.
Service (6A).
DER
H.Graham
Returned to owners
mers.
AIDEN
Lt.Com.P.M.Filleul,R.N.
Returned to owners
EY
R.H. Campbell
T.98. Returned to owner
ANT
Capt.E.B.Schermauley
Did not leave. No. Exam.Ser.
LICENT D.LEACH
Littlehampton.
ed to Owners
Harry Leach
(Released 3.6.40 Re-allocated
I
J.M.Wright
to Spl.Admiralty service (6A)
0SA
A.Gordon
Returned - unsuitable
Owners.,S.
IKOI
A.P.S.
Capt.Shelford
T.98 Sunk in collision with
ed or Dunkirk, ai
AURU II
M.T.B.
J.W.Cottrell
T.98. Re-allocated to Special
ned to Owners
D. OILTAUR ICX
Service.
19/
Mr.Towndrow
S.W.Wills
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
T.98. Returned to owners
1
SA
KLASOL
6.6.40.
JRIUS
R.C.Kyle
No report received from list
AURIUS
of Missing Vessels.
IS8 MISS MADGE
Vectis Shipping Co.
Returned to owner.
SS CMISS MING
S.W.Richardson
RETURNED - UNSUITABLE
ed but did not
Kriz Crusers
T.98 Now on Aux. Patrol
kirk.
W.S.Nott
A.P.S.
-do-
MIDD OIENA
J.Ovett
Returned to owner
88 MONARCH
c/o Wilsons
A.P.S.
ned -do- to Owners
SS MOSS ROSE
T.& G. Baker
Returned to owners 18/6
ased 1.6.40.
T.Adams
Did not return from Dynamo
Dover List 5.
D56' Motor Boat
R.Hoyes
No report recd. from "Missing
Vessels" List.
30' Motor Boat
-do-
R.Hoyes
Stor Torpedo Boat
Thornycrofts
V.A.Dover
1.2
Returned to owners by N.O.I.C.
tor Ferries (2)
- Not used
Ramagate.
Returned
SME
C.Barber

Details

COPY 3.
Sir,
I have the honour to report that, in accordance with
the Instructions of 10 June 1940 received by me from the
Secretary of State for War, I duly left SOUTHAMPTON by
ship at 1400 hours on 12 June, and reached CHERBOURG at
2130 hours the same evening.
For reasons connected with local French orders, it was
not possible to disembark until 0030 hours on 13 June when
Brigadier G. Thorpe (Base Commandant) came out to the ship
in a tug and took me ashore with my staff.
2. At 0800 hours 13 June I left CHERBOURC by car, and
reached LE MANS at-1400 hours after & journey much hampered
by the crowds of refugees on the roads.
Communication Troops, and Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE.
KARSLAKE, Major-General P. de FONBLANQUE, G.O.C., Lines of
There I was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
General I at once KARSLAKE. I instructed him to return to England,
took command of all British troops in France from
which he did by plane that afternoon.
3. At 1500 with General WEYGAND and, after a journey 1 Mission
hours I left LE MANS with Brigadier SWAYNE of for
)
an interview reached the Headquarters of 2000 No. hours that
(Major-Ceneral some 170 miles, Sir Richard HOWARD-VYSE) at
evening. was away at a Cabinet meeting, would see but, me on
his return, General he WEYGAND sent a message to say that he
at 0830 hours on 14 June.
4. I had left as my it was known by The General general inference
staff at LE MANS to get KARSLAKE in touch and with of
to bulk be of that, the after troops crossing engaged
would the SEINE move South in to encircle PARIS.
/ The
FOOTNOTE: ( ) THE THE
MARKET

Details

- 5
with large stocks of vehicles and material which had been
accumulated since September, 1939. Major Macartney of the
Quartermaster General's Movement Staff arrived from the War
Office that night. He brought with him & list showing the
order of priority for shipment of stores etc., and &
suggested outline plan for evacuation. A Senior Naval
Officer also arrived early next norning.
15 JUNE
12. At 0315 hours Lieutenant-Censral J.H. MARSHALL-CORNWALL
reported to me, and we discussed the situation. I placed
all British troops with the Tenth French Army under his
command, and gave him orders to co-operate with that Army
until an opportunity arose to disengage his troops and
withdraw them to CHERBOURG for embarkation to the United
Kingdom.
The subsequent operations of Lieutenant-General J.H.
( ) MARSHALL-CORNWALL'S troops (Norman force) are described in
that officer's report which is attached as Appendix B.
13. The withdrawal of B.B.F. started in the early hours of
15 June. The flights of the Canadian Division which had
arrived in the Concentration Area were sent beck to EREST
for embarkation, Corps Troops were re-embarked at ST. MALO,
and various L. of C. troops in the LE MANS area were moved
nearer the Port areas.
14. Information as to the position of the enemy on the front
of the Tenth French Army and southwards was very meagre as
bad visibility prevented air reconnaissance, and there were
no ground troops to reconnoitre between ALENCON and TOURS.
were engaging enemy the 157 Infantry Brigade in the area CONCHES.
little activity west of ROUEN, but hostile infantry of
The general inference, however, was that there was
aircraft landing, about EVREUX and that he had seen & seemed to of
forced A reported that he had run into heavy column
British pilot of a Bomber aircraft, who had made anti- a
was moving South with its left on CHARTRES.
confirm arms previous moving information that the Fourth
all fire south in that area. This report Garman Army
/ 15.
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
NORMAN Force was an improvised
formation which, on 15th June, comprised:-
3rd 157 Brigade Group (157 Infantry Brigade:
Armoured Brigade.
71 Field Regiment RA; Troop-Carrying
BEAUMAN Division (see Roonote ( ) page ).
Company, 52 Division).

Details

76
70
H.M.S. "WHIPPINGHAM".
SPECIAL REPORT
ARTHUR PREDERICK FORD, Chief Mechanician P/K 21534.
On hight 31st.May and 1st.June 1940, Dunkirk Mole,
who averted what would have been a major disaster by preventing
troops rushing to part when ship was overladen and starddled
E
by enemy gunfire, ship took list of 30° but righted herself
when Ford got troops moved back to starboard. Undermanned
as I was Ford again showed powers of leadership above the
S
ordinary in getting us away from piers by outting our after
moorings and pressing troops into service in getting in
bows, afterwards going below to take ship out.
i
0
J.J.CLOUGH Petty or icer ist.01.P/JX129586 and
&
H.S.GILES A/Ldg.Sea. P/JX125481, were also outstanding for
a
their courage and seal under desperate conditions, working
coolly about the ship when I had troops wounded by shrapnel
or flying concrete, being under fire all the time.
e
no
08
(sd) Eric REED.
e
Lieut.R.N.R.
in command H.M.S. "Whippingham"
d
d
+2
Command
or

Details

78 8
??
H.M.S. whipping am
2.6.40
rice. adminal Commanding
Dover area
I
S
During evacuation operations on the night taken of
ing
ed
to
40 when 2,700 when of the B.E.F. were
the
as
I have the honour to submit the want of
board my ship from Dunkink mole.
0
nd
You Frederick ford, chief trechanician are P/K ais 34r, who, oat, 0
the ship was straddled, overted what would
been in my opinion a major disaster by
d
up and down the top deck assuring the docks the
d
mg too that our own ships were shelling
under them infit for use by the enemy, and so &
inting the such to pat which would have
+ disaster to the ship. She took a list of approx
to pat but sighted herself when troops insued
to starboard under his orders. Mindermanned
s was, ford again revealed 1 power of
or
host and

Details

Lynam. 169.
437
9889
From The Assistant Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk.
( Carmend
407
To The Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk.
6th. June 1940.
пето Vedid end ml Vines Dolneq sno JE
Narrative of events at Dunkirk 26th May - 2nd. June 1940
sngle as VSTS 190 off of eqtie STOM J93 of B.SW JI
GHT brie sansa BI по
Sunday 26th. May.
Jdyln edit dosss Jon Bib
serms TOT slovoid of Ded namismate and R$
Left London for Dover at 2025. Captain Tennant was on train
Vd syssasm 983 briee Eas dossd
notjeujše orig nedw, 0088 Midai 7878 M
STOM 9'19A snew animb sale axrix Our
but he called at Nore en route.
пет OSI Vino 0051 Drie 0081
Arrived Dover 2300. Proceeded to Dover Castle where I found
to White bed 9W 8.6 guijatoq
Captain Denny and Commdr. Goodenough who had been sent to reinforce
Dover staff. Captains Dundas and Hollifax subsequently arrived.
NOTI Toiq S beformation americant Гасоя
bedefilios] sirth .9btj WOE to
Held conference throughout night, eventually getting to bed at
,Jdgin to end 20 Lin
asw 9110 Dris fliud erro Terlsone Jeg of
0400.
вейтто! JohisreC
S Devong ATSM shid dgin 903 wofed Lacobands
Monday 27th. May.
ou этоэ esmit mode 1888 on wes I .atsod
reqerri begsmsb 86W food DITO brie
Captain Tennant arrived at 0900.
asw dosed edd no accord and 10 Joubres sift .8
I proceeded to the Lord Warden and collected 8 Officers and 160
,T9DTO edd to brie emitglosib riens
men, plus signal staff. They were divided into groups of 20 men
from e.BW sibstogs edit
asbitti motveried ThedT .admisIquos VIIB breed
each with a Commander or a Lieutenant Commander in charge of each
STOLISE 9115 OJ elgmexe eath S 2.6W vsb edj ml Tessi
doemode 9113 по tell grivi to sebi and QU
group. They were all provisioned for two days, and the Officers,
.emit edd VSWS 8880 ose Termsd ord Juo Her
bas 0888 JB dosed 983 beliefa destlwok dent-D
most of whom had arrived with nothing were served out with pistols
visittinI viriod 38
Jud seal, semib edd по 20 Indian S BSW
and steel helmets. Water bottles were also provided and filled.
bevelopm wet, dosed 9113 no bestmegto agoons
25 апотерлеб 9708 BBW efsrom TO Joshie sdT
Lieutenant Commander Butler from Chatham Barracks was of the
nedd BSW odw, улопо arts 20 volmixorq
greatest assistance to me during the whole of these proceedings.
I reported to Dover Castle at Noon that the party was equipped
moeted leven Jsdj Dermoint B.6W I IE\0010 JR .e
ymhlleda JOSSETO off. It myst Je DJ
and ready to proceed to the destroyer in which they were to sailed embark.
ST Telbeging sdd TOT Jeod E doest of JUC news
vásátls had WISST Ismigiro THE ml 1.0000
1345 Embs ked in H.M.S. "WOLFHOUND" at Submarine Base and
Ils J801 I of 6mSA
VM JB 190 mid your OJ 9W adud
for Dunkirk. Captain Tennant addressed the men and told them
evijoette Jaris Beaneq
Juods VITIST becloof nede nosed To
briefly what their mission was.
Is,Veb add as gniwol,Io] of ed 9'13"
of enemy air attacks were delivered on the Commanding way across
and noved had SW
by A bombers number but the ship was skilfully handled by her
no 3480 to nedd had on 5% of
Officer, and no damage was sustained.
9T9W 03 бептител I
Dunkirk at 1750. Whilst berthing at
Wharf Arrived another at air attack was made by the enemy but the ship was
brought alongside.
safely accompanied by Commander Ellwood and myself Officer together of
The S.N.O. and Major McCarthy, and the Commanding town to the
with the "WOLFHOUND" the General disembarked and walked through the

Details

4.
410
I ordered the Dutch Scoots to anchor as close to the shore
as possible and the destroyers to send all their boats to ferry
the troops between the shore and the Scoots. As soon as the Scoots
were full they were told to go alonside the destroyers and to
discharge their trooops, and then to return to their position near
the beach. In this way we were able to get some four thousand men
away during the afternoon and evening. I returned to Dunkirk and
reported to the S.N.O.,after which I went down to the beaches
in the M.T.B. once more, to make sure that operations were to
continue throughout the night. About another 3/4000 men were got
away during the night. The 1ST,B. was sent home as she was running
short of fuel.
Captain Bush arrived this evening and had 3 conference with
the S.N.O.
Wednesday 29th. May.
I took Captain Bush down to Bray by the N.T.B. in which he
had arrived to show him what was being done. A large number of
destroyers and sloops had arrived during the night, number of
which I ordered to proceed to Dunkirk to embark troops.
A northerly wind had got up during the night and had made
a nasty lop on the beach. This made embarkation very difficult
Boats were being swamped and the whole operation badly retarded.
There remained no doubt in my mind that the major effort would
have to be made at the Eastern Arm,and the risk of loss of ships
accepted. I returned to Dunkirk and reported to the S.N.O.
accordingly. Orders were passed for the majority of troops on the beaches
to be marched to Dunkirk, but sufficient were to be left to enable
the beach embarkation to proceed.
number of ships, personnel ships, sloops and
other Any craft were berthed alongside the mole today, and we wealeft
in comparative peace by enemy aircraft until the evening when in
fierce air attacks were made. These resulted
a series of being bombed while embarking troops. It looked to the
H.M.S. "GRENADE" that she might sink and block the entrance and
Harbour, for the but moment & trawler and drifter were sent to assist her,

Details

ESD
5.
454
424
sleep sometime during the 24 hours.
23/5
We discharged supplies from M.V.Sodality during the day and in
her I sent back and urgent message to D.S.T.O Dover that ships must
bring with themgear for discharging cargo and that there were still
several cranes in action. Unloading continued hampered many times by
air raids but considering these inconveniences the amount discharged
was very satisfactory. The labour employed was largely men from No.
151 Railway Construction Company under Major Edwards and although an
appreciation of their work will doubtless be forwarded from another
source I must take this opportunity of expressing my praise at the way
they not only carried out this - to them - strange work but also the
manner in which they returned to it after every raid.
22/5
About 2115 one destroyer and two hospitals sailed and about 0400
M.V.Sodality sailed having been delayed by the tide. Although commun-
ications were extremely poor I managed to get a signal passedto D.S.T.O
Dover regarding the sailing of the four ships with & request that the
information should be forwarded to the Ministry of Shipping and Mar
Office (Searail 3).
Difficulty was experienced in obtaining reliable information from
the look-out station at the lighthouse 30 I asked that three saval
-81b
signal ratings should be sent out and these duly arrived. 1 billetted
them with the French in the lighthouse and having given them a list of
ship's lettersof those requisitioned ships which were likely to be
employed in such shallow wateri instructed them to report to the office
the names of ships arriving or leaving. They proved of the greatest
assistance to se and when the remainder of the Sea Transport Staff left
that there were

Details

8.
42457
British Representatives.
Lieut Colonel Jesper.
Commander E.R.Lewis
At the first meeting held in the abri of the office of the
Ponts et Chaussees Major-General Lindsell opened the proceedings by
appealing to the members that they should give eachother every ass-
istance and work for the mutual benefit of both France and England.
Certain decisions were taken and everything was arranged in armost
amicable manner.
Work continued under extremely difficult conditions when Comdr.
Musson R.N.R. arrived with Lieutenants McEwen and Whittle R.N.R. By
this time close co-operation with the military authorities and the
Admiral (through the B.N.L.O) was essential 30 I placed Commander
Musson in charge of the S.T.O's office and set up my own in the
Bastion 32 next door to the B.N.L.O.
I attended another conference presided over by Major-General
Lindsell when he informed us the-t the Tax Cabinet had decided to
evacuate the B.3.F. through Dunkirk using the beaches as much as
possible and the hole alongside which several ships could borth at
the same time. Captain W.G.Tennant and at naval staff would arrive
as soon as they could be got together to organise therecuation but
that meanwhile all available ships should be utilised to embark troops.
I had to report that the dook area had become almost untenable and
that it was doubtful if we should be able to discharge any more cargo
from ships.

Details

8
504
SECRET.
Use of Landing Craft during the
Evacuation of the B.R.F.
APPENDIX "A"
PART III
Dynam 286
Biuld
INTER Survices TRAINING - DEVELOPMENT Center
Form CUMMERLAND EASTHER Burneos
PORTSMOUTH
FROM :- Commandant, Inter Services Training and Development Centre.
TO :- The Vice Admiral,
H.M. Ships & Vessels,
DOVER.
DATE :- 12th. June 1940.
coc/resc/se/40
USE OF LANDING CRAFT DURING THE EVACUATION OF THE 3.3.7.
Two copies of Appendix "A" Part III, to 15 report
on the above subject enclosed with by COC/PM/17/8/40
are forwarded herewith.
2.
Part III deals with the novements of A.L.C. 10
and M.L.C. 12, 17, 21, and 22, which were sent in the
"City of Christchurch" on Stat. May 1940.
Abbilby major RM
for
LISUTENANT COLONEL
10
VICE ADMIRAL
14 JUN 1940
*
DOVER
R
Difference

Details

Дулаш 379.
558
534
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICE,
rams: Divisional Transports,
Southampton.
) Tel. No.: Southampton 3678 & 5746.
$ Tel. No.: Southampton 4241.
THE
SOUTHAMPTON.
Extns. 531 & 730.
01A/JH/PA.
27th June, 1940
ly quote
CONFIDENTIAL
Sir,
I have the honour to forward the attached reports
on the services rendered by the undermentioned Officers
in the hope that some recognition of these services
can be made.
The Officers names are given in what in my opinion
is the order of relative merit:-
Lieutenant Allen Raymond Mackewn R.N.R.
Lieut-Comdr. Ralph William Vernon Soper .R.N.R.
Lieutenant Charles Edward Stocker .R.N.R.
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson,R.M.
I have the honour to be
Your Sir, obedient Servant.
OFFICER.
The Director of Sea Transport
Ministry Berkeley W.l.
is

Details

ENCLOSURE NO.3. to LETTER DATED 27th JUNE, 1940 FROM
561
THE PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICER, SOUTHAMPTON.
037
MAJOR LIONEL STEELE WILKINSON, R.M.
This Officer came under my orders when I assumed
charge as Principal Sea Transport Officer, Dover on
23rd May, 1940 for operation "Dynamo".
I was very greatly assisted by this Officer's
local knowledge and devotion to duty.
During the period 23rd May to 4th June, 1940 he
was and was only absent for very brief periods for sleep.
in almost constant attendance at the Office,
His hard work was of the greatest value.
Southampton
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICER.
COMMODORE,
27th June, 1940
of
the
ges

Details

SECRET
225
Page 8.
0730. Slipped and proceeded to Doven- AB chips croceeding
down the chemal between Dunkfits and DD Serg had been
fired at by shore batterien, a emplo floot 500 burnt on
the forecastle and Cuanel empire 168 also unde. The wind
was exactly right to afford the sexiem protection from
the forecastle state first, but shother it me due to
this protection 02 due to the enery gune having poved on,
it is impossible to say, US$ fire voc not opened on
"Icarus" during this passage.
1013.
Arrived Dover and disabborked troops.
1300.
Secured to Ho.1 Budy, chin's staff and dockyard fitters
working on the
2030.
Blipped and proceeded to Jushirk, "Windsor" in company.
"Icoxue" one Late proceeding owing to not receiving the
signal giving order of Leaving harbous until 2020.
2300
secured in Duskink harbour on Eastern Am.
Saturday 3rd Jane,
0001. alipped and proceeded to Dever by "X" route.
Was 15 collicion with 2 email tranter shile proceeding
westeard doen the chamel: the visibility und extremely
bed owing to the smite from the burning oil fuel tanks
at Dunkisk and 1 spito of nj having & lookout on the
forecastle, there was DO time for = order or full estern
to take affect before hit lig. I 120 unable to alter
may to port an I 500 already just outside the charted
channel to part to avoid the engretic nines, which had
been Inid in the charnel. no major desige una sustained
but the hast fittlig if the 2.7.boom use Crectured. It
in not known what Camage 100 sustained Whe troular.
0050.
Received a sign? 2 GDL informing chips that
magnatic sines 100 been loid indian ininately around
F.O. buag. As 17 0.0.0011 insulation see extrencly Lov
one End been giving continuous trenble, : decided to avoid
AS bucy and return by another mote.
There appeared to be DD norigational cangero betwoon
but there received the question of our can minefields. I
5W buay and the grept changel on & course of 320 degrees,
a course of 315 from BY burg owing to the laying of
therefore informed that 1 Intended to proceed on
mignatic ulnes at and at the used time naked 18
that the mineriald, 18 DATE would be laid in the channel
there were any British minefields on this course. I judged
to northanrd and therefore addinted my speed so an to
mg signal 0045 and as no number vae received at by 0130 it
give at before entering this channel. IV signed 0115 van
the least half en hour in which to not an answer to
passed by that this course une a ent'u one: vas unclece. however,
appeared signal anyand Date the course back in the
I It received was too a late an W this the X wan normal
0400.
Secured "X" youte at channel. Admirally Please and Duoy. discriburied troupn.
08001
slipped satting for mikis cancelled 15 action. cwing to beving only
and proceeded so 30.7
1830.
one "ICHIUS" dynamo and one stooring motor
Monday 4th June
Slipped and proceeded under orders of to
1930.
Secured Fortmonth. alongoide 21tch Hundred Jetty.
S.
During all

Details

Details

SOUTHAMPTON 28JUN1940 1250
*
The
26D/HW/RN.
28th. June, 1940.
354
Sir,
ENCLOSURE NO.3. to LETTER DATED 27th JUNE,1940 FROM
218
it
THE PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICER SOUTHAMPTON.
352.
3
...
to.
MAJOR LIONEL STEELE WILKINSON, R.M.
thed
ing
This Officer came under my orders when I assumed
charge as Principal See Transport afficer, Dover on
nly
23rd May, 1940 for operation "nynemo".
eing
I was very greatly assisted by this Officer's
3
local knowledge and devotion to duty.
1 be
During the period 23rd May to 4th June, 1940 he
1
was in almost constant attendance at the office,
and was only absent for very brief periods for aleep.
a
His hard work was of the greatest value.
32"
feet
are
at
() E.G. Jonghes
COMMODORE,
Southampton
PRINCIPAL SEA TRANSPORT OFFICER.
a of
27th June, 1940

Details

335th
sometime during the 24 hours.
We discharged supplies from ,Sodality during the day and in
her I sent back and urgent message to D.S.T.O Dover that ships must
bring with themgear for discharging cargo and that there were still
several cranes in action. Unloading continued hampered many times by
air raids but considering these inconveniences the amount discharged
was very satisfactory. The labour employed was largely nen from No.
151 Railway Construction Company under Major Edwards and although an
appreciation of their work will doubtless be forwarded from another
source I must take this opportunity of expressing by praise at the way
they not only carried out this to them - strange work but also the
manner in which they returned to it after every raid.
About 2115 one destroyer and two hospitals sailed and about 0400
Sodality sailed having been delayed by the tide. Although commun-
ications were extremely poor I managed to get a signal passedto D.S.T.O
Dover regarding the sailing of the four ships with a request that the
information should be forwarded to the Ministry of Shipping and Bar
Office (Searail B).
Difficulty was experienced in obtaining reliable information from
the look-out station at the lighthouse so I asked that three naval
signal them ship's with ratings lettersof the French should those in be requisitioned the sent lighthouse out and ships these and having which duly to arrived. were given report likely them to 1 billetted a to the list be office of
employed such shallow waterI instructed them
the in arriving or leaving. They proved of the greatest Staff
assistance names of to ships me and when the remainder of the Sea Transport left

Details

8,
3.60
H
British Representatives.
Lieut-Colonel N.M.Jesper.
Commander E.R.Lewis
At the first meeting held in the abri of the office of the
Ponts et Chaussees Major-Jeneral Lindsell opened the proceedings by
appealing to the members that they should give eschother every ass-
istance and work for the mutual benefit of both France and England.
Certain decisions were taken and everything was arranged in apmost
amicable manner.
Work continued under extremely difficult conditions when Comdr.
in
Musson R.N.R. arrived with Lieutenants Vellwert and Whittle R.N.R. By
4
this time close co-operation with the military authorities and the
As
Admiral (through the B.N.L.O) THE essential so I placed Commander
Musson in charge of the 3.2.0's office and set up my own in the
8
Bastion 32 next door to the 3.N.D.O.
I attended another conference presided over by Wajor-General
Lindsell when he informed us that the far Cabinet had decided to
evacuate the 333. through Dunkirk using the beaches as such as
possible and the sole alongside which several ships could berth at
the same time. Captain 1.0. Pennant and a navel staff would arrive
as soon as they could be got together to organise thefevacuation but
that had meanwhile to report all that available the dook ships area had should become be utilised almost untenable to embark and troops. cargo
that I it was doubtful if we should be able to discharge any more
from ships.
8,
8,

Details

8,
360
british Representatives,
Lieut-Colonel If .M.Jesper.
Commander E.R.Lewis
At the first meeting held in the abri of the office of the
Ponts et Chaussees Major General Lindsell opened the proceedings by
appealing to the members that they should give eachother every ass-
istance and work for the mutual benefit of both France and England.
Certain decisions were taken and everything WS8 arranged in apmost
amicable manner.
Work continued under extremely difficult conditions when Comdr.
Musson R.N.R. arrived with Lieutenants lekwen and Whittle R.N.R. By
this time close co-operation with the military authorities and the
Admiral (through the B.N.L.O) was essential so I placed Commander
Musson in charge of the 3.2.0's office and set up my own in the
Bastion 32 next door to the B.N.D.O.
I attended another conference presided over by Major-General
Lindsell when he informed us that the Tax Cubinet had decided to
evacuate the 3,3,3. through Dunkirk using the beaches as sich as
possible and the hole alongside which several ships could berth at
the same time. Captain 1.0. Tennant and a navel staff would arrive
as soon as they could be got together to organise theferacuation but
that meanwhile all available ships should be utilised to embark troops.
I had to report that the dook area had become almost untenable and
that it was doubtful if we should be able to discharge any more cargo
from ships.
E
R

Details

Details

SOURCES
The principal sources on which this account of Operation "Dynamo" is
based, are as follows :-
M.011883/40 Operation "Dynamo." Report of Proceedings. (Report of
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, F.O.C. Dover, referred to in this narra-
tive as D.R.)
M.020721/40
List of ships which took part in Operation "Dynamo," 26th
May to 4th June (From F.O.C. Dover, 26/10/40).
M.017681/40
Ships lost during Operation "Dynamo" - Report (From F.O.C.
Dover, 5/9/40).
M.017978/41
Report of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the evacuation
from Dunkirk, 29th May to 4th June, 1940. (Rear-Admiral
Dover's Report).
C.W.29685/40
Operation "Dynamo." Recommendations for Honours and
Awards. (From F.O.C. Dover, July 1940).
Case 5458
Operation "Dynamo." Evacuation of troops from Dunkirk,
[6 volumes]
May to June 1940. (Contains reports of individual ships,
Admiralty
"Dynamo" Maintenance Officer, S.N.O. Dunkirk, etc.) Re-
Record Office
ferred to as "R.O.I - VI."
Enclosure
Contains signals connected with the operation.
Box No. 370
Admiralty
Record Office
Admiralty War Diary. (Signals).
M.011431/40
Blocking of Dunkirk Harbour (Operation C.K.)
M.010977/40
Demolitions carried out at Dunkirk (Operation X.D.)
Case 6256
H.M. Ships lost during the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk.
Admiralty
Record Office
H. & A.8/42
Evacuation from Dunkirk Norwegian S.S. Hird. Recom-
mendations for awards.
M.016146/40
Dutch coasters. List of commissioned for "Dynamo," etc.
M.010932/40
Report of Proceedings of Riflemen landed to cover Demolition
Party at Boulogne on 23/5/40.
M.010824/40
Evacuation of Boulogne. Report by Major C. F. L. Holford,
Royal Marines (with M.010932/40).
M.3422/40
Particulars of [Belgian] men and craft from the Dartmouth
area who assisted in Dunkirk evacuation. (From C. in C.
Western Approaches, 14/7/40).
M.011882/40
Operation "Dynamo" Work of Personnel Vessels. (From
F.O.C: Dover, 18/6/40).
M.014793/40
Reports of Operations off Dutch, Belgian and French Coasts
[Evacuation of Boulogne.]
xi

Details

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort
was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned
did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack
widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two
the flanks General Franklyn had latter did
through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break
the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to
that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became
and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear
enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the
had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly
blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it ... had It
Germans approach Boulogne
military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in
approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was
completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of
were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville,
tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million
decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The
established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort
went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the
and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May,
if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back
the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of
days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five
the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to
must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were
prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the
mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer
vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of
movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off
gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the
and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only
craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was
the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched,
in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition
party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force
guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it
attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being
orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Communication with England was cut, and all messages had to be sent by des-
troyers.
By 1530 the Germans had occupied the whole of Boulogne except a bridge-
head, all anti-tank guns were out of action, and half of Major Holford's force
were estimated to be casualties. The destroyers Keith (D. (19), Captain D. J.R.
Simson) and Whitshed went over to Boulogne during the afternoon, and were
followed later by the Venetia, Venomous, Vimiera, Wild Swan and Windsor.
The arrival of the first two destroyers was followed by an enemy air attack,
together with close range mortar, machine gun and rifle fire, which caused
damage and casualties, including Captain D. (19) who was killed, and necessi-
tated breaking off, the work of evacuating wounded and withdrawing tem-
porarily from the port. Fortunately, No. 92 Squadron of the R.A.F. (12
Spitfires) soon encountered the large enemy formation and, with some loss to
themselves and much to the enemy, gained a measure of control of the situation;
and by 1955 the destroyers were back in harbour and carrying out the evacua-
tion of the Welsh Guards. The Keith had received a signal at 1749 ordering
all troops to be evacuated.
About 2000, while Lieut.-Comdr. Welman was on the point of firing the last
of the demolition charges, German tanks towing field guns appeared over the
hill north of the harbour and opened heavy fire at the three destroyers coming
in to take off Force Buttercup." An amazing engagement, described by
eye-witnesses as magnificent, ensued between the German field guns and the
destroyers. The Venetia was hit while in mid-channel, but she was got under
control and out of the harbour, thus avoiding blocking in the Venomous and Wild
who were embarking " Force Buttercup" and the Irish Guards while engaging
the enemy tanks and field guns with every gun they had.
It was low water when the destroyers eventually backed out of harbour,
loaded down with troops. When the Venomous backed out her wheel jammed
and she had to steer with her engines; the Wild Swan, following her, grounded
for a moment, but both ships got off and both reached Dover safely. When,
at 2234 some 3,000 troops had been brought off, the Wild Swan reported that
although a considerable number remained further evacuation was impracticable.
The Windsor, however, which had been ordered at about 2030 to help in the
evacuation, arrived after the rest of the destroyers had left; she entered the
harbour after dark, filled to capacity and sailed again without damage or much
difficulty. On clearing the harbour, the Windsor informed V.-A. Dover that
further evacuation under cover of darkness was still possible and that two more
destroyers could lift all the soldiers still left at Boulogne.
Vice-Admiral, Dover, therefore, despatched the Vimiera at 0015 on the 24th
to try to bring off the remaining troops. She arrived at Boulogne at 0130,
and found all silent. At length the Commanding Officer's hail was answered,
and it was found that there were more than 1000 troops waiting for a ship.
Going alongside the jetty, the destroyer was crowded to the tiller flat by 0230,
the only space left being round the guns; and when she slipped at 0245 she
was compelled to leave some 200 men behind. Five minutes later shore batteries
opened fire on the jetty, and at 0255 a bomber passed close and a bomb ex-
ploded 20 yards away. The Vimiera was so over-loaded that even five degrees
of helm made the ship list unpleasantly. She reached Dover safely at 0355
and landed some 1400 men, including Belgian and French troops and some
I The Whitshed had been at Boulogne helping to evacuate wounded from 0630 to 1045
when she left with two transports for Calais.
9

Details

CHAPTER VIII
FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
EVACUATION REACHES ITS ZENITH
Lord Gort hands over his Command to Major-General Alexander
(2nd Corps) to withdraw to the The 50th 5th Divisions
Orders had been issued on the the beaches 30th May and for Dunkirk. the 3rd, 4th and
began to take place on the morning of 31st May.
the British Base staff at Dunkirk, to come the 1st Corps. These moves with
to fall back to the French defences on Belgian under frontier and, together
This meant that the remnant of the B.E.F., on being withdrawn inside the
area of the French defences, came under the orders of Admiral Abrial; the
ance with the instructions he had received.² He selected Major-Generalthe selected Major-Generl the
time had therefore arrived for Lord Gort to hand over
Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps,
now numbering less than 20,000 men in all; and, on taking over command
of the Ist Corps, Major-General Alexander handed over command of the Ist
Division to Brigadier M. B. Beckwith-Smith.
Lord Gort agreed with Major-General Alexander that a provisional date for
evacuating his force was to be the night of 2nd/3rd June.
On the 31st May therefore, Lord Gort's headquarters closed at 1800, and,
after handing over command to Major-General Alexander, Lord Gort embarked
with his A.D.C. in the Hebe's whaler, which had been towed in by the motor
yacht Lahloo to a point a little west of La Panne beach. He proceeded to the
Lahloo and thence to the Hebe. During the embarkation an enemy attack
was made by about 40 aircraft and considerable shelling was directed on to
La Panne beach itself. With Lord Gort on board, the Hebe proceeded to La
Panne beach and continued to embark troops.
It was not, however, till about midnight, that the motor yacht Bounty with
Cdre. Stephenson on board proceeded to transfer Lord Gort from the Hebe to
the Keith. At about the same time, however, the M.A/S.B.6, having em-
barked Lord Gort's chief staff officer General Leese from the Keith, was sent to
the Hebe with orders from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to embark Lord Gort.
On finding that he had left the Hebe, the M.A/S.B.6 returned to the Keith, em-
barked Lord Gort, and sailed at 0304 on the 1st of June for Dover which she
reached at 0547 the same evening.
It had been the intention of the Admiralty that Lord Gort and his staff
should be embarked in M.T.B.'s and at 1522 V.A. Dover had informed Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker by signal that 4 of these vessels would be available for
this V.A. Dover's did not reach R.A. Dover4,
and other and signal all four back at Dover
by Speaking of the non-receipt uses; of indeed Dover's were signal, Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker reached says, The signal informing V.A. of this, like many others, never
me At 1543/30 Rear-Admiral me Wake-Walker had asked that he
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
a M.T.B's. Gort's Second Despatch, para.57.
R.A. 67, 107, 68 and 102. para. (See 58.
M.017978/41, Dover-Report p.18. of Proceedings (R.O. Appendix III. para. G.30). 19).
66

Details

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Headquarters
and
the
various
was venience, French Messages as employment except best done station by they because taken for despatch of transmission could at semaphore. by the the hand riders, with Bastion coding down the to for Beach of or, Dover help the messages the parties, for pier parties distances of the by for sake nor W/T between of were greater too one great party and cars. con- the
lished was a French, laborious Reception a very by and 2300 business slow decoding on on the business. that naval which the day, type W/T first but necessitated of set code owing which (the to sent arrived the Anglo a through the French Statim French) the the Frestroyers Station by destroversion in use message at that estab- This date into was
munication mission broke was down not established with the Dover defective transmitter.ful defective transmitter.ful com-
of sand in the generator. altogether on evening of 1st June, probably on account
On the 1st June the Royal Corps of Signals established a W/T station in
lorry by the Bastion, as well as telephone communication between the Bastion a
and the Headquarters Signal Station. The intense bombing and shelling by
the Germans that day severed the line more than once.
In view of the possibility of the arrival of enemy forces on the 2nd June all
signal forms and records were destroyed on that day.
British Sector to be held till midnight 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, on taking over command of the 1st Corps, Major General
Alexander proceeded to Dunkirk to interview Admiral Abrial who informed him
that he intended to hold the perimeter till all the troops were embarked. A
French Corps on the right was to hold the sector from Gravelines to Bergues
(though Gravelines had not apparently been in French hands for some days)
and a mixed French and British Corps under command of Major General
Alexander was to hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres and thence to the sea¹.
that in his view this plan did not take account of the true naval and condition
Major General Alexander at once told the Admiral and General military Fagalde
situation of the was now such that prolonged resistance was out of the the question, night of
which serious and deteriorating rapidly. The fighting
troops was front could not in his opinion be maintained after beach and
and the present furthermore, the line to be held was so close to the by short
to 1st/2nd Dunkirk June ; that the enemy might soon stop all further evacuation
range War, Major and General received Alexander a reply that gave the the British same French force opinion troops should to being the be Secretary withdrawn embarked Abrial of as State in rapidly equal and for
artillery fire¹.
as possible from on a that basis time of British onward. and This he showed to Admiral allotted to him till
numbers midnight General Fagalde, 1st/2nd stating June, and that then he would withdraw hold under the sector cover of darkness, which
they agreed was the only plan feasible¹.
Cyclone damaged
Day and night our by patrols torpedo were maintaining subjected their to E-boat vigil attacks. northward, but the on
this
day
two
French
destroyers
were
I Appendix to Lord Gort's Second Despatch.
68

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VHI
Isabelle The French carrying trawlers food, also Marie went hit and to and Dunkirk. Pierre exploded carrying While and unloading munitions, under and shell the Ste.
was the Pierre's still on fire munitions when her were consorts left Dunkirk at 1100. the ship caught fire. She fire
Captain Howson returns to Dover
about 1930 some 30 others bombed the and
Meanwhile the having enemy been made made the last at 1415-1500 of his three major air of
the other two bombers escorted by fighters
small went on craft². to bomb Dunkirk, and
likely to up the 'rough treatment", Captain Howson decided un-
also through stand the stern to further glands. Being opinion that the would be
received some damage of making
The yacht Ankh, which from a Captain near miss Howson and started was using as his headquarters,
some to Rear-Admiral seaward, failing light Captain Howson was then
return 2 to Dover, 3 miles ordering to in yacht the Amulree to keep company. Being to
to signal to closed the Wake-Walker in the Keith. The yachts Eilla unable II
Caryandra the latter that Ankh the former reported that she was short of fuel and
in she was damaged and short of lubricating oil, so they returned and
company with the Ankh to Dover.
reduced to of the Vivacious from the beach) found that her tiller wire by
It tow was the at boats about this time, 2000, that the yacht Glagla (which was standing
shelling R.N. in which had been going on continuously, became intense. A Captain and
to a single strand. Her Commanding Officer said, The bombing was
ordered yacht No. 1 of the Solent Patrol [i.e. Captain Howson in the Ankh],
us to make for the open sea, and all the smaller craft followed him out.
It was in the above circumstances that a number of power boats started
withdrawal Walker to Dover, and that at 0611 on the 1st June Rear-Admiral Wake- a
boats had found it necessary to report to V.A. Dover that all craft used for towing
left during the night, and to urge that they be sent back³.
Ankh, was rammed and sunk by the Vimy in the vicinity of the Gull. Her crew
At about 0145 on the 1st June the yacht Amulree, which was escorting the
were R.N., picked up. The Commodore-in-Charge, Sheerness, Captain H. R. Marrack,
she this vessel [the Amulree] was diverted from the valuable work regret which
that D.S.C., in a report to V.A., Dover, says that it was a matter for
seemingly rammed minor administrative duty which indirectly resulted in carry her being
was performing in towing out pontoons from the very beaches, to out a
The and sunk by a British destroyer in the Downs".
Ankh arrived at Dover at 0815 on the 1st June.
Casualties to towing craft
Commodore Of the motor boats lost this day, 2 lost action. The M/B
machine ferried troops to the Worcester were off by enemy eventually
bourne gunned, holed and abandoned. Her Malo. She was East-
shore Queen. The M/B New Prince of Wales crew was embarked in the a shell M/B from a
crew of the crew were wounded. killed, The vessel and S/Lt. was abandoned P. H. E. and the
R.N. and battery. 2 Two able-seamen were damaged by Bennett,
embarked in the M/B Triton.
I 2 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
3 4 Captain Appendix Howson's H.26. Report (R.O.IV, p.119).
R.O.III, p.551.
74

Details

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
At least fourteen other motor boats¹ were lost by misadventure, e.g. engine
failure, grounding, swamping, damaging rudders and/or propellers on floating
or submerged wreckage, or breaking adrift and being lost when on tow. The
seaplane tender No. 291 managed to get back to England in spite of the damage
she had sustained, but was unable to take any further part in "Dynamo".
Conflicting news of La Panne
Meanwhile, as the tows of boats (which Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker now
saw for the first time at 1900 on the 31st May), arrived off Dunkirk they were
directed to the beaches by Lt. Cdr. Wynne-Edwards, first from M.T.B.68 and
later at about 2100, from M.A/S.B. 6. It was found, however, that in the
growing darkness, and with no lights to help them, there was a tendency for
the boats to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assembled.
At about 1930 the Codrington, then off, Bray, was warned by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker to send on the boats detailed for La Panne, but the bulk of them
did not get further than Bray.
The night was dark, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker stayed off La Panne,
"wondering how things were going. Everything was black, ships and boats
and shore showed no lights", although arrangements had been made for a light
to be shown to seaward to guide boats inshore. Shelling was continuous and
seemed to be falling among the ships at the anchorage. News was conflicting;
a message from the shore said that thousands of men were waiting but there
were no boats, while messages came from ships that their boats could find no
one on the beach. the ships and the boats were there, and the troops
ashore, and one could do no more.
I do not know to this day", says Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker, what really took place there".
La Panne beach 31st May/1st June
It is not easy to discover what happened at La Panne, but the following
account, based on a report by Lt. Cdr. J. W. McClelland, R.N., who with a
party of signalmen reached La Panne in the minesweeper Gossamer at 1930 on
the 30th May, gives the main course of events. He was S.N.O., La Panne, for
the seven hours prior to its abandonment as a place of embarkation at about
0200 on the 1st June.
About 1600 on May 31st Captain Tennant, who had been visiting Lord Gort
at La Panne, decided to return to Dunkirk, but he first instructed Lt. Cdr.
McClelland to arrange for the evacuation of Lord Gort and his staff, to carry
out the duties of S.N.O., La Panne³, and to join Major General B. L. Mont-
gomery, then in command of 2nd Corps.
At that time, says Lt. Cdr. McClelland, an enemy battery near Nieuport,
assisted by 2 kite balloons, had found the range of the beach and the off lying-
ships, which had accordingly withdrawn to the westward. Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker asked for the balloons to be shot down, and aircraft came over for that
purpose; at times the balloons were hauled down-but they always re-ap-
peared.
I A.L.C.8, A.L.C.15, Enterprise, Excellent's 35 ft. M|B, Excellent's A/A M|B, Golden
Spray II, Princess Lily, St. Patrick, and the Seaplane tender 243 and A.M.C.3; the Sea
Falcon, Sunshine, Triton and the Two Rivers.
2 M.017978/41, p.21.
3 Lt. Cdr. McClelland speaks of the final evacuation of A, B and C beaches La Panne,
but this is evidently an error as the beaches were lettered from West to East (See Plan 3)
and must therefore have been M, N and O Beaches.
M.017978/41, p.16.
75

Details

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
that could be found, the intention at Panne 1600-being boats
the past 24 hours². Parties were organised the time-about collect all the oars and for
wood R.N.¹ and the 12th Lancers to marshalling the beaches
Work was commenced on a second who lorry had pier been at La Panne by Lieut. Great-
the embarkation of troops from La would at 2030 be with two ships, to recommence
hoped the fire of the Nieuport battery less effective3.
westward of La Panne, which considered would be out
Dover for the embarkation of Lt. Cdr. McClelland at about 1800 from a point 2 miles V.A.
At about 1630, arrangements Lord were Gort made from La Panne direct with
range of the Nieuport battery. In the event, however, Lord Gort embarked of
in the Hebe's whaler nearer to La Panne.
were already filled put off. No additional boats arrived, however, and the
At 2030 two ships arrived off La Panne⁴, and the beaching craft there which
rate fell to about 150 an hour. With about 7,000 men awaiting embarkation
of embarkation was no more than 300 an hour ; indeed, as darkness set in, rate the
before 0400 the next morning (when the beach would be exposed to gunfire,
and might even be in the hands of the enemy) a rate of at least 1,000 an hour
was the necessary. for Urgent representations were made to V.A., Dover, and to ships
however, in response to this signal that at 2223 the Keith asked V.A., Dover, to
to urgently and that they lacked ships and boats⁵. It was probably,
informed clear Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that La Panne had reported 6,000 troops
in vicinity more boats, but none came, although at 2130 V.A., Dover,
tell S.N.O., Dunkirk, that troops must be moved down to Bray, as tows of boats
got Panne. intercepted at Bray in the dark, with a resulting shortage of boats at La
During darkness hostile low-flying aircraft were patrolling continually over-
head and bombing promptly all lights shown, which no doubt explains why
lights. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in the Keith did not see the pre-arranged shore
By 2200 the situation at La Panne had become serious; only about 600
troops had been embarked and the few boats available, which had to be handled
and pulled in the darkness by troops inexperienced in this work, had dwindled
to three. At this time, as the telephone to Dover was still working, Lt. Cdr.
McClelland destroyed the W/T set.
At about 2300 the situation was becoming critical, as troops for whom there
were no boats were piling up on the beach, and the military withdrawal which
would full leave La Panne in no-man's-land by 0400 the following morning was in
on the crowded beach, causing casualties with almost every shell.
swing. To make matters worse the Nieuport battery opened a slow fire
D.G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 4th Division, who in turn
Lt. Cdr. McClelland discussed the situation with the G.O.C., Major-General
conferred the with the Duty Captain at Dover, and it was finally decided to march
being reached after Lt. Cdr. McClelland had made reconnaissance
6,000 men remaining at La Panne to Dunkirk, via Bray-Dunes, the decision
right had along the beaches, without finding any more ships a personal or boats, and after he
not arrives. informed the G.O.C. in reply to a direct question that he thought they would
List. I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report. The name Greatwood is not in the May 1940 Navy
2 3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
Appendix Q.16.
4 Probably the Worcester and Hebe.
5 Appendix H.16.
76

Details

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Thereupon, at about 0050 on the 1st June Lt. Cdr. McClelland informed
Dover that he was closing down the telephone line as the headquarters were now
being abandoned.
While this decision was being arrived at further batteries had come into
action on the town of La Panne, and by 0100 the rate of fire on the beach was
increased. Lt. Cdr. McClelland says that he had by that time lost touch with
Major-General Montgomery, who had left earlier and subsequently embarked
in the Codrington at Dunkirk at 0525 on the 1st June.
By 0130 it was low water, and about half a mile walk to the end of the piers
which were now high and dry. While walking there with the intention of
assisting in the embarkation of the few men who had not been ordered to march
to Dunkirk, Lt. Cdr. McClelland was twice knocked down by shell bursts a
splinter smashed the box signalling lantern he was carrying, and another
slightly injured his ankle. Several houses on the front were now blazing
fiercely.
On reaching the embarkation point Lt. Cdr. McClelland was told that no
boats had been in for over half an hour, and that the naval beach party had
left-apparently in accordance with his orders that they were to leave in the
last boat.¹ As will be seen later, the beach parties at Bray also embarked early
on the 31st May.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches, Lt. Cdr. McClelland
ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beaches with
the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside Bray-Dunes
before 0400.
At 0200, two or three miles down the beach towards Bray, three ships2 at
anchor and some troops had been trying unsuccessfully to attract their attention
by firing their rifles. Further on, as other large groups were waiting for boats,
Lt. Cdr. McClelland decided to swim off and report on the situation. He
managed to get close enough to the Gossamer, which was anchored 4 cables
from the shore, to pick up a lifebelt on a line brought to him by one of the ship's
company.
He was just able to gasp out his message to the Captain of the Gossamer
before collapsing, but he had told of the 4th Division's change of plan and of
the state of the beaches and had asked that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and
Vice-Admiral Dover be informed. The former was evidently informed at
0215³, and at 0235, the Gossamer signalled V.A. Dover that 6,000 British were
marching from La Panne through Bray on Dunkirk⁴.
Being very exhausted and no longer able to walk because of the pain from
the wound in his ankle, Lt. Cdr. McClelland remained in the Gossamer.⁵
Sub.-Lieut. E. C. Croswell's report on La Panne confirms that of Lt. Cdr.
McClelland. He says On Friday [31st May] embarkation at La Panne was
slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray-Dunes.
The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut
were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday, and ships
also suffered shell fire
On Friday evening German gunners found the range
of the beach and were aided by 2 observation balloons which we did not manage
I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report (R.O.III, p.392).
2 The Codrington, Ivanhoe and Gossamer.
3 M.017978/41, p.21.
4
Appendix H.20.
5
Lt. Cdr. McClelland received a mention in despatches.
77

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Lieut. Wells says that at 0100/31 he was continued. informed that Some naval personnel would
Division, original have the The to Brigadier' shelling party evacuate who was had of the at [?Major embarked already dawn beach left, General if continued, at the and about shelling W. at 0330. 0300/31 embarkation and G. Holmes] (says he Lieut. swam in command Wells) out to officers fetch the of not a order the boat in 42nd was his for
passed from Headquarters that as the would probably be over
dawn the following day [Ist June], all naval personnel were to embark forth- at
with". Lieut. Wells accordingly remained in the Halcyon, where he had taken
the Brigadier". The Halcyon arrived at Dover at 0845/31.
There is clearly some connection between the above order from Head-
quarters' and Captain Howson's arrangement for embarking naval personnel
during the early hours of the 31st May.
The only other account of the activities of the beach parties comes from Cdr.
H. du P. Richardson, R.N., who worked with Lt. Cdr. D. B. Dowling, R.N.,
and a naval platoon at Malo beach from 2000 on May the 27th until the beach
was cleared of troops at about noon on the 28th May.
S.N.O. Dunkirk then ordered him to Bray beach to embark 5,000 troops, and
he arrived there at about 1700 on the 28th May, with Cdr. Ken² [?Kerr] and
16 men. They found about 30,000 troops, stretching from Bray to the east-
ward, awaiting embarkation. Cdr. Richardson's beach party, as will be seen,
also returned on the 31st May.
At 0130 on the 29th May a high wind got up which made beach embarkation
almost impossible. Cdr. Richardson therefore sent off about 20,000 troops to
Dunkirk in batches of 1000.
During the night of 29th/30th May another naval embarkation party arrived
on the beach to the eastward³, and this reduced the limits of Cdr. Richardson's
beach.
Early on the morning of the 30th May Cdr. Richardson went to Brigade
H.Q.4 at Bray and suggested that piers be built by running lorries into the sea.
This, he says, was quickly done and proved successful.
Between 1800 and 2000 on the 30th May the enemy directed accurate artillery
fire on to the beach, and continued firing throughout the night. Cdr. Richard-
son's beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers. " No boats", he says,
" had now been in for 16 hours on our beach".
During the night of the 30th/31st May, the weather became bad once more,
and a heavy surf was running. By about 0300 on the 31st May it was impossible
to carry out embarkation from the beaches.
Cdr. Richardson's men were by now showing signs of extreme exhaustion,
and as it was impossible to communicate with the S.N.O. he decided to take
over S.N.O. a whaler they had salved and go to the nearest destroyer to report to the
They waited for high water, and at about 0730 put to sea. There was a very
heavy surf running, and they had an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only
Two other destroyers passed at about 7 cables, but paid no attention.
an oar to steer by. They approached 2 destroyers, but both got underway.
2 I Cdr. There Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.367).
3 is no officer of this name in the May 1940 List.
These Evidently the party landed at E.F.G.H., Cdre. Hallett's Navy sections of the beach.
headquarters 4 were probably (p. 59). the same H.Q. as those referred to by Capt. Howson as Corps
82

Details

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
After about an hour the Margate life-boat, the Lord Southborough, appeared.
All destroyers were now under way, and as the life-boat was returning to Margate
the party went back in her¹. She reached Margate at 1450 on May 31st.
Thus, by about 0830 on the 31st May all the beach parties of which there are
any records had returned or were on their way to England.
Devonia is beached
At 1035 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker had informed V.A. Dover that he would
beach a ship in the hope of improving conditions for boat work, which was then
being made difficult by a lop and he instructed Cdre. Stephenson accordingly.
Cdre. Stephenson, then in the yacht Bounty off. La Panne, boarded the
minesweeper Devonia at 1600 and gave orders to beach the ship. The
Devonia, already much damaged by near misses at 1230, was beached at
full speed off La Panne, and at 1930, on account of the shelling and bombing,
she was abandoned. Fortunately by 1700 the weather off the beaches had
much improved.
Casualties to H.M. Ships
With the exception of the Devonia none of H.M. ships was lost on this day,
but the following were slightly damaged : the Vivacious was damaged by a
shell hit and had 3 dead and 12 wounded; the Hebe received slight damage
from a near miss; the Wolsey was in collision with the P/V Roebuck; the
Impulsive damaged a propeller on uncharted wreckage; the Malcolm was in
collision with Dunkirk pier; and the Scimitar was in collision with the Icarus
and later with a drifter².
Air patrols
During the 31st May Fighter Command carried out patrols, as on the 30th
May, at an average strength of three to four squadrons. Eight patrols in all
were flown, involving 289 sorties. The periods in the day when the Dunkirk
area was not covered were 0620-0800, 0830-1110, 1510-1615, and 1745-1915³.
Coastal Command patrolled the line North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend
throughout the day, patrols being of one section strength, involving in all
37 sorties⁴.
Shortly before 0930 the Air Ministry intercepted a meassage indicating that
the enemy air force had been ordered not to attack the town or harbour of
Dunkirk but to concentrate attacks on shipping at sea, or leaving the coast³.
It was at about 1230 that, off La Panne, the Devonia received extensive
damage to her hull from 4 near misses, but the first major attack on our ships
occurred about 1415-1430 when one of our squadrons estimated the enemy
strength as about 100 aircraft (bombers and fighters). Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker says, "a terrific air battle took place overhead and it seemed to go
against us". Actually, we lost 9 aircraft and claimed 7 enemy shot down.6
Air attacks then followed at half-hourly intervals between 1530 and 1730,
and at about 1717 the Ivanhoe, Whitehall and Express off Dunkirk harbour
were attacked by about 50 bombers. The Whitehall received some damage
and the Express slight damage from near misses. At this time also the Hebe
was attacked off La Panne by 4 bombers and was damaged by near misses ;
I Cdr. Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.370).
2 Probably either the Gervais Rentoul or the Eileen Emma which both returned damaged
as the result of collisions.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p.334.
4 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
5 M.017978/41, p.17.
6 R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
83

Details

CHAPTER IX
SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
GERMANS RENEW THEIR HEAVY AIR EFFORT
E-Boat activity : sinking of the Stella Dorado and Argyllshire
During the night of 31st May-1st June there was a recrudescence of enemy
E-boat activity. After the torpedoing of the destroyers Grafton and Wakeful
off Nieuport in the early hours of the 29th May M.T.B. patrols had been estab-
lished during the dark hours to prevent enemy E-boats from using the inshore
channels.
It was, however, in the less confined waters along Route Y that the enemy
obtained their successes, despite intensive air and surface patrols. Route Y
was patrolled that night by 2 corvettes and 6 trawlers, while Coastal Command
provided 6 aircraft with bombs and parachute flares; and owing to magnetic
mines ships evacuating troops were given permission in the early hours of 1st
June to use that route as well as Route X.
At 0230 on the 1st June the A/S trawler Stella Dorado, which 24 hours earlier
had picked up 55 survivors from the Siroco, torpedoed by an E-boat near
T buoy, was herself torpedoed in the same position and sunk whilst on patrol.
About a quarter of an hour later the A/S trawler Argyllshire, on patrol in
company with the Lord Melchett and Stella Rigel about 2 miles east of S buoy,
commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. Within 5 minutes
she was struck by a torpedo fired by an E-Boat and sank immediately. Five
survivors, including her Captain, Sub-Lieutenant J. S. Weddle, R.N.R., S.O.
11th A/S Striking Force, were picked up by the trawler Malabar.
At the time there were many trawlers and other small craft in the neighbour-
hood, and one of the two E-Boats responsible for these sinkings was reported
to have been disguised as a sailing boat.
Final evacuation postponed
Already on the afternoon of the 31st May ships in Dunkirk road had come
under fire from guns on shore at Mardyck, and early on 1st June it became
evident that Major General Alexander's force could not be evacuated com-
pletely on the night of 1st/2nd June. At 0800, therefore, he agreed on a modi-
fied plan with Admiral Abrial and General Fagalde which involved holding his
present line till midnight 1st/2nd June, so as to cover Dunkirk and to enable
the French to evacuate as many of their troops as possible. Subsequently
Major General Alexander was to withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk with
all available A/A and anti-tank guns and such troops as had not yet embarked.
Embarkations over Bray beaches
It was not only in Dunkirk roads that the ships had been under fire on the
previous day; off Bray they had the same experience. Troops were moving
westward, and embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. It was clear
to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that beach work at Bray would be costly, and
he so informed Vice-Admiral, Dover (0235/1), who concurred, whilst pointing
out the necessity of using the beaches up to the last possible moment.
85

Details

CHAPTER x
THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND
FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND
Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3)
During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the
of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a
the enemy advance had been checked on a
thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea.
was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold.
French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard
Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition
to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to
be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were
not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacua-
tion but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order
that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It
left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the
moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹
Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4)
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under
the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further
evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that
it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark
hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier
and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral
Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night.
Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It
was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the
proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as
follows :-(Appendix R8) :-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles
to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier
between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended.
(c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men.
It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3.
All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft
except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching
eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about
French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in
2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357.
written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read
originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being
was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure
Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear
S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended.
giving details of the plan until 0430/2.
Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message
96

Details

CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most
was consequently would be completed the following
in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence
that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of
the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible
light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt
had owing ordered withdraw before shipping
followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the
up situation he a knew message to the
detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some
maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last
battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy
barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was
tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the
sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult
to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops
from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing
daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear
that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached,
and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in
the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation
in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease alto-
gether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by
destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering
the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining
accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of
the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified
in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been in-
formed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the
fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no
ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the
only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship
of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only
ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
98

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DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not
apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went
by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23) ; and it is to be pre-
out from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacua-
tion until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the
the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk
alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships
to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the
destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested
by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on
account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number
of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was
essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east
of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British
making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and
knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders
to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gun-
boat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to
endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time,
and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rear-
guard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown
was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew,
which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two
dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed
about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French
vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she
eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships
had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in prefer-
ence, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken
up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it
possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to
the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime
in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
103

Details

CHAPTER XI
THE NIGHT 2ND 3RD JUNE
B.E.F. EVACUATED 2330/2
Plan for the night 2nd-3rd June
During the forenoon of the 2nd June considerable doubt existed at Dover
to the numbers remaining to be evacuated from Dunkirk. Captain Tennant
thought as that about 5,000 British and 30,000 French remained, but it was
estimated at Dover, that in addition to the rearguard of 4,000, (who had been
withdrawn according to plan, from the front line), a further 2,000 British
troops might be found in Dunkirk; while the estimated number of French
troops remaining increased during the forenoon from 25,000 quoted on the
previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000. Admiral Nord
himself estimated the French remaining to number 65,000 of which he hoped
that 30,000 might be evacuated on the night 2nd-3rd and the remaining 35,000,
who were holding the bridgeheads, on the following night.
Major-General Alexander intended that all British troops should be
evacuated by 2400 on 2nd, and Captain Tennant asked for the maximum
number of transports to be sent over. During the forenoon of the 2nd a joint
Naval and Military conference was held at Dover, attended by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker who came over from Dunkirk in the early hours, and by Com-
mander J. C. Clouston, Pier Master at the East Pier, to devise a plan to accom-
plish this. The French Admiralty wished daylight evacuation to be resumed,
but Vice-Admiral Ramsay refused to countenance it. The suspension of traffic
in daylight hours had the advantage of enabling all transport resources to
accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent"
upon Dunkirk harbour during the night. By making provision for increased
pier and berthing parties and control of traffic in the harbour channels by
motor boats, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the
hours of 2100 on 2nd and 0300 on 3rd.
At 1052 Vice-Admiral Dover made a signal to the destroyers and mine-
sweepers, which practically amounted to a call for volunteers for the night's
work (Appendix T.3) :-
"The final evacuation is staged for tonight, and the Nation looks to the Navy to
see this through.
I want every ship to report as soon as possible whether she is fit to meet the call
which has been made on our courage and endurance".
The replies showed that there was no lack of willing spirit. Ships were fit
and ready", ready and anxious to carry out your orders", ship unfit but
...
officers and ship's company are willing to serve in any capacity : so the replies
came in. Only the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen, which had returned
to Ramsgate three hours earlier on her fifth evacuation trip, was unable to sail
owing to the exhaustion of her crew, and was sent on to Dover where additional
officers and crew were lent from the Sandown, which, like the destroyer Javelin,
was not degaussed and was consequently forbidden to sail.
It was hoped to avoid on this night the situation which occurred on the
previous night, when more ships could have used the pier had they been avail-
able, by working out a programme whereby personnel ships, destroyers, fleet
105

Details

SIGNALS
APPENDIX o
I have sent Capt. Bush by M.T.B. with an appreciation.
There is little food or water in Dunkirk. This should be sent as soon as possible
Armies are quite unable to help or organise anything. Keep on sending any ships.
A good medical officer with staff should be despatched
1001/29
4. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A., Dover for command
of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast, and is to hoist his flag in such
ship as V.A. Dover shall direct.
1748/29
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER (R) Admiralty
C.-in-C. Portsmouth, C.-in-C. Nore
My 1748/291, 1321/29 and 1832/29 to Hebe only :
Authority for operation Dynamo under V.A. Dover is as follows :
R.A. Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A. Dover for command of seagoing
ships and vessels off the Belgian coast.
R.A. Dover has hoisted his flag in Hebe. Captain Tennant has been appointed
as S.N.O. Dunkirk and is responsible under R.A. Dover for all shore organisation.
1328/30
6. ADMIRALTY to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES IN AREA A (R) C.-in-C. Portsmouth C.-in-C. W.A.
During present operations on Belgian coast where many small craft are present,
destroyers are not repetition not to stop to render assistance to ships in distress. 1105/29
7. Ivanhoe to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
From S.N.O. Dunkirk-enemy shelling pier with shore batteries from S.E.
Request bombers to counter. Vital.
1105/29
and later
8. B.N.L.O., C.-IN-C. NORTHERN NAVAL FORCES to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
My
1105 cancel request. Consider possible retaliation would be to our dis-
advantage.
1200/29
SIGNALS RE EVACUATION 29TH MAY
9. MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD to MAJOR GENERAL DEWING, D.M.O., WAR OFFICE
Morale of troops landing is remarkably high partly no doubt due to arrival home.
Approximately half armed. Percentage of officers small. All drawn from units
promiscuously, mostly Third Corps
1204/29
10. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to GENERAL LINDSELL [Q.M.G.], S.N.O. DUNKIRK
Stores and supply craft have had to return undischarged owing to lack of assist-
ance from shore.
Must press you to organise parties for unloading purposes; Naval beach parties
will indicate when and where required.
1432/29
I V.A. Dover's 1748/29 cannot be traced. Probably Admiralty Message
1748/29 (see Appendix O, 9c) is meant.
G
177

Details

2
very gingerly to the accompaniment of the most outrageous din and
guided by a furious blaze. Hell itself could not put up a better
show, I am pretty sure.
Various Destroyers & about six Yarmouth drifters were off the en-
trance, but owing to the presence of numerous wrecks they were (like
me) a bit chary of entering. A 'schoot' however came boldly past us
and entered with great confidence and I then hailed 'Clythmess' and
told her to follow 'Lord Grey' in at a respectable distance, so I
would have room to come astern & manoeuver if necessary. As I went
ahead the aforesaid schoot returned & shot out of the harbour en-
trance as if he had definitely decided that it was no place for him.
However we proceeded slowly in and tied up just ahead of the wreck of
H.M.T. Polly Johnson - alongside the Eastern mole. Clythness lay as-
tern of us. We now had time to survey thesituation by the eerie
light of numerous oil fires & the flaming wreck of a British Destro-
yer. Bombing was continuous as was the whine of whistling bombs.
There was no sign of anyone on the quay, which was - I now saw - com-
pletely severed just shoreward of us. Damage done probably by the
same bomb that sank 'Polly Johnson'. This of course meant that we
should have to move further into the inferno before I could land &
endeavour to report to Capt. Tennant. I may say I had the gravest
doubts about that officer's safety, for it looked impossible to exist
anywhere nearer the town. However I felt an effort must be made with-
out delay to carry out my very vague orders and so we moved - with
great difficulty - to the other side of the mole in the quay & again
made fast.
My opposite number in Clythness was no other than Tony Heckstall-
Smith, sub-Lt R.N.V.R., son of the famous Major - the pivot round
which all yachting seemed to revolve in the good old days of peace.
8/10
1156
6/4

Details

TexteeD
4
Tactical and Staff Duties Division,
(Naval Staff),
Admiralty,
tais
Whitehall, S.W.1.
SECTION
TON STREET
T.S.D.4383/49.
S.W.I
S.W.
MIRALTY
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30th May, 1949.
line ads by THE Lique THE MARRING DOE refeb THE TOT twolano 1806
6
CABINET 68/67
26JUL1949 REGISTRY
at THE synd .ensiv 20 THE 0 to enge
Dear Acheson
Onslow wrote to you on 14th account April of last
concerning Captain "Dynamo". a proposal Could to publish you please an let Professor me know
Operation about this book and whether question.
publication
THE
the Butler position has had time to consider the
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Details

CABINET OFFICE
No.: Whitehall 5422
HISTORICAL SECTION
26JUL1949
8, BARTON STREET
S.W.I
CABINET 68/67 REGISTRY REGISTRATION
A.B. Acheson, Esq.
I have the following remarks to make on the publication
of the enclosed work "The evacuation from Dunkirk".
(a)
In General
such a book might have been fairly issued It
as a pamphlet in my opinion, a pity to publish it now for
I think through the M.O.I. during the War.
would I think be, the public would expect a more objective study.
contains many mis-statements and inaccuracies should be
in regard It to the operations on land which
corrected.
written as a "Boost" for the Navy. the It other may
10701
It is this but does so at the expense offend. of
achieve Services and Merchant Navy whom it may
celladed
that the title should be changed its origin before
publication I suggest to make it quite clear as to
02
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and scope.
DOVO
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THE
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and
(b)
In Particular
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Details

SECRET
WAR OFFICE NOTE ON DUNKIRK EVACUATION
a
29-F
Up to 30th May, 1940, the arrangement was that British
troops were to be taken off in British ships and French troops in
French ships. Notwithstanding this arrangement up to noon 31st
May 14,811 French troops in addition to 149,642 British had arrived
in this country in British ships. The number taken off in French
ships is not known but the Admiralty had the impression that the
VEIDA LOLID
French Navy made very little effort and that no en rective steps had
been taken to collect French coastal shipping.
girls
On the night 30/31 May Lord Gort received orders that
equal numbers of French and British troops were to be taken off in
British ships. It was decided that the final night of evacuation
was to be 1/2 June. Evacuation by daylight was no longer possible
as the only channel was covered by enemy guns and his air action was
incessant. On the morning 1st June alone we lost six ships by enemy
bombing.
.on (tood?
Notwithstanding the former decision the evacuation was
continued up to and including the night 3/4 June.
Major General
Alexander and the last of the British troops left Dunkirk in the
amp COULOR
early morning of 3rd June. This withdrawal was made in full
agreement with Admiral Abrial who said he had sufficient French
troops to hold the perimeter and asked only for British naval and
air assistance during night 3/4 June. At considerable risk to - our
shipping taking part this assistance was given.
During the period after the decision to take off equal
numbers of French and British troops the numbers brought off in
British ships were
ОИ
British
74,943
French
97,735.
The total numbers including wounded during the whole period
of evacuation were
British
224,585
French
112,546.
The two main reasons for the disparity in total numbers
are
(a) Failure of French Navy to make an effort
to assist in evacuation.
bolf of
(b) Failure of French High Command to issue any
orders as to evacuation.
(c) French Commanders insistence that his troops
were too tired to continue withdrawal to the
coast, had resulted in their failure to reach
гньыие VDAICE ФЕГІЛЕКА
Dunkirk while evacuation was still possible.
The War Office.
3rd May, 1941.
noti
шолетов!
Constanor
of
TO clobori

Details

onward Command are as in which for
-5-
(11)) para.3(iii) Divisis
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they
are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction
and O.C. in charge of Records.
with officers clerical available
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
person
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th May, 1940, by
to to SOUTHERN ALDERSHOT COLLIAND.
passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distri-
buted to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed
cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No
Composition the orders of of COLIHAND. the G.O.C. concerned
franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to
the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
visional, be Divisional Ps sent Battleand being despatched by ctc., will in
from the Reception G.H.Q.
ponsible tted the Staffs Areas to
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN COMMANDS.
A.Q.I.G., LONDON Area.
take and administerthmer ther ther the first for
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
antival anged blanket Reception that Areas blanket per man
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
he
D.H.T.
blanket Corps "Re-organisation to issued on on arrival which loan,
D.H.I.
D.M.O. & P.
D.H.D. & A.A.
laced in PHASE
Centres",
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
for representatives (2) of the R.A.P.C.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelon.
am or 1'Sub-Units with cash and
Ranks whose Units payment. 02" Officers
rders 20,000 to daily be issued at each of the
by
the
Chief
without War Office,
Pay
Books
ormations dation in accommodated London and Detention in
for the dispatch
para.3(1) above.
of representatives
above. Echelon for to the

Details

ble
-5-
FOR PRS
and
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they
(TH)
are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction
and O.C. in charge of Records.
Lable
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th May, 1940, by
passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distri-
buted to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed
cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No
franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to
the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN COMMANDS.
A.Q.II.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.o. & P.
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelen.

Details

ADMINISTRATION=
the
Staffs
above. the initial To assist case to Areas (see para.1.) Areas. Command and as personnel (ii)), in which
-5-
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they
are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction
and 0.0. in charge of Records.
as from follows:- G.H.Q. 'A' 4 3 Commands' Officers are being to shown officers clerical in available personnel
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th Hay, 1940, by
passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distri-
buted to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed
These
Officers Officers will to report report to to SOUTHERN ALDERSHOT COLLIAND.
cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No
franking or stamping is necessary.
Beef., To facilitate shown work in of theirisional, to under Battlemposition the orders being of of COLIHAND. the G.O.C. concerned, in
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to
the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
locations given the the despatched by ctc.,
Major-Generals i/c Administration
Areas Reception the Staffs Areas G.H.Q. to
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN CORBIANDS:
A.Q.M.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOLE FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Blankets. THE will PHASE THE been that the in the which per for he man
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.o. & P.
Clothing & To be Corps to on on arrival loan,
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
to attend Pay. Arrangements replaced "Re-organisation
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
(a) Officers acquittance Reception charge being Areas made in order for representatives in PHASE (2) of the Centres". R.A.P.C.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelon.
(b) are To pay not individual present. rolls Other to of make Units am 02° Sub-Units payment. with cash
and
the staffs to to Ranks 20,000 whose Units 02" Officers
Detention their II, also to identity. be Other made the orders to daily be issued without at each by War the of Office, the Chief
Pay
Books
Unit Documentations D.A.G. authorised, of in
He they will belong in also arrange in accommodated London and Detention
ich Unit and Do Corps who an not given own in para.3(111) despatch personnel of above. arrange at 2nd for Echelon-to the for
the

Details

-5-
egs
is Their FOR onel slizz) and
are to take are being sent separately to all addresses of this instruction
Separate instructions as to their duties and the documents they
and 0.01 in charge of Records.
Post. Field Service postcards are being despatched to Command
Headquarters to arrive on the afternoon of the 29th Hay, 1940, by
passenger train. They will be collected as early as possible and distri-
buted to Reception Areas. One card per man is allowed. When completed
cards will be collected and handed in bulk to the nearest G.P.O. No
franking or stamping is necessary.
If further postcards are required the Indent should be forwarded to
the Army Forms Depot, to whom surplus cards should be returned.
erned.
in
111
Major-Generals i/c Administration
ALDERSHOT, EASTERN, NORTHERN, SCOTTISH, SOUTHERN and WESTERN CORRIANDS:
A.Q.II.G., LONDON Area.
G.H.Q., HOME FORCES.
H.A./C.I.G.S.
Q.II.G.
D.Q.M.G(A)
D.S.D.
D.H.T.
D.H.I.
D.li.O. & P.
RD
D.H.D. & A.A.
D.R.O.
D.Hob.
D.Mov.
D.S.T.
D.O.S.
F.9.
G.H.V., 2nd Echelen.

Details

Details

Details

Details

23A.
A
Branch
24A
THE WAR OFFICE
CASUALTY BRANCH,
BLUE COAT SCHOOL,
CHURCH ROAD,
WAVERTREE,
18 August, 1941.
LIVERPOOL, 15.
14
PD/GEN/28
188
189
Dear Mensies,
I on dealing with the question or presumption
of death of the cosualties crising out of (1) the
bombing of the two vessele S.S. "Empress of Britein"
and S.S. "Queen of the Channel", and (2) the loss of the
S.S. "Aneelm". At present the only information in my
possession 1a as follows : -
,91.
"Impreas of Britain."
Bombed 26.10.40 and the survivors landed at
Belfast and Gourook.
"Cusen of the Channel"
X
Bombed and sunk 28.5.40 during the evacuation
from Dunkirk. Troops and crew all transferred to
"Dorien Rose".
"Anselm". The only information I have 10 a list of
survivors. A copy of the embarkation roll will be
of great assistance.
If you can furnish me with copies of the
official reports dealing with the casualties to the
above three vessels I shall be grateful.
A.M.20581 to
Yours sincerely,
,m.18451.
Major I.G. Monzies,
(Sa)A.S.WESTON. (Sa)A.S. WESTON.
& (M).1.D.
RUDE
BONNY
BONNY
BOY BI.
" opi. Admy. Service.
BOY BOB
Did not go - for Dynamo.
BOY BRUCE
C. Hayes
Returned to owner.
BREAD WINNER
J.H.A. Bellhouse
Returned to owner.
BREAM
Golding Bros.
Prepared - did not go.
BRITANNIA IV
Sayers Bros.
Returned to owners 5.6.40.
BRITANNIC
H. & J. Budd
Reported lost.
BRYWYN
C. Priestley Mist
T.98. Returned to owners 19/6.
BULL PUP
Mr. Smith
Reported lost.
BURGONIA
G.W. Burgoine
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
BURTON
Leigh Building Co.
Returned to owners.
BOU SAADA
E. Dreyfus
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
BARBARA
A.E. Johnson
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
BHURANA
W.H. Grint
Auxy. Patrol Service.
BOAT (16 ft.)
W. Robertson
Reported lost by owner.

Details

CHEK
SSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
MA JOIE
Mrs. L. Clarbour
T.98 Abandoned off Dunkirk
N.S.C.O. Thames 27.7.40.
MAJOR
B.R.Bunn
Now A.P.S.
MALDON ANNIE
Col. Lamount
T.98 No information of return
from Dunkirk.
MALVINA
R.E. Cooper
To V.A. Dover
MOLLY
E.Thomas
Returned to owner
MARE NOSTRUM
B.C.Kirby
Returned to owners 19/6
MARCHIONESS
J.Mears
Returned to owners 11.6.40.
MARGHERITA
J.Mears
No information of return from
Dunkirk.
MARINA
A.Jacobs
Returned to owners.
MARSAYRU
C.Wyatt
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MARINA
J.T.Phelps
Returned to owner prepared did
not go.
MARICEL
C.Robinson
Repaired, fuelled, floated, but
not taken over.
MARY
Danish
Survived. Returned to Weymouth
MARY HOWARD
Mr.McKenzie
Unable to sail
MARY IRENE
H.Cartridge
T.98. Returned to owners -
5.6.40.
MARY ROSE
O.Dives
T.98. No report received from S.
"Missing Vessels" List.
MARY SPEARING
W.G.S.Crouch
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
MARY SPEARING II
"
Returned to owners.
MATILDA
Chelsea Yachts &
Boat Club Co.
Returned to owners.
MAYBELLE
D.Robinson
Returned to owners did not go.
MAYFLOWER
C.Adams
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy.
Service (6A).
MEANDER
H.Graham
Returned to owners
MERMAIDEN
Lt.Com.P.M.Filleul,R.N.
Returned to owners
MERSEY
R.H. Campbell
T.98. Returned to owner
MIGRANT
Capt. E. B. Schermauley
Did not leave. No. Exam.Ser.
Littlehampton.
MILLICENT D.LEACH
Harry Leach
(Released 3.6.40 Re-allocated
to Spl. Admiralty service (6A)
MIMI
J.M. Wright
Returned - unsuitable
MIMOSA
A.Gordon
A.P.S.
MINIKOI
Capt. Shelford
T.98 Sunk in collision with
M.T.B.
MINORU II
J.W. Cottrell
T.98. Re-allocated to Special
Service.
0.
MINOTAUR
Mr.Towndrow
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MINX
S.W. Wills
T.98. Returned to owners
a
6.6.40.
MIRASOL
R.C.Kyle
No report received from list
of Missing Vessels.
MURIUS
Vectis Shipping Co.
Returned to owner.
MISS MADGE
S.W.Richardson
RETURNED - UNSUITABLE
MISS MING
Kriz Cruisers
T.98 Now on Aux. Patrol
MISS MODESTY
W.S.Nott
A.P.S.
MIZPAH
J.Ovett
Returned to owner
MOIENA
c/o Wilsons
A.P.S.
MONARCH
T.& G. Baker
Returned to owners 18/6
MOSS ROSE
T.Adams
Did not return from Dynamo
Dover List 5.
36' Motor Boat
R.Hoyes
No report recd. from "Missing
Vessels" List.
30' Motor Boat
R.Hoyes
-do-
Motor Torpedo Boat
Thornycrofts
V.A.Dover
M.2
Motor Ferries (2)
- Not used
Returned to owners by N.O.I.C.
Ramsgate.
MOUSME
C.Barber
Returned to owners.
MUTT

Details

VESSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
M-
M
MA JOIE
Mrs. L. Clarbour
T.98 Abendoned off Dunkirk N.S.
M
Thames 27.7.40.
IV
M
MAJOR
B.R.Bunn
Now A.P.S.
R R R R R R R R S. R S R + S. S. S S S to
MALDON ANNIE
Col.Lemount
T.98 No information of retu
from Dunkirk.
aged
MALVINA
R.H. Cooper
To Dover
IV
MOLLY
E.Thomas
Returned to owner
Is
MARE NOSTRUM
B.C.Kirby
Returned to owners 19/6
A
MARCHIONESS
J.Mears
Returned to owners 11.6.40.
MARGHERITA
J.Mears
No information of return fr.
Dunkirk
IV
MARINA
A.Jacobs
Returned to owners
DNG
A
I
MARSAYRU
C.Wyatt
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
A
MARINA
J.T.Phelps
Returned to owner prepared di
go.
M
MARICEL
C.Robinson
Repaired, fuelled, floated,
not taken over
MARY
Danish
Survived Returned to Weymou
I
MARY HOWARD
Mr.McKenzie
Unable to sail
1
MARY IRENE
H.Cartridge
T.98. Returned to owners - 5.6
I
MARY ROSE
0.Dives
T.98. No report received from
N
"Missing Vessels" List.
N
MARY SPEARING
W.G.S.Crouch
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
IN
MARY SPEARING II
- 11 -
Returned to owners.
MATILDA
Chelsea Yachts &
Boat Club Co.
Returned to owners
A
RD BELLE
D.Robinson
Returned to owners did not go
I
I
MAYFLOWER
C.Adams
Re-allocated to Spl.Admy.Service
I
(6A)
I
MEANDER
H.Graham
Returned to owners
MERMAIDEN
Lt.Com.P.M.Filleul
Returned to owners
N
R.N.
I
MERSEY
R.H.Campbell
T.98. Returned to owner
MIGRANT
Capt. E.B.Schermauley
Did not leave. Now Exam.Ser.
Littlehsmpton
(
MILLICENT D.LEACH
Harry Leach
DNG
(Released 3.6.40 Re-allocated to
6
6
(Spl. Admiralty service
(6A)
MIMI
J.M. Wright
Returned - unsuitable
6
MIMOSA
%
C
A.Gordon
A.P.S.
Q
C
MINIKOI
Capt.Shelford
G
T.98 Sunk in collision with
c
M.T.B.
Q
(
MINORU II
J.W.Cottrell
T.98. Re-allocated to Sepcial
C
Service.
MINOTAUR
Mr.Towndrow
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MINX
S.W.Wills
MIRASOL
T.98. Returned to owners 6.6.40.
R
R.C.Kyle
No report received from list of
R
MURIUS
Missing Vessels.
R1C
Vectis Shipping Co.
MISS MADGE
Returned to owner
S.W.Richardson
RI
RETURNED - UNSUITABLE
MISS MING
R1
(
Kris Cruisers
MISS MODESTY
T.98 Now on Aux. Patrol
W.S.Nott
A.P.S.
Ric MIZPAH
J.Ovett
Returned to owner
RI
MOIENA
0/0 Wilsons
A.P.S.
RC
MONARCH
T.& G.Baker
MOSS ROSE
T.Adams
Returned to owners 18/6
Did not return from Dynamo Dover
RC
List 5.
36' Motor Boat
R.Hoyes
No report recd.from "Missing
RO
Vessels" List.
30' Motor Boat
R.Hoyes
- do -
RO
Motor Torpedo Boat
Thornycrofts
V.A.Dover
R
M.2
to Ow Jrs.
Motor Ferries (2)
- Mot-llacd
Returne d 1.6.40
MOUSME
C.Barber
Returne

Details

ENCLOSURE
No
2
TO DOVER LETTER OF 6 ans, 1940
Blwel 1359 -Kasa
OM :- The Flag Officer-in-Charge, Harwich.
:-
The Vice Admiral Dover.
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate.
(Copy to Commander-in-Chief, The Nore).
TE:- 15th June, 1940.
No. (M) J.60/40.
With reference to Operation "Dynamo" and Commander-in-Chief
ae Nore's 1411/8, the following small craft were sent from
he ports indicated in this Sub. Command and have not yet
rk
eturned.
rom Lowestoft.
at Newhaver Sxon 17/6
ishing Vessel
"Jane Hannah" (believed lost).
er.
rom Woodbridge.
acht.
"Major" (believed to be at Sheerness).
eller
rom Walton.
converted Lifeboat. APS "Barbara". (believed to be at Sheerness). ne
From Harwich.
Motor Boat of H.M.S. "GALLANT". (lost)
Motor Boat
"SEAMEW"
lost)
FROM Shotley. (H.M.S. "GANGES")
The following service boats
1 Sailing pinnace.
4 cutters.
4 whalers.
RT 10 E
3 skiffs.
You are requested to confirm that the above craft are not i.
your waters and to forward the list to Admiralty.
CAPTAIN Myan R.N.
for REAR ADMIRAL.
rk.
Barges.
ON.
F. Peters.
Towed to Ramsgate by DUKE.
N.
Leigh Building Supply Co.
"
"
"
If
PRINCE.
eam Tug.
Attached to N.C.S.O. Southend. Abandoned off Dunkirk: Engine
trouble.
VICE ADMIRAL
17 JUN 1940
*
TU
Oaptain,
N.C.S.O. Thames.
N.O.I.C. Southend.

Details

YORK
AGE
text
e-row
NOS
ASSOTE
1898
OFFICE
&
the
GREAT
AGIS
in gaire
- 3 -
SLB
were
Y
Before the boats left I arranged with Commander A.L. Sanders Naval Officer in
70 Lowestoft for an advance of £200 to me so that some cash payments could be
to these fishermen suddenly taken out of their daily earnings. The money ha
accounted for in detail on the appropriate naval account form and the
in view
maistry of Shipping has been advised of the advances. I am informed tonight that
ne Sea Transport Department is sending out a circular letter to all concerned so
that they can make claims for their services.
Wilth the loss of only one boat and a few small damages the operation can be
considered to have been a great success so far as boats were concerned which came
from north of Lowestoft. This is attributéd to the ceaseless work put in by
Mr. Graham, Mr. Jay and Mr. Macmillan; work involving all night attendance at the
office on May 31/June 1st as it was originally intended the little ships should
sail at dawn June 1st. The fishermen's only regret is that they were not called on
earlier so their long experience of working boats to an inch on flat beaches could
have been better utilised. I would like official thanks to be sent to Major Hannam
of the Salvation Army Hostel, who on my appeal at once found beds and fed some thirty
fishermen making them most comfortable.
The
a
ced
as
am
onl
Dey
(805) 00 Hormoes
exp

Details

126
boat up and returnine to in the
daylight. Much the same thing happened- bombs dropped
around me and the machine guns rattled overhead, but I
was not so much worried about that as about keeping the
engines running and I was thankful to have no more trouble
with them.
I did not see my original "crew" again, SO I
dont know how they got on. No doubt they returned safe
and sound, as I and the "Naiad Errant" did.... the job
had been done.
NOTE
"Naiad Errant" a twin screw motor yacht of 9.12 gross
tonnage (7.56 register tonnage) was built by William
Osborn Limited of Littlehampton for Major and Mrs R.K.T.
Nightingale and launched there in June 1939. She was
registered at Littlehampton No. 167764 in 1939.
In May 1940 she was lying at Clarks Wharf Sunbury on
Thames when she was requisitioned by Admiralty during her
owners temporary absence in Bath, and steamed down river
the same night by Mr.H.C.H.Clark of Messrs Horace Clark
& Son, Sunbury - on -Thames assisted by a crew composed of
members of the Sunbury Auxiliary Fire Service to Ramsgate
where she was handed over to Admiralty.
On return from Dunkirk she was retained by Admiralty
refitted at Clark's Wharf Sunbury on Thames and has since
formed part of the "Mosquito Navy" engaged on coastal
patrol service. Her Owner Major R.K.T.Nightingale M.C.
is one of the crew of M.L. "Lady Ruth" of the Middlesex
Flotilla of the Upper Thames Patrol (Home Guard) Able Sea-
man Samuel Palmer D.S.M is now serving on H.M.S.Jackal.

Details

10 Burnham on Crouch
Silver Road
SEASALTER
INTERNATIONAL FIS ERIES EXHIBITION
SIX MEDALS
VICTORI
RECINA
LONDON 1883
156
FISHERIES
XHIBITION
THE SEASALTER & HAM OYSTER FISHERY
COMPANY
LIMITED.
WHITSTABLE,
TELEPHONE 2003,
TELEGRAMS "SEASALTER
DIRECTORS
WHITSTABLE
MAJOR A GARDNER, M.C. CHAIRMAN
COMMOR L.G.GARDNER R.N. LRETOI
E.W. LUCKHURST
H.W. M COX.
a RECEIVED 15/11/17
LONDON WAREHOUSE.
PRODUCERS OF THE CELEBRATED WHITSTABLE NATIVES
PUDDING LANE,
161/17
MONUMENT STREET, E.C.3.
SHELLFISH MERCHANTS
TELEPHONE: MANSION HOUSE
3965 & 3966
HEAD OFFICE
TELEGRAMS SEASALTER,
BILGATE, LONDON
WHITSTABLE.
REGISTRY
October 1st 1940.
Dear Sir,
l
"SEASALTER" T.0.9144/STN.6B.
k
id
Referring to your circular letter of above reference,
we have pleasure in enclosing herewith an account of the
"Seasalter's" voyage to Dunkirk and back, written by the
and
Master, Mr L.W. Salmon.
You will notice that our vessel was one of the first
icul-
three to arrive on the spot.
el
Your kind acknowledgment will oblige,
my
Yours faithfully,
per pre
The Seasalter and Ham Oyster
The Director of Sea Transport,
Fishery Company Limited.
Ministry of Shipping,
he
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
London. W.1.
Secretary,
few troops
to the engines failing we had to
Owing WE proceeded back to Dunkirk W here we took five more loads tide off
and shore which we were now able to do owing to the rising being
the Whilst these operations were being carried out we were

Details

DUNKIRK CLAIMS COMMITTEE
WINDSORA
his Rigin
EMBERA
VIKING
TELEGRAMS:-
TELEPHONES:
.M.SOUTHEND-ON-SEA.
SOUTHEND 2222 (2 LINES)
189
THE CREAT WAKERING BRICK CO. LTD.
BRICK MANUFACTURERS.
DIRECTORS:
SIR FREDERIC W.SENIER,J.P.
MAJOR A.P. WEDD,D.L.,J.P.
11,12,12A, WESTON CHAMBERS,
CALEB RAYNER.
PHILIP HENRY TRANTER,
MANAGING DIRECTOR.
SCHEA
WESTON ROAD,
ALL OFFERS AND SALES SUBJECT TO
THE USUAL WAR, ACCIDENT, STRIKE
AND/OR LOCK-OUT CLAUSES AND TO
ACCEPTANCE WITHIN SEVEN DAYS,
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED AS IN
THE COAL TRADE.
SOUTHEND-ON-SEA, 17th September, 1940.
ESSEX.
The Ministry of Shipping,
Berkeley Square House,
Berkeley Square,
LONDON. W.1.
Ref., T.0.9144/STN.6B.
Dear Sirs,
I am in receipt of your letter of the 16th instant,
and have much pleasure in enclosing a cutting from our
local paper, which I think meets with your requirements,
Yours faithfully,
R
H
P. "Ardmore", H. Tranter Esq.,
8, Branksome Road,
Southend-on-Sea,
Essex.
1 SEP BI
after taking On
About 10.30 a.m., m we arrived at Southend Pier and
-975
were asked to take the vessel to Dunkirk as there were
not sufficient Naval Ratings available. Provisions for
three days and more petrol were taken aboard, and we were
-1-

Details

Information supplied to F.S. 3N. bounty Hold
Blackpool 15.1.43
Dunkirk June 100L The on which May was 27th, the 1940,. official and was name concluded for the on
Transport Instructions Officers, had and been in given to local Naval Officers and Sea
Officers, might be used to search either their local some cases ports the for Fisheries any small Department
as Tenders'on the English to go coast on to the shore at Dunkirk craft or to that serve
the there quite operation. was sure just of time The in local the men excitement were for the given to larger a very ships free engaged hand, but on
matter for addresses of the Owners. This, of took, and of the
names and the names of the craft that instruct they them to make
the Admiralty. our Executive side working in close course, co-operation was all with a
Department allowed to pay the piper, and we quickly realised the Finance if we
The operation concluded, it was the task of
lengthy normal procedure to operate it might become that
was due. and involved task to pay compensation to a very whom it
immediately The matter was therefore put to the those to
Committee method would be to create a small and most
straightforward agreed to the suggestion that the simplest Treasury, who
would be to consider the whole affair. All Treasury Departmental difficulties
representative from the Treasury.
overcome by the inclusion on that Committee of a
to in the days following Dunkirk at two points on the French place
There were two other evacuation operations which took
the west of Dunkirk, which were given the official coast
Operations Cycle and Aerial. The Departmental Committee names dealt of
with less these concurrently with the Dynamo Operation. They
is known, operations, and certainly much less dramatic, but were it
of the cráft employed on the 3 operations.
well to of them as it was not possible to separate the names
the Committee dealh with some
involved in the three operations.
Altogether there wore 1,170 small craft of all descriptions
As a first step, on the 12th June 1940 a circular letter
sent to all owners involved, advising them to forward any clas
House. The claims as receivèd were checked against reports then Was
to the Ministry of Shipping, Berkeley Square
coming in from the various ports, and were dealt with speedily and
generally on broad lines. It will be appreciated that owing to
the urgency of the operation there was no time to on-survey the
craft, and there was no certainty as to their condition when
taken over or to what stores and equipment might have been on
board; and the Committee had to judge the claims for damage or
missing equipment mostly on circumstantial evidence. Generall
speaking the claimants acted in the manner one would expect of
loyal citizens, and it was rare that an excessive or doubtful
claim was made.
The claims received fell roughly into 3 major classes:-
(1) Hire and expenses. (2) Repairs and replacements.
(3) Compensation for Total Loss.
So far as expenses other than total loss were concerned
procedure of the Committee was to authorise the Secretary to
with clearly defined and straightforward cases in consultati
with technical or other competent officers of the Department
payments being scheduled and reported to the Committee for
approval. It was also arranged, in the hope of avoiding
the settlement of claims from fishermen whose boats were of
prepare and stand by for the subsequent operations Cycle 8
that the Fishery Officers of the Ministry of Agriculture
8
Fisheries should be authorised to settle them on behalf of

Details

COPY.
June, 1941.
The Secretary,
Ministry of War Transport,
this
arrange
Sir,
The Committee appointed by authority of your minute of the
tostantialth corres-11
of
7th "Dynamo", has now finished its work, subject to the exceptions
June, 1940, to deal with claims arising out of the Operation
mentioned at the close of this report.
Committee has met on nineteen occasions, and, with the in
for
receipt
the
of
a
July throughout. The Committee also appended claims
exception on the latter's departure for Blackpool, has dealt with
The that Mr. G.J. Allen succeeded Mr. W. Robson retained as Chairman its
those
to
cases
apply
original from membership operations "Cycle" and "Aerial". The statement and the
hire
was
arising shows the number and character of the cases dealt with,
period service
expenditure authorised.
The claims received fell roughly into three major classes:-
1. Hire and expenses.
lost
longshoremen
2. Repairs and Replacement.
was
Found
made
3. Compensation for Total Loss.
compensation
arrange
as expenses other than total loss were concerned, to deal with the
for
and
was
procedure clearly defined So of far the and Committee competent straightforward was officers to authorise cases, of the in the Department, consultation Secretary payments with approval. made
some
150
being technical scheduled or other and reported Committee's to the Committee agenda for being covering crowded by
he
to
masses be met expeditiously. It was also arranged, nature from of
This procedure of items prevented on which no the question of principle arose in and the enabled hope
total
avoiding claims to delay in boats the were settlement ordered of to claims prepare of the and the stand Fishery by for the
only
to
fishermen whose "Cycle" and "Aerial", that authorised Officers to
Taunches,
subsequent Ministry operations of Agriculture and Fisheries should the experiment be was
and
of the of the Department. But part not of
traffic
settle them on as behalf was hoped, owing to some reluctance, without specific on the
They
do
were
authority; the operation. officers and In the it was end, some however, time of before it correspondence, worked the well scheme and by came enabled officers claims full who were to
so successful concerned, to deal with claims into
etc.
which
be the considered best position with the to minimum deal with cases evidence. where decision often depended
in on circumstantial rather than direct
dealt with by the Committee direct, it was
generally possible In cases to obtain of evidence dealing of with payment claims in was the comparatively case of wages
and stores and regards the process the loss of equipment, however, it was a their fairly
general of everything portable, what was owing on
simple. experience As that while vessels were there re-delivered was no evidence, to
board to the in the first instance. of such The Committee a nature as had to to justify the advice assumption of the
owners conditions stripped under which they were taken up, as decide to whether
articles claimed would probably for were have been on board, and, with offer. the The
that technical they felt officers, bound to in arrive most cases at a reasonable to give to the sum to claimant desirable the benefit
Committee what was aboard. This was particularly had been
since, of the doubt owing as to the to omission of an on-survey, the claimants
relieved of their onus of proof.
/A

Details

10 June, 1941.
The Secretary,
Ministry of War Transport.
Sir,
The Committee appointed by authority of your minute
of the 7th June, 1940, to deal with claims arising out of the
Operation "Dynamo", has now finished its work, subject to the
exceptions mentioned at the close of this report.
The Committee has met on nineteen occasions, and,
with the exception that Mr. G.J. Allen succeeded Mr. W. Robson
as Chairman in July on the latter's departure for Blackpool,
Juny every
has retained its original membership throughout. The Committee
also dealt with claims arising from operations "Cycle" and
"Aerial". The statement appended shows the number and character
of the cases dealt with, and the expenditure authorised.
The claims received fell roughly into three major
classes:-
1. Hire and expenses
2. Repairs and Replacement
3. Compensation for Total Loss.
So far as expenses other than total loss were concerned
the procedure of the Committee was to authorise the Secretary
to deal with clearly defined and straightforward cases, in
consultation with technical or other competent officers of the
Department, payments made being scheduled and reported to the
Rc
Committee for covering approval. This procedure prevented the
Committee's agenda being crowded by masses of items on which
no question of principle arose and enabled claims to be met
expeditiously. It was also arranged, in the hope of avoiding
delay in the settlement of claims of this nature from fishermen
whose boats were ordered to prepare and stand by for the
Officers of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries should be
subsequent operations "Cycle" and "Aerial", that the Fishery
authorised to settle them on behalf of the Department. But the
experiment was not so successful as was hoped, owing to some
reluctance, on the part of the officers concerned, to deal with
claims without specific authority; and it was some time before
the scheme came into full operation. In the end, however, it
worked well and enabled claims to be considered with the minimu
of correspondence, by officers who were in the best position
to deal with cases where decision often depended on
circumstantial rather than direct evidence.
In cases dealt with by the Committee direct, it was
generally possible to obtain evidence of payment in the case
of wages and stores and the process of dealing with claims was
comparatively simple. AB regards the loss of equipment, howev
/it

Details

Details

MORT
SEAL
LINE STEAMERS
79
80 st, 1940.
Director of Sea Transport,
exten
Ministry of Shipping,
od.
25th August, 1940.
London.
mort
Gentlemen,
129
and
I have to acknowledge the receipt of
RECEIVED
rebiod
130
your letter of the 20th instant and to
USA Area STATE
thank you for the interesting report of
7th instant.
the Master of the S.S. "BENLAWERS" on
tain a report from the Master
VIDAD
the evacuation from France
his experiences at Calais.
I am, Gentlemen,
'S truly,
gards
Your obedient Servant,
902
JOP
(Sgd.) b.y. Whyman
S to proceed into harbour,
for Director of Sea Transport.
Pp
on, and that things did
Messrs. William Thomson & Co.,
breakwaters we picked up
28, Bernard Street,
Leith.
from the harbour, but
rong tide and the space
clearing the breakwater
cort, and once more
reaching the
being
apparently received the signal from within.
instructed us out to sea,
In the afternoon we managed in, mooring alongside
that quay with our head out ready for any emergency, for it was the
came Calais was not to be held long. Major Attway R.M., apparent
for, who on board together with Officers of the unit our cargo D.S.T.O. was destined
asked us to co-operate as much as possible to get the cargo
der
SINGLE
The great majority of the buoys were unlit,
TWI
the
a bi.,
were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat
and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the
next wave of bombers were overhead.
(Continued)

Details

TROGRAD Telegraphic STEAMERS Address, LTD. LTD.
STEAMERS
"THOMSON, LEITH."
Memorandum
EPHONE 35652 LEITH
79
20th August, 1940.
From William Thomson Ho
To Director of Sea Transport,
PARTNERS
28 Bernard Street,
IOMSON.
Ministry of Shipping,
THOMSON
J.D. THOMSON, Bart.
Leithl.
London.
M.MITCHELL.
M. Ref: T.M.6213/40/S.T.A.6
Dear Sir,
130
"Benlawers"
We refer to your letter of 7th instant.
We have now been able to obtain a report from the Master
of the above vessel in connection with the evacuation from France
and this report is enclosed.
Yours truly,
ENCLOSURE
N°295
that we were in for a hot reception, and that
us to proceed into harbour,
Many
not look too well. As we headed between the things did
this a available we message were was easier ordered "Keep for ship's said out", in again than of which "Benlawers" at done was once owing flashed by size. the to the O.C. to On us strong Escort, breakwaters clearing from tide the the and harbour, we breakwater picked the space but up
"Benlawers" was put in a position to enter, on reaching and once the
more
breakwaters having however, Escort hailed us and instructed us out to sea,
apparently received the signal from within.
In the afternoon we managed in, mooring alongside
quay that with our head out ready for any emergency, for it was apparent the
Calais was not to be held long. Major Attway R.M., D.S.T.O.
came for, on board together with Officers of the unit our cargo was destined
who asked us to co-operate as much as possible to get the cargo
der
SINGLE
The great majority of the buoys were unlit,
the
TWI
a bi.,
Daige
were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat
and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the
next wave of bombers were overhead.
(Continued)

Details

78
STATEMENT FROM "BENLAWERS" ON EVACUATION FROM CALAIS.
131
On the 23rd. May 1940 "Benlawers" was instructed to
proceed to sea from Southampton with her usual cargo of M.T!s, whi
were mainly filled with ammunition and in addition about 30 tons of
Petrol was stowed on the after main deck.
9060
On arrival off Dover on the morning of the 24th. May,
orders were received to proceed in company with the "Kohistan" and
a Destroyer Escort to Bologne, all going well till we headed down the
French coast towards that port, when heavy gunfire broke out close
ahead, and we were not surprised when the Escort ordered us to
about ship and follow him.
Off Calais the Escort ordered us to proceed into harbour,
warning us that we were in for a hot reception, and that things did
not look too well. As we headed between the breakwaters we picked up
a message "Keep out", which was flashed to us from the harbour, but
this was easier said than done owing to the strong tide and the space
available for ship's of "Benlawers" size. On clearing the breakwater
we were ordered in again at once by the 0.C.Escort, and once more
"Benlawers" was put in a position to enter, on reaching the
breakwaters, however, Escort hailed us and instructed us out to sea,
having apparently received the signal from within.
In the afternoon we managed in, mooring alongside the
quay with our head out ready for any emergency, for it was apparent
that Calais was not to be held long. Major Attway R.M., D.S.T.O.
came on board together with Officers of the unit our cargo was destined
for, who asked us to co-operate as much as possible to get the cargo
der
single
the
The great majority of the buoys were unlit,
TWIS
a bi., carge and
were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat
and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the
next wave of bombers were overhead.
(Continued)

Details

(2)
132
hloaded as quickly as possible for the enemy was close, saying they
would hold them if they got the stuff to do it with. All our men
em
turned to, and did their utmost to this end, the R.E's being more
WEB
This
for
Total
or less played out, having we understood been at it for three days
to
700
without a break. Our task was considerably hampered by recurring
we
50
bombing attacks from the air, and later from shell fire from the
BY
The
direction of the town, which we were told was from howitzers towed
into the town by the advance tanks, and it was evident they were
very close as men we had landed contacted the enemy within half an
to on deck S.B. our
hour of being put ashore. About 10 p.m. we had discharged part of
were received to proceed to low
our cargo, when Major Attway, who I may add was carrying out
the to
admirable work along with his S.T.O. colleagues, told me that things
batteries,
looked very black, and left it to me to leave when I considered it n
to to
necessary, but at the same time ordering me to stay and take off as
the
many men as possible. All preparations were made for a hasty departure,
30 on the I decided it
but I gave my word that I would not leave till he ordered me to
bank to the line of do
so. Meantime the last train load of wounded arrived, apparently after
we we to
a very and rough passage, having been bombed heavily, and I am told
French with of us. The the
driver had to be forced to keep the train moving at the
of a revolver. first point
we to take the wounded, this I agreed to, By this
were asked on a few of the
As the hospital ship which was expected did not arrive,
were being heavily shelled, all making over our lying in this time we
precarious or 30 the position a
the one. Attempts were made to discharge more cargo during
night the or rather May early morning, as Officers from the front
pleading for ammunition, and this was done till we started were
the wounded. At to load
about 2 a.m. we felt an extra heavy blow to the ship,
der
single
The great majority of the buoys were unlit,
TWIN
a bi.,
Daigo
were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat
and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the
next wave of bombers were overhead.
(Continued)

Details

-2-
ear
189
About 1.00 p.m. I was ordered to shift alongside the S.S.
ROEBUCK" to avoid taking the ground, as I was drawing more than 14
'eet of water. Destroyers, Trawlers and Hospital Ships were arriving
continuously, and the embarkation of the troops and wounded proceeded
1990
without interruption, notwithstanding the efforts of the German Bombers
TO
who were continually coming over the port and dropping their bombs.
Lewis Gunner Mellis was continually in action with his Gun and soon had
some willing assistants from amongst the troops, who collected ammuni-
tion from the other troops and kep the Lewis Gun trays full. About
3.00 p.m. I berthed alongside again and on being asked by the Pier
Commander when I would be ready to sail, replied "I have come for a
full load of troops so why sail before I am full up it only means more
ships will be required".
The Commander informed me that he had to dispatch the
Destroyers as quickly as possible, and that I could assist the embarka-
tion by taking troops whenever a jam occurred on the Pier, so I carried
on accordingly. About this time, the Germans were particularly active,
and shore A.A. Guns, Destroyers and ships were hitting back with every-
thing they had. Occasionally a few shells whined overhead and fell into
the Harbour, but did no material damage. Numerous air battles were in
progress and several machines came down, some of the Pilots baling out.
At 6.00 p.m. the Pier was crowded with French Troops, most of
them keen to board the Destroyers in the hope they would be landed in
French Ports. Observing a lot of them coming on board, having a feed
and going ashore again, I had a conference with a British Army Captain
and a French Major, and decided that if the French Troops would not
embark that the ship should sail. I estimated that I had 500 Troops
on board, about 70 of them French, and the French still refusing to
embark I reluctantly cast off and steamed out of the Harbour.
The homeward roûte was a wonderful sight, hundreds of small
craft of every description were seen making towards Dunkirk. Meanwhile
the German Bombers were busy, large flights of them appearing and
dropping their loads all over the place. I organised a party of ten
sildiers on the Forecastle Head with orders to fire at any aircraft
coming within ranage. Gunner Mellis was putting in some great work
with his gun, and it was afterwards reported to me by an Army Officer
that he had registered hits on three enemy 'planes, two of which came
down; in fact, the Officer hearing of his excellent shooting went to
stand by him with his glasses and observed him shoot down an enemy
fighter plane. The Pilot baling out was eventually picked up by a
tug about half a mile astern of us. At this time there were more
than seventy enemy planes overhead dropping their bombs all around us
like hailstones, but our luck held good and we escaped undamaged, but
I feel sure that some of the small boats being towed towards Dunkirk
were either hit by the bombs or swamped with the huge columns of water
caused by the explosions.
At Dusk the North Goodwin Lt. V. was sighted and navigating
the vessel through the Downs in the dark I dropped anchor off Deal at
11.30 p.m. to await daylight to proceed to Dover. Most of the troops

Details

From Lieut: WykehamN Martin.
Dynam.
223.
A14/0/1352
1352
1st Lieut: of "Alice', D.B.2.
15
Date
7th June 1940.
TO V.A. Dover.
Report on Dynamo Operation.
15
Alice left Southampton at 2030/26/5/40
and at Dover was directed to beach herself at
La Panne, to fac litate unloading of cargo of
250 tons of provisions.
This operation was carried out at
0800/28 by Alice and Kaap Falga, the former
having rescued Pilot Sergeant T.BOYD, 516716
of 213 Fighter Squadron, who had descended
by parachute.
Two hours later he was transfered
to Able Tasman, also beached at La Panne as
it was thought that she would be the first
to return, Alice and Kaap Falga having received
orders to refloat as soon as possible and beach
themselves again after dark at Bray Beaches,
there to land some provisions and evacuate soldiers
before daylight.
Lieut: Slater (C.O. Alice ) and Lieut
Beale (C.O. Kaap Falga) landed to make definità
arrangements with G.H.Q. for the evening's
operation.
Whilst they were ashore four bomb
and Machine gun attacks were carried out against the
three ships beached and the Military ashore
About 1400/29 Major P.De Havilland, of
at
unea
G.H.Q. four soldiers, himself being wounded, with instructions
(D.A.Q.M.G.) arrived on board Alice with
29
for to try and get in touch with a destroyer cut
28
22,
immediately, me as his communications had been the
and he wished to report to the War Office
seriousness of the situation.
stated that Germans would be occuppying evening
Dunkirk and He advancing along the coast that
due to the capitulation of Belgian Troops for
told him of the intentions he had the
evening evacuation Beaches, where the provisions were
I and he told me that troops
falling just come back from on Bray La Panne, and that
were no longer He also required mentioned there. that Zudycote the beach Channel. at Bray
was under fire as was the he said
Two naval leg. and one
had taken been to hit Military one hospital I came to the
From his Lieut: Slater Falga)
description (Alice)
who conclusion was KIlled that and it Lieut: was Beale wrong; (Kaap since on June6th he
who me I spoke that was wounded. Lieut to Lieut Beale Slater were was I was made also over to unharmed. the refloat and phone, splinters Alice, and from assured
but aircraft due Efforts lubrication system
of the engine,

Details

II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the
secured the charts and burnt
boarded KaapFalga where I took over command
before giving order to abandon ship, order, then
refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there
was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was
still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne
over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that
the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead
prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping
to receive our message. The destroyers were,
however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there
would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard,
which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the
proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still
underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons
and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers
took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination
service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to
the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore
off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to
than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to
the had to be evacuated due a
hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel
asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was
engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe
tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if
owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as
expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga
capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly
wishing
engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that
coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed

Details

21
19
FICER-THOMARGE
Lieut. H.R.Wykeham-Nartin, R.N.
( 1st. Lieut. 'Alice')
31 MAate 1940
"
29/5/40
OUTHRMETO
F.O.I.C., Southampton,
Report
Dynamo Force 28/5/40 (Dutch vessels 'Alice', 'Caap Falga',
(store ships) and'Able Tasman' (aminition ship)
Proceeded from Southampton 26/5/40 and thence received instruct-
ions at Dover to proceed to La Panne and beach these ships to
facilitate unloading cargo. This operation was carried out at
0800 28/5/40 by 'Alice' and 'Caap Falga', the former having
rescued aSgt. Pilot who had descended from a disabled Spitfire
by parachute, (Lt.Com. Crick) arrived earlier at 0600 when It.
he was afterwards transferred to 'Able Tasman'.
Com. Crick landed to report to G.H.O. He returned at 0900 with
orders to refloat 'Alice' and "Caap Talga' and send then to Beary
Beaches where provisions were required and certain Army units
were to be evacuated.
ded Falga to R.N. (Capt. requirements from G.H.O. and request
Lt.Sclater of'Alice) and Lt. Beale (Capt. of *Caap
being inadvisable might be to sent beach to their ships again owing to the appares
that boats acertain definite 'Alice'and'Caap Falga' at Bray Beachi
Meanwhile enemy attacks were made on these
ent existance of aircraft there.
ships and the four bomb and machine-gun after which Major P.de Havilland soldiers,
with with to report the situation that the
arrived the on instructions to try and get to
ashore, board 'Alice' with four in
Genermans were his communications Dunkirke and, that forces at
a destroyer immediately having been cut. He stated Bray
Beaches were advancing from on La Panne and that provisions evacuation were
was
no longer required falling or bach possible to land as complete
.00
He reported anticipated had been killed near him taken and to that the
Lt. Beale had that been Lt. wounded Sclater in the leg and had been
Military Hospital
The
See/over.

Details

25
First Lieut. then abandoned Alice and took his crew and Major De Haviland (wounded)
and 4. soldiers to Kaap Falga where 1st. Lieut. Alice took command. Major De.
Havilland of G.H.Q came on board with instructions for Kaap Falga to go to sea
25
and try and intercept a destroyer so that he could report by m/t to the War Office
the seriousness of the situation. No. Destroyer would stop so Kaap Falga returned
to the Downs and reported arrival. Then to Dover where stores were cleared by 09.00
1st. Kaap Falga's engines were badly coked up and in attempting to return to
Dunkirk at 22.00 1st. they overheated to such an extent that the Ship could not
make suffient speed to reach Dunkirk by 03.00 2nd. the latest hour that ships had been
ordered to stay off Dunkirk.
Due to the possibility of this defect Kaap Falga was not used on the night of June 2nd.
the last night of the evacuation.
Sailed for Poole 14.30/3 arrived 12.00/5
PACIFIC
A
Lieut.Comdr. C.J.Skrine R.N. Lieut. Triscott R.N.R.
Sat.25th. May Crews for Dutch Skoots proceeded from ortsmouth to Poole where
they arrived about noon and were detached for these vessels.
Pacific proceeded at 14.00 leaving discharged dutch crew at Brownses Island. Was
ordered to anchor at Yarmouth for the night.
Sun. 26th. May. Weighed at 0.430 and proceeded for Portsmouth Harbour at 09.3.0
Being Senior officer of the Party I went ashore and arranged for stores and swinging
etc. No sailing orders were obtainable until about 19.00 when we were ordered
to complete swinging as soon as possible and sail at once for Newhaven. Accordingly
sailed at dark with Amazone Atlantic Zeus & Pascholl in company (wega and San Antonio)
has broken down)
Monday 27th. May. Arrived off Newhaven at 04.00 and was ordered to anchor outside
Lay at anchor all day awaiting orders. At dark received orders to sail for downs
in company with a party of skoots that had previously arruved Newhaven. Weighed and
Proceeded
Tues. 28th. May Arrived Dover about 08.00 and berthed alongside 09.00. Went ashore
and having ascertained the possible nature of the operation made arrangements for
sandbags first aid outfits etc., to be supplied to my party of Skoots by noon
However an air raid warning intervened and none of these stores had been received
13.00 received orders to sail forthwith. Sailed about 13.00 and took over a large
lifeboat at sea from one of the slower skoots who was dropping behind. Pacific
gradually overhauled the other four skoots and I think was the first of this party
to reach La Panne.
From No. 6 E Buoy we proceeded at slow speed 180° straight for the beach where in
answer to our hail a shout was raised by the soldiers on the beach. The intention
waswas to turn to Port and anchor off. However partly due to the fact that the
larger ships were closer in than I anticipated but mainly due to my leadsman failing
to obtain any sounding at all we grounded on a bank of sand before we had turned
90° This occured at 23.00 We sent the large Lifeboat ashore with 3 of our 5 hands and
instructed them to take off men to other ships as with the wind blowing inshore it was
not certain that we should get off, With the remaining two hands we laid out a kedge
on our Port quarter. By going full astern and heaving on the kedge we got afloat
when the tide rose at 02.00
29th. May. The ships lifeboat and skiff was then sent inshore and 1 officer and
7 men were brought off to Pacific before the boats lost touch with her in the dark
They did howver bring several par ies off to other ships. Verbal orders had been
received before leaving Dover to leave shore before03.30 being anxious to recover
boats and men Pacific remained inshore till daylight finally sailing at 04.30
when it seemed liekly that the boats and crews had been embarked by other ships.
Rerurned to Dover by route Y arriviving about 16.30 and disembarked troops. No
orders were immediately available but verbal orders were subsequently received
to embark water and provisions and sail about 22.00 Application was made for the
balance of complument and I was informed that I should be sent 3 hnds from
Montvera. These did not arrive until 02.40 at which time Pacific sailed for Dunitirk.
30th. May. The morning of 30th May was misty at about 08.20 when crossing Le Dyck bank
there was a violent underwater explosion about two cables on the Starboard bow
No aircraft was about and it is supposed that it was a torpedo which had exploded
on the Bank. No vessel was in sight Arrived off the beach 09.00 about 1 mile E
of Dunkirk and anchored close in. We had no boat of our own but collected two from
a skoot that was just leaving, conditions as regards surf were pretty good but boats
very waterlogged and no boat was obtainable all day. By 16.00 my crew were exhausted
by pulling those boats in and out from the hore all as I had 30 Officers and 620
men aboard I decided to sail. We might have had many more in half the time
if a motor boat had been available. Accordingly sailed at 16.00 When crossing the
Inner Ratel Bank was attacked by by two of a flight of three fighters with machine
guns. They scored a few hits on the ship and injured nobody. Had nothing but a pistol
with which to reply.

Details

II.
62
(NARRATIVE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER H.M.S. FRISO DURING
61
OPERATION DYNAMO)
Friday 31st May (contd) During the moráing one of the Beachmasters
came off to me and endeavoured to persuade me to beach the ship
so as to lead quicker, pointing out that two other smaller skoots
(HEBE & SURSOM CORDA) were doing so very successfully. As it was
now a falling tide with an onshore wind I refused. For this I
was later very glad as both other skoots shor tly afterwards
became stuck on the beach and were unable to get off. (HEBE came
off at the next high water. During the forenoon I hailed a large
motor driven pleasure boat, got him alongside me and transferred
250 men to him. By about 1230 I had onboard 648 men and space
was extremely cramped. I had delayed my departure hoping that a
destryyer or other fast craft would appear and take my load from
me so that I could fill up again. However as another skoot appeared
I slipped my anchor (the capstan being again defective) and sailed.
Just as I was about to leave Dunkirk Roads I was hailed by a Fleet
Minesweeper and ordered to tow a Drifter full of troops to Dover.
By 1330 the Drifter was in tow and we were proceeding at about
5 knots. At approximately 1400 a Heinkel appeared out of the low
cloud and at a height of 350 feet released a large bomb, probably
500 lbs, and as he passed over he opened fire with machine guns.
The bomb fell on my Port quarter between me and the Drifser.
Luckily the Bomb exploded below the surface and beyond violently
shaking both ships no xjer major damage was done. The force of
the explosion caused my compass to jump out of its gimbals.
Certain damage was dome to Auxiliary Machinery in the Engine Room.
After we had been proceeding for about half an hour we were shelled
by the Nieuport Battery. As the third salvo straddled us I decided
to risck the navigational dangers and cut across the snadbanks so
as to present the minimum target and to open the range as fast as
possible. Luckily the Enemy never found the range again. Thick
fog was encountered at about 1830.
On making the North Goodwin Light Vessel I discovered
that the Shaking up had caused a 30 dgree error in the compass.
During the oassage through the Downs the tow parted on several
occasions due to the wash of fast moving vessels.
At about 0100 on Saturday 1st June I was about 1
cable from the entrance to Dover Harbour when I was bombed again.
This time it was only a very small bomb, which although a very
near miss only wetted the troops on the port side aft. There
were no casualties from machine gun fire. At 0130 I secured
alongside Admiralty Pier Dover. At 0230 we shifted billet and
secured for the night for which I was very grateful as we had
been running continuously for over three days and I had had no
to the Engine and provisions and water were embarked. At
sleep for 90 hours. On Saturday temporary repairs were effected 1700
I proceeded to Ramsgate with HEBE in company arriving Harbour. at 2000,
where as I could not anchor I secured in the Inner
On Sunday and Monday 2nd & 3rd June respectively
permanent repairs were effected to the Engine and Capatan. were When
all skoots were brought to immediate notice in case they
required again it was decided that FRISO was not sufficiently
reliable and so was left in the Inner Harbour.
I cannot speak too highly of my crew who worked
without break. The 0 nly men being onboard at the were
continuously, and on Friday were in the Boats for 7½ time hours
my First a Lieutenant one seamen and the E.R.A. and myself.
I have the honour to be,
VICE ADMIRAL
Sir,
0JUN1940
Your obedient servant,
*
*
DOVER
B
Gene Lymmus.
Lieutenant.
To the Vice Adminal
Royal Navy.
Dorn.

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289.
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83
NARRATIVE OF DUTCH BOAT "JAVA"
26th May - 4th June, 1940.
0645, 27th May, the crew of D.B.22 under the command of
Lieut-Commander Drake, RND left Chatham Barracks and travelled via
Portsmouth to Southampton, joining "Java" that evening. The
vessel was then under repair, with orders on completion to load
ammunition in the River.
On the afternoon of 29th May those orders were cancelled
and we were instructed to fuel and proceed light to Dover.
Accordingly about 1700 with Main and Auxilliary machinery
persuaded to function by Diesel experts from the shore "Java" left
dock and proceeded down the Solent to Hamble.
At 0400 on 30th May our troubles started. Our final air
pressure started the Main Engine and we left with the handicap of
being able neither to stop or go astern as the belt driving our
Auxilliarys parted immediately. Eventually our Auxilliary
Diesel was started and ran all day for light and air with the
result that shortly before arrival at Dover our E.R.A. collapsed
owing to fumes. As our Windlass gear was already out of action
the ship was allowed alongside and on the morning of 31st May
"Sandhurst" was notified of our defects. By this time our
Auxilliary engine also had ceased running.
The Main belt was renewed, but as regards the other and
major defects, notably our Ballast Pump, it was pointed out that
as they would take several hours to complete and we were under
1 hours' notice for sea, it was not worth starting on them.
On Saturday morning, 1st June Lieut-Commander Drake was
taken ill and detained sick in "Sandhurst".
I received orders that afternoon to proceed to Dunkirk to
arrive at 0200 on 2nd June and left at 1945, steaming 10 knots
with neither Auxilliary nor Anchor gear working. My confidence
in our new belt was apparently misplaced as being too slack it
failed to drive the Compressor. This lack of air and consequent
inability, if stopped, to restart, either ahead or astern, might
have led to complications if, at midnight, 16 miles off Dunkirk,
No.3 Cylinder had not commenced to seize, shedding bolts from
the Crankcase which my Engineroom staff eventually held in place
with wedges. But our speed was down to 5 knots making an 0200
arrival impossible and I had no choice but to put about, but a
for
minuteslater however presumably with the Engine cooling, some
higher revolutions were obtained, and I receeded another 5 miles
towards the shore. Again however the Engine failed and it was
only at slow speed and with great care that it could be kept
moving at all. Considering further progress unwise I cruised
in the neighbourhood until daylight and then made the best of my
way home, berthing in Dover about 1015, 2nd June. Here repairs
were considered impossible and on Tuesday, 4th June I was towed
by "Gorecht" to Sheerness and on the following day by "Bornrif"
to Tilbury, thence the following morning to Surrey Commercial Docks
ADNIRAL
Havri
DOVER 14JUN 1940
ft. R.N.V.R.

Details

"VREDE"
Page 8.
150
144
From
8. On-closing the Naval Control Service cutter off Southend
Route Instructions and Sailing Orders were received to arrive
off Marte les Bains, 5 miles East of Dunkirk, not before 2300.
As there was time in hand "Vrede" was anchored in the Downs in
company with several other commandeered schoots at 1830.
9. I was informed by the Commanding Officer of "REIGER" that the
N.C.S. trawler off the North Goodwin Light Vessel had told him
to turn back, the trawler having been told by another schoot
that Dunkirk was in enemy hands. The B.B.C. news bulletin
gave no guidance, nor could I get any information from other
ships present, so I eventually sailed with "Reiger" at 1400
with the idea of complying with sailing orders if the situation
permitted.
IO. Owing to the darkness and to the failure of several light
buoys "Vrede" took the ground at the inshore end of the
ZUYDECOOTE PASS . Attempts to refloat her proving abortive it
was decided to wait for the flood tide.
II. During this time many ships were seen entering and leaving
within two cables of where "Vrede" lay aground and at 0030 &
large merchant ship was seen to encounter two ships leaving.
This first ship blew three short blasts and went astern. Shortly
afterwards there was a dull explosion, without any flame,and
when the resultant water and spray subsided nothing could be
seen of the ship. As it was impossible to assist from where
"Vrede" lay aground, and as other vessels were in the vicinity,
no action was taken.
I2. At 0400 "Vrede" was refloated by the tide and allowed to
drift to a safe anchorage where the air bottles might be
recharged. While at anchor an unidentified destroyer approached
and hailed an order to proceed inshore to the beach as soon as
possible and embark troops.
IS. At 0500 "Vrede" was anchored as close inshore as the shelving
nature of the beach permitted. Both dinghies were lowered and
sent to cooperate with several motor launches which proved to be
Margate pleasure boats manned by their Margate crews. These men
were absolutely tireless and cheerful under the most trying
conditions, receiving troops from the dinghies and ferrying
them to the ships. In thes manner some 150 officers tiredbut
cheerful officers and men were embarked, including a Belgian
major with whom we had some difficulty owing to the impossibility
of drying his corsets. The motor launches were withdrawn by
other authority at about 0930 and as one of the dinghies had
been wrecked and it was impossible to get nearer to the beach
than about 3/4 mile I decided the operation could best be served
by embarking troops from Dunkirk, whence many other ships were
proceeding.
I4. I entered Dunkirk harbour at I030 Wednesday 29th. May and
secured alongside the eastern breakwater. Approximately 500
troops, our full capacity, were embarked during which operation
several minor bombing attacks took place, none of which obtained
hits nearer than the central pier.
I5. As only

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260
650 Troops.
June.
246
ntd)
At 2000 received orders Dover Most Secret Memorandum No.
A.14/0/40.) to proceed to vicinity of Bray to lend support and
covering fire. Owing to low visibility and necessity for oiling
before starting "Locust" was one hour late in position. Took
ship close inshore but coast was very misty and no targets could
be seen. Heavy small arm firing was heard in Bray, which was also
being shelled from apparently the village of Furnes. After some
waiting "Locust" was fired at by machine guns from a position
approximately half way between the foreshore and Adinkerke. This
was replied to by 0.5 machine gun fire from "Locust". Further
fire was directed at the ship from the direction of La Panne,
and this was answered with 4" H.E.
I then attempted to silence shore batteries which were shelling
Bray from Furnes, and 30 rounds of 4" H.E were fired. This ap-
parently achieved some result as the firing died down, and several
explosions causing fires were observed.
June. 0300. Ceased firing and proceeded.
0350. Tug "Fossa" signalled she was ashore and required assist-
ance. In attempting to close, "Locust" took the ground but same
off again, and I decided it was impracticable to close "Fossa".
A Motor Landing craft was therefore hailed and brought alongside
induth
and her troops, 51 in mumber were transferred to "Locust", and the
theathear
M.L.C was sent to rescue the crew of the Tug, and any troops she
may
had on board.
0450. Proceeded, and at 0545 overtook a small armed yacht in the
charge of a Major R.A, who had 28 mén with him. Party was trans-
ferred to "Locust", and Major gave information that covering fire
of "Locust" had been effective.
1005. Arrived Dover, and disembarked 79 Troops.
1820. Slipped and proceeded to Dunkirk Harbour.
2223. Went alongside East Mole, Dunkirk and commenced embarkation
of British Troops.
2302. Sailed with 650 British and 70 French Troops.
June.
0408. Arrived Dover.
1845. Slipped and proceeded.
2300. Anchored off Dunkirk Mole and commenced embarking troops
from Motor boats.
June. 0015. Demolition party consisting of Lieutenant Holdsworth and
6 men left by Motor boat for wreck of "Mosquito". On arrival
it was found that the wreck was submerged to the level of the
battery deck, and despite repeated efforts of Lieut. Holdsworth
who attempted to enter the Captain's Quarters, the forward charge
had to be placed in the wheelhouse. The after charge was placed
in the after magazine. The demolition party were working under
great difficulties due to the movement of the wreck in the swell,
and to the darkness, and great initiativewas displayed by P.T.O. Lieut.

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- 4
472
an open with soldiers was off hailed. He reported having picked with
during daylight. boat in tow About half-way across a French trawler
boat up for h ich Dunkirk and it was thought this might the
be the boat we were searching. To make sure we
barge with set were found approximately three miles from
proceeded to sail Dunkirk where хихария two open boats and a Thames
the coast. The first open boat yielded five Spanieards,
the second one about 6 soldiers, Belgian, French
and English. We then went alongside the Thames barge at
approximately 1330.
This was found to contain about 220
soldiers including two Colonels and a Major of Artillery, and
various wounded. They were endeavouring to sail to England
but had made approximately three miles in 10 hours, see note below.
Motor-mechanic Whittaker fitted a new piston to the air compressor
motor while the 1st Lieut. and myself trimmed the sails.
They had no charts on board. The air compressor motor was
made to run but all efforts to start the diesel failed.
I then left my lst.Lieut., SublLieut. Dehammel with instructions
to sail the barge to Dover,and proceeded along the coast having
opened up the distance to search for the "Girl Gladys".
About two miles to the east I found an open boat containing 18
soldiers who were embarked, after which we approached to withing
approximately three miles of the coast slightly to the eastward
of La Panne. Visibility was good and no sign of the drifter
could be seen, the search was therefore abandoned and course
was set to intercept the Thames barge.
At approximately 1720 when out of sight of land we were attacked
by eight six or eight dive-bombers, 20 to 30 bombs were dropped
and fell at distances varying from 10 to 50 yards of the ship.
The bombers appeared to attack in pairs out of the sun and
having released their bombs continued their dive firing machine-
guns.
Course was altered frequently in an endeavour to miss
the bombs.
Some appeared to explode after entering the water,
some on striking the surface and a certain appeared not to explode
at all.
One exploded under the bow right ahead and the ship
passed through the splash. A certain amount of discomfort was
experienced by myself and members of the crew who were exposed. to
the splash in the x eyes for the next twelve hours or 30.
Able-Seaman Power was wounded in the leg when manning the port
turrett also one of the soldiers in the fore peak. As I now had
wounded on board I considered it advisable to return to Dover
forthwith and to ask for assistance for the barge. A tug was
sent out at approximately 2100 and found the barge sailing well
about 10 miles from Dover. I consider Sub Lieut, DeHammel
performed a very creditable operation. The bombing to which
the ship had been subjected had caused leaks to the hull and the
petrol tank and the ship was not used again for that night's
operation.
on passage to Dunkirk.
0115 Arrived Dunkirk and embarked C.O's
of block-ships and Captain Dangerfield.
Carried out reconnaissance of the harbour.