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Grave
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ORDE Registry
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Small Craft Service List
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Red List (1939–40) — OCR
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- Ship type: D
Lloyd’s Yacht Register (1939)
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Document Collections — Tagged Pages
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59*3
vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve units 23rd Division moved to their positions during
of ist and 2nd Corps on protection and traffic I7th May; they were provided with about forty
control of main routes in Belgium. Railheads, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from
which had been advanced on i3th May to the ordnance reserves.
general line Enghien—Ninove, were now moved The enemy break-through was now offering
back across the frontier. an imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to the
During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawal communications over the Somme at Amiens
to the Senne positions began, and was success- and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet
fully completed by the afternoon of the lyth. this, every available man and weapon was
Some enemy tanks and motor cycle units had collected and orders were issued to the
been reported on the right flank of ist Corps, commander, Lines of Communication Area, for
west of the forest of Soignies, and as a precaution, the remainder of I2th and 46th Divisions to be
part of the ist Army Tank Brigade, which had despatched to the forward zone. One brigade
started to withdraw for entrainment, was (36th Infantry Brigade of I2th Division)
turned about to meet the thrust. arrived during the day, and the leading
By the time the tanks reached their entraining battalion was despatched with four field guns
stations railway difficulties prevented the trucks to cover the north-western exits from PeYonne,
being moved, and the remainder of the move while engineer parties, organised by the
was carried out by road; this gave rise to Commander, G.H.Q. Troops, were sent to
inevitable mechanical trouble later on. * prepare for demolition the crossings over the
Canal du Nord between the river Somme and
By.the early morning of iyth May the situation the right of 23rd Division at Ruyalcourt.
in the south had become grave, and enemy The remainder of 36th Infantry Brigade were
armoured and mobile forces were reported to moved forward to Albert, and the other two
have crossed the Oise. At St. Quentin the brigades of I2th Division ordered to the Abbe-
situation was obscure, and though by this time ville area. These latter, however, arrived too
General Giraud, lately commanding the French late to come under my effective command, and
7th Army, had been ordered to take command their operations on the Somme were carried
of the forces in that region, it was clear from out under the Commander Lines of Communi-
reports and from visits of liaison officers that cation Area.
he had not yet succeeded in establishing effective Elsewhere in the area between Corps rear
control. A gap of at least twenty miles existed boundaries and the Somme, local defence
south of the Forest of Mormal in which there schemes were put into operation under the
appeared to be no organised resistance. Later orders of the Commanders of G.H.Q. Troops
in the day information was received from the and of " X " Lines of Communication Sub-Area*.
French that ten enemy armoured divisions were Few if any of these units or their commanders
engaged in the battle. had any experience in fighting, but their
During the whole of this period, communi- determination was beyond all praise.
cation with my liaison officer at General Georges' A mobile bath unit, for example, took part
Headquarters was maintained so as to keep in in the defence of St. Pol, while, both now and
touch with events as they developed. However, later, the General Construction Companies of
I received no infoimation thiough this channel the Royal Engineers, and many units of the
of any steps it was proposed to take to close the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to
gap, which might have affected my own place their localities in a state of defence and
command. manned them until they were overwhelmed,
It was not till later, on the night of iqth/zoth relieved or ordered to withdraw. Wherever
May, that General Billotte informed me of the possible, transport was collected or requisitioned
action which was being taken to this end by to enable parachute detachments to be dealt
the French Armies in the south. with.
These many small delaying actions all contri-
The defence of rearward areas. buted to gain the time required for the.with-
25. Rear G.H.Q. at Arras had intensified the drawal of the main forces.
precautions already being taken against sabotage The defence of the town of Arras itself was
and air landing units, but on the early morning entrusted to the O.C. ist Bn. Welsh Guards
of I7th May a telegram was received from who had under his command some units of the
General Georges ordering 23rd Division to move Royal Engineers, an Overseas Defence battalion
at once to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord, (gth West Yorks), and various details including
on a frontage of fifteen miles from Ruyalcourt an improvised tank squadron.
(10 miles north of Pdronne) to Arleux (6 miles
south of Douai). Orders were issued for all administrative troops
not required for defence to move forthwith north
The division, which, like the I2th and 46th of a line Orchies-Lens-Fre'vent.
Divisions had joined the B.E.F. for work in
rearward areas, consisted of eight battalions only At the same time to guard against a more
with divisional engineers, but no artillery, and immediate threat to my right flank a force was
signals and administrative units in no more than organised consisting of I27th Infantry Brigade
skeleton form. Its armament and transport was of 42nd Division, ist Army Tank Brigade,
on a much reduced scale and training was far a Field Artillery Regiment and the Hopkinson
from complete. Missionf, all under the command of Major-
General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, my Director
Nevertheless, troops of these three divisions
fought and marched continuously for a fortnight, * This Sub-Area had been formed to deal with units
and proved, were proof needed, that they were which, remained in the old G.H.Q. and Corps areas
composed of soldiers who, despite their when the B.E.F. moved into Belgium.
inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold f The Hopkinson Mission, under the Command oi
Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Hopkinson, had been formed to
their own with a better found and more numerous secure certain information for the R.A.F. and for
enemy. G.H.Q. immediately on entry into Belgium.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5921
as it turned out, fatally injured in a motor These moves left only four divisions on the
accident returning from the conference which he frontier defences and made'it possible to with-
and I had attended at Ypres on the night of draw the headquarters and Corps troops of
2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him in 3rd Corps for employment on the Canal line
command of the French First Group of Armies, where they were badly needed. This was done
and presumably succeeded to the function of at 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with
co-ordination although this was never officially 42nd and ist Divisions and 2nd Corps with
confirmed. 3rd and 4th Divisions.
2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions tcame under
out 3rd Corps and that night made a' march west-
of three different nations, and that I personally wards. I had decided to employ 2nd and 44th
could not undertake any measure of co-ordina- Divisions on the Canal line facing west, but their
tion in the forthcoming operations as I was move required a farther twenty-four hours to
already actively engaged on my Eastern and complete.
Southern fronts and also threatened on my Meanwhile the canal defences required stiffen-
Lines of Communication. ing as much as possible. And accordingly,
Nevertheless, I saw General Blanchard and Polforce temporarily assumed control of the
proposed to him that to implement our part of whole front between St. Omer and Raches,
the Weygand plan, we should stage an attack and two regiments of 2nd Armoured Recon-
southwards with two British divisions, one naissance Brigade were placed under its com-
French division and the French Cavalry Corps. mand. Polforce also undertook the responsi-
So far as we were concerned the attack could bility for demolitions as far north as Watten
not take place till the 26th at the earliest owing including no less than 43 bridges.
to the.reliefs which were in progress, and the The sector eastward from Raches was now
need to assemble 5th and 5oth Divisions. I handed over to the French, the British
also asked General Blanchard to enquire from demolition parties being left on the bridges at
G.Q.G. how such an operation could be syn- the disposal of French 3rd Corps.
chronised with the attack from the line of the Macforce, now comprising four field batteries,
Somme which was said to be in process of half an anti-tank battery and one battalion,
preparation. These negotiations, as will be seen, withdrew from the line Carvin-Raches on
were later continued by Sir Ronald Adam on 23rd May and was moved to a rendezvous in
my behalf. I emphasised, both to the Secretary the. eastern end of the Forest of Nieppe where
of State and'to General Blanchard, that the it was joined by Headquarters and one. regiment
principal effort must come from the south, and of ist Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade.
that the operation of the northern forces could i39th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) continued
be nothing more than a sortie. to hold the sector from Carvin to Raches until
I never received any information from any 26th May.
source as to the exact location of our own or .The situation on the canal line deteriorated
enemy forces on the far side of the gap; nor during 23rd May and the enemy established
did I receive any details or timings of any bridgeheads at Aire, at St. Omer (which seems
proposed attack from that direction. to have changed1hands twice during the day)
and near Watten. His tanks were reported as
zyrd May—Further development of the Canal line. harbouring in the forest of Clairmarais, and
39. On 23rd May the organisation- was con- during the day his armoured fighting vehicles
tinued of " stops " behind the Canal line. came within three miles of Hazebrouck. ,By
At Hazebrouck, where the organisation of the evening, however, these movements nad
defences had been begun on 2 ist May by the been checked and steps taken to keep. the
staff of the Major-General R.A. at G.H.Q. enemy out of the Forest of Nieppe.
the garrison was now about 300 strong and . The enemy had also been active that day on
included eighteen French light tanks and some the canal line at Be'thune, where they had been
Belgian machine gunners. driven off and had then moved towards Carvin.
Cassel was occupied by i3/i8th Hussars, less Here the defenders had been reinforced by
one squadron, and on the same afternoon (23rd) further artillery under C. R. A. 2nd Division
Brigadier Usher's force took over the defence of (Brigadier. C. B. Findlay), and the crossings
Bergues. were firmly held.
On the night of 22/23rd May the withdrawal- On 23rd May Calais was finally isolated. Its
to the frontier defences had been carried out. garrison; had been reinforced under the orders
The French had taken over the sector northwards of the War Office, by 3oth Infantry Brigade
from Maulde and the right boundary of the (Brigadier C. Nicholson) and 3rd battalion
.B.E.F. was now Bourghelles-Seclin both inclu- Royal Tank Regiment—a cruiser tank regiment.
sive to the French.. This change of boundary did I had intended to move the latter within the
not however affect the dispositions which the canal line, but it was already too late-. After
B.E.F. had taken on the Canal line by which two attempts they were driven back into Calais,
the rear of the French positions was protected. with the. exception of three tanks which
On the left of the B.E.F. the Belgians, who eventually reached Dunkirk by way of Grave-
had previously agreed to relieve the 44th lines. The remainder of the gallant defence
Division after withdrawal to the Lys on the of Calais was conducted under the orders of the
night of 23rd/24th May, ordered one of their War Office. It-was finally concluded on the
divisions to occupy the sector Halluin-Courtrai night of 26/27th May.
on the night of 22nd/23rd May. 44th Division Information received at this time indicated
was concentrated in G.H:Q. reserve on the that two enemy armoured divisions were
morning of 23rd May. converging on Calais and two more,- supported
On the right, 2nd and 48th Divisions passed by a motorised. S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) division,
through the French on the night of 22nd/23rd on St. Omer. A fifth armoured division appeared
Mav and also concentrated in G H.O reserve. to he mnvincr rm
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5926 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
at the time they had nothing available save their homes in northern France before the French
the 68th Division and the regional troops, Government put into operation the plans they
they did not demur. had made. The French organisations were not
However, so far as I am aware, no action was available and no British troops could be spared
ever taken in this respect. to control the traffic. The refugee problem had
therefore become increasingly acute, and the
Description of the Dunkirk Perimeter. tide which at first set westwards from Belgium
48. The British sector of the Dunkirk peri- had now met the enemy again in the
meter had its right at Bergues, and thence Somme area and had begun to turn back on
followed the canals to Fumes and Nieuport. itself. Scenes of misery were everywhere, and
These places were old-fashioned fortified towns, the distress of women, children and aged people
easy to defend but affording good bombing was pitiable. Fortunately the fine weather
targets. The destruction of the bridges pre- and warm nights mitigated their plight to some
sented no difficulty, and all were in fact blown degree and though the outbreak of famine was
in time by British or French troops except that expected at any moment it did not actually
at Nieuport which was wide and solid, and could occur in the area of the B.E.F. Little, un-
not be demolished before the arrival of the enemy. fortunately, could be done to help the refugees,
Two natural switch lines were available : the since supplies for the troops were still seriously
canal from Bergues to Dunkirk and the Canal short. Moreover their presence on the roads
des Moeres from Dunkirk south-east towards was often a grave menace to our movement.
Hondschoote. It had been necessary to give Corps a free hand
Immediately north of this line came the in handling them*: on occasions it had been
inundations, extending from Bergiies over the necessary to turn vehicles into the fields in
district of the Moeres to a width varying from order to keep the roads clear.
one to three miles. Except in a few places, During the 27th May, troops and their trans-
they did not cover the roads but were designed port began to withdraw into the perimeter on
to leave them clear, while preventing deploy- the fronts of all three Corps; and where the
ment. They did, however, sometimes prevent troops had received the necessary orders,
troops from digging themselves in. On the ' vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the
Belgian side of the frontier the order to begin assembly areas. The few troops who could be
the inundations was not given by Belgian G.Q.G. spared for traffic control did not, however,
till the morning of 26th May and they never prove sufficient for the purpose, and conse-
became effective. quently a great number of British and French
To the north of the inundations was more vehicles entered the perimeter and the town,
low-lying land ; then came the Bergues-Furnes of Dunkirk when they should have remained
Canal, and the main lateral road from Fumes outside. There was inevitably a large number
to Dunkirk. Finally there was the narrow of vehicles which had become detached from
strip of dunes giving way to a wide, open beach their units, and a number of cases also occurred
running the whole length of the position and that day in which units became separated from
shelving very slowly to the sea. There were no their formations and arrived within the peri-
quays or piers whatever except those at Dunkirk meter without sufficiently clear orders. These
itself. At intervals of about a mile along the were sent to reinforce the defence of the peri-
shore lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La meter, or embarked, as seemed best to those in
Panne, Bray Dunes and Malo-les-Bains. control.
Next day (28th May) when Corps started to
Layout of the Sector and Problem of Traffic Control. take charge in their areas, the difficulties with
49. Sir Ronald Adam, on leaving Cassel, the British traffic were cleared up, only to be
went at once to the headquarters of the 48th replaced by difficulties with the French traffic.
Division at Bergues to find out the latest situa- The French 6oth Division .began to arrive
tion and in particular what troops were imme- from Belgium, and at the same time rearward^
diately available either to hold the perimeter elements of their light mechanised divisions"
or to control the traffic. He learnt that the appeared from the south-east and south. These
enemy were advancing north eastwards from were soon followed by the transport of the
the.Forest of Clairmarais : there could therefore French 3rd Corps, mainly horsed. None of
be no question of using any of the reserves of these appeared to have received orders to leave
48th Division, and the only troops immediately their transport outside the perimeter: seldom
available were certain engineer units. General did they do so unless compelled by British
Thome, however, lent his C.R.A. (Brigadier traffic control posts.
Hon. E. F. Lawson) who was instructed to lay By the 28th, Brigadier Lawson, using the
out the defence of the perimeter, and to use for greatest energy, had succeeded in the urgent
the purpose such troops as were on the spot, task of manning the perimeter from Bergues to
or were entering the perimeter. Nieuport with troops from a number of units,
The position was then divided into three chiefly artillery.
Corps areas, each including a collecting area
outside the perimeter, a sector of the canal line 50. The Admiralty had placed - the naval
and a sector of the beach. arrangements for embarkation in the hands of
Already it was seen that the traffic problem the Dover Command. A Senior Naval Officer
was going to assume formidable proportions. had been sent to Dunkirk to work out detailed
Ever since the loth May it had been a potential plans, and steps had been taken to collect a
source of trouble, but it had been kept in hand large number of small ships, and of boats for
in the early stages by strict adherence to pre- talcing troops from the beach out to the ships.
arranged plans and by the use of infantry for On 27th May, however, these arrangements
traffic control. Once the withdrawal from the had not had time to take effect, nor had it yet
Dyle began, the problem became acute in France been possible to provide sufficient naval ratings
as well as in Belgium. Refugees began to leave to man the beaches. Yet a start was made;
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5934 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
of my three Corps. Lieut.-Generals Sir Alan Honours and Awards.
Brooke, M. G. H. Barker and Sir Ronald Adam, 73. I am submitting separately the names of
Bart. The sudden turn of events on iyth May officers and other ranks whom I wish to recom-
threw a violent and unexpected strain on the mend for reward or to bring to your notice for
Commander, Lines of Communication Area (the gallant or distinguished service.
late Major-General P. de Fonblanque), and I
wish to record my sincere appreciation of his I have the honour to be
good and devoted work during the time that he
was serving under my command. Sir,
Finally, I desire to express my thanks and Your Obedient Servant,
good wishes to all those officers in' the' French GORT,
Army whose duties brought them into contact
with the British Expeditionary Force, and whose General,
goodwill, understanding and personal friendship
did so much to foster the good relations which Commander-in-Chief,
existed between the two armies. British Expeditionary Force.
APPENDIX TO SECOND DESPATCH OF C.-IN-C., B.E.F.
OPERATIONS OF IST CORPS FROM 6 P.M. artillery fire. It was therefore evident that the
ON 3isT MAY TO MIDNIGHT SND/SED JUNE, force could not be evacuated completely on the
1940 night ist/2nd June. Major-General Alexander
therefore agreed on a modified plan with Admiral
Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander, Abrial and General Fagalde at 8 a.m. on ist June.
on taking over command of ist Corps, handed He arranged to hold his present line till
over command of the ist Division to Brigadier midnight ist/2nd June; thus he would cover
M. B. Beckwith-Smith. He then proceeded to Dunkirk and so enable the French to evacuate
Dunkirk to see Admiral Abrial, who informed as many of their troops as possible. He would
him that he intended to hold the perimeter till then withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk
all the troops were embarked. A French Corps with all available anti-aircraft and anti-tank
on the right was to hold the sector from Grave- guns and such troops as had not yet embarked.
lines to Bergues (Gravelines however had not During the ist June, heavy enemy attacks
apparently been in French hands for some days) developed on the British sector, supported by
and a mixed French and British Corps under bombing and artillery fire. The garrison of
command of Major-General Alexander was to Bergues (ist Loyals) were forced to withdraw
hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres, and to the line of the canal north of the town, and
thence to the sea. to the west, 46th Division, i26tH Infantry
Major-General Alexander at once • told the Brigade of 42nd Division and ist Division
Admiral and General Fagalde that in his view were forced back north of the canal for about
this plan did not take account of the true naval 1,000 yards. 5oth Division had also to meet
and military situation which was serious and enemy penetration from the east, but by
deteriorating rapidly. The fighting condition of nightfall on ist June the enemy advance had
the tro'ops was now such that prolonged resist- been checked on a line Bergues-Uxem-Ghyvelde,
ance was out of the question and the present thence due east to the frontier and along the
front could riot in his opinion be maintained frontier defences to the sea.
after.the night ist/2nd June : furthermore the
line to be held was so close to the beach and to Embarkation was temporarily stopped at
Dunkirk that the enemy might soon stop all 3 a.m. on 2nd June to prevent casualties in
further evacuation by short range artillery fire. daylight; by that time there remained in the
He gave the same opinion to the Secretary of Dunkirk area about 3,000 men of various
State and received a reply that the British force artillery and infantry units, with seven anti-
should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible on a aircraft guns and twelve anti-tank guns. They
basis of equal numbers of British and French held the outskirts of Dunkirk throughout
continuing to be embarked from that time - 2nd June with little interference save heavy
onward. This he showed to Admiral Abrial shelling and bombing of the beaches.
and General Fagalde informing'them that he By midnight on 2nd/3rd June, all the remain-
would hold the sector allotted to him till mid- ing British troops had been embarked. Major-
night ist/2nd June and then withdraw under General Alexander, with the Senior Naval Officer
cover of darkness. They agreed that in the. (Captain W. G. Tennant, R.N.) made a tour of
circumstances no other plan was feasible. the beaches and harbour in a motor boat and
The naval situation had by now grown worse, on being satisfied that no British troops were
and the Channel from Dunkirk was under direct left on shore, they themselves left for England.
LONDON
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh 2;
39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; i, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;
80, Chichester Street, Belfast;
or through any bookseller.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947 3297
the one thought to be present penetrated further were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs
than the northern Route Y. It may well be and machine gun bullets.
that this U-Boat laid moored mines, which are Required by their duty to remain offshore
thought to have caused the loss of two A/S waiting for the troops, who themselves were
trawlers. unable to move down to the water for the
same reason, it required the greatest determina-
8. AIR CO-OPERATION* tion and sense of duty, amounting in fact to
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity crews, to on
heroism, the part of the ships' and boats'
enable them to complete their mission.
for effective air co-operation in an operation of In their reports, the Commanding Officers of
this nature. Not only did German air effort many ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F.
interrupt and reduce seaborne traffic, but it personnel for gallantry in such combats as were
also prevented embarkation by suspending observed from the ships, at the same time ex-
troop movement. To both Naval and Military press their sense of' disappointment and sur-
observers on the coast, the situation at times prise at the seemingly puny efforts made to
was extremely disheartening. Rightly or provide air protection during the height of this
wrongly, full air protection was expected, but operation, though the gallantry of our out-
instead, for hours on end the ships off shore numbered airmen was the admiration of all.
9. No. ii GROUP FIGHTER PATROLS—DUNKIRK AREA HISTORY.
Date Patrols Total flying Enemy aircraft
hours daily assessed as destroyed
26th May ... 22 480 20
27th May ... 23 •tt6 08
j°
28th May II ^76
o/ w 2Q
•*J
29th May ... Q
y 674
Wr 6<j
30th May ... 9 7O4
/"T-
3ist Mav 8 . /too
f
ty*J
u
jog
ist Tune ... 8 s«8 4.3
TO
2nd June 4 231 35
3rd Tune ... 4 33Q
4th Tune ... 3 234
Totals 101 4,822 262
Notes :
(1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an
increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger
patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation " Dynamo " suffered most from enemy air effort on 2Qth May and on ist June, after which
latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation
by day.
10. The position of enemy batteries had been
* Air Ministry footnote: located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on
It was not to <be expected that all air action would 3ist May, and additional batteries in the Grave-
be visible from .points on the coast; many enemy
raids were in fact intercepted and enemy aircraft fines area on the ist June. Air Bombardment of
destroyed. Moreover, fighter patrols formed only one these batteries during the ist and 2nd June un-
part of the air operations in connection with Dunkirk, doubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and
as a considerable reconnaissance and bombing effort dawn on each of the nights 2nd/3rd June and
directly connected with the operation was also being
made. 3rd/4th June, when seaborne 'traffic was passing
2. Air protection could not be complete for the within range of the enemy batteries command-
following reasons: — ing the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk
(a) the enemy air force had the initiative and Roads and Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valu-
could choose the times of their attacks. able contribution by the R.A.F to the success-
(6) the operations were outside the range of con- ful outcome of the operation. A similar benefi-
trolled interception provided by radar stations in cial result was obtained by the bombing of the
the United Kingdom. In consequence, all that batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead
could be done was to put up patrols and to trust under fire.
that these would intercept or generally discourage
enemy air attacks. 11. CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
(c) the demand for continuous fighter cover, with In the earlier stages the large number of
the limited size of our fighter force, meant that
patrols were necessarily weak in numbers of aircraft, British troops located in the dunes off the beach
and our fighters were thus placed on disadvan- were of rear formations with few officers. There
tageous terms with the enemy. When evacuation was little control over these mixed units, aggra-
was eventually limited to the dusk and dawn hours vated no doubt by the fact that Army Officers'
it was possible to concentrate our fighters in much
greater strength for these periods, with a corre- uniform is indistinguishable from that of other
sponding improvement in the cover provided. ranks which makes the presence of an Army
3. Only in conditions of complete air supremacy Officer difficult to recognise by troops other than
could the Dunkirk evacuation have been completed •those under their own Commands. The appear-
without interference from the enemy. Such air ance of Naval Officers, in their unmistakable
supremacy could only have been attained by pro- uniforms, helped to restore order and the troops
longed previous air operations or by the local con-
centration of a far greater force of fighters than the responded to commands in a disciplined manner.
R.A.F. then had. In the early stages, in the absence of any Army
A 2
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Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" Fatt Recommendations of Personnel. M.Drifter SHIPMATES. Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, W.S. 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, LT/JX.1858584. his conduct and leadership were at all times of the In the absence of a Skipper during the operations highest order. Recommended for decoration. H.M. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope, R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English, R.N. Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the need for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy and then collapsed, due to internal injuries. He is now in hospital and his condition gives cause for grave anxiety.
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Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly gallant and meritorious service. Recommended for decoration. otor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant G. A., Cadell. R.N. Recommendations. (Retired). FFICERS: Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs On the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French WISHART. 24 Finally, when all ships were leaving, and embarked any British remained. Then encountered a series see of French soldiers, having searched the Quay to if mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home himself at one time or another falling overboard. attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly enemy about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no coolness and effic) ency. doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price. Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted. He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. Recommended for early promotion, Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. With a civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, R. N. sailed from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. On arriving off the beaches spent more than 48 hours on ferrying work, and in salving craft; and in towing off ships aground. Underwent the common experience of being stormed by French troops and having to repel these boarders in order to save his ship. When isolated, attacked by 4 Messerschmitts with machine-guns for about half an hour, and at other times was under sporadio gun- fire. Ferried off a total of about 400 French troops. This civilian displayed a complete disregard of danger and showed a high order of seamanship. Recommended for decoration.
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Dynams 61. DOVER. - 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S."LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of R.A.F.Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No. 243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to ers and two French 5491 Binld ason to the British Dyuamo 178 S off Grave Lines, These attacked us FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". My boat avoided the I saw that Commander DATE: 5th June, 1940 om a bomb, and was TO : FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER. S, I was fully oid the attacking ok round for the other SINKING OF R.A.F.MOTOR BOAT NO. 243 id the whole crew were on, and slowed down to ouston ordered me to at full speed to Dunkirk. Sub.Lieutenant R.Wake's report on the above incident is forwarded 3 shortly afterwards tack, my boat was herewith. e-gun bullets, and my ion. The speed of the set a mean course for out half an hour after Love Dawson he enemy aircraft left rriving there at 2100, r Boat No.243 to Rear- CAPTAIN, R.N. ers alongside were ICE ADMIRAL ommander Clouston and at only Sub. Lieutenant 6- JUN 1940 armaham are the only * up. Aircraftsman DOVER nder Clouston dead in picked up. had remained to pick boat, which would have e top of the canopy, as out of action and the L have made our arrival continued.
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Dynam 61. DOVER. 179 5 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only b.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
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Dyrams 61. DOVER. à 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. and reported the loss of F. Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only Sub.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action arrival and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued.
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VERY SECRET 928 WAR REFUGEES 6 While nothing in this memorandum should be taken as indicating that H.M. Government has any special reason to suppose that the possibilities with which it deals are imminent, considerations of humanity and prudence have led the Departments concerned to consider what steps would have to be taken to deal with an influx of refugees from Belgium or Holland in the event of a German invasion of those countries. During the last war nearly 250,000 Belgian refugees were accommodated here without insuperable difficulty, but it is estimated that at least 500,000 might be expected to escape on this occasion. ,In addition to this great increase in numbers, the problem of accommodation has been very greatly complicated by the danger of large scale air raids and the necessities of existing evacuation schemes. The French Government has indicated that although it would be prepared to do all in its power to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Belgium, it could not undertake to retain any substantial number owing to the grave problems arising from the evacuation of the population of Northern France and the presence in that country of the British Expeditionary Force as well as the French Army. For obvious reasons, any appeal to the public is impossible at present but energetic steps are being taken to prepare emergency schemes for accommodation in public buildings etc., in neutral areas. The resources of reception areas are already fully taxed and it would be undesirable to send large numbers of refugees - especially women and children - to evacuation areas, where they might be expected to be subjected to severe air raids. It is doubted, however, whether this course can be avoided if the total should prove to be as large as is now feared. H.M. Government is therefore anxious to explore all the possibilities of accommodation outside Great Britain and semi-official approaches have already been made to the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland. The advantages to the unfortunate people concerned of being placed in an area free from enemy attack will at once be apparent. The purpose of this note is to bring the problem to the notice of /the
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Statement of the operations of Commander Dove's party at Dunkirk. Prefatory Note. The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200 sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from Captain A/P took command of the Drifter (skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R) Report. Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4 tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay. Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr. Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party. Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was man- eeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges. Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr. Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a re- grettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncom- batant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number* of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over (ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr. Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up. dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'
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3 ried us four hours to do scale normally bombardment 20 minutes. This ide to fly another work which takes (made in Germany) which was entirely kite deserted from a except large floating for Bank's crane party. We THE decided There so cases similar to key this that our uninterrupted and large to wind which continued Owing to return a contrary to H.Q. We found our the efforts proved of IM car presumably the result of about 2 miles and our were of fifth many column activity. We made way times on the way, especially on the We reported leading that H.Q. it it was back to H.Q. on foot, a distance road to were bombed several H.Q. the position seemed extremely from grave. the South Quay. Cdr. was Henderson hardly informed us that G.H.Q. intended taking to be over evacuation bastion At practicable to embark troops the and the extreme shortage of supplies. We were and to sail as soon as that all superfluous personnel would have therefore ordered owing by to Dove to go aboard the "Gervaise Rentual" most of the bombardment permitted. The air force personnel, onboard. We demolition the party were, we were informed, already and QZS.60. were On arrival also at the ship we found we had no charts and to the our given a new route order via Zuydcoote Passage therefore made way bastion. At the bastion we found that a number of soldiers, the obviously a back as quickly as we could through the bombardment unnerved by the relentless attack, were approaching H.Q. in went out in the midst of the bombardment, without steel helmets, destroy- or fire threatening manner with their rifles. Cdr.Dove and Cdr. Henderson arms which had just entered harbour, arrived. The situation control and and parleyed with them until a naval landing party from which a might " have er developed seriously was immediately brought under take we informed that the evacuation of the town of Dunkirk was to were forthwith. We were therefore given new orders by Cdr.Dove. found We place able to collect a chart and return to the ship where we were Cdr. Bankes. He told us to collect as many small craft as possible and take them and the drifter round to the beaches on the north side of the town to pick up soldiers. We tried to commandeer two Belgian tugs and manage to secure two launches byt on investigation both were too badly a picket boat but the French naval commander objected strongly. We did damaged to be serviceable. One had its steering gear rendered useless one by bombs, and the other, a diesel engine, had no fuel, and no knew how to work it. We now had onboard four air force officers, 10 re moment four drifters arrived in the entrance, two of which were in a soldiers, the majority of the demolition party and Cdr. Bankes. At this sinking condition owing to bombing and machine-gunning, These two the "Bola Roy" and the "Paxton" were sunk by gun-fire from the "Gervaise Bentual", clear of the fairway, after all personnel had been taken on- board, the drifters "Playmates" and "Gervaise Rentual." The remaining 2 drifters were ordered by Cdr. Bankes to tie off the beaches and they proceeded thereforthwith. We were now helded from the South Quay and on crossing there found Cdr. Dove who was the last person to leave the South Quay. We took him aboard and landed him and Cdr. Bankes on the North Jetty, where they met Captain Tenant, Cdr. Dove insisted on returning to the bastion to the end of the pier, within hail for an hour. Captain Tenant then told find out if there were anyone left there and instructed us, to be off us to extend those orders until midnight. It was now about dark and air activity was intense. Huge fires light up the town and later numer- believed we heard artillery. After standing off for about 1 hour, ous parachute flares were dropped by the enemy. For the first time we gun us, we received enemy a morse message from the beach, to come alongside in which time the enemy dropped magnetic mines and attempting to machine the North Jetty, There we found Naval Commander whose name was not ascertained, other Captain drifter and tell any personnel ships to come along- from Tenant's party, who ordered us to make con- side the North We spoke to the Queen of the Channel (?) to this effect Jetty. drifters who were Lying some way to the north and were difficult and to the locate. Another morse message asked us to use and found all possible a despatch. to After this we ?) returned ship alongside to the North and fully Jetty loaded. were We took personnel (Queen of Channel and children and some soldiers, and hound aboard which written) was was destroyer, continuing "Unless and complete W/T dubies. fighter The protection gist of this can be message provided (which only to proceed a home to Dover also an urgent despatch to H.M.S. "Wolf- ordered aboard about 30 women after delivering women and children before dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'
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Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. H.M.Drifter SHIPMATES.- - Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, W.S. 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, 1858584. his and leadership were at all times operations of the conduct In the absence of a Skipper during the highest order. DSM : Recommended for decoration. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope. R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. D.S.M. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd e n t DSM Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. DSC Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. D.S.O. DSC Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. ASO Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English. R.N. D.S.O Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being the for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her falling internal into rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the need of the enemy and then collapsed, due to injuries. hands He is now in hospital and his condition gives cause for grave anxiety.
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Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. M.B. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed gallant and meritorious service. courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly Recommended for decoration. Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant a. A. Cadell. R.N. Recommendations. (Retired). OFFICERS: X Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. D.S on the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked 24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard. Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and effic) ency. M. Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price. Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted. He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. turing stered ivors Recommended for early promotion, was whom Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. 3 D.S.M. With a civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, R. N. sailed from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. On arriving off the beaches spent more than 48 hours on ferrying work, and in salving craft; and in towing off ships aground. Underwent the common experience of being stormed by French troops and having to repel these boarders in order to save his ship. When isolated, attacked by 4 Messerschmitts with machine-guns for about half an hour, and at other times was under sporadic gun- fire. Ferried off a total of about 400 French troops. This civilian displayed a complete disregard of danger and showed a high order of seamanship. Recommended for decoration.
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Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. H.M.Drifter SHIPMATES. - Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, LT/JX.1858584. In the absence of a Skipper during the operations his conduct and leadership were at all times of the highest order. Recommended for decoration. H.M. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope, R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English. R.N. Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being the for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her to falling internal into rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the injuries. hands He is now in hospital and his need of the enemy and then collapsed, condition due gives cause for grave anxiety.
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Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed gallant and meritorious service. courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly Recommended for decoration. Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant G. A. Cadell. (Retired). R.N. Recommendations. OFFICERS: Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. On the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked 24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard. Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and efficiency. Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price, Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted, He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. Recommended for early promotion. Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. R. N. sailed off the beaches spent more than and 48 in hours towing on With a from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, On arriving ships ferrying boarders half stormed attacked aground. by work, by in THE and Underwent troops in salving and the of having craft; common to 400 under When experience repel French sporadic isolated, these for danger troops. of about gun- being off This fire. Forried off a total disregard of and Recommended for decoration.
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376 350 4. 1/6 after she was hit in the after Bodler Room and started to settle down. Captain Berthon then anchored her and M.T.B. 102, which had just arrived, came alongside. I embarked in her with my Staff, and after telling 2 tugs to stand by KEITH I went into Dunicirk to see General Alexander. Dive Bombing and Maching Gun attacks were made on the N.T.B. on the way there. 35. General Alexander was away from the H.Q., but I saw a Staff Officer and discussed the situation. At that time I gathered that the plan was to evacuate during the next night from the Western Beach only and Dunkirk. The Rearguard were to withdraw at dawn and make their way to Dunkirk. As this meant continuing the embarkation for some hours of daylight I had grave fears of heavy losses after that morning's experience. 36. As there was nothing more I could do at Dunicirk and all ships were returning I decided to return to Dover to make contact. M.A/S.B. 37. 10. At Dover I was able to discuss the plans for the night I reached Dover at 1130 in N.T.B. 102 and left again at 1730 in to operations which was invaluable, and thereafter I returned each day for this purpose. 0330 38. from the 18 miles of beach East of Dunicirit, for which large mmbers of The plan for this night was, roughly, to embark between 2100 and small craft were to be towed out. In addition Personnel Ships were to embark from Dunkirk. sailed early in M.A/S.B.10 and landed at Dusirink at 1900, visited 39. the S.N.O. and I the Ceneral, and gave them details of the plan. French I then learnt and to my great relief that the Rearguard were being relieved by the withdrawing during the night. started to arrive and from then onwards I moved 40. between the At beaches 2100 ships and Dunkirk, continually senting ships which The were as loading slowly off the beaches into Dunicirk to fill - there. plan very originally made would not have made full use of Dunkink. I went alongside the root of the East ydar in Donkirk there until to 41. off At 0200 of the Naval Ratings of the Shore Party, and There I lay was 0245 when I proceeded of the Harbour at this time and a Trawler was instead sunk. of As bring some round all ships barthed in harbour. considerable shelling clear morning I decided to get ships away by 0300 some of the it was a very this put into effect I left for Dover: later hour. 0330, small craft and having however, seen continued their work off the beaches to & 42. Night - Sunday 2nd - Monday 3rd June. it was understood that there was sere to 5000 embark British from still Dunkirk ashore and over 30,000 some French local beach made any East- At this stage French, and the plan arranged craft from the beach close ward. entirely Actually except a strong for wind and heavy shelling on the embarkation there impossible. 43. Minesweepers A very large and carrying Schoots capacity was outside. provided in Personnel in addition Ships, to Destroyers, Drifters and Paddlers, Flotillas of boats working from Tugs time also the French had collected from a large quays up mmber the harbour. of fishing 44. vessels, Trawlers, By this and small steamers which worked bombing I arrived at Dunkirk in M.A/S.B. 10. at 2030, after a 45. /attack
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PRELIMINARY EVENTS CHAP. I 17TH MAY French 9th Army front broken By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹ The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw. These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³ 18TH MAY Allied rail communications severed By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge. During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies' bases. On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F. completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British 1st Corps). Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French; unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle. After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified. I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24. 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25. 3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26. 4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30. 3
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CHAPTER IV MONDAY, 27TH MAY (See Plan 3) The Dunkirk perimeter the organisation of the Dunkirk the bridgehead. Canal de la Its perimeter was to extend from On the morning of 27th May, Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam commenced and thence by Furnes and Nieuport Gravelines to the Belgian coast. In fact, however, Gravelines, south-eastward to Colme, along the canal to Bergues perimeter, and were falling back to the line of the Mardyck Canal, from the the French were already evacuating and the western part of the to Spyker on the Canal de la Colme. The French were to be responsible sea, for the defence of the western half of the perimeter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the British for the eastern half. The position of the Belgian Army was now so obscure that its inclusion in the bridgehead was not taken into account. I The British sector of the Dunkirk perimeter had its right at Bergues, whence it followed the canals to Furnes and Nieuport. Immediately north of this line were the inundations ; to the north of the inundations was low-lying land, and then the Dunkirk-Furnes Canal and the main lateral road from Furnes to Dunkirk; finally, there was the narrow strip of dunes giving way to a wide open beach running the whole length of the position and shelving very gradually to the sea. There were no quays or piers whatever, except those at Dunkirk itself. At intervals of from 3 to 4 miles along the shore (from east to west) lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La Panne, Braye-Dunes, and Malo-les-Bains (adjoining Dunkirk). During the day troops and their transport began to withdraw into the perimeter on the fronts of all three British Corps. Where the troops had received the necessary orders, vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the assembly areas; but owing to the shortage of troops for traffic control a great number of British and French vehicles were able to enter the perimeter and the town of Dunkirk², causing grave congestion on the roads. Beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray-Dunes and Malo-les-Bains, one beach being allotted to each of the 3 British Corps.³ Dunkirk had been bombed for some days, but the town and port received their most serious damage on 27th May. At least 12 attacks were made on Dunkirk and the sea approaches between 0825 and 20004. Lorry columns had been set on fire in the town and a pall of black smoke from the burning oil tanks hung continuously over the town and docks, impeding the air defence. Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troops and they were sent to the dunes east of the town to await embarkation.³ The Belgain armistice During the 27th May Lord Gort received a further telegram from the Secre- tary of State for War which read, " want to make it quite clear that sole 2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47. 4 3 R.A.F. Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 50. Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 49. Narrative, p.320. 18
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MONDAY, 27TH MAY CHAP. IV meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later : " Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005." To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.² All ships diverted to the beaches Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³ were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne. The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of sub- sequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵ Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the 17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo' the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040, Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains. This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into 3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11). 2 D.R. page 3, para. 8. 3 The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields. 4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8. 5 D.R., p.3, para. 38. 6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, York- shire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II. 7 Appendix D.6. 23
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SIGNALS APPENDIX H 20. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, from DOVER La 6,000 British marching Panne through Bray on Dunkirk. 0235/1 21. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER west We must have more boats of La Panne. 0243/1 22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Gossamer It is now impracticable to send more boats. You must do your utmost with 0334/1 yours. 23. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER Situation on beaches is critical. Third Division marching to Dunkirk. More boats urgently required. 0345/1 24. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Thousands more (?moving) from La Panne westward. No boats. 0358/1 25. GENERAL WHITAKER to GENERAL DILL, WAR OFFICE Absolutely essential provide many more small boats with motor boats to tow if grave losses are to be avoided and remainder B.E.F. cleared. Matter utmost urgency. 0430/1 26. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER All craft used for towing boats have returned in the night. They must be sent back. 0611/1 27. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Warn following ships to stop them. 2150/1 20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty Reported that number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Essential to arrest this. Keep good lookout and force them back. 2201/1 20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY Owing to severe conditions and enormous wastage on Dunkirk coast, small boat flotillas, vital for beach work, can no longer be relied upon even in fair weather. Information just received that at least two such flotillas have turned back tonight Saturday. 2328/1 30. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty False information and orders to return are being given to our inshore units by 5th Column scoots or other vessels. Endeavour to keep our small vessels to their duty on the coast. 2335/1 Sunday, 2nd June 31. ADMIRALTY (D.N.I.) to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Your 2335/1 : Please supply any information regarding the ships suspected of 5th Column activities. 1834/2 Monday, 3rd June 32. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY Your 1834/2. Following is information to date : On the morning of the 1st June it was reported that a number of small craft had left Dunkirk beaches. An M.T.B. was sent out to round them up and send them back. A signal was intercepted from Leda en route to Dunkirk saying that she had met boats returning, and she was ordered to send them back. 171
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PLAN 2 Scale ofMiles to 5 o 10 20 30 40 N The Allied withdrawal into 18th MAY the Dunkirk KENT GSTEND . 30ᵗMAY BRUGES ANTWERP PANNE perimeter on the + NIEUPORT 23rd MAY 30th May May + 4. FURNES MALINES Yser GAND BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH LINES C GRAVE STATES BERGUES R.Lys ALOST R WORMHOUTE LOUVAIN CHANNEL YPRES COURTRAI Escant R.Dyle WATTE MENIN BRUSSELS . R St. OMER CASSEL COMINES Dandre WAVRE BOULDONE . ZEBROUCK INS ARMENTIERES R. R AIRE MERVILLE ATH LILLE 23rd:MAY Meuse 23rd MAY St. AMAND NAMUR . BASSEE CARVIN . 18th MAY R. Sambre St.POL . VALENCIENNES DOUAI BARRAS Escaut a CAMBRAI OULLENS BEVILLE B ALBERT R.Somme PERONNE him AMIENS StQUENTIN French 10th Arm MEZIERES SEDAN R.Oise Mause The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May. Allied line on 18th Щау French 3rd Army R.Aisne Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May German progress shewn in blue TSD/HS (ESG) C.B.H.16675
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Source: The National Archives, Kew, MT 40 66. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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79 1 ml EN LINE STEAMERS 1940. TRACT OF LETTER FROM CAPTAIN EDGAR JONES, S.S. "YEWDALE", SHEERNESS, UNDER DATE 2nd JUNE, 1940. 128 There is a great deal of damage to this ship, caused by shrapnel from bombs. These have penetrated through the ship's side into holds, bunkers and engine room, also Mate's room has been badly damaged shrapnel having penetrated through about 14" of steel at doubling plate and has damaged cabin and Master's room. The Wheelhouse is badly damaged and compass completely wrecked. There are several burst pipes and defects in engine room. The shrapnel that penetrated stokehold has also damaged boiler but we do not think that marks on boiler are very deep. We broughtabout 900 men across, 7 of whom were killed and 77 injured. Mate who was in Wheelhouse with Bo'sun and myself was struck below the knee by shrapnel and is in grave danger of losing his leg. I have not been able to find out what hospital he is in, but he is neither at Ramsgate or Deal. I have written to his wife and forwarded his wages. We obtained some satisfaction in these raids however, as we brought down one enemy bomber which we Saw plunging headlong into the sea half a mile ahead of us. When we arrived at the spot we could see nothing but oil. dd The great TWIS a bi., varge were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the next wave of bombers were overhead. (Continued)
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ons at G.W.R. 49 20113 STATE When G.W.Rly Docks Manager's Dep to Newhaven via Dover Marine Section, Fishguard Harbour. SEAL were CDM.C/3077/S. was 20th 181 June 1940. On the B.25/272. that was from Dris sts. 'St. David". loss of EVACUATION OF TROOPS FROM FLANDERS. Dear Sir, and in the It has been reported to me that the "st. David" under the command of Captain Joy on the 24th May was ordered to Dunkirk, via Dover, to evacuate wounded from thatarea. She arrived at that Port on the morning of the 25th and lay alongside receiving wounded until that evening, During the whole of the time the town and quays were being subjected to severe bombing. On her way out, when passing along the Grave- lines shore, she came under heavy gun fire, and one large calibre shell fell within less than the Ship's length ahead of her. at The vessel was then manoeuvred out of the Channel to avoid gun fure. Later on, air craft (apparently French) escorted her until she was clear of danger. About midnight she arrived at Newhaven, where all here wounded were landed. to The next morning she proceeded to the Downs, and the day after, the 28th May, received orders to proceed to Dunkirk once again to evacuate more wounded. difficult owing to the lack of the usual aids to navigation and The weather was very misty, and navigation made very the fact that many vessels had been sunk in the fair-ways since her last leaving that Port. At 8.00'clock that evening she entered Dünkirk, where she remaired until the next morning. were subjected to terrific bombardment by air and land, and it During the whole of the night, the town, quays, etc. became necessary, owing to the lack of R.A.M.C. ashore, for the board receiving the wounded and placing them in the cots etc. carrying them down the quay as required, with the Medical Staff on geamen, Firemen, Stewards etc. to load the wounded themselves, we This work was exceedingly difficult, as the whole 1g was for in a bad condition, and there was not even any gangways available area nd constructed passing the stretcher cases on board, However, the Engineers n e whole a wide and useful gangway, which was used during the SC time of the embarkation. et
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Dynams 61. DOVER. à 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S."LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of R.A.F.Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No. 243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to ers and two French 5491/14 Bin/d ason to the British Dyudmo 61 178 S off Grave Lines, These attacked us FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". My boat avoided the I saw that Commander DATE: 5th June, 1940 om a bomb, and was TO : FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER. S, I was fully oid the attacking ok round for the other SINKING OF R.A.F.MOTOR BOAT NO. 243 id the whole crew were on, and slowed down to ouston ordered me to at full speed to Dunkirk. Sub. Lieutenant R.Wake's report on the above incident is forwarded 3 shortly afterwards tack, my boat was herewith. e-gun bullets, and my ion. The speed of the set a mean course for out half an hour after Love Wawson he enemy aircraft left rriving there at 2100, r Boat No.243 to Rear- CAPTAIN, R.N. ers alongside were 10E ADMIRAL ommander Clouston and at only Sub. Lieutenant 6- JUN 1940 armaham are the only * A up. Aircraftsman DOVER nder Clouston dead in picked up. had remained to pick boat, which would have e top of the canopy, as out of action and the L have made our arrival continued.
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Dynam 61. DOVER. 179 5 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only b.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
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Dyram 61. DOVER. 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Party. Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of R.A.F.Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that unly Sub.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. 7. In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick up survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
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