Escaut

Details

Details

Details

ESCAUT (.15)
(ex-Belgian) canal boat
M
28th May
This vessel was lost BRILLED during Operation Dynamo.
R.N.
2040
company with the on Express. Dover
in
Bailed from Dowey by route Y, under the
orders or Caps 0.16 (walcolm),
also in company.
the dre. henress. Salkori and Scimites
29th May
0015
Arrived off Bray beach- Boate lowered.
Embarkation commenced.
-
Embarked about 400 troops from a shoot
[probably the Hildal.
-
Proceeded.
-
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 100 troopa.
1700
Embarked 12 small beach parties and
R.A. Dover.
2100
Left Dover, and was followed to Dunkirk
by Mr. Vanquisher.
30th May
0100ce
Dunkirk, Disembarked R.A. Dover and
the beach parties.($ Embarked troops.
1130
Proceeded with about 900 on hourd.
1500ca
Doyer. Disembarked 884 typese. (1)
1600ca
Proceeded.
1930
Entered Dunkirk harbour. substituted about
1200 troops,
-
Proceeded.
31st May
0430
Dover, Disembarked 1,041 treate(1)
-
Proceeded.
-
Arrived Bray. Enburked troops. One
wheler loat inshore,
pollo
shore One soldier
killed, six wounded. Some damage to
Esk. Proceeded. Air attacks is
Dunkirk channel.
Dover, Disembarked 100 (2)
1st June
0500ca
Proceeded.
0900cm
orr Dunkirks Air attock.
Entered the herbour. Embarked a fee
troops. Ordered to assist P/V Presse
which however could not be founds
while searching, sighted 2/V Scotts
on fire and singing) embarked from
her about 1,000 French troops, during
Captain, and proceeded, leaving the
air attack. Embarized
093008
Scotta's survivors in boats to be
collected by the traulers which had
Arrived by then Doysr. arrived. Disembarked 979 EPOODS.
2nd June
2030
Proceeded.
3rd June
00300A
Arrived Dunkisk assbarked about
500 Franch troops.
Proceeded. Arrived Dover. Disemberred 500 troops.
Total 3,204
(1) D.B.
(2) Not mentioned
End
293

Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
   4. On landing the fighting troops were passed        The towns of Le Mans and- Laval were
rapidly through transit camps and their vehicles     fifty miles apart, and the base ports were on an
were cleared at once to Vehicle Marshalling          average one hundred and fifty miles from the
Parks, whence they were despatched in convoys,       assembly area. Helpful though the French
while troops left by rail on the same day as         authorities were, the unfamiliar conditions made
they landed.                                         telephone communication difficult, apart from
    Since the troops and their vehicles were         the danger of breach of security which it entailed.
landed at different ports they had to be collected   Since many despatch riders spoke no French it
in an assembly area which had been chosen            was often found that control could only be
in the vicinity of Le Mans and Laval. The            properly maintained by personal visits; Com-
assembling of troops by rail and vehicles by         manders and their staffs were therefore forced
road took about six days. The resource of            to spend many hours on the road.
individual drivers was tested by changes of             The dispersion dictated by the possibility of
programme, inevitable in an operation of this        aerial bombardment greatly increases demands
kind, by the damage which some vehicles had          upon signal communications and transport and
sustained during the sea passage and by              thus lengthens the time which must elapse
mechanical failures. Drivers and vehicles were       between the issue of orders and their execution.
on the road for long periods, but their duty was
lightened by the hospitality of the French           The Move to the Belgian Frontier.
inhabitants, which all ranks will recall with          9. On 22nd September, I left Le Mans for
gratitude.                                           Amiens. Arriving at Mantes-sur-Saine, I was
    5. On i3th September I moved my head-            handed a telegram from General Georges, Com-
quarters from the War Office to Camberley,           mander of the French Front of the North-East,
where General Headquarters was forming. On           which read as follows :—
the following day, accompanied by Lieutenant-          " Pour General Commandant, B.E.F.
General (now General) Sir John Dill, Commander            " Limite envisaged prevoit front de B.E.F.
of ist Corps, and by my personal staff, I              droite a MAULDE gauche a MENIN ou
embarked in H.M.S. " Skate," and, landing at           gauche a AUTRYCHE - SUR - ESCAUT.
Cherbourg, left by motor car for the Chateau de        Ge"n6ral GEORGES d6sirerait avoir accord
la Blanchardiere, Le Mans, which the French            22 Septembre."
Government had kindly placed at my disposal.           In the meantime, however, General Gamelin
    6. On 2ist September the concentration of        had proceeded to London to discuss with His
the General Headquarters Staff and of the            Majesty's Government the frontage which was to
essential Lines of Communication units was           be held by the British Expeditionary Force.
complete. The next day the advanced elements            After I had made a reconnaissance on 24th
of ist Corps and of General Headquarters Troops      and 25th September of the sector which it was
arrived, the former moving to an area around         proposed to allot to the British Expeditionary
Laval and the latter to an area around Le            Force I visited General Georges at Grand
Mans. Units were given a minimum of one              Quartier General on 26th September, in the
week in which to assemble and reorganise and         company of my Chief of the General Staff,
although some of the units of ist Corps were still   Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall. I then
incomplete, the limited accommodation available      agreed to accept the sector offered by General
in the assembly area made it essential to begin      Georges to the British Expeditionary Force.
the move forward before 26th September when          This sector was from Maulde exclusive to
the leading units of 2nd Corps were due to arrive.   Halluin inclusive, and thence a defensive flank
   7. During these early weeks the maintenance       along river Lys/Armentieres. General Georges
of the Force presented a problem which called        placed 5ist French Division (Ge'ne'ral de
for the greatest resource and initiative on the      Brigade Gillard) under my command, and I
part of my Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant-       decided to employ it in my left sector, covering
 General W. G. Lindsell, his Staff and Services.     the towns of Roubaix and Tourcoing.
    In the units of the Royal Army Service Corps
were many officers and men fresh from civil             10. It had been originally intended that
life who were constantly called upon to surmount     formations, as soon as they had completed their
unforeseen difficulties.    By their unflagging      reorganisation in the assembly area, should
energy and the assistance of the French authori-     move to a concentration area in the North of
ties the Force was maintained without any            France, and remain there in readiness to occupy
failure of supplies. It should be added that with    the line not earlier than 5th October. General
the exception of eleven regular officers, the        Georges decided, however, that it was inadvisable
personnel of the Movement Control organisation       to await the arrival of the whole British Expe-
was built up from Supplementary Reserve              ditionary Force in 'the concentration area and
officers and men.                                    expressed a wish that ist Corps should move
                                                     without delay into the sector north of Maulde.
    The administrative staff were obliged to deal    I accordingly informed General Georges that
with the day-to-day work of landing troops,          ist Corps would take over its sector on 3rd October
their vehicles and current supplies, and to          and that 2nd Corps would be able to^o into the
undertake the equally important task of building     line about I2th October.
up reserves of ammunition, supplies, and
ordnance stores. Covered accommodation was              ist Corps began the two hundred and fifty-mile
 difficult to obtain and temporary dumps of non-     move from the assembly area on 26th September.
perishable stores had to be established wherever        Tanks, tracked vehicles, and slow moving
the necessary space could be found in the vicinity   artillery proceeded by train and the remainder
 of the ports of entry.                              of the force advanced on three parallel routes.
    8. In these early days the Staff met for the        Three days were allotted for the move of each
first time the problem arising from the wide         formation. Two staging areas were arranged on
 dispersion imposed by the necessity to guard        each road, south of the rivers Seine and
against air at.ta.gk,                                Somme respectively, and anti-aircraft defence


Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                      5909
  the Belgian Government were wedded. The                     Both these plans were worked out in the
  French authorities were never in a position to          greatest detail, and orders and instructions
  obtain reliable and accurate details of the plans       kept up to date as new divisions arrived and
  of the Belgian General Staff for the defence of         the role of divisions changed.
  their country in the event of an invasion by                The Escaut plan was by far the simpler of
  Germany; staff conversations were out of the            the two; it involved sending armoured car
  question, yet plans had to be framed in such a          reconnaissances to the river Dendre to be
  way that they could be put into instant opera-          relieved by divisional cavalry, who were later,
  tion in the event of Belgium asking for military        if necessary, to fight a delaying action back-
  assistance from France or Great Britain when             wards to the Escaut; demolitions were provided
  invasion had taken place or was imminent.                for on both rivers; for the remainder of the
     Such slender contact as existed between the           force, however, the advance appeared likely
  British and Belgian Military authorities was             to be an easy one, well within a day's march
  maintained through the Military Attach^ at His           on foot. The Dyle plan, on the other hand,
  Majesty's Embassy at Brussels and General               involved an advance of some sixty miles, carried
  Van Overstraeten, Military Adviser to the King           out at a time when every moment was of value
  of the Belgians.                                         over roads not previously reconnoitred, perhaps
                                                           crowded with refugees moving counter to the
       15. Three alternative plans were decided on         allied armies. Much, too, depended on the
    by the French High Command during October             resistance which the Belgians, and perhaps the
    and November 1939, and I had agreed with              Dutch, were able to offer to the enemy, who at
    General Georges on the part to be played in           such a time would certainly be making every
    each of them by the B.E.F.                            effort to pierce the line of the Meuse and the
                                                          Albert Canal.
       The first alternative was to occupy the frontier
    defences, pushing forward mobile troops to the             16. The plans made in advance for the advance
    line of the Escaut, while the French 7th Army           to the Dyle position actually worked to schedule
    on my left were to delay the enemy on the line          in almost all respects. It may therefore be
    of the Messines Ridge and the Yser Canal.               convenient to summarise them here.
   This plan was soon discarded in favour of the
    second alternative, which was to secure and               The Allied forces were to advance to the line
   hold the line of the Escaut itself, from the point       Namur—Wavre—Louvain—Antwerp, of which
   at which it crosses the frontier at Maulde               the B.E.F. Sector extended from Wavre to
   northwards to the neighbourhood of Ghent                 Louvain, both inclusive. On our right was to
   where it was intended to effect a junction with         be the French ist Army (General d'Armee
   Belgian forces.                                          Blanchard) under whose command was the
                                                            French Cavalry Corps, and whose task it was
       Later, however, as information became avail-        to delay the arrival of the enemy on the Dyle
   able regarding the defences of the Belgian Army,        position and to block with its main forces the
* and its readiness for war, the French High               Gembloux gap, with the Cavalry Corps pushed
   Command formed the opinion that it would be             forward to the line Eghezee (8 miles north of
   safe to count on the Belgian defence holding            Namur)—Tirlemont. On our left the French
   out for some days oh the Eastern frontier, and          7th Army (General d'Armee Giraud) was to
   the Albert Canal. It was also ascertained that          advance to the general area Antwerp-Ghent,
   the Belgians were preparing a de Cointet anti-          with the object of supporting Belgian resistance
   tank obstacle running southwards from Wavre             north of Louvain. The plans of this Army
  towards Namur.                                          included a possible advance into Holland as
      The line of the river Dyle was from the military     far as the line Turnhout-Breda, and this was
  point of view a better one than that of the Escaut.      actually carried out. It had been ascertained
  It was shorter, it afforded greater depth and its        that a portion of the Belgian Army, if forced to
  northern portion was inundated. In addition,            withdraw from their frontier defences would
  it represented smaller enemy occupation of              come into line on the left of the B.E.F. on the
  Belgian territory.                                      general line from Louvain exclusive, thence
                                                          northward to the fortified area of Antwerp,
      On the other hand, it involved the B.E.F.           known as the National Redoubt.
  in a forward move of some sixty miles against
  time, while it also necessitated the holding by             The British front was to be occupied initially
  the French on our right of the Gembloux gap             with ist Corps (Lieutenant-General M. G. H.
  which contains no natural anti-tank obstacle.           Barker, who had recently taken over command
  This plan was twice discussed by General Georges        from General Sir John Dill), on a two-division
  with me on I3th October at my headquarters              front, on the right, and 2nd Corps (Lieutenant-
 at Le Cauroy and again on i6th November at               General A. F. Brooke, now Sir Alan Brooke)
 Folembray the headquarters of the French First           on the left, on a front initially of one division.
 Group of Armies; on this occasion there were                 The advance was to be made in four periods.
 also present General Billotte, who commanded             In the first, i2th Royal Lancers (Armoured
 the Army Group, and Generals Blanchard and               Cars) were to move to a general line some eight
 Corap, Commanding the French ist and gth                 miles beyond the Dyle in observation of the
 Armies. At this conference it was agreed that            approaches from the east; they were to be
 the frontage of the B.E.F. on the Dyle position          relieved by cavalry regiments of ist and 2nd
 was to be from Wavre to Louvain, both places             Corps when they arrived.
 inclusive, and a formal instruction to this effect           Behind them were to come, from right to left,
 was issued to me by General Georges on the               2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) and
 following day. From this time onward, Com-               ist Division (Major-General Hon. H. R. L. G.
 manders and Staffs were studying simultaneously          Alexander) of ist Corps, and 3rd Division
 two alternative plans for advances to the Dyle           (Maj01-General B. L. Montgomery) of 2nd
 or the Escaut; these became known as plans               Corps. The whole of the move of these three
 DandE.                                                   divisions was to be made by motor transport,


Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

and troop carrying companies were allotted to                OPERATIONS—FIRST PHASE
Corps in such a way as to complete the move                          (ioth-i6th MAY)
in 90 hours.                                          Belgium calls on Allies for assistance: advance
    At the same time 44th Division was to march         to the River Dyle by British and French
to an area north-west of Audenarde, with a              Armies: the Belgian anti-tank obstacle is
view to organising the defence of the Escaut in        found to be sited further forward than had
this area.                                              been expected. The enemy penetrates the front
    Movement in the first phase was to be con-          of French gth Army and crosses the Meuse.
tinuous by day and night. The French had                Action by Royal Air Force. General Billotte
decided to restrict the movements of their main         appointed to co-ordinate action of British,
bodies to the hours of darkness, but I judged           French and Belgians. The Dutch lay down
the time factor to be of paramount importance                arms.
and accepted the risk that our air support might      loth May—The enemy invades Holland and
be insufficient to prevent enemy interference              Belgium.
with the move. Events proved that the risk
was justifiable.                                         18. The tension which had been increasing
                                                      during April had lessened somewhat during the
    In the second period, to be completed by the      early days of May; during this period I had
end of the sixth day, 48th Division (Major-           received reports of enemy activity from several
General A. F. A. N. Thorne) and 4th Division          sources of varying degrees of reliability, culmin-
 (Major-General D. G. Johnson, V.C.) were to          ating in a report from the Hague, but it was not
move by march route and motor transport into          until the night of 9th-ioth May that information
 ist and 2nd Corps reserve respectively, while        was received of exceptional activity on the
 ist Army Tank Brigade consisting of two              frontiers of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.
battalions was to move chiefly by rail into           The weather was set fair, and with the exception
 ist Corps area.                                      of some heavy thunderstorms which had no
    The third period was to be completed by the       effect on operations, remained so to the end of
tenth day, and included the movement of soth          the month. At about 4.30 a.m. on loth May,
Division to 2nd Corps reserve, while 4th Division     enemy aircraft appeared over my headquarters
moved into the line on the right of 3rd Division.     at Arras and bombs were dropped on aero-
    The fourth period included the forward            dromes hi the neighbourhood and on a number
movement of 3rd Corps. 5th Division (Major-           of towns including Doullens and Abbeville.
General H. E. Franklyn) was to move to                At 5.30 a.m., a message was received from my
positions in G.H.Q. reserve, along the river          mission with General Georges ordering " Alertes
Dendre, north and south of Grammont; 42nd             i, 2 and 3," namely, instant readiness to move
and 44th Divisions to the line of the river           into Belgium. I at once sought, and obtained,
Escaut around Tournai and to the south of             the release of the 5th Division from War Office
Audenarde respectively, to organise bridgehead        reserve, and henceforward it was employed
positions pending orders for a further advance.       under my orders. At about 6.15 a.m. I received
                                                      instructions to put Plan D into effect.
    Detailed instructions had also been issued           It was ascertained that I2th Royal Lancers
 for the preparation of defences on the three         could be ready to cross the frontier at i p.m.,
 river lines of the Dyle, Dendre and Escaut, as       and accordingly I laid down this time as zero
 also for the necessary demolitions and inunda-       hour.
 tions. Special arrangements had been made
 for the control of traffic, including refugees for      At i p.m. I opened my command post at
 whom routes had been allotted; definite bodies       Wahagnies, midway between Douai and Lille.
 of troops were detailed for these tasks.                ist and 2nd Corps experienced some delay
                                                      in moving, due largely to the fact that owing
                                                      to the short notice received, preliminary moves
The Belgian Anti-Tank obstacle                        of transport had not taken place; apart from
    17. Late in April and early in May, I received    this, moves on this day proceeded according to
reports regarding the siting of the Belgian           plan; very little interference was experienced
anti-tank obstacle; it appeared that, without         either from enemy aircrait or refugees and
informing either the French High Command or            i2th Lancers reached the Dyle unopposed at
myself, they had sited the obstacle much               10.30 p.m.
further to the east than had originally been             The French armies on our light and left were
planned, namely on the line Namur-Perwez-             reported as advancing on time.
Louvain: furthermore the obstacle was not                The Belgian population received the allied
as yet by any means completed. The matter             armies in the most cordial manner, and in
was discussed with General Georges.                   particular the leading troops were loudly cheered.
    On the British front, the river Dyle was so
far superior as an anti-tank obstacle to any           Operations between nth and i$th May.
artificial work further east which the Belgians           19. On nth May, enemy air action increased
might be preparing that I had no hesitation in         somewhat, but did not interfere with the forward
urging adherence to the existing plan for the          movement of troops, and during the afternoon
defence of the Dyle position.                          and evening, the leading infantry brigades
    On the front of the French ist Army the            reached the Dyle, refugee traffic being
 situation was different: the absence of a natural     handled successfully. The original arrange-
 obstacle forced them to rely on.that prepared         ments, of which the Belgian Government were
 by the Belgians. To clear the matter up,              aware, included the use by the B.E.F. of roads
information was demanded as to the true site          'passing through the northern and southern
 of the artificial obstacle. These negotiations        outskirts of Brussels, but not through the
 were begun through our Military Attache1 on           centre of the city. A series of requests was
 8th May, but they were not destined to be             however received to discontinue the use of these
 concluded.                                             roads on the ground that Brussels had been


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59^4          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
of Military Intelligence. The force was known         occupied by the French. It was not however
as Macforce and its task was to cover the            practicable to move the 23rd Division again
crossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3          and G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet,
miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It began         by next morning no French troops had appeared
to assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7th      either on the right of 23rd Division or to relieve
May.                                                 them. Later in the day, however, an order was
                                                     received by which the commander of the French
Withdrawal to the Escaut begun.                      2nd Region was ordered to fill the gap. En-
   26. It had now to be decided whether or not       quiries by a liaison officer at Amiens, where the
the withdrawal from the Senne to the Dendre          staff of the French 7th Army was in process of
was to begin on the night of 17/18 May, and the      taking over from the 2nd Region, established
situation in the South was such that I felt that     that no troops would be likely to arrive for
to spend a day on the Senne would be to risk         twenty-four hours at least.
being outflanked on the right and so imperil            By the afternoon, however, some enemy had
the force under my command to no good purpose.       reached Pe"ronne, and were in contact with
General Billotte had issued orders for withdrawal    36th Infantry Brigade.
to the Dendre that night, but I had also seen           On this day Major-General R. L. Petre,
an order from General Georges which envisaged        commanding the I2th Division, was given
remaining on the Senne for a further twenty-         command of the troops engaged on this flank,
four hours. I therefore sent a liaison officer to    namely 23rd Division, 36th Infantry Brigade
General Billotte to represent my views. In           and the garrison of Arras.*
the result, General Billotte's orders stood             In the meantime an order issued by the French
confirmed.                                           First Group of Armies had laid down the
   By 4 p.m. on i7th May therefore ist and 2nd       boundary between the French ist Army and
Corps were on the Senne with 5th, ist and 4th        the B.E.F. through Maulde, Orchies, Raches
Divisions in line right to left. 48th Division       and He*nin Li6tard. Arras was thus excluded
was covering the right flank from Enghien to         from the zone of the B.E.F., but its defence
Lembecq. 5oth Division was on the Dendre, to         was necessarily continued by British troops.
which line 2nd and 3rd Divisions were now            All troops not required for defence left on the
withdrawing,, whilst 3 Corps was in position on      igth, including rear G.H.Q. which moved in two
the Escaut with 42nd Division (less one infantry     echelons to Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accord-
brigade) and 44th Division.                          ance with plans prepared on i7th May when
                                                     the threat to Arras became serious.
   27. On i8th May I held a conference at the
headquarters of ist Corps at which were settled         On the evening of i8th May I moved back
the details of the withdrawal to the Escaut.         my command post from Renaix to its previous
This line was to be held with six divisions, right   location at Wahagnies.
to left ist Corps (48th and 42nd Divisions, less     Moves of the Royal Air Force.
one infantry brigade, with 2nd Division in              29. On this day also, the bulk of the Advanced
reserve), 2nd Corps (ist and 3rd Divisions with      Air Striking Force moved from the neighbour-
50th Division in reserve), 3rd Corps (4th and 44th   hood of Rheims to Central France and the Air
Divisions), on a front from the bridge over the      Component moved one of their main operational
Escaut at Binaries to Audenarde, both inclu-         aerodromes from Poix to Abbeville. On the
sive. 5th Division was in G.H.Q. reserve.            evening of I9th May enemy action obliged them
   There was little pressure during the day on       to evacuate this aerodrome also. The Ah*
the British front or on that of the Belgians to      Officer Commanding the Air Component then
the North. Owing to the late arrival of orders       moved his headquarters to England, but an
the Belgian Army had started their withdrawal        advanced landing ground was maintained at
after the B.E.F.; they had therefore asked for       Merville until 22nd May.
and received protection to their right flank at         From the 2 ist May onwards all arrangements
Brusseghem up to 7 a.m. and Assche up to             for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made
8 a.m. on i8th May. On withdrawal they               by the War Office in conjunction with the Air
effected a junction with the B.E.F. on the           Ministry at home. The air liaison work was
Dendre at Alost.                                     carried out in England at Hawkinge and the
   Southward from their junction with the            targets selected in accordance with telephone
B.E.F. the French line ran through Mons and          or telegraphic requests from the B.E.F. so long
Maubeuge, and enemy tanks were attacking             as communications remained open, supple-
the front of the French Corps on my immediate        mented by information received from the Royal
right. Enemy air action had by now intensified       Air Force, and other sources.
on the front of the B.E.F. and continuous fighter
support was necessary during the hours of day-       Alternative plans considered.
light, both to enable our reconnaissances to take       30. On the night of 18/19 May, the ist, 2nd
place and to hold off enemy bombers. The             and 3rd Corps completed then: withdrawal to
enemy did not confine bis attention to troops        the line of the Escaut without interference, and
but attacked the long columns of refugees            prepared to defend the line of the river. Soon
which continued to move westwards.                   after arrival, however, the level of the water
                                                     became dangerously low, at places less than
The position on the Canal du Nord.                   three feet deep. It looked, therefore, as if, apart
   28. The position on the Canal du Nord had         from the unusually dry weather, some of the
caused some anxiety, partly on account of con-       sluices in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes had
tradictory orders received. Shortly after orders     been closed in order to produce inundations
had been issued on I7th May for the occupation       in the low lying ground in that area, even if
of the position by 23rd Division, an order was       at the expense of the water on the front of the
received from G.Q.G. allotting to the B.E.F.         B.E.F.
the sector Pe'ronne-Ruyalcourt instead of the          * Major-General Petre's command was known as
sector Ruyalcourt-Arleux which was now to be                            Petreforce.


Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17. OCTOBER/1941                                  "59*5
    The enemy had, during the previous day,           the abandonment of large quantities of equip-
 penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica-     ment. It would obviously be unwelcome to
 tion with the bases was severed' at that'point.      the Belgians who would be faced with the
'Communications by road and rail over the             alternatives of withdrawing with us and aban-
 Sorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igth      doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter of
 May and the town was being placed in a state         their own, or seeking an armistice.
 of defence with such resources as were available,       So far as I am aware, the French High
 mainly, units of I2th Division. However, there       Command had never suggested such a move-
 was little doubt that enemy armoured forces          ment up to that date and it is doubtful whether
 in'that area, which at the time I estimated at       even had they, decided on immediate withdrawal
 five armoured divisions, would shortly break         as soon as the French gth Army front on the
 through to the coast.                                Meuse had been penetrated, there would ever
    The force could then no longer be supplied        have been sufficient time for the troops in the
 through the ports south of the Somme, and the        north to conform.
 great bulk of the reserves, which were in the           Thirdly there was the possibility of with-
 rearward areas, would • shortly cease to be          drawal north-westwards or northwards towards
 available to the force for the purposes of main-     the Channel ports, making use of the successive
tenance or replacement. Several days' reserve         river and canal lines, and of holding a defensive
 had, however, for some time past been maintained     perimeter there, at any rate sufficiently long to
 north of the Somme.                                  enable the force to be withdrawn, preferably in
    The prospect of securing the reinforcement of     concert with the French and Belgians. I
 the Armoured Division had likewise become            realised that this course was in theory a last
 remote/ I had been advised that two Armoured         alternative, as it would involve the departure
 Brigades, of this division would disembark at        of the B.E.F. from the theatre of war at a time
 Havre on i6th May, and were to concentrate at        when the French might need all the support
 Bolbec, and I had therefore sent instructions by     which Britain could give them. It involved
 the hand of a staff officer to the Commander         the virtual certainty that even if the excellent
 (Major-General R. Evans). He was to move the         port facilities at Dunkirk continued to be
leading brigade on disembarkation with all            available, it would be necessary to abandon
 speed to secure, the crossings of the Somme west     all the heavier guns and much of the vehicles
 of Amiens, from Picquigny to Pont Remy, both         and equipment. Nevertheless, I felt that in
inclusive, with a view to .the concentration of the   the circumstances there might be no other
 remaining -brigade behind the Somme and the          course open to me. It was therefore only
 move of his division to join the main body of        prudent to consider what the adoption of such
 the B.E.F. However, in the meantime, orders          a plan might entail. On this day therefore at
 had been issued locally to concentrate the           about 1.30 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff
 Division south of the Seine, and the plan to         telephoned to the Director of Military Opera-
 cross the Somme and join the B.E.F. proved           tions and Plans at the War Office and discussed
 impossible to execute. The division therefore        this situation with him.
 remained in the Lines of Communication Area
 and never came under my effective command.           The Position of the French ist Army and the
    About midnight on the iSth/igth May,                   British right flank reinforced.
 General Billotte came to see me, and gave me            31. The French ist Army had by igth May
 an account of the situation as he saw it. He         completed its withdrawal and was in touch
 also told me of the measures which were being        with the right of ist Corps. On the night of
 taken to restore the situation on the front of       i9/20th May they took up positions on the line
 the French Qth Army, though clearly he had           of the Escaut as far south as Bouchain ; but at
 little hope that they would be effective. Reports    that point, instead of continuing to hold that
 from the liaison officers with French formations     river towards Cambrai (which according to my
.were likewise not encouraging ; in particular        information was not held in strength by the
 I was unable to verify that the French had           enemy) they had drawn back westwards along
 enough reserves at their disposal south of the       the river Sensee. Thus in the quadrilateral
 gap to enable them to stage counter-attacks          Maulde—Va-lenciennes—Arleux—Douai, some
 sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation       nineteen miles by ten, there was assembled the
 that the gap would be closed.                        bulk of the French ist Army, amounting to
    Thus, in my opinion, there was an imminent        three Corps of two divisions and two divisions
 danger of the forces in the north-eastern area,      in reserve—a total of eight divisions. The
 that is to say the French forces next to the sea,    Commander of the French 3rd Corps, General
 the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of         de la Laurencie, remained that night in close
 the French ist Army on our right, being              touch with General Mason-MacFarlane, at the
 irretrievably cut off from the main French           headquarters of Macforce.
 forces in the south.                                    Further west the French Cavalry Corps was
    There were three alternative courses of action    assembling at Oppy, north-east of Arras.
 open to the northern forces under General               None of these forces were being seriously
 Billotte : first, in the event of the gap being      pressed at this stage, but since the enemy had
 closed by successful counter-attacks made            already penetrated, so deeply further south, I
 simultaneously from north and south it would         felt it necessary, without more delay, to
 in theory be possible to maintain the line of the    strengthen the dispositions for the defence of
 Escaut, or at any rate the frontier defences,        what had become the bastion of Arras. It was
 and thence southwards on one or other of the         also necessary to secure crossings westwards
 canal lines.                                         from the right of Macforce, along the line
     Secondly, there was the possibility of a with-   Carvin—La Basse"e.
 drawal to the-line of the Somme as far as its           I therefore ordered soth Division, then in
 mouth. This plan had the attraction that we          G.H.Q. reserve, to send one Infantry Brigade
 should be falling back on our lines of communi-      (25th) to take up positions on the Canal on the
 cation and if it was successful would not entail     line La Bassee—Carvin under the command of


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•5916        -SUPPLEMENT TO THE. LONDON GAZETTE, -17 -OCTOBER:
 Macforce. The remainder of the division was           - I .discussed,--these- instructions- with,'.the
 moved that night (i9/20th) to the same area,        .C.I.G.S. at- my Command Post at Wahagnies
 and was thus suitably placed for the counter         at 8.15 a.m.; I put to him my view that
 attack in which they took part on 2ist May.          withdrawal to "the south-westwards, however
    I also ordered I2th Lancers with a field          desirable in principle, was not. in the circum-
 battery to move to Arras and carry'out necessary     stances practicable. ;
 reconnaissances south and south-westwards,          . In the first place, it would involve the dis-
 and to gain touch with the outlying portions of      engagement of seven divisions which were at
 Petreforce.                                          the time in close contact with the enemy on the
   Arras was heavily bombed for the first time'       Escaut, and would be immediately followed up.
 on igth May, but 23rd Division, though in an            In addition to this-rearguard action the B.E.F.
exposed position, was not seriously attacked.         in its retirement to the Somme would have to
 However, at 5 a.m., 6th Royal West Kent, of          attack into 'an area already strongly occupied
 36th Infantry Brigade, on the Canal du Nord          by the enemy armoured and mobile formations.
north-west of Peronne, had been attacked by           Some of these indeed now appeared to be holding
enemy tanks and had been withdrawn to Sailly        •the line of the Somme whilst others were already
on the road to Albert.                              -within a short distance of the coast, and might
                                                      turn northwards at any time. Thus the B.E.F.
   General Petre that night issued orders for         would be obliged to disengage its seven divisions
23rd Division to withdraw from the Canal du           in contact with the enemy, fighting a rearguard
Nord to the line of the Grinchon river south of     'action, at the same tune to attack south-west-
Arras to join up at La Herliere with 36th             wards, and finally to break through enemy
Infantry Brigade which was to hold a line             forces on the Somme. During this manoeuvre
thence to Doullens. 23rd Division was, how-          both flanks would have to be guarded.
ever, caught by enemy aircraft when embussed
and finally occupied posts on the line of the            Secondly, the administrative situation made
Scarpe for some six miles East of Arras.             it unlikely that sustained offensive operations
                                                     could be undertaken. Communication with the
   Thus, by the evening of igth May, the situa-      bases was on the point of being interrupted.
tion was somewhat relieved in that the defensive     The mobile echelons of gun and small arms
flank had begun to take shape. On the other          ammunition were full, but once they were
hand, the character of the operation had now         exhausted I could not safely reckon on being
radically altered with the arrival of German         able to replenish them.
troops in Amiens. The picture was now no                 Lastly, though I was not in a position to
longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken,    judge, I had the impression that even if I had
but of a besieged fortress. To raise such a          decided to attempt this manoeuvre, neither the
siege, a relieving force must be sent from the       French ist Army nor the Belgians would have
south and to meet this force a sortie on the         been in a position to conform.
part of the defenders was indicated.
                                                         Nevertheless, I told the C.I.G.S. that I fully
                                                     realised the importance of an attack in a
  The attack of $th and 50$ Divisions.               southerly direction and that I already had plans
    32. On 2oth May, the breach South of Arras       in hand to counter-attack with the 5th and
 deepened and widened. From indications              5oth Divisions to the south of Arras and that
 received during the day the enemy armoured          these divisions would be ready to attack on
 forces appeared to be directed on two main          the following morning (2ist May). These were
 objectives; one down the valley of the Somme       the only reserves which I then had available,
 on Abbeville, the other by Hesdin and Montreuil,   apart from one armoured reconnaissance brigade,
 doubtless making for the Channel Ports.            and one infantry brigade of 2nd Division. To
 I2th Lancers, early in the day, reported tanks     create a further reserve I had already begun
"from the direction of Cambrai approaching          negotiations with Belgian G.Q.G. for the relief
 Arras, where they were held off by the Welsh       of 44th Division on the Escaut, but these were
 Guards; a strong request for bomber support        not yet completed.
 was therefore made through the War Office to           The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action and accom-
 the Air Ministry. Later in the day enemy           panied by the C.G.S. he left for Lens to meet
 tanks were reported to be ten miles west of        Generals Billotte and Blanchard. At that
 Arras, and all endeavours by I2th Lancers to       interview the C.I.G.S. explained the action to
 reach Doullens had failed. By 6 p.m. they          be taken by 5th and 5oth Divisions. General
 were back on the line Arras—St. Pol.               Billotte fully agreed to this plan, and said that
    Early in the morning General Sir Edmund         the French would co-operate with two divisions.
 Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General            On return to my headquarters, the C.I.G.S.
 Staff arrived at G.H.Q.; he brought with him       sent a telegram to General Georges which made
instructions from the Cabinet that the B.E.F.       it clear that, in his opinion, General Billotte's
was to move southwards upon Amiens, attacking       Army Group would be finally cut off unless the
 all enemy forces encountered and to take station   French ist Army made an immediate move on
 on the left of the French Army. He was also        Gambrai or unless General Georges launched a
to inform General Billotte and the Belgian          counter-attack northwards from Peronne. My
 command, making it clear to the latter that        liaison officers with Generals Billotte and Blan-
their best chance was to. move that night           chard conveyed a similar message from me to
between the B.E.F. and the coast.                   those commanders, making it clear that if our
    Similar information was to be given by the      counter-attack was not successful the French
 War Office to General Georges. During the          and British Armies north of the gap would
 day however, it appeared that operations were      have their flank turned and could no longer
actually being directed by General Weygand          remain in their present positions.
who later, on 23rd May, announced in a General          On 2ist May I sent a formal acknowledgement
Order that he was now Commander-in-Chief            of the instructions brought by the C.I.G.S.
in all theatres of war.                             adding that, in my opinion, withdrawal to the


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-SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON~GAZETTE; 17 OCTOBER, 1941

south-west was' entirely impossible until the              •covered" had -already far e'xceeded the estimated
situation had been retrieved on the front of the            life of the tracks which were now beginning to
French ist Army.                                            break through wear.
                                                               It v/as clear therefore that the attack of
   33. 5th Division was therefore "ordered .to              Frankforce would not maintain its momentum
join 5oth Division in the Vimy area, and its               .unless it was reinforced and supported by the
commander, Major-General Franklyn, was placed               French on its left. • During 22nd May, therefore,
in command of all the British troops operating              .General Franklyn held his ground, and pro-
in and around Arras. Frankforce, as it was to               longed his right flank westwards, while the
be known, consisted of 5th and 5oth .Divisions             -French Cavalry Corps took up a position at
(each of two brigades only), ist Army Tank                 •Mont St. Eloi. All day long pressure increased
Brigade* (previously with Macforce) together                round his right flank, and an observation post
with Petref orce. and the force under O.C. i2th             of i2th Lancers on Mont St. Eloi could see at
Lancers. Petreforce was by this time very tired             one moment as many as 48 enemy tanks.
and widely dispersed.                                      • Next day (23rd May) the enemy advanced
   My immediate instructions to General Franklyri           steadily north-eastwards from the high ground
were to. occupy the bridgeheads on the Scarpe,              of the Lorette ridge, and by evening they were
east of Arras and thus to relieve the remains of            reconnoitring the' southern outskirts of Bethune
23rd Division. He would then be suitably                    and the road from Lens to Carvin. It was clear
disposed to advance south and south-east of                 that Frankforce was becoming dangerously
Arras on the following day in conjunction with              hemmed in. Two roads were still available for
the French.                '                                their extrication and at about 7 p.m. I decided
   It will be convenient to conclude the story              that .there was no alternative but to withdraw
of Frankforce here.                                         Frankforce. This withdrawal had necessarily to
                                                            be in an easterly direction. 5th and 5oth
   During the evening of 20th May, General                 Divisions had been engaged with the enemy all
Franklyn completed his reconnaissances for an               day and had inflicted very severe losses ; they
attack on the following day to secure the line              were now ordered to withdraw to the area
of the rivers Scarpe and Cojeul: his intention              around Seclin, where they would be well placed
was to exploit success by moving on 22nd May                to take part in any further counter-attack to
to the Sensee and thence towards Bapaume                    the southward which might be staged. Petre-
and Cambrai. In these plans he had the full                 force was withdrawn to an area north of Seclin.
co-operation of General Prioux, Commander of
the French Cavalry Corps, but the light                        Thus concluded the defence of Arras, which
mechanised divisions were much" reduced in                  had been carried out by a small garrison, hastily
strength and probably had no more than one                  assembled but well commanded, and determined
quarter of their tanks fit for action.                      to fight. It had imposed a valuable delay on a
                                                            greatly superior enemy force against which it
   However, one of these divisions was ordered              had blocked a vital road centre.
to advance on each side of Frankfbrce, while
12th Lancers watched the right flank on the                2ist May — The Organisation of the Canal line.
Arras—St. Pol road. The hope was not realised,
however, that the French 5th Corps would also                 34. The time had now come to organise, as
attack southwards from Douai with two divisions            soon as possible, the further defence of the
in co-operation with Frankforce on the 2ist.               south-western flank of the force.
A conference had been arranged at 6 p.m. on                " The enemy advance beyond Arras had hitherto
the 20th at General Franklyn's headquarters but            been carried out almost entirely by armoured
no representative from that Corps attended.                forces, supported by motorised infantry which
Finally, at 12.30 p.m. on the 2ist I received a            was doubtless increasing in numbers every day.
letter from General Blanchard to say that the              The situation regarding the enemy's normal
Corps Commander, General Altmeyer, thought'he              infantry divisions was still uncertain. It was
could move on the 22nd or the following night.             therefore of first importance to reinforce the
   Tim;, however, was vital. General Franklyn              organisation of the line of the canals from the
adhered to his plans, and at 2 p.m. attacked with          Escaut to La Bassee, and to continue it to
ist Army Tank Brigade, I5ist Infantr,y Brigade             St. Omer and the sea. These canals offered the
of 5oth Division and I3th Infantry Brigade of              only anti-tank obstacle on this flank. They were,
5th Division all under General Martel. The                 however, crossed by numerous bridges, many of
French ist Light Mechanised Division co-                   which had already been prepared for demolition
operated, though its movements did not develop             by our own engineers under my Engineer-in-
so widely to the flanks as General Franklyn                Chief (Major-General R. P. Pakenham- Walsh),
had hoped.                                                 the Commander of Macforce, and the French
                                                           Commanders' of the fortified sectors of Lille and
   The opposition was stronger than had been               Flanders (Qene'raux de Brigade Bertschi and
expected. Objectives for the day were reached,             Barthdiemy).
and in the evening there were heavy dive-                     It had been proved that even weak garrisons
bombing attacks by the enemy. Enemy tanks                  holding important road centres, such as Arras
had been put to flight: over 400 prisoners had             and Doullens, were of much value in imposing
been captured: a number of enemy had been                  delay, for the initial advances of the enemy
killed and many transport vehicles destroyed.              always followed the main roads. It was therefore
   The tank brigade had, however, begun to                 decided to continue the policy of organising
suffer severely from mechanical trouble ; the              such " stops," not only along the canals but at
tanks had been on the road continuously since              all possible centres whether north or south of
 they detrained -at Brussels, and the mileage              the canal line.
                                                              Macforce, which had been formed on
   * At this time their strength was reduced to approxi-   May, had been augmented on i8th and igth by
mately 65 Mark I and 18 Mark II tanks. By the end of
the withdrawal from Arras there remained 26 Mark I          I38th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) which
and 2 luark II tanks.                                      went into line on the canal between Raches and


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' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
  Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry        near Maulde on the front of ist Division a
  Brigade of the same division joined the force.         number of enemy had crossed the river dis-
  On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the        guised as refugees, but had been detected and
  42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse          driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com-
  to St. Amand was handed over to the French.            manders all felt that they could hot how hold
     Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major-           on for more than .twenty-four hours. We
  General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, to           discussed a withdrawal to our old frontier
  take command of the sector of the canals between       defences, where advantage could be taken of the
  Aire and Carvin. General Curtis' force was             existing blockhouses and trenches, and of tha
  known as Polforce, and was to.consist of four          anti-tank ditch. This move would have little
  battalions - of 46th Division, 25th Infantry           effect on the French on our right since it would
  Brigade of 5.oth Division (in line between La          pivot on the junction point, where the Escaut
  Bassee and Carvin) and one field battery,              crossed the frontier, but "would seriously affect
  together with a number of engineer and other          the Belgians, who now held the line of the
  units o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been moving         Escaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of the
  northwards and .were collected on the Canal.          canal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen.
  It had originally been intended that part of this         I had also to consider the pressing need to
  force should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion,        stiffen the defence of the canal line westwards to
  but the railway trains in which were the remain-      Gravelines and to form a new reserve to replace
 ing three battalions of 46th Division failed to        the divisions now committed to counter-attacks
 reach that town in time and remained south of          southward from Arras.
 the Somme. The defence of these localities south          A provisional decision was therefore reached
 of the Canal had therefore to be abandoned.            to withdraw to the frontier defences on the night
     Further to the north-west the defence of the       of 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I had
 canal line was being organised by Brigadier            reached agreement with the French and the
 C. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi-          Belgians.
 cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported that             General Weygand had visited General Billotte
 the enemy had already reached the left bank of         during the day and the latter indicated that an
 the river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer.          attack was being planned for the following day
 23rd Division had been ordered to move to this         (22nd May), northwards from the direction of
 area and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards)     Roye, with the object of closing the gap. At
 arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher therefore       8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where in
 held the right bank of the river from St. Omer to      the Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the King
 Gravelines with this battalion and five batteries      of the Belgians and General Billotte. There
 of heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction   were also present General Van Overstraeten,
 with certain French troops of the Secteur             General Champon, the head of the French
 Fortifie des Flandres.                                Mission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownall
    The front of Macforce was covered by the           and others.
 French, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were still            I explained the situation which was developing
 in their quadrilateral on the line of the Escaut      on the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi-
 and the Sensee. Here, however, information            culty of maintaining positions there since the
 was frequently lacking and could only be obtained     water in the river was so low as no longer to
 by reconnaissance.                                    form an obstacle. It was then agreed that on
    Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupied     the night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should be
in the sense that the whole of the length of 85        abandoned and that the Allied armies should
miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse        occupy a line from Maulde northwards to
 (West of St. Amand) was divided into sectors          Halluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai and
 for each of which a British commander was             Ghent.
responsible. The total strength of the troops              I discussed the possibility of reserves. It
 on the Canal line did not on this day exceed          appeared that the available divisions of the
 10,000 men, and the number of anti-tank               French ist Army were all too tired to take part
 weapons was barely adequate to cover all the          in offensive operations in the immediate future.
 crossing places: certainly there could be no          It was therefore agreed that the French should
 question of being able to keep an effective           take over a further sector of the defensive
 watch against small parties of infantry crossing      positions northwards from Maulde, so that the
the canal between the bridges. The barges,             2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn into
however, had almost all been moved away or             reserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,,
 at any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy,      French took up these positions on 22nd May.
.and bridges were fast being prepared for              On the north, 44th Division on withdrawal
demolition.                                            from the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- -
                                                       Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgian
2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front.           formation would relieve them on the night of
   35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three        23rd/24th May.
Corps Commanders. I told them what had                     When these moves were complete the Allied
happened on the southern flank and how, in             line would run slightly west of north to Halluin,
-order to take the initiative and encourage the        and then almost at right angles, north-eastwards
French ist Army to do likewise, I had gone to          along the Lys. It was evident that sooner or
the length of committing practically the whole         later the Belgian army would have to swing
of my reserve.                                         back to a line in rear, pivoting on their right
   From the Corps Commanders I learned that            of Halluin. Accordingly at the end of the
the line was thinly held and that attacks had          conference General Billotte asked the King of
taken place at several points. At Petegem on           the Belgians whether if he were forced to with-
the front of 44th Division the enemy had secured       draw he would fall back on to the line of the
a bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of            Yser. His Majesty agreed, though evidently
3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French       with some regret, that no alternative line existed.


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5906          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

                           SECOND DESPATCH f
(Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendix
covering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June).

   | i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and other
records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, including
those of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commanders
and staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of the
General Staff at G.H.Q. are only partially complete for the period loth—i8th May, owing to some
papers having been destroyed at Boulogne, and a portion of the records for 3ist May lost at sea.
Some records of less importance were burnt at Hazebrouck to avoid possible capture and others
were destroyed in a lorry which caught fire near Cassel on or about 24th May.
     2. The Appendix contains an account of the operations at Dunkirk from 6 p.m., 3ist May, to
midnight 2nd/3rd June, which may conveniently be appended to this despatch, though they were
not carried out under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It has been compiled by the General
Staff at G.H.Q., from sources similar to those used for the despatch itself.


                               London,               Arrival of yd Corps in France.
                                   25 July, 1940.       3. 3rd Corps (Lt.-General Sir Ronald F.
Sir,                                                 Adam, Bt.), consisting of 42nd Division (Major-
   1. I have the honour to submit a report on        General W. G. Holmes), 44th Division (Major-
the employment of the British Expeditionary          General E. A. Osborne) and 5ist Division
Force, and on the part which it played in             (Major-General V. M. Fortune) was due for
operations in France and -Belgium from ist           despatch to France in February and March, and
February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, on which          5 ist Division arrived during early February.
date I gave up Command of the Force.                 The 5oth (Motor) Division (Major-General G. le
                                                     Q. Martel) arrived in France at the same time
   The period under review may be divided into       and was allotted to 2nd Corps. It had been
two distinct and sharply contrasting phases,         arranged that the front of the B.E.F. should be
namely, before and after loth May, on which          extended northwards to Croix de Poperinghe on
date active operations began. The active             the Belgian frontier, two miles north-east of
operations themselves can be divided geo-            Bailleul, and that 3rd Corps should go into the
graphically into two distinct parts ; on the east,   line on the left of the B.E.F. taking over 5th
the advance to the River Dyle, and the with-         Division from 2nd Corps, and relieving 53rd
drawal to the frontier; on the west, the defence     French Division, between Armentieres and Croix
of Arras and the organisation of the Canal line.     de Poperinghe, with 5ist Division. The Com-
Later, the two parts merged into one whole in        mand of the new sector had passed to the
the final phase of the withdrawal and embarka-       B.E.F. at midnight 3ist Jan./ist February, and
tion of the Force.                                   the relief of the French troops was to take
   No such clear definition can be made in terms     place about I2th February.
of time; furthermore, the two operations, on            At this time, however, owing to the situation
the east and on the west, were closely inter-        elsewhere in Europe His Majesty's Government
dependent, and the same reserves had to serve        found it necessary to postpone the despatch of
for both. For this reason the accounts of the        3rd Corps (excepting 5 ist Division) and also of
operations on the two fronts cannot but be           certain anti-aircraft, administrative and labour
intermingled at certain points in the narrative.     units. I was also instructed to earmark one
Broadly speaking, however, three distinct phases     division for withdrawal from the B.E.F. if
can be distinguished. First, the advance to the      required ; for this I selected 5th Division. It
Dyle from ioth-i6th May; then from i7th-26th         was evident that the programme of shipments of
May the withdrawal from the Dyle to the              ammunition and other war material to France,
Escaut, the defence of the Belgian frontier and      on which I had counted to make up the serious
of the southern and western flanks ; and finally     deficiencies in stocks, would be severely curtailed
the withdrawal and embarkation of the Force          in February and March.
from 27th-3ist May.
   2. The narrative in my first despatch dated          4. These changes entailed a delay in the
25th April, 1940, concluded with the completion      development of the Force which was naturally
of the first contingent of the Force.                disappointing; moreover, it became impossible
   I had been informed that the expansion of the     for me to take over the new sector to Bailleul,
Force was to be continued by the despatch of         and at the same time to retain a proper propor-
3rd Corps during the early months of 1940;           tion of divisions in reserve. I was, therefore,
the Armoured Division was to follow in May,          obliged to obtain the consent of the French to
and a fourth Corps, with ist Canadian                the indefinite postponement of the relief, and to
Division, during the late Summer ; furthermore,      accept the resulting congestion in the area of
it had been decided that the Force should be         the B.E.F.
divided into two Annies, as soon as the number          5oth Division was temporarily accommodated
of divisions in the field, excluding the Armoured    in an area south-west of Amiens in G.H.Q.
Division, rose above eleven.                         reserve.
   Preparation for this expansion, which had            At the end of March, however, the 3rd Corps
been proceeding since the previous autumn,           was finally despatched to France ; 5ist Division
continued steadily until loth May.                   duly relieved the French in the new sector on


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5908          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

   There were also deficiencies in technical          units, including anti-aircraft. My Adjutant-
apparatus for light anti-aircraft requirements,       General's branch, in conjunction with the
such as Kenison Predictors, signal lights,            Adjutant-General's branch at the War Office,
technical and specialised vehicles of many            had in hand plans for the more economical use
types and a number of smaller items. The same         of man-power, the elimination of fit men from
difficulties in provision of equipment were no        sedentary or base duties and the reduction of
doubt the cause of delays in the despatch of new      tradesmen in War Establishments. Investiga-
units to the B.E.F., particularly armoured and        tions made by the War Office, which had my
anti-aircraft units, and while it is to some extent   full co-operation, were directed towards a more
true that the shortness of the campaign pre-          economical and more flexible system of replace-
vented the full effect of the shortages being felt,   ment and repair of vehicles and equipment in
it is I think, justifiable to assume that the         the Force.
presence of the Armoured Division and of a
complete Army Tank Brigade would have been             The Royal Air Force.
an invaluable aid in the difficulties with which          13. On I5th January, 1940, Air Marshal A. S.
we were faced in meeting enemy armoured                Barratt had assumed command of the British
formations.                                            Ah- Force in France, including the Air Com-
                                                       ponent which, however, was to remain under my
 The Administrative Situation.                         operational control. Under this arrangement,
    11. The development of the rearward installa-     in my opinion, the control of available air forces
 tions had been proceeding systematically.             was better allocated to meet the needs not only
    The medical base installations had been            of the British but also of the French Army for
 extended and a hospital area was in course of         whom considerable aerial reconnaissance was
 rapid development near Boulogne in addition           being carried out. The development of the
to the original medical base sub-area at Dieppe.       Allied Central Air Bureau and of its communica-
                                                       tions to the headquarters of higher formations
    The British Army requirements in the port of       in France and to the Royal Air Force at home,
 Brest, a French naval base, had been sub-             was likewise to prove its worth in the 4^ys to
 stantially reduced by the use of other ports          come as an organisation for co-ordinating
 such as St. Malo and Caen ; by May, seventeen        information and requests for air action.
ports in all were being operated and 2,500 tons
of stores were being despatched to railheads              At the same time I felt that the resources of
daily.                                                the Air Component would prove insufficient for
                                                      the requirements of the Force during operations ;
    At the same time, the construction of semi-        so long, therefore, as this state of affairs existed
permanent dep6ts of all kinds in the neighbour-       it was of prime importance that the machinery
hood of Nantes, Rennes and Rouen was in                for obtaining the allotment of additional bomber
progress; this would later on have led to more         and fighter support should be as simple and as
efficient and economical working than was             swift in operation as it could be made.
possible in the temporary accommodation,
taken up in September, 1939. By loth May,                 Throughout the period, construction of new
seven ammunition depdts were open, in addition        aerodromes, landing grounds and communica-
to railhead dumps ; all these were intended, in       tions for the British Air Force in France was
time, to be rail served; while the construction of    proceeding as fast as resources would permit,
the regulating station at Abancourt, by French        concrete runways being constructed in the
railway troops on behalf of the B.E.F., was well      early part of the year until the season allowed
advanced. It opened on a limited scale in the         for the sowing of grass. Upwards of 10,000 men
first week of May. A supply dep6t was being           were employed on this work, and forty-seven
constructed close by so as to relieve the             aerodromes and satellites (including 19 new
dangerous congestion at the ports of Rouen            aerodromes) were under development or con-
and Havre.                                            struction. By I5th May eight of the nineteen
                                                      new aerodromes were capable of use, and at
    The progress of all these undertakings was        least 50,000 tons of concrete had been laid.
adversely affected by the shortage of labour, to      Constructional work was also undertaken on
which I referred in my first despatch, and it         behalf of the Air Ministry at other R.A.F.
was decided, in March, to send three Divisions        installations in central France.
to France to undertake labour duties and
at the same time continue their training, albeit       The Dyle and Escaut Plans.
slowly. The Divisions selected were I2th
(Major-General R. L. Petre), 23rd (Major-                14. Very shortly after the arrival of the B.E.F.
General W. N. Herbert) and 46th (Major-               in their positions on the Belgian frontier I had
General H. O. Curtis). These arrived in April;        been invited by General Georges, commanding
23rd Division was allotted for work on aero-          the French Front of the North East, under
dromes in the forward area, and the remaining         whose Command I was, to study the part to be
two to the Lines of Communication area.               played by the B.E.F. in the event of an advance
                                                      into Holland and Belgium, or into Belgium
                                                      alone. The question of such an advance was
Organisation.                                         one of high policy with a political as well as a
   12. The absence of actual operations up to         military aspect; it was therefore not for me to
 loth May gave opportunities to make a number         comment on it. My responsibilities were con-
of changes in organisation.                           fined to ensuring that the orders issued by the
   Divisional cavalry regiments were grouped          French for the employment of the British
into Armoured Reconnaissance Brigades and the         Expeditionary Force were capable of being
Lines of Communication area was re-organised          carried out; and indeed events proved that the
into two districts.                                   orders issued for this operation were well within
   Infantry battalions were filled up to the new      the capacity of the Force.
and higher establishments, and action was                The subject presented difficulties greatly
initiated to raise the establishment of artillery     complicated by the policy of neutrality to which


Details

5912          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

   I visited H.M. the King of the Belgians and          By the night of i5th May the movements
   General Van Overstraeten and reached agree-        envisaged in Plan D were all running ahead of
  ment that the Belgian ist Corps should be           schedule. 4th Division was moving into Corps
   withdrawn from the area of 2nd Corps and that      reserve behind 3rd Division; 5th Division was
  the left boundary of the B.E.F. should be           moving on to the Senne in place of 5oth Division
  adjusted so as to allow the Belgians the use of     as originally planned, and the latter was now
  the road Vilvorde-Alost for this purpose. I         moving to G.H.Q. reserve along the River
  also stressed the importance of having fresh        Dendre.
  Belgian troops established early in position
  north of Louvain to continue the British line
  covering Brussels.
     Further serious news came from the south                OPERATIONS—SECOND PHASE
  where the enemy had crossed the Meuse between                         (i7th-26th MAY)
  Sedan and Me"zieres, and further north he was
  reported to be surrounding the fortress of St.       Withdrawal to the Escaut decided on; the threat
  Heribert (4 miles S.S.W. of Namur).                    to Arras and to the right flank; formation of
     The French Cavalry Corps on my right had            Macforce and deployment of 2yd Division on
  on the previous day received orders to retire          the Canal du Nord. The enemy reaches the
  to the Perwez position whence they subsequently        Somme and cuts communications with the Base ;
  withdrew, according to plan, to the main position      Calais and Boulogne invested: the admini-
  running through Gembloux.                              strative position. The organisation of the Canal
                                                         line. Alternative lines discussed with French
     At the request of Air Marshal Barratt I             and Belgians, resulting in further withdrawal
  placed at his disposal for use on the French          from the Escaut to the Frontier defences and
 front three squadrons of fighters which I had          fresh plans for attacks southwards in conjunction
 only recently received in response to an urgent         with French main forces. $th and $oth Divisions
  appeal to the Secretary of State for War.             counter-attack on 21st May. A further attack
     23. On 15th May the Dutch Army laid down           in conjunction with French planned for
 its arms; the immediate effect of this on the           26th May: this plan is abandoned owing to
 operations of the B.E.F. was small, for the            penetration of Belgian line on the Lys.
 British forces operating in Holland had at no
 time been under my command. I anticipated,             The beginning of the withdrawal (ifith-T.'jth May)
 however, that this would come as a shock to              24. By i6th May, it became clear that a
 the Belgian Army.                                     prolonged defence of the Dyle position was
     The French 7th Army withdrew' its advanced        impracticable. The French ist Army on my
 formations to the neighbourhood of Antwerp            right were unlikely to make good the ground
 and on this day ordered divisions to move across      lost' on the previous day, notwithstanding the
 my rear to fill the gap created further south.        support I had given them in the air and on the
 This move, however, did not take place till           ground, and a further withdrawal seemed likely
 some three days later when it was accomplished,       to be forced on them by events in the south.
 thanks to efficient traffic control, with little         On the other hand there had been no serious
 delay to our own movements.                           attack on the Belgian positions on my left;
    On this day (i5th May) I established a             nevertheless, any withdrawal from our present
 command post at Lennick St. Quentin, 6 miles          positions would of necessity involve a withdrawal
 west of Brussels. On the British front, the day       by the Belgian Army in the course of which
 passed quietly on the whole, ist Corps was not        Brussels, and probably Antwerp also, would be
 attacked in strength ; 3rd Division of 2nd Corps     abandoned to the enemy.
 was attacked north-west of Louvain and its              Very early on i6th May therefore, I sent a
 forward positions were penetrated, but a counter-    representative to General Billotte who was
 attack successfully restored the original line.      co-ordinating the movements of the British,
 There was considerable enemy bombing of              French and Belgian Forces; I asked that, if
 rearward areas during the day, and the movement      he intended to withdraw, he should let me know
 of refugees became increasingly difficult to         the policy and the timings at once, especially
 control. This was, in part, due to the bombing       as the first bound back to the Senne canals
 of Tournai and other towns on the routes and         involved a march of some fifteen to twenty
to the French decision to close the frontier to       miles.
pedestrian and horsed traffic. Despite my                At about 10 a.m. I received from him orders
requests, made as early as loth May, the Belgian      for a withdrawal to the Escaut, and for the
authorities had done nothing to restrict the use      occupation of the positions along that fiver
of private motor cars or the sale of petrol.          originally planned. The operation was to begin
    During the day I received a request that I        that night (16/17 May), one day being spent on
should take over part of the front held by the        the Senne and one day on the Dendre positions ;
French division on my right. To meet this             thus the Escaut would be reached on the night
request I placed under the orders of this division    of 18/19 May, though the French orders did
a brigade of 48th Division ; this step proved         not rule out the possibility of staying for longer
necessary since at about 6 p.m. the enemy had         than one day on each bound.
penetrated the French front, thus threatening            That evening, I held a co-ordinating con-
the right of 2nd Division. By this tune, how-         ference at ist Corps Headquarters as a result
ever, 48th Division, less one brigade, was in         of which I ordered 5th Division, which was on
position in ist Corps reserve behind 2nd              the way to join 2nd Corps, to the line of the Senne
Division, and I agreed with the commander of          in ist Corps reserve. Two brigades of 46th
ist Corps that the withdrawal of his right            Division* which had been moved up from the
should take place to the River Lasne to join          Lines of Communication for the protection of
up with the French left. This movement was
carried out on the night of the 15/16 May,              * One of the three divisions sent to France for
closely followed by the enemy.                        pioneer duties.


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5924         SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
    some sectors were held jointly with the French.      I replied that a plan for withdrawal north-
    The virtual closing of Dunkirk as a port of        westward had been agreed with the French
    entry was making the supply situation ever         tha't morning; I added that the news from the
    more difficult, and the ammunition situation       Belgian front was disquieting,' and concluded
    permitted only of very restricted expenditure.     by saying:—
                                                             . . . " I must not conceal from you that
  The Plan for Withdrawal.                               a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment
                                                         will'inevitably be lost even in best circum-
.   44. Later, on 26th May, I discussed the plan         stances."
 for withdrawal with the Corps Commanders, and
 issued orders for the operation in accordance            Later in the day, I had a further teiegram
 with the agreement reached with General               from the War Office which read as follows :—
 Blanchard that morning. The plan, as agreed                 " . . . Prime Minister had conversation
 with the French First Group of Armies, envisaged         M. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fully
 the reservation of certain roads for the exclusive       explained to him the situation and resources
 use of the B.E.F. In fact, however, French               French Army. It is clear that it will not be
 troops and transport continued to use them, and          possible for French to deliver attack on the
 this added very considerably to the difficulties         south in sufficient strength to enable them to
 of the withdrawal of British troops. The roads           effect junction with Northern Armies. In
 were few and for the most part narrow, and for           these circumstances no course open to you
 the next three days they were badly congested            but to fall back upon coast. . . . M. Reynaud
 with marching troops and horsed transport of             communicating General Weygand and latter
 French formations, and with refugees.                    will no doubt issue orders in this sense
    On the night 26th/27th May, ist and 2nd               forthwith. You are now authorised to
 Corps, leaving rearguards in the frontier defences,      operate towards coast forthwith in con-
 were to swing back to the old divisional reserve         junction with French and Belgian Armies."
 position with their right at Fort Samghin
 (5 miles south-east of Lille), while the French        The Situation, of the Belgian Army.
prolonged this line from Thumeries to the canal
at Pont-a-Vendin, linking up there with 2nd                45. The situation on the Belgian front was
Division. The following night (27th/a8th May),          causing me ever increasing anxiety. At the
main bodies were to withdraw behind the Lys,            conference at Ypres on the evening of 2ist May,
leaving rearguards on the Deule canal up to its         His Majesty the King of the Belgians had agreed
junction with the Lys at Deulemont: these               that, if forced to abandon the positions on the
rearguards were to stay there until the next night      Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining
 (28th/29th May). The immediate effect of              touch with the left of the B.E.F. Now, however,
these dispositions would be to shorten the total        signs were not wanting that the Belgian Army
perimeter by some 58 miles, but on the other            were being forced to withdraw northwards and
hand I had to face the possibility of having to         away from the Yser canal. If so, the task of
occupy the front from Ypres to the sea, some            defending the whole line as far as the sea
25 miles long, which was still the responsibility       appeared likely to fall on ourselves and the
of the Belgian Army.                                    French, as actually did happen.
                                                           Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, who
    There remained the question of the future.          had been carrying out liaison duties with
I had not so far discussed with General                 H.M. the King of the Belgians since the opera-
Blanchard a further withdrawal to the sea.             tions began, came to G.H.Q. on the morning of
However, the possibility could not have been           26th May, and I e'xpressed to him my earnest
absent from his mind; nor was it absent from           hope that the Belgian Army would fall back
mine, for, although up to now no instructions          towards the Yser. Sir Roger Keyes took this
had been given authorising me to undertake             message back to the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
such an operation, I had, as I have said, foreseen     where he saw His Maj esty. Later he telegraphed
the possibility of such a move being forced            to me sajdng that the Belgians would do their
upon us.                                               best, but that His Majesty considered that the
   I returned from the conference at General           only method of avoiding immediate and com-
Blanchard's headquarters at about 10.30 a.m.           plete disaster was a strong and immediate
on 26th May to find a telegram from the                counter offensive between the Lys and the
Secretary of State which read:—                        Escaut. Such an operation was, however, quite
      . . . " I have had information all of            out of the question since, now that 5th and
   which goes to show that French offensive            5oth Divisions had been committed, my reserves
   from Somme cannot be made in sufficient             were again reduced to one weak cavalry
   strength to hold any prospect of functioning        regiment.
   with your Allies in the North. Should this             The indication that the Belgian Army would
   prove to be the case you will be faced with a       withdraw northwards and not to the Yser, was
   situation in which the safety of the B.E.F.         confirmed in a note, a copy of which I received,
   will predominate. In such conditions only           sent on 26th May by General Michiels, the
   course open to you may be to fight your way         Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, to
   back to West where all beaches and ports            General Neissens, head of the Belgian Mission
   east of Gravelines will be used for embarka-        with G.K.Q.
   tion. Navy will provide fleet of ships and             This note contained the following passage :—
   small boats and R.A.F. would give full support.           . . . ft To-day, 26th May the Belgian Army
   As withdrawal may have to begin very early             is being attacked with extreme violence on
   preliminary plans should be urgently prepared.         the front Menin-Nevele,* and since the
   . . . Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud           0 battle is now spreading to the whole of the
   to-morrow afternoon when whole situation               area of Eecloo, the lack of Belgian reserves
   will be clarified including attitude of French
   to the possible move. . . . "                       • * Eight miles west pf Ghent.


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Page 3.
OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS (continued)
PORTSMOUTH A/P YACHTS
AHOLA
CARYANDA
NONETA
ANLAH
EILA II
SERIOLA
ANKH
LAHLOO
THELE
BOUNTY
MASAYRU
MISCELLANEOUS H.M. SHIPS (small craft)
A.L.C. 5
GREY MIST (Dan-laying
A.L.C. 15
Vessel)
-
A.L.C. 16
# GRIVE (F.A.A. Yacht)
A.L.C. 17
KINDRED STAR (Drifter)
ALOUETTE II
# KING ORRY (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
# AMULREE (Harbour Defence
LLANTHONY (Examination
Patrol Craft)
Service Vessel)
ARONIA (Yacht)
LORMONT (Armed Boarding
BEN AND LUCY (Drifter)
Vessel)
BLUEBIRD (M.B.)
MONARDA (Drifter)
BYSTANDER
MONA'S ISLE (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
CALETA (Harbour Defence
ST. OLAVES (Rescue Tug)
Patrol Craft)
TARRET (A/S Yacht)
CHRYSTOBEL II (Harbour
THRIFTY (Drifter)
Defence Patrol Craft )
V. 4 ("Vernon' s" pinnace)
"DOLPHIN'S" MOTOR-BOAT
VELIA (Armed Trawler)
EVELYN ROSE Trawler)
VERNON I
"EXCELLENT'S" A/A MOTOR-BOAT
VIVIANA (A/S Trawler)
GAVA (Trawler)
Ambleve.
Escaut.
transferred
GLALA (Harbour Defence Patrol
Meuse.
from
Craft)
Sambre.
Semoise.
page 9.
yser.
DUTCH SKOOTS (Commissioned with Naval Crews)
ABEL TASMAN
DOGGERSBANK
PACIFIC
PASCHOLL
AEGIR
FREDANJA
PATRIA
ALICE
FRISCO
PRINCESS JULIANA
AMAZONE
GORECHT
REIGER
ANTJE
HEBE
RIKA
ATLANTIC
HILDA
RUJA
BART
HONDSRUG
BORNRIF
HORST (Abandoned)
SAN ANTONIO
SURSUM CORDA
BRANDARIS
JAVA
TILLY
CARIBIA
JUTLAND
TINY
DELTA
KAAPFALGA
TUNG
DEMOK I
LENA
TWENTE
DENEB
ORANJE
VREDE
DESPATCH II
ORANGE YREESWIJH
ZEUS
(Continued)
# Sunk

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CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
xiii
CHAPTER I
Preliminary Events, 10th to 18th May, 1940
Germany invades Holland and Belgium
1
Allies reach River Dyle
1
German thrust on French 9th Army front
1
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
2
Germans cross Meuse
2
Dutch Army surrenders
2
Allies withdraw to River Escaut
2
French 9th Army front broken
3
Allied rail communications severed
3
CHAPTER II
The week before Operation "Dynamo", 19th to 25th May, 1940
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
4
...
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
4
...
Vice-Admiral Dover, represented at War Office Conference
4
Channel ports the German objective
4
Gerneral Weygand directing Allied operations
5
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
5
Naval Staff at Dover considers large scale evacuation
5
Provision of small craft considered
5
Counter-attack south of Arras
6
Germans approach Boulogne
6
Organisation of the canal line
7
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
7
Canal line occupied
7
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
7
"The Operation will be known as 'Dynamo' "
7
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
8
Calais cut off
8
i

Details

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued
north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming in-
of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation
northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect
of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbour-
hood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were
ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created
on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take
place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for
the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked
north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counter-
attack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut
was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position
withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the
the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day
began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
2

Details

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's
front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured
and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was
a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British
rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and
weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the
defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers,
and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their
localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved
or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed
to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was
also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right
flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on
the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued
without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and
prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its
withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was
soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the
river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the
opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern
area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off
from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed
this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were
actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin),
who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all
theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May),
now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from
the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens,
attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because
it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually
in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately
followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption
by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was
unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two
divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this
attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and
it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely fore-
seen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider
the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting,
which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control
and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and
small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations
and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of
evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very
gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was
considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated
could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports
must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised
that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took
place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and
the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation
and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats
required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

Details

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort
was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned
did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack
widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two
the flanks General Franklyn had latter did
through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break
the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to
that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became
and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear
enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the
had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly
blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it ... had It
Germans approach Boulogne
military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in
approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was
completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of
were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville,
tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million
decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The
established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort
went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the
and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May,
if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back
the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of
days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five
the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to
must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank
of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut
to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were
made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison
work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once
again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer
and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was
possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors,
for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of
anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no
effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the
canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and con-
sequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too
that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military
requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening
enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last
remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was
abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal
to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an
evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and
in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters
which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after
allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed
the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the
remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names
of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was in-
timated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable
ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embark-
the 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and
waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had
the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also
them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell
sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had
been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and
the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time,
owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded
with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following
day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste
of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports
great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak
on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour) ; and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers,
skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged
continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft
reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers
of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter
the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian
canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc,
and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze
minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the
the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland),
water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The
the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24,
borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord South-
wherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the
appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

Details

Details

INDEX
Discipline. See British Expeditionary Force and French troops.
Disembarkation ports, 25.
Docksey, Capt. T. E., 21.
Doggersbank, 20, 29n, 32, 45, 47n, 64, 72, 107n.
Dolphin's power boats, 72n.
Donald, Lt. Cdr. C. G. W. Died of wounds, 10.
Dorienta, 71n.
Doris, 71n, 94 (sunk).
Dorrien Rose, 24, 29, 62.
Dove, Cdr. J. S., 50n (reports Dunkirk blocked), 59.
Dover, mined, 38.
Dowling, Lt. Cdr. D. B., 82.
Drifters, 23, 24 (flare burning).
Drogou, Lt. de V., 73.
Duchess, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Duchess of Fife, 28n, 54n, 101, 107n, 109.
Du Guesclin, 62n, 73n.
Dundalk, 86, 107я, 109.
Dunkirk, S.N.O. See Tennant, Capt. W. G.
Dunkirk: water supply destroyed, 8; demolitions, 8, 19, 106; inundations, 12; bridge-
easier, munications 27, 30; limitations, 48; reported blocked, 50; ships not to close, 51 ; com-
head, 15, 18, 35; damaged, 15, 18; out of action, 23 ; reported fallen, 24; conditions
established with Dover, 51; reduced number of ships sent, 61-2 bom-
barded, 70; harbour deserted, 87; harbour full of ships, 88; growing number of
wrecks described, off, 117. 94; pier damaged, 97; blocking of inner harbour, 111-112, 119-20 piers
Duperre, 73.
Dwarf, 60.
Eastbourne Queen, 74.
E-boats, activity). 27-8, 36, 37n, 49 (fail to discover change of route), 68-9, 85 (recrudescence of
Edmond René, rams Kingfisher, 116.
Edvard Nissen, 111-12.
Edward Z. Dresden, 114n.
Eggington, Ldg. Sea., 119.
Eileen Emma, 23n, 83n (damaged), 95 (sunk).
Eilla II, 71n, 74.
Elizabeth Green, 53, 114n.
Ellwood, Cdr. M. 0. D. (i/c Communications), 67.
Emerald Wings, breaks down, 111.
Emile Deschamps, sunk, 119.
Emma, 73.
Emperor of India, 28n, 47n, 54n, 100.
Empire Henchman, 7In.
Endeavour, 73n.
Enterprise, 72n, 75n.
Epervier, 99.
Escaut, 60.
Esk, 28n, 49, 79 (takes across R.A. Dover and Beach parties), 54n, 55, 58, 64n, 92, 97,
102, 107n.
Ethel Everard, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Evans, W. L., 110.
Excellent's A/A M.B., 72n, 75n.
Excellent's 35 ft. M.B., 71n, 75n.
Exhaustion of ships' crews, 29, 113.
Express, back 28n, 41-2, 54n, 55, 59 (flag of R.A. Dover), 62n, 83 (slightly damaged), 109 (sent
empty), 112n, 114n, 118.
Fagalde, General, 12, 68, 85.
Fairplay I, 71n.
Fair Breeze, 60, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Feasible, 71n, 73 (disabled).
Fenella, 34, 43 (sunk), 46.
Fidget, 32n, 51n.
"Fifth Column", 24, 100.
198

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675

Details

Details