Encourage

Details

' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
  Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry        near Maulde on the front of ist Division a
  Brigade of the same division joined the force.         number of enemy had crossed the river dis-
  On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the        guised as refugees, but had been detected and
  42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse          driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com-
  to St. Amand was handed over to the French.            manders all felt that they could hot how hold
     Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major-           on for more than .twenty-four hours. We
  General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, to           discussed a withdrawal to our old frontier
  take command of the sector of the canals between       defences, where advantage could be taken of the
  Aire and Carvin. General Curtis' force was             existing blockhouses and trenches, and of tha
  known as Polforce, and was to.consist of four          anti-tank ditch. This move would have little
  battalions - of 46th Division, 25th Infantry           effect on the French on our right since it would
  Brigade of 5.oth Division (in line between La          pivot on the junction point, where the Escaut
  Bassee and Carvin) and one field battery,              crossed the frontier, but "would seriously affect
  together with a number of engineer and other          the Belgians, who now held the line of the
  units o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been moving         Escaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of the
  northwards and .were collected on the Canal.          canal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen.
  It had originally been intended that part of this         I had also to consider the pressing need to
  force should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion,        stiffen the defence of the canal line westwards to
  but the railway trains in which were the remain-      Gravelines and to form a new reserve to replace
 ing three battalions of 46th Division failed to        the divisions now committed to counter-attacks
 reach that town in time and remained south of          southward from Arras.
 the Somme. The defence of these localities south          A provisional decision was therefore reached
 of the Canal had therefore to be abandoned.            to withdraw to the frontier defences on the night
     Further to the north-west the defence of the       of 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I had
 canal line was being organised by Brigadier            reached agreement with the French and the
 C. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi-          Belgians.
 cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported that             General Weygand had visited General Billotte
 the enemy had already reached the left bank of         during the day and the latter indicated that an
 the river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer.          attack was being planned for the following day
 23rd Division had been ordered to move to this         (22nd May), northwards from the direction of
 area and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards)     Roye, with the object of closing the gap. At
 arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher therefore       8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where in
 held the right bank of the river from St. Omer to      the Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the King
 Gravelines with this battalion and five batteries      of the Belgians and General Billotte. There
 of heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction   were also present General Van Overstraeten,
 with certain French troops of the Secteur             General Champon, the head of the French
 Fortifie des Flandres.                                Mission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownall
    The front of Macforce was covered by the           and others.
 French, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were still            I explained the situation which was developing
 in their quadrilateral on the line of the Escaut      on the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi-
 and the Sensee. Here, however, information            culty of maintaining positions there since the
 was frequently lacking and could only be obtained     water in the river was so low as no longer to
 by reconnaissance.                                    form an obstacle. It was then agreed that on
    Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupied     the night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should be
in the sense that the whole of the length of 85        abandoned and that the Allied armies should
miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse        occupy a line from Maulde northwards to
 (West of St. Amand) was divided into sectors          Halluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai and
 for each of which a British commander was             Ghent.
responsible. The total strength of the troops              I discussed the possibility of reserves. It
 on the Canal line did not on this day exceed          appeared that the available divisions of the
 10,000 men, and the number of anti-tank               French ist Army were all too tired to take part
 weapons was barely adequate to cover all the          in offensive operations in the immediate future.
 crossing places: certainly there could be no          It was therefore agreed that the French should
 question of being able to keep an effective           take over a further sector of the defensive
 watch against small parties of infantry crossing      positions northwards from Maulde, so that the
the canal between the bridges. The barges,             2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn into
however, had almost all been moved away or             reserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,,
 at any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy,      French took up these positions on 22nd May.
.and bridges were fast being prepared for              On the north, 44th Division on withdrawal
demolition.                                            from the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- -
                                                       Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgian
2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front.           formation would relieve them on the night of
   35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three        23rd/24th May.
Corps Commanders. I told them what had                     When these moves were complete the Allied
happened on the southern flank and how, in             line would run slightly west of north to Halluin,
-order to take the initiative and encourage the        and then almost at right angles, north-eastwards
French ist Army to do likewise, I had gone to          along the Lys. It was evident that sooner or
the length of committing practically the whole         later the Belgian army would have to swing
of my reserve.                                         back to a line in rear, pivoting on their right
   From the Corps Commanders I learned that            of Halluin. Accordingly at the end of the
the line was thinly held and that attacks had          conference General Billotte asked the King of
taken place at several points. At Petegem on           the Belgians whether if he were forced to with-
the front of 44th Division the enemy had secured       draw he would fall back on to the line of the
a bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of            Yser. His Majesty agreed, though evidently
3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French       with some regret, that no alternative line existed.


Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                  5933
 creation of a road control organisation under                      APPRECIATIONS
 the Quarter-Master-General, on the linos of that           The Royal Navy; the Royal Air Force;
 in use in the French Army, had already been                       Commanders and Staffs
 submitted, but unfortunately too late for more
 than preliminary results to be achieved.               The Royal Navy.
                                                           70. I have already referred to the embarkation
 Security.                                              of the Force from Dunkirk and its transport to
    67. Akin to the foregoing problem is that of        England which evoked the wholehearted admira-
 security/ Until loth May the work of the               tion of the Army. The operation was carried out
 Intelligence Service in this respect had been          in accordance with the finest traditions of the
 heavy and constant, but when operations began,         Royal Navy. The plan involved the use of
 it 'assumed almost unmanageable proportions.           hundreds of privately-owned small craft, and
 This was due to the opening of the Belgian             was put into execution at short notice and at a
 frontier, the mass movement of refugees, and           time when Naval resources were severely
 the arrival of enemy saboteurs and agents by           strained by demands elsewhere. It was carried
 parachute/                                             through regardless of danger and loss by enemy
                                                        bombing. My deep gratitude is due -to all
    The troops, however, soon became aware of           concerned, particularly to Vice-Admiral Sir B. H.
 the danger and realised the importance, of             Ramsay, Vice-Admiral at Dover, Rear-Admiral
 security measures and the paramount need for           W. F. Wake Walker, who superintended the
 discretion.                                          • actual embarkation and Captain -W. G. Tennant,
                                                        R.N., the senior naval officer ashore. Nor can
 Supply and Transport.                                  the Army forget the sterling work of all those
    68. As has been already indicated in this           members of the Merchant Navy and the civilian
 Despatch, the operations showed clearly how            owners of small craft, in many instances
 complete reliance cannot be placed on any one          volunteers, who unhesitatingly and regardless of
 channel of movement or maintenance. Enemy              dangers gave their services to the British
 action by mobile forces or by air may put              Expeditionary Force.
 important road or railway routes out of action
 for hours or days at a time, or even completely       The Royal Air Force.
 sever communications with the bases.
                                                          71. Successful operations on land depend more
    The proportion of reserves held forward, and       than ever before on the closest co-operation
 under load, on rail or on lorry, must therefore be    between aircraft and troops on the ground, and
 high, despite the resultant extravagance in trans-    the B.E.F. owes a deep debt of gratitude to the
port. The War Office had provided Lines of             Royal Air Force for their work throughout the
Communication Railhead Companies, R.A.S.C.,            operations. Pilots returned to the air again and
to operate in the event of a railhead being out of     again to carry out essential tasks for both French
 action for a time, and these units fully justified    and British Armies, when they were long overdue
their existence.                                       for rest and sleep.
   During the final phases of the operations, the         The embarkation of the Force would have
civilian employees pf the French and Belgian           been well-nigh impossible but for the fighter
railways were often not to be found, and the           protection afforded. The toll taken* of the
 Railway Operating Companies, R.E., had to take        enemy aircraft on this and earlier occasions has
over the working of the trains at short notice.        once again established the individual superiority
   The change of bases made necessary after            of the British airman in the air.
20th May was a fine example of quick decision,            I wish specially to record my thanks to Air-
flexible administration, and the power of the          Marshal A. S. Barratt (now Sir Arthur Barratt),
administrative staffs at home and in France to         Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Air
improvise at short notice.                             Forces in France, and to the Air Officer- Com-
                                                       manding my Air Component, Air-Vice-Marshal
 The Behaviour of the Troops.                          C. H. B. Blount.
    69. Most important of all, the Campaign has
 proved beyond doubt that the British Soldier          Commanders and Staffs.
 has once again deserved well of his country.            72. The course of operations in May afforded
 The troops under my command, whatever their '        very unequal opportunities for the several
 category, displayed those virtues of steadiness,      branches of the Staff, Services and departments
patience, courage and endurance for which their        to show thek efficiency, and it would, therefore,
corps and regiments have.long been famous.            perhaps, be invidious to deal with their work in
    In addition to the fighting troops, the rear-      detail to a .greater extent than I have already
ward units, as well -as the three divisions sent to    done in this Despatch. Some, however, were
France for pioneer duties, all found themselves,      required with their Staffs to bear a specially
 at one time or another, engaged with the enemy       heavy and prolonged strain of responsibility
although often incompletely trained and short         and I wish to refer particularly to the valuable
of the proper complement of weapons.                  services of my Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-
                                                      General H. R. Pownall), my Quarter-Master
   Time and again, the operations proved the.         ^General (Lieut.-General W. G. Lindsell), and my
vital importance of the good junior leader, who       Engineer-in-Chief (Major-General R. P. Paken-
has learned to encourage, by his example, the         ham Walsh), my Signal Officer-in-Chief (Major-
men whom he leads, and whose first care is the.       General R. Chenevix-Trench), and my Military
well-being of the troops placed under his com-        Secretary (Brigadier Sir Colin Jardine, Bart.).
mand. Firm discipline, physical fitness, efficiency      From the narrative of events, it will be evident
in marching and digging, and'skill at arms, old-      how great is the debt I owe to the Commanders
fashioned virtues though they may be, are as
important in modern warfare as ever they were            *On one day, 77 enemy machines were shot down at'
in -J-hp nact                                         the loss of only 16 of our own.


Details

292
Officers but was before only to the fact that they were waiting for official orders
Perhaps the this men may due have refused to take orders from English Naval and Army
from their Commander at the end embarking. of English officers trying to persuade them to
proceed to ships this the jetty, shouted "Allez" at them, but the French
naturally.considered. nothing more than an insult, which maymhave added to the
general
As for the B.E.F. words cannot praise them too highly. They were under constant
bombing and shelling, and unable to do anything active, many, too, having marched
as much as 80 miles in 3 or 4 days, yet on no occasion was a single grumble or com-
plaint overheard. They all just seemed to want to get back at it.
I understand that one R.A.F. mechanic was the only other survivor, besides myself.
He was picked up by a destroyer, clinging to remains of the motor boat. According to
him, the rest had already died from exposure.
Although I realise that it is of no consolation to those bereaved, I feel that
the extraordinary courage of all the poor fellows in the water should be recorded.
Even though they must have known that the end was near, they never grumbled, nor were
they afraid; they even went so far as to ask permission of Conmander Cluston before
removing their tin hats. When I left them clinging around the wreck, although already
suffering from exposure, they were singing and discussing old times together.
Commander Cluston's example must have helped them all as it helped me. Although
exhausted himself, he continued to chat, encourage and white-lie to the end.
Mata Soloner
(M. Solomon)
Sub. Lieut, R.N.V.R.

Details

giving embarkating da anne points from East
Dunkerk" ts human in
the dark pall . from Drunk
narifation very precarions rm an h
locale a was vessel for orders, both "Til
closed the wrech of admit", East of I
Per to endeavors to obtain instructions
found that the ship was a week who
50ydo their but, at the Same time
large bodies freen on Dunkuh Lash
honelted afainst the this then dear
the harbous, informing "Tilly of by inter
I secured about half
the Pier remmediates started embart
"Tells" then Came almpide me, but, a
having fould her propellor, she strue
deck, bending stanchions there r also on
my starbd light screen was carried and
Suen" then secured alenpide her.
forced to her were suite in adequale
The fang plants who
inclined to "ush" them. I would S
these hosp were the one ones I one
who all shewed lach of discipline, all It
having discardes their arms.
on the Pier becoming chaotic I then
regulated on the the flow of troop, tap ping
shoulder who the next to
The soldin usponded was to encourage
had I control they and must The to choso the Jeter to men ation Tilli I eased There ordered as as
Amo did, life bells unforting which ater taking with had any
each
man

Details

VESSEL
OWNER
REMARKS
DIAMOND
Cosens & Co.
Released 3.6.40.
DIANA MARY
C/o Toughs
Returned to owner.
COP
MA J
DIANTE
E.W. Tyler
T.98. A.P.S.
DOLPHIN
c/o Watercraft
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
MAJO1
DOREEN
E. Brown
T.98. Returned to owner 6/6.
MALDO
DORIAN
E.S. Webberley
A.P.S. Hamble.
DREADNOUGHT II
G. Murrell
No information of return from Dunkirk.
MALVI
DREADNOUGHT III
G. Murrell
No information of return from Dunkirk.
MOLLY
DUCHESS OF YORK
W. & P. Robinson
Returned to owners.
MARE
DUKE
S. Williams & Sons, Ltd.
Returned to owners.
MARCH
D.L.G.
C.B. Wright
Released 3.6.40. Re-allocated to
MARGH
S.P.L. Admy. Service (6A).
DANDY
Wackett
A.P.S.
MARINA
DIANTHUS
J. Tims & Sons
Returned to owners,
MARSAY
DINKY (10' Boat)
H.H. Miramo
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
MARINA
DORIS (Wherry)
T.H. Read
Reported lost by owner.
DUMPLIN (Boat)
G. Stead
Reported lost at Dunkirk.
ARICE
Now presumed lost.
ARY
ARY HC
ARY IR
EASTBOURNE BELLE
Allchorn
Returned to owners.
ARY ROB
EDWARD & MARY
C. Adams (6A)
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy. Service.
ELIZABETH GREEN
H. Green
T.98. Re-allocated to A.P.S.
RY SPE
ELLA
W. Wills
T.98. Returned to owner 6.6.40.
RY SPE
ELVIN
E.W. Vincent
T.98. Returned to owner.
ILDA
EM
Messrs. Hill
Released - unsuitable.
EMPRESS
E. Crouch
Abandoned at Dunkirk.
BELLE
ENCHANTRESS
Allohorn & Sons
ENCOURAGE
Abandoned at Dunkirk.
LOWER
Bob Leach & Sons
Released 1.6.40. Re-allocated for
ENDEAVOUR
W. Robinson
Spl. Admy Service (6A).
DER
ENTERPRISE
Damaged - returned to owner.
G.J. Kent
AIDEN
T.98. No report received from ciron.
EY
list of missing vessels.
EOTHEN
ANT
Lt. R.H. Edmead
A.P.S.
E.R.V.
E. Harvey
T.98. Returned to owner 5.6.40.
ERIC
LICENT
H.S. Redman
T.98. Returned to owner.
ESPERANZA
Bond's Boatyard
Returned to owners 31.5.40.
ETHEL ELLEN
E.S. Amey
T.98. Returned to owners 6.6.40.
DSA
ETHEL MAUD
P.H.C. Wills
T.98. Returned to owner.6.6.40 -
IKOI
damaged.
ELAINE
J.R. Brown
A.P.S.
DRU II
EDWINA
Geo. Reid & Ors.
No trace Remagate List 31.7.40.
No information of return from Dunkirk.
TAUR
EASTER MORN (WY61)
H. Duke
Prepared, but did not go to Dunkirk.
ENDEAVOUR (WY)
T. Hutchinson
EDINA (Wherry)
Prepared, but did not go to Dunkirk.
T.H. Read
Reported lost by owner.
RASOL
EX-SERVICE DINGHY
6th Ramsgate Scouts
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
EDNA
H.V. Little
Returned to owner.
08
EASTBOURNE QUEEN
H. Sayers
Reported lost at Dunkirk.
MADGE
MING
$ MODESTY
PAH
WA
RCH
ROSE
Motor BOE
Motor Boa
vior 2 Torpedo
top Ferries
SME

Details

292
Perhaps the men may have refused to take orders from English Naval and Army
Officers but this was due only to the fact that they were waiting for official orders
from their Commander before embarking. English officers trying to persuade them to
croceed to ships at the end of the jetty, shouted "Allez" at them, but the French
naturally considered this nothing more than an insult, which may have added to the
general difficulties.
As for the B.E.F. words cannot praise them too highly. They were under constant
bombing and shelling, and unable to do anything active, many, too, having marched
as much as 80 miles in 3 or 4 days, yet on no occasion was a single grumble or com-
plaint overheard. They all just seemed to want to get back at it.
I understand that one R.A.F. mechanic was the only other survivor, besides myself.
He was picked up by a destroyer, clinging to remains of the motor boat. According to
nim, the rest had already died from exposure.
the extraordinary courage of all the poor fellows in the water should be recorded.
Although I realise that it is of no consolation to those bereaved, I feel that
Even though they must have known that the end was near, they never grumbled, not before were
removing they their tin hats. When I left them clinging around the wreck, although already
afraid; they even went so far as to ask permission of Commander Cluston
suffering from exposure, they were singing and discussing old times together.
Commander Cluston's example must have helped them all as it helped end. no. Although
exhausted himself, he continued to chat, encourage and white-lie to the
(M. Solomon)
Sub. Lieut, R.N.V.R.

Details

OF
OWNER
REMARKS
DIAMOND
Cosens & Co.
Released 3.6.40.
DIANA MARY
C/o Toughs
Returned to owner.
DIANTE
E.W. Tyler
T.98. A.P.S.
DOLPHIN
c/o Watercraft
Re-allocated to A.P.S.
DOREEN
E. Brown
T.98. Returned to owner 6/6.
DORIAN
E.S. Webberley
A.P.S. Hamble.
DREADNOUGHT II
G. Murrell
No information of return from Dunkirk.
DREADNOUGHT III
G. Murrell
No information of return from Dunkirk.
DUCHESS OF YORK
W. & P. Robinson
Returned to owners.
DUKE
S. Williams & Sons, Ltd.
Returned to owners.
D.L.G.
C.B. Wright
Released 3.6.40. Re-allocated to
S.P.L. Admy. Service (6A).
DANDY
Wackett
A.P.S.
DIANTHUS
J. Tims & Sons
Returned to owners.
DINKY (10' Boat)
H.H. Miramo
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
DORIS (Wherry)
T.H. Read
Reported lost by owner.
DUMPLIN (Boat)
G. Stead
Reported lost at Dunkirk.
Now presumed lost.
EASTBOURNE BELLE
Allchorn
Returned to owners.
EDWARD & MARY
C. Adams (6A)
Re-allocated to Spl. Admy. Service.
ELIZABETH GREEN
H. Green
T.98. Re-allocated to A.P.S.
ELLA
W. Wills
T.98. Returned to owner 6.6.40.
ELVIN
E.W. Vincent
T.98. Returned to owner.
EM
Messrs. Hill
Released - unsuitable.
EMPRESS
E. Crouch
Abandoned at Dunkirk.
ENCHANTRESS
Allchorn & Sons
Abandoned at Dunkirk.
ENCOURAGE
Bob Leach & Sons
Released 1.6.40. Re-allocated for
Spl. Admy Service (6A).
ENDEAVOUR
W. Robinson
Damaged - returned to owner.
ENTERPRISE
G.J. Kent
T.98. No report received from circn.
list of missing vessels.
EOTHEN
Lt. R.H. Edmead
A.P.S.
E.R.V.
E. Harvey
T.98. Returned to owner 5.6.40.
ERIC
H.S. Redman
T.98. Returned to owner.
ESPERANZA
Bond's Boatyard
Returned to owners 31.5.40.
ETHEL ELLEN
E.S. Amey
T.98. Returned to owners 6.6.40.
ETHEL MAUD
P.H.C. Wills
T.98. Returned to owner.6.6.40 -
damaged.
ELAINE
J.R. Brown
A.P.S.
EDWINA
Geo. Reid & Ors.
No trace Ramsgate List 31.7.40.
No information of return from Dunkirk.
EASTER MORN (WY61)
H. Duke
Prepared, but did not go to Dunkirk.
ENDEAVOUR (WYL)
T. Hutchinson
Prepared, but did not go to Dunkirk.
EDINA (Wherry)
T.H. Read
Reported lost by owner.
EX-SERVICE DINGHY
6th Ramsgate Scouts
No trace of return from Dunkirk.
EDNA
H.V. Little
Returned to owner.
EASTBOURNE QUEEN
H. Sayers
Reported lost at Dunkirk.

Details

DUNKIRK COMMITTEE.
MEETING at the HELD AT 11 a.m. on Wednesday 21st August,1940
Ministry of Shipping Room 8021 A.
AGENDA
1
2
Minutes of Meeting held on 14th August, 1940.
Matters Arising.
3
4
Report Cases for of Payments for week ended 20th August,
discussion and settlement on the table:- 1940
1. Total Loss:-
"RENOWN"
Osborne Bros.
"LANSDOWNE" Messum & Sons Ltd.
11. Hire:-
5
Any other business.
"ENCOURAGE" etc Bob Leech & Sons

Details

DUNKIRK COMMITTEE
Meeting held at 11. a.m. on Wednesday 21st August, 1940,
at Ministry of Shipping, Room 8021A.
Present:-
MR. ALLEN (CHAIRMAN)
11 SIMMONS
11 RIDDELL
" WAND
1. Minutes of Meeting held on 14th August were agreed.
2. Matters arising were discussed:
(a) "IOTE" Agreed to increase the offer to
£1,525 in full settlement.
(b) "BEVERLEY" Considered position arising from
1
recent correspondence and interview
e
with Mr. Thompson who has undertaken
to try to obtain Mr. Cordery's written
agreement to permit him to act for both
parties. Agreed that in the event of
no settlement between the parties,
solicitors opinion will be sought.
3. Report of Payments for week ended 20th August amounting
to £884.6.2₫ was presented and passed.
4. The following cases were discussed:
1. Total Loss:
(a) "Renown" Agreed to offer £800 which is
the insured value.
(b) "Lansdowne" Agreed to offer £500 which
is the insured value.
11. Hire:
"Encourage": etc., owned by Bob Leach &
Sons. S.T.O's report
considered; agreed to write
that no case has been made
for further payment.
111. Lost effects:
"Kit Cat": Claim for lost compass
considered: Agreed first to
try and recover it.
5. Next Meeting fixed for 11.a.m. on Wednesday, 4th September, 1940.
4/8/80

Details

Details

Details

early
at beachearricades always we Bray appeared part to know of to the when have as of day, far tanks, this no out.townrds.evening fighter patrevening there the enemy were seemed times when
sh
tide which and it was came La plank Panne. pier of venthes, footway Wi as lorries, the handrail so water etc., R.E. mark were did
westward. As the afternoon wore a the abandoned the enemy's hit and saw "VI bu
and "CLAN
the to - get or outer twor-boats that men alongside. At could out walk ong out the to
brunt boats many the late ships boats his on grass staff in embarked a get to
of the evening a number of wind powe cl
in most like closely to thele THE in these or three - would states In bar this have of
the evening. the C. tide England MA/SB.
Friday, to 1,200 May men. 31. was in the region of 5-6 time hours to water load - line power that 18, for except 1,000 from the
Saturday
June 1 under very was as
There
with During the bet
encourage high the enough boats and sea dry the broached for twelve to at northerly high water work breeze most and a heavy
and the La Dunkirk. were good general
that west towards there the direction of numbers of enem
in holding Dunkink therolding Dunkirk as it the tonly real hoperds the the hours. We all that and were Many left of
be by The off from not them. The more rate than and getting the a fraction a beaches was & The beaches was & beache armies evacuation on Dunkirk, so from slow
to of and close in was possible lay to
At TOTAL offing, on Ke
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< THE
when patrols little there trouble were sky entirely was during clear, adequate the but earlier despite part this of the the enemy aircraft could
part staff much of his transferred own were way again and to many some bombs gaps until were during the which late the day. afternoon Our and fighter evening, gave
87's though was skipjack Keith All an
It close
of The this bad weather and other H.M.S. days in "KEITH" small off craft dropped. Bray. up and He At enemy spent 0645, had a R.A. large things and
attack on on hit
the on most the beaches of the almost small craft and onshore near wind, coupled with down the stranding coast.
these time after At the 0805 second a further or third The strong ship salvo imme was diatelya moving at boiler a hi fre qu
off day, the and it became tovident that toyal evident that there been was slowed the no hope greater down the of the part work of
THE sar
Bray. shelled About We from proceeded noon the "HEBE" eastwards at La and Panne were reported originally that they planned. were bringing
side, then. M.T.B.
noon trouble. to try An to locate up the to shore La Panne in forced "KEITH" to withdraw towards being
eastward spotting work. of La enemy Panne A observation and may have balloon battery been was which up was a early few causing in the the
after-
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< with w s
1430 down off by aircraft La Panne but signal 1t was was still made there asking able for to this do some miles useful to
the
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< 10-15 attack
number and at of the same time we a came tremendous under fire aerial from in a the hidden evering. shore to be At shot about
executed. frequent escorting STATE THE on broke while overhead. they engaged Our a the
fighters battle in which battery, large
type the most her the hit went off <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< the to from atta B
"KEITH" was bombed ships at 1500, and beaches without through. were success. mostly The ill
and
-3-
- 2 -

Details

early
part
of
we
the
appeared
to
day,
but
towards
beaches always Barricades to know when have of tanks, this no fighter was the patrols, case. evening and there the enemy were seemed times when
the 4
westward. a
at Bray and and La out plank Panne. as far as At lorries, the Bray low the water etc., R.E. mark S were did thrown the
causing the brunt wre
the tide which it came that
boat
top approach in connection, most of high water. a was like closcly to thew the to isloping, - in get or these twotor-boats beach operations. or end. three men At alongside. of a distinct - would states The In this have to of
man
ri
Friday, to the 1,200 beaches men. was in the region of 5-6 time hours to load - power the that testroyer that destroyer boats to 1,000 from the bar
May 31.
as the thenelding Dunkirk therolding Dunkirk encourage high the enough it boats and There sea dry the broached was inshore for a twelve fresh the to to to only at make northerly move hours. high real boat westwards water work We breeze did about most and all this 0830, difficult. that morning, and was were possible and Many left a of heavy
be The off from not them. The more rate than of and a flow fraction getting at the as of beaches many the men evacuation was off so from slow
by to the end, hope of a complete close in on Dunkirk, lay to
when patrols little there wers tirely trouble sky was during clear, the but earlier despite part this of the enemy aircraft armies could
part staff much transferred his again and to many adequate some bombs gaps until were during the which late the the day. afternoon Our and fighter evening, gave
of The bad other H.M.S. days in "KEITH" small off craft dropped. Bray. He At enemy spent 0645, had a R.A. things and
off the on most the day, beaches of the weather small craft and onshore near wind, coupled up and with down the the stranding coast. large
noon Bray. trouble. shelled the About to An noon to locate the La La and Panne Panne had were been reported forced in originally was to that slowed the withdraw no they down were the work
eastward of enemy "KEITH" early in towards being after-
executed. number frequent. escorting and fighters spotting at off the aircraft La were work. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< aircraft same Panne La Panne time but A we it bombed was was ships made at 1500, and beaches broke able in was which for the to up they engaged the were was this evering. do a few some causing mostly to miles be useful the a battery, At shot the large to about the
without
ill
success.
- 2 -
ate the
ny observ
Panne and

Details

gwing embarkating La points from Eas
Dunkurk" ts anne human i
the dark pall . from Drunk
narifation very precarions rm an h
locale a was vessel for orders, both Ti
closed the wrech of admit", East of )
Per to endeavors to obtain instructed
found that the ship was a week we
50ydo ofher but, at the Same time
large bodies freen on Dunkuh Lash
honelted afainst the this then dea
the harbous, informing "Tilly of by inter
I secured about half
the Pier started embar
"Telly" then Came almpide me, but, a
having fould her propellor, she stru
deck, bending stanchions there r also n
my starbd light screen was carried an
Suen" then secured alenpide her.
forced to her were suite in adequale
The fang planks who
inclined to "ush" them. I would S
these hoops were the one ones I one
who all shewed lach of discipline, all It
having discardes their arms.
regulated on the the flow of troop, tap pin
on the Pier becoming chaotic I then
The soldin usponded was to encourage
shoulder who the next to
had I must the men I eased ordered as
control The Jeter alion as
they and to choso to Tilli There
Amo did, life bells unforting which ater taking with had any
each
man