Bruges

Details

Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                    5923
   The remaining infantry brigade of 48th             Cavalry Corps for this attack. Therefore, even
Division (i43rd) was later placed under 2nd           if no British divisions could be made available,
Corps, and a pioneer battalion sent to begin          the possibility of carrying out the operation
preparations for the defence of Ypres in case         would not be entirely precluded. I did realise
Belgian measures for the purpose should prove         however that the French Were unlikely to take
inadequate.                                           the offensive unless British support was forth-
   The Belgians had at this time one division         coming.
in reserve between Menin and Ypres, and this             Even so, however, the situation on my northern
was ordered to counter-attack at 2 p.m. "How-         flank was deteriorating so rapidly that I was
ever it is doubtful whether it was found possible     convinced that there was no alternative but to
ever to launch this counter-attack. Orders were       occupy, as quickly as troops could be made
also issued for the Belgian ist Corps to come         available, the line of the Ypres-Comines canal
into line on the right of their 4th Corps between     and the positions covering Ypres. I therefore
Ghelewe and Ledeghem; this move was carried           issued orders to 5oth Division to join 2nd
out on the 26th May.                                  Corps at once, and shortly afterwards I ordered
   Sir John Dill (who had now become C.I.G.S.)        5th Division to follow. 2nd Corps placed
and whom I had asked to visit me, 'arrived on         5th Division on its left flank northwards
the morning of 25th May, and I explained the          from Halluin along the Ypres-Comines canal
position to him. He then telegraphed to the           with 5oth Division on its left around Ypres. At
Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State,         this time also, the greater part of the medium
that there could be no disguising the seriousness     and lieavy artillery of ist and 2nd Corps was
of the situation. He added that in his opinion        grouped under 2nd Corps, and the successful
the proposed counter-attack to the south could        defence of the positions on the Ypres-Comines
not be an important affair in view of the enemy       canal and around Ypres, which was maintained
attacks which had penetrated the Belgian              during the next three days; was greatly assisted
defences.                                             by these artillery units, which remained in
   General Blanchard arrived during Sir John          action till they had fired all their ammunition.
Dill's visit and took part in our discussions.            The Commander of 3rd Corps, who was no
   During the day the Belgians continued to           longer required to take part in the attack
withdraw in a north-westerly direction under           southwards, was now ordered to take over the
enemy pressure. Reports also indicated that a          command of the front from St. Omer to Raches
fresh enemy attack would take place next day           from Major-General Eastwood, whom he relieved
on the northern end of the Lys position.               on 26th May. .
                                                          I immediately communicated my decision to
                                                       the headquarters of the French First Group of
       OPERATIONS—THIRD PHASE                          Armies, but I was unable to get-into personal
                                                       touch with General Blanchard that evening as
                 26th-3ist MAY                         he was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges.
The decision taken, in agreement with the French,      However, I went to see General Blanchard at
  to withdraw behind the Lys. H.M. Covernment          his headquarters at Attiches early next morning
  authorises withdrawal to the coast. The Dunkirk      (26th May), at a moment when the enemy was
  perimeter organised by Sir Ronald Adam.              attacking at Carvin and had penetrated the
   The Belgians ask for an armistice. General          front of a North African Division near Bois
  Blanchard at first determines to remain in           d'Epinoy. I found that General Blanchard also
  position but later French yd and Cavalry Corps       feared the collapse of the Belgian Army and felt
  withdraw to Dunkirk. Occupation of perimeter         that the time for a counter attack southwards
  completed. Problems of embarkation of British        was past. Indeed he had already decided that
  and French troops. Withdrawal of 2nd and             the situation on both flanks made it necessary
  yd Corps. G.H.Q. closes and C.-in-C. embarks         to withdraw.
  for England.                                            After an hour's discussion, we arrived at a
                                                       joint plan for the withdrawal of the main bodies
The decision to Withdraw.                              behind the line of the Lys. These arrangements
  43. By 6 p.m. that night (25th May) I was            were subject to there being no further deteriora-
convinced that the steps I had taken to secure         tion in the Belgian situation.
my left flank would prove insufficient to meet            With this decision, there vanished the last
the growing danger in the north.                       opportunity for a sortie. The layout of the
  The pattern of the enemy pincer attack was           B.E.F. was now beginning to take its final
becoming clearer. One movement from the                shape. Starting from what could be described
south-west on Dunkirk had already developed            as a normal situation with Allied troops on
and was being held; the counterpart was now            the right and left, there had developed an
developing on the Belgian front.                       ever lengthening defensive right flank. This
   The gap between the British left and the            had then become a semi-circular line, with
Belgian right, which had been threatening the          both flanks resting on the sea, manned by
whole day, might at any time become impossible         British, French ' and Belgians. Later the
to close : were this to happen, my last hope of        position became, a corridor in shape. The
reaching the coast would be gone. At this              southern end of this corridor was blocked by
tune, it will be recalled, I had no reserves beyond    the French ist Army; and each side was
a single cavalry regiment, and the two divisions       manned, for the greater part of its length, by
(5th and 5oth) already earmarked for the attack        British troops. Next to the sea were French
southwards.                                            troops on the west, and French and Belgian
   The French ist Army, which was not                  troops on the eastern flank.
affected in the same way as the B.E.F.^                   The immediate problem was to shorten this
by the situation which was developing on               perimeter. British and French forces were
the Belgian front, had, it will be remembered,         together holding a front of 128 miles of which
agreed to provide three divisions and the               97 miles were held by British troops, though


Details

5924         SUPPLEMENT TO .THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
    some sectors were held jointly with the French.      I replied that a plan for withdrawal north-
    The virtual closing of Dunkirk as a port of        westward had been agreed with the French
    entry was making the supply situation ever         tha't morning; I added that the news from the
    more difficult, and the ammunition situation       Belgian front was disquieting,' and concluded
    permitted only of very restricted expenditure.     by saying:—
                                                             . . . " I must not conceal from you that
  The Plan for Withdrawal.                               a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment
                                                         will'inevitably be lost even in best circum-
.   44. Later, on 26th May, I discussed the plan         stances."
 for withdrawal with the Corps Commanders, and
 issued orders for the operation in accordance            Later in the day, I had a further teiegram
 with the agreement reached with General               from the War Office which read as follows :—
 Blanchard that morning. The plan, as agreed                 " . . . Prime Minister had conversation
 with the French First Group of Armies, envisaged         M. Reynaud this afternoon. Latter fully
 the reservation of certain roads for the exclusive       explained to him the situation and resources
 use of the B.E.F. In fact, however, French               French Army. It is clear that it will not be
 troops and transport continued to use them, and          possible for French to deliver attack on the
 this added very considerably to the difficulties         south in sufficient strength to enable them to
 of the withdrawal of British troops. The roads           effect junction with Northern Armies. In
 were few and for the most part narrow, and for           these circumstances no course open to you
 the next three days they were badly congested            but to fall back upon coast. . . . M. Reynaud
 with marching troops and horsed transport of             communicating General Weygand and latter
 French formations, and with refugees.                    will no doubt issue orders in this sense
    On the night 26th/27th May, ist and 2nd               forthwith. You are now authorised to
 Corps, leaving rearguards in the frontier defences,      operate towards coast forthwith in con-
 were to swing back to the old divisional reserve         junction with French and Belgian Armies."
 position with their right at Fort Samghin
 (5 miles south-east of Lille), while the French        The Situation, of the Belgian Army.
prolonged this line from Thumeries to the canal
at Pont-a-Vendin, linking up there with 2nd                45. The situation on the Belgian front was
Division. The following night (27th/a8th May),          causing me ever increasing anxiety. At the
main bodies were to withdraw behind the Lys,            conference at Ypres on the evening of 2ist May,
leaving rearguards on the Deule canal up to its         His Majesty the King of the Belgians had agreed
junction with the Lys at Deulemont: these               that, if forced to abandon the positions on the
rearguards were to stay there until the next night      Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining
 (28th/29th May). The immediate effect of              touch with the left of the B.E.F. Now, however,
these dispositions would be to shorten the total        signs were not wanting that the Belgian Army
perimeter by some 58 miles, but on the other            were being forced to withdraw northwards and
hand I had to face the possibility of having to         away from the Yser canal. If so, the task of
occupy the front from Ypres to the sea, some            defending the whole line as far as the sea
25 miles long, which was still the responsibility       appeared likely to fall on ourselves and the
of the Belgian Army.                                    French, as actually did happen.
                                                           Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, who
    There remained the question of the future.          had been carrying out liaison duties with
I had not so far discussed with General                 H.M. the King of the Belgians since the opera-
Blanchard a further withdrawal to the sea.             tions began, came to G.H.Q. on the morning of
However, the possibility could not have been           26th May, and I e'xpressed to him my earnest
absent from his mind; nor was it absent from           hope that the Belgian Army would fall back
mine, for, although up to now no instructions          towards the Yser. Sir Roger Keyes took this
had been given authorising me to undertake             message back to the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
such an operation, I had, as I have said, foreseen     where he saw His Maj esty. Later he telegraphed
the possibility of such a move being forced            to me sajdng that the Belgians would do their
upon us.                                               best, but that His Majesty considered that the
   I returned from the conference at General           only method of avoiding immediate and com-
Blanchard's headquarters at about 10.30 a.m.           plete disaster was a strong and immediate
on 26th May to find a telegram from the                counter offensive between the Lys and the
Secretary of State which read:—                        Escaut. Such an operation was, however, quite
      . . . " I have had information all of            out of the question since, now that 5th and
   which goes to show that French offensive            5oth Divisions had been committed, my reserves
   from Somme cannot be made in sufficient             were again reduced to one weak cavalry
   strength to hold any prospect of functioning        regiment.
   with your Allies in the North. Should this             The indication that the Belgian Army would
   prove to be the case you will be faced with a       withdraw northwards and not to the Yser, was
   situation in which the safety of the B.E.F.         confirmed in a note, a copy of which I received,
   will predominate. In such conditions only           sent on 26th May by General Michiels, the
   course open to you may be to fight your way         Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, to
   back to West where all beaches and ports            General Neissens, head of the Belgian Mission
   east of Gravelines will be used for embarka-        with G.K.Q.
   tion. Navy will provide fleet of ships and             This note contained the following passage :—
   small boats and R.A.F. would give full support.           . . . ft To-day, 26th May the Belgian Army
   As withdrawal may have to begin very early             is being attacked with extreme violence on
   preliminary plans should be urgently prepared.         the front Menin-Nevele,* and since the
   . . . Prime Minister is seeing M. Reynaud           0 battle is now spreading to the whole of the
   to-morrow afternoon when whole situation               area of Eecloo, the lack of Belgian reserves
   will be clarified including attitude of French
   to the possible move. . . . "                       • * Eight miles west pf Ghent.


Details

return
**
SOT VSSINED
Lost at Unknown Dunkirk
.op
LSOT
*xoudds
DID
.op
IseasV
DYI
Name of Vessel
Cause and Position
Remarks.
and G.R.T.
Date
LARK
1/6
At Dunkirk.
Abandoned on
Sailing barge
beach.
pelto
G.R.T. 67
D.W.
140
2/6
Stranded on Bryr Brayne
Abandoned.
Tug. awold
Sands off Dunkirk.
Carrying 100
G.R.T. 105
troops. All
to
benobriada
Shink
taken off.
About
to
S.S.TRAIN FERRY
bandoned on beach at
LOST.
No.2.
12/6
Le Havre during
est .T.B.O
G.R.T.2678.
operations.
D.W.
MISSAI MAZOO
credition
S.S. BRUGES
About
Bombed off Le Havre.
SUNK. 781 .T.R.O
P.C.
Benands Due beriosed
DXL
G.R.T.2949
to
D.W
741
88 .T.R.O
Je nottanosve gnizub
11.0
.TEIRESIAS
17/6
Bombed off St. Nazaire
BELIEVED SUNK.
NOSTW Benyemous Honato
in 47. 7°N. 2°23'W 8\1
G.R.T.7405
ENTERSETAS
Intrant Ja
D.W. 9644
anovivous anthosez
Wosed
S.S. DIDO.
18/6
At Brest. Abandoned.
Blown up in.8.0
G.R.T.3554
Dry Dock.
.W.G
D.W. 5050
hedmen
MARL APARTAS
.MURMANSK.
19/6
Grounded at Brest.
Abandoned. 11188
Trawler.
G.R.T. 348
.T.R.O
D.W.
DOS
.W.O
S.LUFFWORTH.
Prev.
Abandoned at Brest.
SUNK.
Tramp.
21/6.
G.R.T. 279.
.T.H.O
D.W. 370
our
.W.G
S.S.LANCASTRIA.
17/6
Bombed. Position
SUNK.
P.C.
unknown.
G.R.T.16,243.
D.W. 13,226.
or
M.V. KUFRA.
23/6
Rammed by 'San Diego'
SUNK.
C.L.
in 44° 11' 2°W.
G.R.T. 4364
D.W. 2724
S.S. "MONA'S QUEEN" 29/5/40.
Sunk by enemy action
29 survived.
off Dunkirk.
26 lost.
S.S. "LADY ROSEBERY"
1/6
SUNK.
Aux. sailing barge
Abandoned at
G.R.T. 109
Dunkirk.
"DUCHESS".
1/6
During operations at
Spritsai 11. barge
do.
Dunkirk.
G.R.T. 55 Net.
S.S. "ELLAVORE"
At Havre. Bombed by
SUNK.
G.R.T. 1302,
10/6
aircraft.

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
the whole day, might at any time become impossible to close; were this to
happen, my last hope of reaching the coast would be gone".'
In order to secure the British northern flank Lord Gort decided to issue
orders for the occupation, as quickly as troops could be made available, of the
line of the Ypres - Comines canal and the positions covering Ypres. In the
absence of General Blanchard, who was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
Lord Gort communicated this decision that evening to the Headquarters of
the French First Group of Armies.¹
The necessity of evacuation was becoming a matter of paramount immediacy.
British destroyers bombard suburb of Calais
Meanwhile, on the 25th May, the trawler Lord Howe sailed to Calais with a
cargo of ammunition². She entered the port and discharged part of her cargo
in the face of heavy enemy fire from the dunes to the southward. In view of
the risk involved, Commodore W. P. Gandell, R.N. (P.S.T.O., French Ports),
who was on the quay, then ordered the Lord Howe to sail.
Outside Calais the destroyer Greyhound closed the Lord Howe, which was
carrying a request for bombardment support of the town. At the same time,
the Greyhound received a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover, ordering the
bombardment of the Calais suburb of St. Pierre. The Greyhound opened fire,
and at 2000, an H.A. battery east of Sangatte registered a hit on her, killing
2 and wounding 3. About this time the destroyer Grafton arrived and also
opened fire. The 2 destroyers returned to Dover as darkness set in.³
Evacuation of Calais countermanded
At 2130 a force of seven trawlers⁴, three yachts⁵ and two drifters⁶, sailed for
Calais road, ready to evacuate troops from Calais, the moment an order was
received to do so. Five of the trawlers towed motor boats. Commander
W. V. H. Harris, R.N. (Commander M/S, Dover), in the Grey Mist, was in
command. The destroyers Windsor and Verity left Dover at 2300, to cover
the withdrawal of this force.
On arrival off Calais, two of the motor boats were ordered into Calais harbour.
At about 0300/26, a signal was received that Calais was to be held at all costs;
furthermore, it was ordered that this signal was to be sent by hand to the
Brigadier commanding on shore. The Conidaw went in to deliver the signal.
All ships were then ordered back to the Downs, but the Botanic and Maretta
remained behind until the two motor boats and the Conidaw returned.⁷
The Botanic and Maretta were damaged by gunfire when returning on the
26th May, and were unable to take part in Operation "Dynamo".
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 43.
2 Lieut. L. C. Whittle, R.N.R., in the Lord Howe, says it was the 24th May.
3 Vice-Admiral, Dover's 1907/25/5.
4 The Botanic, Fyldea, Maretta, Arley, Polly Johnson, Brock and Calvi.
6 The Grey Mist, Conidaw and Chico.
5 The Playmates and Willing Boys.
7 Report by Commander M/S, Dover (R.O. II, p. 497).
13

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675

Details

POLLY THOMAS
008ADO
canad
MINISTRY Hotel OF SHIPPING, HOTEL,
Name of Vessel
363
and G.R.T.
8A
Date
Sailing barge
1/6
Cause and Position
20A
LARK
G.R.T. 67
At Dunkirk.
D.W. 140
M.0346/41.
List C.
1
T56le
FOSSA
Tug.
2/6
1. Ships proper lost during
H"March, 1941.
G.R.T. 105
Stranded
Dunkirk Operations.
Sands off on Dunkirk. Bryr Brayne
ed
House,
N.
S.S.TRAIN No.2. FERRY
Name.
Date lost.
About
d,
D.W. G.R.T.2678.
12/6
bandoned on at
1st June, 1940.
your letter of
ship
M.S. BASILISK
ough
S.S. P.C. BRUGES
M.S. GRAFTON
29th May, 1940.
rding herewith
ops
About
30th May, 1940.
oncerning the loss
ing
intity was a
G.R.T.2949
11/6
,M.S. GRENADE
D.W. 741
Bombed off Le Havre.
1st June, 1940.
d by you.
.M.S. HAVANT
buoy
a
S.TEIRESIAS
S
0 have been
1st June, 1940.
in
G.R.T.7405
17/6
.M.S. KEITH
PS as
ou will probably
D.W. 9644
.M.S. WAKEFUL
29th May, 1940.
roops,
tish
S.S. DIDO.
in Bombed 47.7°N. off St.Nazaire
20.
on is obtained
I.M.S. SKIPJACK
1st June, 1940.
3,733.
G.W.T.3550
ot always readily
673
18/6
H.M.S. MOSQUITO
1st June, 1940.
ers
TrawlerMANSK.
At Brest. Abandoned.
(approx)
D.W. G.R.T. 348
19/6
Blow
ncerely,
When
Dry &
Grounded at Brest.
nd about
MAhcak
oard
S.S.LUPPWORTH.
g picked
Aband
G.R.T. 279.
Prev,
D.W. 370
21/6.
isting
Abandoned at Brest.
een
S.S.LANCASTRIA.
evacuees)
G.R.T.16,243.
17/6
SUNK,
13,226.
/2/1941
Bombed. unknown. Position
Lue Coat School,
Is
M.V. KUFRA.
Church Road,
SUNK.
Wavertree,
G.R.T. 4364
23/6
LIVERPOOL, 15.
bombs
D.W. 2724
mes early
"MONA'S QUEEN' 29/5/40.
in Rammed 44° 11' by 'San 2°W. Diego'
bombs and
SUNK.
sequently
at there
DIFERRION.
sunk by H.M.S. JANUS.
10
10
1/6
off Sunk bunkirk. action
were any troops on board.
"DUCHESS"
29 survive
MAID OF KENT. Lost on 1/6/40 as the result of bombing available attacks and
G.R.T. 55 Net.
Spritsail barge
26 lost.
during no information as to any military personnel on
Dunkirk operations. No details board.
1/6
SUNK.
S.S. "ELLAVORE"
During at
Abandoned
MONA'S QUEEN. Personnel Vessel sunk by mine whilst off Dunkirk.
G.R.T. 1302.
Dunkirk
No other details available.
10/6
H.M.S. FIELDS. Received direct hit Impossible from enemy to aircraft ascertai
GRACIE while carrying 700-800 troops.
At Havre. aircraft, by
do.
number of troops killed.
SUNK.

Details

House,
Name of Vessel
and G.R.T.
Date
Cause and Position
Remarks
N.
LARK
1/6
At Dunkirk.
Abandoned on beach. ugh
Sailing barge
G.R.T. 67
tity
D.W.
140
as a
EOSSA
2/6
Stranded on Bryr Brayne
Abandoned. Carrying
Tug.
Sands off Dunkirk.
100 troops. All
G.R.T.105
taken off.
in
B as
S.S. TRAIN FERRY
About 12/6
Abandoned on beach at
LOST.
ish
NO.2.
Le Havre during
G.R.T.2678.
operations.
D.W. -
S.S. BRUGES
About 11/6
Bombed off Le Havre.
SUNK.
P.C.
G.R.T.2949
D.W. 741
S.S. TEIRESIAS
17/6
Bombed off St.Nazaire
BELIEVED SUNK.
C.L.
in 47.7°N. 2° 23'W.
G.R.T.7405
D.W. 9644
S.S. DIDO
18/6
At Brest.Abandoned.
Blown up in
G.R.T.3554
Dry Dock.
D.W. 5050
S.T.MURMANSK.
19/6
Grounded at Brest.
Abandoned.
Trawler.
G.R.T. 348.
D.W.
S.S.LUFFWORTH.
Prev.21/6.
Abandoned at Brest.
SUNK.
Tramp.
G.R.T. 279.
D.W. 370.
S.S.LANCASTRIA.
17/6
Bombed. Position
SUNK.
P.C.
unknown.
G.R.T.16,243.
D.W. 13,226.
M.V. KUFRA.
23/6
Rammed by 'San Diego'
SUNK.
C.L.
in 44° 11'M2°W.
G.R.T. 4364.
D.W. 2724.
S.S. "MONA'S QUEEN".
29/5/40
Sunk by enemy action
29 survived.
off Dunkirk.
26 lost.
S.S. "LADY ROSEBERY"
1/6
SUNK+
Aux. sailing barge
Abandoned at Dunkirk.
G.R.T. 109.
"DUCHESS".
1/6
During operations at
Spritsail barge
do.
Dunkirk.
G.R.T. 55 Net.
S.S. "ELLAVORE".
10/6
At Havre. Bombed by
SUNK.
G.R.T.1302.
aircraft.
-4-

Details

COPY.
REPORT ON LOSS OF H.M.T. "ABUKIR"
May 24th for the Downs for orders, arriving there in the
We cleared from Southampton on the afternoon of
morning of May 25th where we received orders to proceed to
Ostend, to land supplies for the B.E.F., arriving off that
port about 20.00 of the same day.
The town was then in flames and the majority of the
buildings on the sea front were in ruins, the quays and signal
stations being absolutely deserted. The pilot boarded me
when I was almost in my berth and informed me that apart from
a few French Naval Officers there was no-one of any authority
in the port.
I interviewed these Officers who apparently had no
knowledge of my ship, but suggested that I should start dis-
charging at day-break.
On the way back to the ship I met a British Army
lorry driver who told me that a Lieut Harris with 38 British
troops who were adrift from their units were standing by at a
farm about five miles outside the town. We went out and
brought them in but on our arrival back at the ship we were
bombed SO intensely - the quay being the target - that I
decided to abandon the ship until daylight. At 02.00 on May
26th I managed to get into telephone communication with the
British Mission at Bruges, who instructed me to commence dis-
charging, which I did with the assistance of the troops and the
ship's crew. We were bombed off and on throughout the day.
Later on the British Mission informed me that a British bomber
had made a forced landing at Ostend and would I try to make
contact with her crew. Lieut. Harris and myself located these
men at the Stane Aerodrome. After firing the machine, the two
officers and two men who formed her crew joined my ship later
on in the afternoon, bringing with them the machine guns and
instruments of the destroyed bomber. On the way back from the
Aerodrome we picked up another 25 British troops who had also
been separated from their units, also two wounded R.A.F. men.
At 20.00 on the 26th May the bombing became so intense
that once again we abandoned the ship until day-break, resuming
work with the assistance of Dutch Army deserters. Throughout
the day German aircraft were continually bombing us and at 15.
they started dive bombing and machine gunning us so heavily tb
once again I decided to abandon the ship, having had two
casualties, one being an R.A.F. gunner shot in the arm and a
Belgian civilian shot in the left eye. Getting through to
Bruges again they instructed me to cease discharging and to
what Army vehicles I could, the rest to be destroyed, also t.
British Mission had decided to evacuate by my ship that night
I suggested sailing after dark at 22.00 to which the
agreed. The Mission boarded me and at the stated time I cut
my lines and sailed with approximately 220 people on board in-
cluding crew, soldiers and Belgian refugees. I was followed
out of the port by the British S.S. "MARQUIS". On clearing the
entrance enemy aircraft flew over dopping Verey lights and
bombs. A call for assistance was sent out as Mr. Newman of
the British Mission had previously informed me that an escort
consisting of two destroyers would be waiting for me off the
port. This attack lasted for half an hour when the aircraft
returned to Ostend.