Also known as
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Amiens
ORDE: 1 ·
SCSL: 0 ·
Lloyd’s: 0 ·
Red List: 1
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ORDE Registry
1 record1 potential matching record has been identified.
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Small Craft Service List
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Red List (1939–40) — OCR
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Ship Details
These details have been aggregated from multiple sources and may include contemporary records, later recollections, claims or assertions for which no corroborating evidence has been identified. Inclusion does not establish that any account or assertion is accurate. The information may be incomplete, out of date, disputed or incorrect and should be checked against the underlying source records and independent evidence before being relied upon.
- Ship type: D
Lloyd’s Yacht Register (1939)
Source: Lloyd’s Register Foundation, Heritage & Education Centre, Lloyd’s Register of Yachts 1939, digitised via Internet Archive. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Images have been converted, resized and watermarked for web display; machine-generated table OCR has been added.
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Document Collections — Tagged Pages
32 pagesImaged document collections containing pages whose OCR text or table data has been tagged with the name Amiens. Open a collection to view the page images and transcriptions.
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AMETHYST A/S Trawler (?) 01000 30th May On patrol, 9.2.5.60 (see Appx. J, 1st June 2300 Sailed signal from J.16a and J.20). 2nd June 2nd June On the patrol line with the tr. Spurs 1035 and another trawler (see Appx. J, signals J.40 and 41) when they from university Di came under fire from shore guns. 1700 Salled. Ust for 11. Goodwin and route X as for se Dunkirk west channel. 3rd June 0010 Observed the first of the returning transports, end escorted her. 0150 Opened fire on a plane. 0250 Opened fire on a plane. 0430 Pound 8 wooden M/S from Dunkirk with 100 Prench troops on board. This ship, demaged in collision, had lost her any, her crew being overshelmed and unable to pull themselves together. The Amlena put a petty officer and three men on board, and they brought the vessel to Dover. 0900 Anchored off Dover. 2000 Sailed with the name orders as before. yog very thick; compelled to return and anchor off the N. Goodein. 4th June 0450 Bailed, to essort the transports from Dunkirk which bed anchored in the vicinity of the Amiens. 1850 Ordered to proceed under orders of the dr. Spervier, and in company with the Bl. Amiral Houches, to find and take in LOW the French motor boat V.T.B.26. 2100 Under orders of the Knervier. Arrenged to sail in search of the V.T.B. as about dawn [0400]. During the night, was informed that V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton. 5th June 0600 Sent the Mouchet to Ramegate, and proceeded to Largate. N11 Authority - French Admiralty record, Polio No.22. (1) Not mentioned in D.R.'s list of ships. 46
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AMIENS French sloop (Aviso) Capitaine de corvette Monick. 1st June 2300 Sailed from Cherbourg. 2nd June 1035 Anchored off Dover. Received orders to protect transports returning from Dunkirk. 1700 Sailed. Set course for N. Goodwin and route X as far as Dunkirk west channel. 3rd June 0010 Observed the first of the returning transports, and escorted her. 0150 Opened fire on a plane. 0250 Opened fire on a plane. 0430 Found a wooden M/S from Dunkirk with 100 French troops on board. This ship, damaged in collision, had lost her way, her crew being overwhelmed and unable to pull themselves together. The Amiens put a petty officer and three men on board, and they brought the vessel to Dover. 0900 Anchored off Dover. 2000 Sailed with the same orders as before. Fog very thick; compelled to return and anchor off the N. Goodwin. 4th June 0450 Sailed, to escort the transports from Dunkirk which had anchored in the vicinity of the Amiens. 1850 Ordered to proceed under orders of the dr. Epervier, and in company with the sl. Amiral Mouchez, to find and take in tow the French motor boat V.T.B.26. 2100 Under orders of the Epervier. Arranged to sail in search of the V.T.B. at about dawn [0400]. During the night, was informed that V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton. 5th June 0600 Sent the Mouchet to Ramsgate, and proceeded to Margate. Nil Authority - French Admiralty record, Folio No.22. 47
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V.T.B.25 V.T.B.26 French fast M/B's (Vedettes) 3rd June 1500 Rear sloop Admiral Landriau (on board ordered Savorgnan de Brazza at Dover) the these two new French Cherbourg, to proceed to Dunkirk and vedettes, which had just arrived from 2200 report to Admiral Abrial. The two vedettes arrived at Dunkirk and 2300 Admiral Abrial sailed for Dover in secured alongside the Chasseur 11. V.T.B.25. En route, this vessel struck a wreck and damaged a propeller but speed. was able to proceed at slow 4th June 0400ca Near the North Goodwin, the V.T.B.25 assisted in picking up survivors from the Belgian trawler Marechal Foch. The dr. Malcolm, which was also there, embarked Admiral Abrial, and took V.T.B.25 in tow to Dover. The V.T.B.26 with a damaged engine, finished by securing to a buoy in the mouth of the Thames. (1) No. of passengers, if any, not known. Authority - French Admiralty record, Folio No.9. (1) The Amiens was ordered to search for the V.T.B.26 and states that during the night of 4th/5th June, she was informed that the V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton. 88 290
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Source: The National Archives, Kew, RED LIST INDEX 1939 40. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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30 ORKNEYS AND SHETLANDS COMMANDS-continued. 30A KIRKWALL. KIRKWALL Base Ship.-Pyramus, Armed (Trawlers.) Boarding Vessels. SUMMARY OF MINOR FRENCH VESSELS. Ship. Type. Crew. Proposed Service. Ship. Type. Crew. Proposed [34] D Aquamarine A- Service. 24th A/S Group (Trawlers). [34] D Kingston Beryl D At Portsmouth. At Plymouth-contd. Kirkwall. [34] D Kingston [34] Pentland Firth (S.O.) A D Jacinth D Chevxeuil A - Mine- British Auxiliary Patrol, Pedrant - - Trawler British sweeper Portsmouth. L/L Sweep. [34] Arctic Explorer AD Aberdeen. Gaston Riviere - [34] D Kingston Onyx Trawler British L/L Sweep. La Capricieuse A Mine- British Auxiliary Patrol, [34] Hugh Walpole A D Left Scapa 17 July. A sweeper Portsmouth. Andree et Louis - Trawler British [34] P Kingston Peridot L/L Sweep. - [34] Scalby Wyke A D Aberdeen. Patrol British D Auxiliary Patiol, Arras Pessac - - Boat Portsmouth. Auxiliary British Auxiliary Patrol, [34] P Kingston Portsmouth. [34] Tekoura A D - Aberdeen. Sapphire D - - Patrol British Epinal Auxiliary Patrol, [34] P Kingston Topaz Boat Portsmouth. Sauterne - - Auxiliary British Auxiliary Patrol, Portsmouth. D [34] P Kingston Diligente - Patrol British Auxiliary Patrol, Boat Portsmouth. Turquoise D Lucien Gougy - Auxiliary - Conversion Under Pink.C.NorthernPat W.L/L. See Amiens - Patrol British Auxiliary Patrol, M/S Trawler (Ungrouped). [34] D Northern Chief D Boat Portsmouth. Groeland - Auxiliary British Auxiliary Patrol, [34] Lune X D - Aberdeen. Repairs. Date Lucienne Jean - Trawler French M/S Nore. W.A. uncertain. [34] D Northern Duke (L/L) AD Trawler French M/S Nore. Poulmic - Auxiliary 1 [34] D Northern Foam D Congre - - 1 Mine Watching, (L/L) Plymouth. Beaulne-Verneuil Boom No Asie A - - Trawler British A/S trials, [34] D Northern Gift D Portsmouth. Vessel decision La Frene 1 - Tug Contraband Control Service. [34] D Northern Isles A D Reine des Flots A Trawler British A/S trials, Portsmouth. Peuplier - - Tug (Vessels of C.C. are being considered for reallocation to other services.) [34] P Northern Quentin Roosevelt Trawler French Auxiliary Patrol, No Princess A Portsmouth. Caporal Peugeot Tug decision [34] P Northern Reward Pierre Audre - Trawler British Auxiliary Patrol, No. 4 1 - Tug Portsmouth. [34] P Northern Sky A D No. 5 - Tug La Nantaise A - Trawler British 27 A/S Group. C.C.S. Drifters. [34] P Northern Sun A D Phase - Marie Elena - Drifter British L/L Sweep. At Falmouth. Kirkwall Rose Valley Port Duties. - Lydd II D - - Kirkwall. Commandant Mine- French Nore. At Plymouth. Domine sweeper La Moqueuse - Mine- French Nore. Rescue Tug. Commandant Mine- French Nore. sweeper Duboc Conquerante Patrol British Falmouth. sweeper - Auxiliary Patrol, St. Mellons D - Examination Vessels. Coucy Patrol - No decision. Boat W.A. - mood Boat Belle o' Moray Belfort Patrol - No decision. Jaques Morgan - Trawler British Auxiliary Patrol, - - W.A. - Boat Beryl II - - LERWICK. Pomerol - - Patrol Polish Tyne. Nadine - Trawler British L/L Sweep. Boat Rambler Rose Kirkwall. Drifter. Medoc - - Patrol Polish Tyne. Autioche Trawler British L/L Sweep, - [33] Seabreeze Boat Strenuous Listrac A - Trawler British A/S trials, Dutch - (Flag F.O.I.C Lerwick. Jean Frederick Trawler Holyhead, Plymouth. Lemnos Shetland) L'Atlantique A Trawler British A/S trials, Notre Dame Trawler Dutch Holyhead, - Aberdeen. - - Repairs. uncertain. Date Examination Service. Plymouth. De france Jeanne Antoine Trawler No Fear Not Ambrose Pase A Trawler British A/S trials, decision - Lerwick. Plymouth. La Belle Poule - Schooner No decision Heather Belle - Aiglon - Trawler British L/L Sweep. - L'Etoile - Schooner No decision [34] St. Sunniva Accommodation Ship. Roche Velen - Trawler British L/L Sweep. President T. Survey French Nore. Aberdeen. Tissier Ship SULLOM VOE. Louis et Marie Trawler British L/L Sweep. Notre Dame f Drifter de Lourdes No Base Ship-Fox. Nazareth - Trawler British L/I. Sweep. decision Armed Boarding Vessel. Harbour Defence Patrol Craft. Cambre - Drifter Monique Audrer Trawler British L/L Sweep. [34] P Discovery II Under See Pink V.A.C. List. Northern Patrol. [23] Aliped VF - Sullom Voe. [23] Learig F - - (C38488)
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
4. On landing the fighting troops were passed The towns of Le Mans and- Laval were
rapidly through transit camps and their vehicles fifty miles apart, and the base ports were on an
were cleared at once to Vehicle Marshalling average one hundred and fifty miles from the
Parks, whence they were despatched in convoys, assembly area. Helpful though the French
while troops left by rail on the same day as authorities were, the unfamiliar conditions made
they landed. telephone communication difficult, apart from
Since the troops and their vehicles were the danger of breach of security which it entailed.
landed at different ports they had to be collected Since many despatch riders spoke no French it
in an assembly area which had been chosen was often found that control could only be
in the vicinity of Le Mans and Laval. The properly maintained by personal visits; Com-
assembling of troops by rail and vehicles by manders and their staffs were therefore forced
road took about six days. The resource of to spend many hours on the road.
individual drivers was tested by changes of The dispersion dictated by the possibility of
programme, inevitable in an operation of this aerial bombardment greatly increases demands
kind, by the damage which some vehicles had upon signal communications and transport and
sustained during the sea passage and by thus lengthens the time which must elapse
mechanical failures. Drivers and vehicles were between the issue of orders and their execution.
on the road for long periods, but their duty was
lightened by the hospitality of the French The Move to the Belgian Frontier.
inhabitants, which all ranks will recall with 9. On 22nd September, I left Le Mans for
gratitude. Amiens. Arriving at Mantes-sur-Saine, I was
5. On i3th September I moved my head- handed a telegram from General Georges, Com-
quarters from the War Office to Camberley, mander of the French Front of the North-East,
where General Headquarters was forming. On which read as follows :—
the following day, accompanied by Lieutenant- " Pour General Commandant, B.E.F.
General (now General) Sir John Dill, Commander " Limite envisaged prevoit front de B.E.F.
of ist Corps, and by my personal staff, I droite a MAULDE gauche a MENIN ou
embarked in H.M.S. " Skate," and, landing at gauche a AUTRYCHE - SUR - ESCAUT.
Cherbourg, left by motor car for the Chateau de Ge"n6ral GEORGES d6sirerait avoir accord
la Blanchardiere, Le Mans, which the French 22 Septembre."
Government had kindly placed at my disposal. In the meantime, however, General Gamelin
6. On 2ist September the concentration of had proceeded to London to discuss with His
the General Headquarters Staff and of the Majesty's Government the frontage which was to
essential Lines of Communication units was be held by the British Expeditionary Force.
complete. The next day the advanced elements After I had made a reconnaissance on 24th
of ist Corps and of General Headquarters Troops and 25th September of the sector which it was
arrived, the former moving to an area around proposed to allot to the British Expeditionary
Laval and the latter to an area around Le Force I visited General Georges at Grand
Mans. Units were given a minimum of one Quartier General on 26th September, in the
week in which to assemble and reorganise and company of my Chief of the General Staff,
although some of the units of ist Corps were still Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall. I then
incomplete, the limited accommodation available agreed to accept the sector offered by General
in the assembly area made it essential to begin Georges to the British Expeditionary Force.
the move forward before 26th September when This sector was from Maulde exclusive to
the leading units of 2nd Corps were due to arrive. Halluin inclusive, and thence a defensive flank
7. During these early weeks the maintenance along river Lys/Armentieres. General Georges
of the Force presented a problem which called placed 5ist French Division (Ge'ne'ral de
for the greatest resource and initiative on the Brigade Gillard) under my command, and I
part of my Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant- decided to employ it in my left sector, covering
General W. G. Lindsell, his Staff and Services. the towns of Roubaix and Tourcoing.
In the units of the Royal Army Service Corps
were many officers and men fresh from civil 10. It had been originally intended that
life who were constantly called upon to surmount formations, as soon as they had completed their
unforeseen difficulties. By their unflagging reorganisation in the assembly area, should
energy and the assistance of the French authori- move to a concentration area in the North of
ties the Force was maintained without any France, and remain there in readiness to occupy
failure of supplies. It should be added that with the line not earlier than 5th October. General
the exception of eleven regular officers, the Georges decided, however, that it was inadvisable
personnel of the Movement Control organisation to await the arrival of the whole British Expe-
was built up from Supplementary Reserve ditionary Force in 'the concentration area and
officers and men. expressed a wish that ist Corps should move
without delay into the sector north of Maulde.
The administrative staff were obliged to deal I accordingly informed General Georges that
with the day-to-day work of landing troops, ist Corps would take over its sector on 3rd October
their vehicles and current supplies, and to and that 2nd Corps would be able to^o into the
undertake the equally important task of building line about I2th October.
up reserves of ammunition, supplies, and
ordnance stores. Covered accommodation was ist Corps began the two hundred and fifty-mile
difficult to obtain and temporary dumps of non- move from the assembly area on 26th September.
perishable stores had to be established wherever Tanks, tracked vehicles, and slow moving
the necessary space could be found in the vicinity artillery proceeded by train and the remainder
of the ports of entry. of the force advanced on three parallel routes.
8. In these early days the Staff met for the Three days were allotted for the move of each
first time the problem arising from the wide formation. Two staging areas were arranged on
dispersion imposed by the necessity to guard each road, south of the rivers Seine and
against air at.ta.gk, Somme respectively, and anti-aircraft defence
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 ^5901
was provided at these river crossings. The certain French technical troops continued to
weather was fine throughout the whole period of work in the sector under the command of the
the move. French Commander of the Defensive Sector
The first stage was one hundred and of Lille, Colonel (now General de Brigade)
twenty miles. An average of five hundred Bertschi.
vehicles moved daily over each stage of the route, While defences continued to develop on the
maintaining a distance of one hundred yards lines of the original plan, based on the close
between each vehicle as a precaution against defence of the frontier, it was also necessary to
air attack. A halt of one day for maintenance organise the position.
purposes was made after the first day's move. The priority of work envisaged the eventual
In the initial stages of the move, the Provost construction of three positions in the forward
service were responsible for the regulation of area, and a Corps reserve position was sited
traffic, but on entering the French Zone des across the base of the Lille salient formed by
Armees, columns came under the direction of the frontier. Further in rear, a second position
the French road control (Regulatrice Routiere) had been sited, following the line of the Haute
organisation, which gave valuable help in Deule, Sense"e and La Basse"e canals.
marking detours and in directing traffic through The whole scheme involved the immediate
towns. A French-speaking British officer was construction of field defences and the duplica-
established in Amiens to ensure liaison between tion of the anti-tank obstacle in the forward
my headquarters and the French authorities. zone.
Breakdowns and accidents were few, which It was consequently necessary to construct
reflects great credit on the drivers, who were at an early stage reinforced concrete " pill-
unaccustomed to long hours at the wheel and boxes " to afford protection to those weapons
to driving on the right-hand side of the road. which formed the backbone of the fire defence
Among the many important lessons which were throughout the whole depth of the position.
learnt during the largest road movement ever In order to save time standard designs were
undertaken with motor transport by any British prepared to accommodate both British and
Army were the need for early reconnaissance of French weapons.
staging areas, for control at the dispersal points,
and for allowance for unforeseen delays. 13. Work on these " pill-boxes " was begun by
the Royal Engineers, assisted by other arms.
11. The move forward continued without Early in November a specially constituted force
incident or interruption, and on the agreed date, composed of twelve field companies of the
3rd October, ist Corps took over from the Royal Engineers drawn from Territorial Army.
French the sector Maulde-Gruson on the Belgian Divisions at home, and known as " X Force,"
frontier. This sector lay between that of the arrived in the British Expeditionary Force
ist French Army and of the i6th French Corps, area. This force had its own transport and
with 2nd Division (Major-General H. C. Loyd) special plant for the construction of reinforced
on the right and ist Division (Major-General concrete " pill-boxes" by mass production
Hon. H. R. L. G. Alexander) on the left. methods. It was accompanied by companies of
General Headquarters opened in and around the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps.
Habarcq (8 miles west of Arras) on 2nd A special Excavator Company, equipped with
October. mechanical excavators of various types, arrived
On I2th October, 3rd Division of 2nd Corps at the same time as X Force. It has been
(Major-General B. L. Montgomery) moved employed in digging anti-tank ditches, burying
into the line between Bouvines and Lannoy, signal cables, constructing breastworks, and
relieving the left brigade of ist Corps and the other tasks.
right regiment of the French 5ist Division. A creation of such a defensive system
4th Division of the same Corps (Major-General demanded a quantity and variety of engineer
D. G. Johnson, V.C.) was located in General stores far exceeding pre-war anticipations.
Headquarters reserve. Bad weather in October and November, and
The initial occupation of the line by the British a succession of frosts later, considerably delayed
Expeditionary Force was thus completed arid the work, but by the end of the period covered
the organisation of the position was undertaken by this despatch the position had been developed
at once. in considerable depth. A large number of con-
crete " pill-boxes" had been completed and
The Organisation of the British Positions. many others were under construction ; new wire
12. In allotting sectors the geographical fea- had been erected and existing wire strengthened,
tures of the pronounced salient occupied by the buildings had been reinforced, and many miles
British Expeditionary Force had to be con- of anti-tank ditch dug.
sidered. East of the Tournai-Orchies road
the country is flat, much wooded and inter- The Saar Detachment.
sected by small streams. Further to the north 14. In November, 1939, I arranged with
lies open and undulating agricultural land which General Georges that a British infantry brigade
lends itself to artillery observation and to the should take its place in the line on the Saar
movement of armoured fighting vehicles. front, under the command of a French Division.
Further north again the sector is for the most The brigade took over the sector from the
part on the fringe of a highly industrial and French 42nd Division on the 4th December
mining district. without enemy interference and during the
When ist Corps arrived in the sector assigned period under review conditions were quiet.
to the British Expeditionary Force in the first Since that date infantry brigades of the
week in October, an almost continuous anti- British Expeditionary Force have successively
tank obstacle already existed in the form of a completed short tours of duty in this sector, and
ditch covered by concrete blockhouses built to junior leaders have thus had valuable training
mount anti-tank guns and machine guns. In in their day to day duties when in contact with
accordance with plans prepared in peace time the enemy.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5907
28th March; 44th Division, on disembarkation, The sub-machine gun was taken into experi-
moved into 3rd Corps reserve in the St. Pol area, mental use by patrols in the Saar front: its
and 50th Division into 2nd Corps reserve, south- value had already been recognised and I trust
west of Lille ; 42nd Division, on arrival, moved that a weapon of this type will be permanently
to the area south-west of Amiens, in G.H.Q. included in the armament of the infantry.
reserve.
Preparation for Further Expansion.
5. The German invasion of Denmark and 7. In the meantime I had been preparing for
Norway on gth April created a new situation; the arrival of further troops, and, in particular,
leave was stopped in the British and French for the formation of Army Headquarters which
Armies on loth April, and i5th Infantry Brigade were due to arrive in the latter part of June.
of 5th Division was despatched to England, On the assumption that the positions held by
en route for Norway, on I5th April; certain the B.E.F. were to remain the same, a lay-out
units of 42nd Division were also retained at had been prepared involving a move of G.H.Q.
home, but with a few exceptions despatched The construction of the new G.H.Q. and of
later. The remainder of 5th Division was left the two Army headquarters.was put in hand;
in France, but in War Office reserve, and was this involved the laying of about 150 route
accordingly relieved in 3rd Corps by 42nd miles of heavy armoured cable. Negotiations
Division. Reports of enemy intentions to invade were in progress regarding the extension of the
Holland and Belgium were received from front of the B.E.F. on arrival of a fourth Corps,
different sources and at different times, and the French being anxious that this should
between the nth and 22nd April certain troops be southwards rather than northwards.
were placed under short notice to move. Intensi-
fied air reconnaissance .was ordered in the zone Development of the Defensive Positions..
allotted to the Air Component which included 8. The development of the successive defen-
part of the Ruhr and the area to the west of it, sive positions and switch lines behind the
but apart from small bridging activity no Belgian frontier was continued steadily till
positive results were observed. loth May. By this date over 400 concrete
o
" pill-boxes " of varying size had been com-
The Soar Front. pleted with over ibo more under construction,
6. During this period the detachment of one while work on the improvement of field defences,
infantry brigade on the Saar front was main- wire and other obstacles proceeded continuously
tained ; at the outset the severe cold interfered on the original front and in the sector north of
considerably with the work of improving the Armentieres recently taken over from the
defences in the forward area. Much required to French.
be done, as regards increased protection, pro- Chiefly by the use of excavator machinery
vision of alternative fire positions, covered over 40 miles of revetted anti-tank ditch had
approaches and improved communications ; the been added to that prepared by the French
wire required thickening and its tactical lay-out army in time of peace. Machines had also been
improving; the thaw, when it set in, was rapid used to assist the troops in constructing earth-
and energetic steps had to be taken to maintain work defences, mixing concrete and burying
a proper standard of sanitation. signal cables.
The tour of duty of each infantry brigade was Training.
raised in March to three weeks, and a pioneer
battalion was included in the detachment. 9. Training areas were being prepared to
accommodate the Armoured Division and other
At the end of March it was decided to increase formations; base reinforcement depdts were
the Saar force to a total of one division, with rapidly taking shape in their new locations near
attached troops, including cavalry, machine Rouen, and their training staffs had assembled.
guns, and pioneers. 5ist Division was selected. Corps schools had been established, principally
The Division had concentrated in the Metz area for the training of junior leaders, and a sniping
by 30th April and by 7th May had relieved school had been set up. Practice camps, both
7th French Division, thus extending the for field and anti-aircraft artillery had been
British front on the Saar on either side of the developed with the help of the French and steps
front originally held to a total of 12,000 yards taken to continue the weapon training of
from Guerstling exclusive to Remeling inclusive. selected units.
5ist Division remained in the Saar area and The practice undertaken with anti-tank
took no part in the operations in Northern weapons, to which special attention was given,
France. From loth May therefore, it ceased was amply to prove its value when the time came.
to be under my effective command; the Saar
Force was later moved to the Rouen area, The Equipment Situation.
where it took part in subsequent operations. 10. The situation as regards equipment,
Patrolling, both by our own troops and by though there was latterly some improvement in
the enemy, grew steadily more active during certain directions, caused me serious misgivings,
this period; early on the morning of the 5th even before men and material began to be
March, the enemy carried out a successful raid, diverted by the needs of operations elsewhere.
supported with a box barrage of a type familiar I had on several occasions called the attention
in the war of 1914-18, on one of our front line of the War Office to the shortage of almost every
positions in a wood known as the Hartebusch, nature of ammunition of which the stocks in
then held by a battalion of the 4th Division France were not nearly large enough to permit
(2nd D.C.L.I.). In this and subsequent of the rates of expenditure laid down for sus-
encounters the enemy regularly suffered casual- tained operations before the War.
ties, many of them at the hands of battalions There was a shortage of guns in some of the
of the I44th Infantry Brigade of the 48th anti-tank regiments of the Royal Artillery,
Division, the first Territorial Army formation while armour-piercing shells for field guns had
to meet the enemy in.this campaign. not, by loth May, been provided.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
declared an open town and that British troop Air Force to impede the enemy advance; but
movements would prejudice its safety, but no such opportunities were of a fleeting character,
adequate alternative routes to the Dyle were since the enemy established strong anti-aircraft
available and I was therefore compelled to defences soon after his arrival, particularly in
adhere to the original plan of using the outskirts towns at which roads converged. Tactical
of the city. reconnaissance became virtually impossible
The 3rd Division, on arrival, reported that a without fighter support, and the demands made
Belgian division was holding the bridgehead at on the fighter group of the Air Component were
Louvain, although I had assumed that this extremely heavy. They had been met with
should be a British responsibility. 2nd Corps unfailing skill and courage, and with marked
therefore took up a narrow front on their right success, but by now the group was reduced to
with a strong reserve in rear of Louvain. some 50 aircraft, and although I had asked for
5th Division, which was training in the area four fresh squadrons from home, only one had
south-west of Amiens, was ordered to proceed arrived. In three days' operations, the British
by march route so as to shorten the move by Air Force in France had firm reports of the
motor transport in a later phase, and later destruction of 101 enemy aircraft, mostly
occupied a position on the Senne. fighters, against a loss of 78 of our own.
The news from the Belgian army, of which That afternoon a conference was held at the
King Leopold had assumed command on the Chateau Casteau, near Mons which was attended
outbreak of war, was not good. Belgian cyclist by the King of the Belgians, General Van
troops from east of the Meuse were falling back Overstraeten, M. Daladier, Generals Georges
on Huy. At Maastricht, it was reported that and Billotte, and my Chief of the General Staff
they had been forestalled by enemy action from (Lieutenant-General H. R. Pownall), as my
the rear and had been unable to demolish representative in my absence. The primary
important bridges over the : Albert Canal and object of the conference was to achieve
the Meuse across which the enemy had some measure of co-ordination in the
begun to move. Air bombing was requested Belgian theatre of war. General Billotte's
and was extremely effective, but could not command included the French ist and
altogether deny the passage of the water 7th Armies, between which lay the Belgian
obstacles to the enemy. On my right the Army under the independent command
French Cavalry Corps had reached their of their King, and the B.fe.F. which, though
position on the line Huy—Hannut—Tirlemont under the command of General Georges, was not
and reconnoitred the Belgian anti-tank obstacle. under that of General Billotte. Whatever the
They reported that, as I had supposed, there nature of the operations, a common doctrine
was no effective obstacle on the Gembloux line was clearly necessary and when General Georges
and that the obstacle on the Perwez line was enquired if the King of the Belgians and I
not only unfinished but badly sited on a forward would be prepared to accept co-ordination by
slope. I thereupon conveyed to General Georges General Billotte as bis representative, General
a confirmation of my objections to pushing Pownall said he was sure that I would agree.
forward so as to make use of the obstacle in its The King of the Belgians likewise agreed.
unfinished state, notwithstanding the Belgians' . 21. On I3th May I moved my Command Post
anxiety that I should do so. Later that day I forward to Renaix; no event of major impor-
was informed that he had decided that the main tance occurred during the day, but some small
line of resistance was to be on the Gembloux infantry attacks developed on the British sector.
line as planned, but that the French were to These were easily held. Movements of the main
push out advanced troops to the line of the bodies of the French ist and 7th Annies con-
obstacle. He expressed the hope that the B.E.F. tinued in accordance with their plans, and units
would conform, and ist and 2nd Corps of the latter were by now north of Antwerp on
accordingly reconnoitred the anti-tank the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming
obstacles reported to exist round the forest of increasingly evident that they would be unable
Meerdael with a view to pushing forward to prevent the enemy occupation of Walcheren
detachments with anti-tank guns. They found and Zuid Beveland which was developing from
them complete only in places. the north-east.
20. The first phase of Plan D was successfully During the day and the following night the
completed by i2th May, and the French ist Belgian forces were in process of withdrawing
Army on my right then accelerated the pro- their northern forces to the general line Louvain-
gramme governing their forward movement by Antwerp, and the Staff of the Belgian G.Q.G.
moving by day as well as by night. The enemy expressed concern lest the simultaneous with-
progress across the Albert Canal had up to now drawal of their Cavalry Corps and that of the
been relatively small, due to a successful French, north-west and south-west from their
counter-attack by the French Cavalry Corps at junction point at Tirlemont, would create a gap.
St. Trend, but larger concentrations were now There appeared to me to be little danger, but
reported north of the Albert Canal. Disquieting nevertheless I ordered I2th Lancers to watch
news was received from the Ardennes, where a the situation, assisted if need be by divisional
German thrust was reported as developing on cavalry regiments.
the front of the French gth Army, with at least 22. On I4th May I went to Brussels, where at
two armoured divisions. 12 noon I met the Commanders of ist and 2nd
On this date I requested the War Office to Corps at the British Embassy. The Commander
expedite the despatch of the ist Armoured of 2nd Corps reported that the Belgian ist
Division to the greatest extent possible. I also Corps was now reforming in 4th Division
asked that they should be shipped to the nearest' area. I also discussed the organisation of the
available port and loaded tactically with a view second position on the Senne canal and of a
to operations as soon as possible after landing. Corps reserve line east of Brussels. 5th and 48th
The day was one of great activity in the air, Divisions were ordered to reconnoitre the Senne
and afforded great opportunities for the Royal position on I5th May. That afternoon at 3 p.m.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 59*3
vulnerable points, were ordered to relieve units 23rd Division moved to their positions during
of ist and 2nd Corps on protection and traffic I7th May; they were provided with about forty
control of main routes in Belgium. Railheads, field, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft guns from
which had been advanced on i3th May to the ordnance reserves.
general line Enghien—Ninove, were now moved The enemy break-through was now offering
back across the frontier. an imminent threat to rear G.H.Q., to the
During the night i6/i7th May the withdrawal communications over the Somme at Amiens
to the Senne positions began, and was success- and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet
fully completed by the afternoon of the lyth. this, every available man and weapon was
Some enemy tanks and motor cycle units had collected and orders were issued to the
been reported on the right flank of ist Corps, commander, Lines of Communication Area, for
west of the forest of Soignies, and as a precaution, the remainder of I2th and 46th Divisions to be
part of the ist Army Tank Brigade, which had despatched to the forward zone. One brigade
started to withdraw for entrainment, was (36th Infantry Brigade of I2th Division)
turned about to meet the thrust. arrived during the day, and the leading
By the time the tanks reached their entraining battalion was despatched with four field guns
stations railway difficulties prevented the trucks to cover the north-western exits from PeYonne,
being moved, and the remainder of the move while engineer parties, organised by the
was carried out by road; this gave rise to Commander, G.H.Q. Troops, were sent to
inevitable mechanical trouble later on. * prepare for demolition the crossings over the
Canal du Nord between the river Somme and
By.the early morning of iyth May the situation the right of 23rd Division at Ruyalcourt.
in the south had become grave, and enemy The remainder of 36th Infantry Brigade were
armoured and mobile forces were reported to moved forward to Albert, and the other two
have crossed the Oise. At St. Quentin the brigades of I2th Division ordered to the Abbe-
situation was obscure, and though by this time ville area. These latter, however, arrived too
General Giraud, lately commanding the French late to come under my effective command, and
7th Army, had been ordered to take command their operations on the Somme were carried
of the forces in that region, it was clear from out under the Commander Lines of Communi-
reports and from visits of liaison officers that cation Area.
he had not yet succeeded in establishing effective Elsewhere in the area between Corps rear
control. A gap of at least twenty miles existed boundaries and the Somme, local defence
south of the Forest of Mormal in which there schemes were put into operation under the
appeared to be no organised resistance. Later orders of the Commanders of G.H.Q. Troops
in the day information was received from the and of " X " Lines of Communication Sub-Area*.
French that ten enemy armoured divisions were Few if any of these units or their commanders
engaged in the battle. had any experience in fighting, but their
During the whole of this period, communi- determination was beyond all praise.
cation with my liaison officer at General Georges' A mobile bath unit, for example, took part
Headquarters was maintained so as to keep in in the defence of St. Pol, while, both now and
touch with events as they developed. However, later, the General Construction Companies of
I received no infoimation thiough this channel the Royal Engineers, and many units of the
of any steps it was proposed to take to close the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to
gap, which might have affected my own place their localities in a state of defence and
command. manned them until they were overwhelmed,
It was not till later, on the night of iqth/zoth relieved or ordered to withdraw. Wherever
May, that General Billotte informed me of the possible, transport was collected or requisitioned
action which was being taken to this end by to enable parachute detachments to be dealt
the French Armies in the south. with.
These many small delaying actions all contri-
The defence of rearward areas. buted to gain the time required for the.with-
25. Rear G.H.Q. at Arras had intensified the drawal of the main forces.
precautions already being taken against sabotage The defence of the town of Arras itself was
and air landing units, but on the early morning entrusted to the O.C. ist Bn. Welsh Guards
of I7th May a telegram was received from who had under his command some units of the
General Georges ordering 23rd Division to move Royal Engineers, an Overseas Defence battalion
at once to occupy the line of the Canal du Nord, (gth West Yorks), and various details including
on a frontage of fifteen miles from Ruyalcourt an improvised tank squadron.
(10 miles north of Pdronne) to Arleux (6 miles
south of Douai). Orders were issued for all administrative troops
not required for defence to move forthwith north
The division, which, like the I2th and 46th of a line Orchies-Lens-Fre'vent.
Divisions had joined the B.E.F. for work in
rearward areas, consisted of eight battalions only At the same time to guard against a more
with divisional engineers, but no artillery, and immediate threat to my right flank a force was
signals and administrative units in no more than organised consisting of I27th Infantry Brigade
skeleton form. Its armament and transport was of 42nd Division, ist Army Tank Brigade,
on a much reduced scale and training was far a Field Artillery Regiment and the Hopkinson
from complete. Missionf, all under the command of Major-
General F. N. Mason-MacFarlane, my Director
Nevertheless, troops of these three divisions
fought and marched continuously for a fortnight, * This Sub-Area had been formed to deal with units
and proved, were proof needed, that they were which, remained in the old G.H.Q. and Corps areas
composed of soldiers who, despite their when the B.E.F. moved into Belgium.
inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold f The Hopkinson Mission, under the Command oi
Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Hopkinson, had been formed to
their own with a better found and more numerous secure certain information for the R.A.F. and for
enemy. G.H.Q. immediately on entry into Belgium.
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59^4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
of Military Intelligence. The force was known occupied by the French. It was not however
as Macforce and its task was to cover the practicable to move the 23rd Division again
crossings over the Scarpe between Raches (3 and G.Q.G. were informed to this effect. Yet,
miles N.E. of Douai) and St. Amand. It began by next morning no French troops had appeared
to assemble at Orchies on the afternoon of i7th either on the right of 23rd Division or to relieve
May. them. Later in the day, however, an order was
received by which the commander of the French
Withdrawal to the Escaut begun. 2nd Region was ordered to fill the gap. En-
26. It had now to be decided whether or not quiries by a liaison officer at Amiens, where the
the withdrawal from the Senne to the Dendre staff of the French 7th Army was in process of
was to begin on the night of 17/18 May, and the taking over from the 2nd Region, established
situation in the South was such that I felt that that no troops would be likely to arrive for
to spend a day on the Senne would be to risk twenty-four hours at least.
being outflanked on the right and so imperil By the afternoon, however, some enemy had
the force under my command to no good purpose. reached Pe"ronne, and were in contact with
General Billotte had issued orders for withdrawal 36th Infantry Brigade.
to the Dendre that night, but I had also seen On this day Major-General R. L. Petre,
an order from General Georges which envisaged commanding the I2th Division, was given
remaining on the Senne for a further twenty- command of the troops engaged on this flank,
four hours. I therefore sent a liaison officer to namely 23rd Division, 36th Infantry Brigade
General Billotte to represent my views. In and the garrison of Arras.*
the result, General Billotte's orders stood In the meantime an order issued by the French
confirmed. First Group of Armies had laid down the
By 4 p.m. on i7th May therefore ist and 2nd boundary between the French ist Army and
Corps were on the Senne with 5th, ist and 4th the B.E.F. through Maulde, Orchies, Raches
Divisions in line right to left. 48th Division and He*nin Li6tard. Arras was thus excluded
was covering the right flank from Enghien to from the zone of the B.E.F., but its defence
Lembecq. 5oth Division was on the Dendre, to was necessarily continued by British troops.
which line 2nd and 3rd Divisions were now All troops not required for defence left on the
withdrawing,, whilst 3 Corps was in position on igth, including rear G.H.Q. which moved in two
the Escaut with 42nd Division (less one infantry echelons to Hazebrouck and Boulogne in accord-
brigade) and 44th Division. ance with plans prepared on i7th May when
the threat to Arras became serious.
27. On i8th May I held a conference at the
headquarters of ist Corps at which were settled On the evening of i8th May I moved back
the details of the withdrawal to the Escaut. my command post from Renaix to its previous
This line was to be held with six divisions, right location at Wahagnies.
to left ist Corps (48th and 42nd Divisions, less Moves of the Royal Air Force.
one infantry brigade, with 2nd Division in 29. On this day also, the bulk of the Advanced
reserve), 2nd Corps (ist and 3rd Divisions with Air Striking Force moved from the neighbour-
50th Division in reserve), 3rd Corps (4th and 44th hood of Rheims to Central France and the Air
Divisions), on a front from the bridge over the Component moved one of their main operational
Escaut at Binaries to Audenarde, both inclu- aerodromes from Poix to Abbeville. On the
sive. 5th Division was in G.H.Q. reserve. evening of I9th May enemy action obliged them
There was little pressure during the day on to evacuate this aerodrome also. The Ah*
the British front or on that of the Belgians to Officer Commanding the Air Component then
the North. Owing to the late arrival of orders moved his headquarters to England, but an
the Belgian Army had started their withdrawal advanced landing ground was maintained at
after the B.E.F.; they had therefore asked for Merville until 22nd May.
and received protection to their right flank at From the 2 ist May onwards all arrangements
Brusseghem up to 7 a.m. and Assche up to for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made
8 a.m. on i8th May. On withdrawal they by the War Office in conjunction with the Air
effected a junction with the B.E.F. on the Ministry at home. The air liaison work was
Dendre at Alost. carried out in England at Hawkinge and the
Southward from their junction with the targets selected in accordance with telephone
B.E.F. the French line ran through Mons and or telegraphic requests from the B.E.F. so long
Maubeuge, and enemy tanks were attacking as communications remained open, supple-
the front of the French Corps on my immediate mented by information received from the Royal
right. Enemy air action had by now intensified Air Force, and other sources.
on the front of the B.E.F. and continuous fighter
support was necessary during the hours of day- Alternative plans considered.
light, both to enable our reconnaissances to take 30. On the night of 18/19 May, the ist, 2nd
place and to hold off enemy bombers. The and 3rd Corps completed then: withdrawal to
enemy did not confine bis attention to troops the line of the Escaut without interference, and
but attacked the long columns of refugees prepared to defend the line of the river. Soon
which continued to move westwards. after arrival, however, the level of the water
became dangerously low, at places less than
The position on the Canal du Nord. three feet deep. It looked, therefore, as if, apart
28. The position on the Canal du Nord had from the unusually dry weather, some of the
caused some anxiety, partly on account of con- sluices in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes had
tradictory orders received. Shortly after orders been closed in order to produce inundations
had been issued on I7th May for the occupation in the low lying ground in that area, even if
of the position by 23rd Division, an order was at the expense of the water on the front of the
received from G.Q.G. allotting to the B.E.F. B.E.F.
the sector Pe'ronne-Ruyalcourt instead of the * Major-General Petre's command was known as
sector Ruyalcourt-Arleux which was now to be Petreforce.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17. OCTOBER/1941 "59*5
The enemy had, during the previous day, the abandonment of large quantities of equip-
penetrated as far as Amiens, and rail communica- ment. It would obviously be unwelcome to
tion with the bases was severed' at that'point. the Belgians who would be faced with the
'Communications by road and rail over the alternatives of withdrawing with us and aban-
Sorrime at Abbeville were still holding on igth doning Belgian soil, fighting on a perimeter of
May and the town was being placed in a state their own, or seeking an armistice.
of defence with such resources as were available, So far as I am aware, the French High
mainly, units of I2th Division. However, there Command had never suggested such a move-
was little doubt that enemy armoured forces ment up to that date and it is doubtful whether
in'that area, which at the time I estimated at even had they, decided on immediate withdrawal
five armoured divisions, would shortly break as soon as the French gth Army front on the
through to the coast. Meuse had been penetrated, there would ever
The force could then no longer be supplied have been sufficient time for the troops in the
through the ports south of the Somme, and the north to conform.
great bulk of the reserves, which were in the Thirdly there was the possibility of with-
rearward areas, would • shortly cease to be drawal north-westwards or northwards towards
available to the force for the purposes of main- the Channel ports, making use of the successive
tenance or replacement. Several days' reserve river and canal lines, and of holding a defensive
had, however, for some time past been maintained perimeter there, at any rate sufficiently long to
north of the Somme. enable the force to be withdrawn, preferably in
The prospect of securing the reinforcement of concert with the French and Belgians. I
the Armoured Division had likewise become realised that this course was in theory a last
remote/ I had been advised that two Armoured alternative, as it would involve the departure
Brigades, of this division would disembark at of the B.E.F. from the theatre of war at a time
Havre on i6th May, and were to concentrate at when the French might need all the support
Bolbec, and I had therefore sent instructions by which Britain could give them. It involved
the hand of a staff officer to the Commander the virtual certainty that even if the excellent
(Major-General R. Evans). He was to move the port facilities at Dunkirk continued to be
leading brigade on disembarkation with all available, it would be necessary to abandon
speed to secure, the crossings of the Somme west all the heavier guns and much of the vehicles
of Amiens, from Picquigny to Pont Remy, both and equipment. Nevertheless, I felt that in
inclusive, with a view to .the concentration of the the circumstances there might be no other
remaining -brigade behind the Somme and the course open to me. It was therefore only
move of his division to join the main body of prudent to consider what the adoption of such
the B.E.F. However, in the meantime, orders a plan might entail. On this day therefore at
had been issued locally to concentrate the about 1.30 p.m. the Chief of the General Staff
Division south of the Seine, and the plan to telephoned to the Director of Military Opera-
cross the Somme and join the B.E.F. proved tions and Plans at the War Office and discussed
impossible to execute. The division therefore this situation with him.
remained in the Lines of Communication Area
and never came under my effective command. The Position of the French ist Army and the
About midnight on the iSth/igth May, British right flank reinforced.
General Billotte came to see me, and gave me 31. The French ist Army had by igth May
an account of the situation as he saw it. He completed its withdrawal and was in touch
also told me of the measures which were being with the right of ist Corps. On the night of
taken to restore the situation on the front of i9/20th May they took up positions on the line
the French Qth Army, though clearly he had of the Escaut as far south as Bouchain ; but at
little hope that they would be effective. Reports that point, instead of continuing to hold that
from the liaison officers with French formations river towards Cambrai (which according to my
.were likewise not encouraging ; in particular information was not held in strength by the
I was unable to verify that the French had enemy) they had drawn back westwards along
enough reserves at their disposal south of the the river Sensee. Thus in the quadrilateral
gap to enable them to stage counter-attacks Maulde—Va-lenciennes—Arleux—Douai, some
sufficiently strong to warrant the expectation nineteen miles by ten, there was assembled the
that the gap would be closed. bulk of the French ist Army, amounting to
Thus, in my opinion, there was an imminent three Corps of two divisions and two divisions
danger of the forces in the north-eastern area, in reserve—a total of eight divisions. The
that is to say the French forces next to the sea, Commander of the French 3rd Corps, General
the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of de la Laurencie, remained that night in close
the French ist Army on our right, being touch with General Mason-MacFarlane, at the
irretrievably cut off from the main French headquarters of Macforce.
forces in the south. Further west the French Cavalry Corps was
There were three alternative courses of action assembling at Oppy, north-east of Arras.
open to the northern forces under General None of these forces were being seriously
Billotte : first, in the event of the gap being pressed at this stage, but since the enemy had
closed by successful counter-attacks made already penetrated, so deeply further south, I
simultaneously from north and south it would felt it necessary, without more delay, to
in theory be possible to maintain the line of the strengthen the dispositions for the defence of
Escaut, or at any rate the frontier defences, what had become the bastion of Arras. It was
and thence southwards on one or other of the also necessary to secure crossings westwards
canal lines. from the right of Macforce, along the line
Secondly, there was the possibility of a with- Carvin—La Basse"e.
drawal to the-line of the Somme as far as its I therefore ordered soth Division, then in
mouth. This plan had the attraction that we G.H.Q. reserve, to send one Infantry Brigade
should be falling back on our lines of communi- (25th) to take up positions on the Canal on the
cation and if it was successful would not entail line La Bassee—Carvin under the command of
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•5916 -SUPPLEMENT TO THE. LONDON GAZETTE, -17 -OCTOBER:
Macforce. The remainder of the division was - I .discussed,--these- instructions- with,'.the
moved that night (i9/20th) to the same area, .C.I.G.S. at- my Command Post at Wahagnies
and was thus suitably placed for the counter at 8.15 a.m.; I put to him my view that
attack in which they took part on 2ist May. withdrawal to "the south-westwards, however
I also ordered I2th Lancers with a field desirable in principle, was not. in the circum-
battery to move to Arras and carry'out necessary stances practicable. ;
reconnaissances south and south-westwards, . In the first place, it would involve the dis-
and to gain touch with the outlying portions of engagement of seven divisions which were at
Petreforce. the time in close contact with the enemy on the
Arras was heavily bombed for the first time' Escaut, and would be immediately followed up.
on igth May, but 23rd Division, though in an In addition to this-rearguard action the B.E.F.
exposed position, was not seriously attacked. in its retirement to the Somme would have to
However, at 5 a.m., 6th Royal West Kent, of attack into 'an area already strongly occupied
36th Infantry Brigade, on the Canal du Nord by the enemy armoured and mobile formations.
north-west of Peronne, had been attacked by Some of these indeed now appeared to be holding
enemy tanks and had been withdrawn to Sailly •the line of the Somme whilst others were already
on the road to Albert. -within a short distance of the coast, and might
turn northwards at any time. Thus the B.E.F.
General Petre that night issued orders for would be obliged to disengage its seven divisions
23rd Division to withdraw from the Canal du in contact with the enemy, fighting a rearguard
Nord to the line of the Grinchon river south of 'action, at the same tune to attack south-west-
Arras to join up at La Herliere with 36th wards, and finally to break through enemy
Infantry Brigade which was to hold a line forces on the Somme. During this manoeuvre
thence to Doullens. 23rd Division was, how- both flanks would have to be guarded.
ever, caught by enemy aircraft when embussed
and finally occupied posts on the line of the Secondly, the administrative situation made
Scarpe for some six miles East of Arras. it unlikely that sustained offensive operations
could be undertaken. Communication with the
Thus, by the evening of igth May, the situa- bases was on the point of being interrupted.
tion was somewhat relieved in that the defensive The mobile echelons of gun and small arms
flank had begun to take shape. On the other ammunition were full, but once they were
hand, the character of the operation had now exhausted I could not safely reckon on being
radically altered with the arrival of German able to replenish them.
troops in Amiens. The picture was now no Lastly, though I was not in a position to
longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, judge, I had the impression that even if I had
but of a besieged fortress. To raise such a decided to attempt this manoeuvre, neither the
siege, a relieving force must be sent from the French ist Army nor the Belgians would have
south and to meet this force a sortie on the been in a position to conform.
part of the defenders was indicated.
Nevertheless, I told the C.I.G.S. that I fully
realised the importance of an attack in a
The attack of $th and 50$ Divisions. southerly direction and that I already had plans
32. On 2oth May, the breach South of Arras in hand to counter-attack with the 5th and
deepened and widened. From indications 5oth Divisions to the south of Arras and that
received during the day the enemy armoured these divisions would be ready to attack on
forces appeared to be directed on two main the following morning (2ist May). These were
objectives; one down the valley of the Somme the only reserves which I then had available,
on Abbeville, the other by Hesdin and Montreuil, apart from one armoured reconnaissance brigade,
doubtless making for the Channel Ports. and one infantry brigade of 2nd Division. To
I2th Lancers, early in the day, reported tanks create a further reserve I had already begun
"from the direction of Cambrai approaching negotiations with Belgian G.Q.G. for the relief
Arras, where they were held off by the Welsh of 44th Division on the Escaut, but these were
Guards; a strong request for bomber support not yet completed.
was therefore made through the War Office to The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action and accom-
the Air Ministry. Later in the day enemy panied by the C.G.S. he left for Lens to meet
tanks were reported to be ten miles west of Generals Billotte and Blanchard. At that
Arras, and all endeavours by I2th Lancers to interview the C.I.G.S. explained the action to
reach Doullens had failed. By 6 p.m. they be taken by 5th and 5oth Divisions. General
were back on the line Arras—St. Pol. Billotte fully agreed to this plan, and said that
Early in the morning General Sir Edmund the French would co-operate with two divisions.
Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General On return to my headquarters, the C.I.G.S.
Staff arrived at G.H.Q.; he brought with him sent a telegram to General Georges which made
instructions from the Cabinet that the B.E.F. it clear that, in his opinion, General Billotte's
was to move southwards upon Amiens, attacking Army Group would be finally cut off unless the
all enemy forces encountered and to take station French ist Army made an immediate move on
on the left of the French Army. He was also Gambrai or unless General Georges launched a
to inform General Billotte and the Belgian counter-attack northwards from Peronne. My
command, making it clear to the latter that liaison officers with Generals Billotte and Blan-
their best chance was to. move that night chard conveyed a similar message from me to
between the B.E.F. and the coast. those commanders, making it clear that if our
Similar information was to be given by the counter-attack was not successful the French
War Office to General Georges. During the and British Armies north of the gap would
day however, it appeared that operations were have their flank turned and could no longer
actually being directed by General Weygand remain in their present positions.
who later, on 23rd May, announced in a General On 2ist May I sent a formal acknowledgement
Order that he was now Commander-in-Chief of the instructions brought by the C.I.G.S.
in all theatres of war. adding that, in my opinion, withdrawal to the
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SUPPLEMENT to THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941 5919
On return from the meeting, orders were issued evacuation was carrie.d out under the orders of
to implement these decisions, and that evening the War Office, being completed on the night
I moved my command post to the Chateau de of 23/24th May.
Premesques, midway between Armenti&res and
Lille. The Administrative Situation.
37. During the whole of this period I had
The final severance of the L. of C. and the invest- been kept in the closest touch with the adminis-
ment of Boulogne. trative situation by the Quarter-Master-General
36. During the gist May the enemy penetra- (Lieutenant-General W. G. Lindsell). Up to
tion into the rearward areas increased and com- i6th May the administrative arrangements
munication across the Somme was finally which formed part of Plan D had worked well,
severed. Since the I7th May the Commander and although enemy air action steadily intensified
of the Lines of Communication Area (Major- during the period, there was no serious inter-
General P. de Fonblanque) had been taking ference with the maintenance of the force.
energetic steps for its defence, in so far as it was On i7th May, however, the Quarter-Master-
possible with the few and scattered troops General decided, in view of the situation south
available. of Arras, to discontinue the use of the railway
These consisted, apart from Armoured from the regulating station at Abancourt via
Division and 5ist Division now returning Amiens and Arras, and to switch all traffic via
from the Saar, of those portions of I2th and Eu and Abbeville to Bethune. He also ordered
46th Divisions (some nine battalions in all) forward every available trainload of ammunition
which could not be despatched forward, three to the Hazebrouck area.
unbrigaded infantry battalions and the contents On igth May, directly after the C.G.S. had
of the reinforcement depdts, together with spoken to the War Office as to the possibility
troops of the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps of enforced withdrawal, the Q.M.G. telephoned
and of the administrative services. to the War Office to discuss the opening of new
On '23rd May, however, the War Office bases. On the same day, one of his staff officers
appointed Lieutenant-General- Sir Henry .left for London to arrange an emergency ship-
Karslake to command the defences on the Lines ment programme for supplies and stores to
of Communication and I was not concerned in the ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. It
the operations which ensued. Nevertheless, was to prove none too soon, for the railway
I did not immediately abandon hope of the at Abbeville was cut on 2ist May. A new plan
Armoured Division breaking through, and I had to be put into operation at once for the
urged the War Office to use their best endeavours. maintenance of the fcfrce north of the Somme,
to this end and to prevent its being used piece- estimated at 250,000 men and requiring a daily
meal in local operations at the request of the lift of ammunition, supplies and petrol, of some
French Command. 2,000 tons.
At about 3.30 p.m. on the 2ist May, I received The petrol situation, fortunately, gave no cause
information that an enemy column of all arms for concern since, although the dumps forward
was approaching Boulogne. The rear element of the Somme had been destroyed on evacuation,
of G.H.Q., consisting largely of the Adjutant- together with a large civil storage plant near
General's Branch and of headquarters of Douai, there still remained a large army bulk
Services, which had been sent to that town on filling station near Lille.
I7th and i8th May, had been moved to Wimereux The supply situation was however, bad, and
on 20th May as a result of enemy bombing. on 2ist May, Corps had only three days
* All possible steps had been taken to put R.A.S.C. supplies in the forward area. Matters
Boulogne in a state of defence with the troops might, at any time, have become serious had it
available, consisting of labour units and the not been for the success of the measures taken
personnel of rest camps. On igth May, an between 23rd and 26th May, to organise the
endeavour was made to bring up troops from supplies in Lille belonging to the Expeditionary
beyond the Somme, to hold the line of the Canche; Force Institutes and to civilian firms.
but the time for this was past and the troops The decision to maintain the force through
could not get beyond Abbeville. The hospitals the northern ports was finally taken on 2ist
in the Etaples area were now evacuated, and on May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area
2ist May a party of Engineers, supervised by established at Dunkirk, together with a section
my Director of Works, Brigadier W. Cave- of Q.M.G's staff, in close touch with the British
Browne, demolished most of the bridges over and French Naval authorities.
the Canche. Rail communication in the area was by now
As soon as the news of this new threat was precarious, and plans were worked out on the
received, the War Office was asked for bomber basis of establishing dumps, one in each Corps
. support, which was at once forthcoming. Enemy area, which could be wholly maintained by
tanks were located and bombed at Hesdin and road. The position was, by this time, greatly
Fruges, but no good targets were obtained on complicated by the numbers of improvised
the coast road. The War Office was also asked forces which the quickly changing situation
to send a detachment of Royal Marines for the had made necessary: most of these, like the
defence of Boulogne but had already done three divisions for pioneer duties, had no proper
so. Early on the 22nd May, 2oth Guards administrative echelons. Some were within
Brigade (Brigadier W. A. F.' L. Fox-Pitt) of reach of Corps, but others were not and these
two battalions with an anti-tank battery had to be dependent on fortuitous sources of
.landed, thus establishing the defence of the supply, or else live for a time on the country.
town and enabling those troops who were not The situation had" grown even worse by
required for the defence to be evacuated in 22nd May, when the ports at both Boulogne
good order. and Calais were out of action, and the greater
By the evening of 22nd May, the enemy part of the Railhead Mechanical Transport
armoured forces were within nine miles of Calais. Companies had been captured. Furthermore
if-g final a^ reconnaissance of Ostend had shewn that the
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5906 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
SECOND DESPATCH f
(Covering the period from ist February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, with an Appendix
covering operations of ist Corps from 6 p.m. 3ist May, to midnight 2nd/3rd June).
| i. The narrative portions of this despatch have been compiled from the war diaries and other
records of the General Staff at G.H.Q. These have been supplemented by war diaries, including
those of the Swayne Mission, and by diaries, notes and records made by various commanders
and staff officers at the time, or within a few days of their arrival in England. The records of the
General Staff at G.H.Q. are only partially complete for the period loth—i8th May, owing to some
papers having been destroyed at Boulogne, and a portion of the records for 3ist May lost at sea.
Some records of less importance were burnt at Hazebrouck to avoid possible capture and others
were destroyed in a lorry which caught fire near Cassel on or about 24th May.
2. The Appendix contains an account of the operations at Dunkirk from 6 p.m., 3ist May, to
midnight 2nd/3rd June, which may conveniently be appended to this despatch, though they were
not carried out under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. It has been compiled by the General
Staff at G.H.Q., from sources similar to those used for the despatch itself.
London, Arrival of yd Corps in France.
25 July, 1940. 3. 3rd Corps (Lt.-General Sir Ronald F.
Sir, Adam, Bt.), consisting of 42nd Division (Major-
1. I have the honour to submit a report on General W. G. Holmes), 44th Division (Major-
the employment of the British Expeditionary General E. A. Osborne) and 5ist Division
Force, and on the part which it played in (Major-General V. M. Fortune) was due for
operations in France and -Belgium from ist despatch to France in February and March, and
February, 1940, to 3ist May, 1940, on which 5 ist Division arrived during early February.
date I gave up Command of the Force. The 5oth (Motor) Division (Major-General G. le
Q. Martel) arrived in France at the same time
The period under review may be divided into and was allotted to 2nd Corps. It had been
two distinct and sharply contrasting phases, arranged that the front of the B.E.F. should be
namely, before and after loth May, on which extended northwards to Croix de Poperinghe on
date active operations began. The active the Belgian frontier, two miles north-east of
operations themselves can be divided geo- Bailleul, and that 3rd Corps should go into the
graphically into two distinct parts ; on the east, line on the left of the B.E.F. taking over 5th
the advance to the River Dyle, and the with- Division from 2nd Corps, and relieving 53rd
drawal to the frontier; on the west, the defence French Division, between Armentieres and Croix
of Arras and the organisation of the Canal line. de Poperinghe, with 5ist Division. The Com-
Later, the two parts merged into one whole in mand of the new sector had passed to the
the final phase of the withdrawal and embarka- B.E.F. at midnight 3ist Jan./ist February, and
tion of the Force. the relief of the French troops was to take
No such clear definition can be made in terms place about I2th February.
of time; furthermore, the two operations, on At this time, however, owing to the situation
the east and on the west, were closely inter- elsewhere in Europe His Majesty's Government
dependent, and the same reserves had to serve found it necessary to postpone the despatch of
for both. For this reason the accounts of the 3rd Corps (excepting 5 ist Division) and also of
operations on the two fronts cannot but be certain anti-aircraft, administrative and labour
intermingled at certain points in the narrative. units. I was also instructed to earmark one
Broadly speaking, however, three distinct phases division for withdrawal from the B.E.F. if
can be distinguished. First, the advance to the required ; for this I selected 5th Division. It
Dyle from ioth-i6th May; then from i7th-26th was evident that the programme of shipments of
May the withdrawal from the Dyle to the ammunition and other war material to France,
Escaut, the defence of the Belgian frontier and on which I had counted to make up the serious
of the southern and western flanks ; and finally deficiencies in stocks, would be severely curtailed
the withdrawal and embarkation of the Force in February and March.
from 27th-3ist May.
2. The narrative in my first despatch dated 4. These changes entailed a delay in the
25th April, 1940, concluded with the completion development of the Force which was naturally
of the first contingent of the Force. disappointing; moreover, it became impossible
I had been informed that the expansion of the for me to take over the new sector to Bailleul,
Force was to be continued by the despatch of and at the same time to retain a proper propor-
3rd Corps during the early months of 1940; tion of divisions in reserve. I was, therefore,
the Armoured Division was to follow in May, obliged to obtain the consent of the French to
and a fourth Corps, with ist Canadian the indefinite postponement of the relief, and to
Division, during the late Summer ; furthermore, accept the resulting congestion in the area of
it had been decided that the Force should be the B.E.F.
divided into two Annies, as soon as the number 5oth Division was temporarily accommodated
of divisions in the field, excluding the Armoured in an area south-west of Amiens in G.H.Q.
Division, rose above eleven. reserve.
Preparation for this expansion, which had At the end of March, however, the 3rd Corps
been proceeding since the previous autumn, was finally despatched to France ; 5ist Division
continued steadily until loth May. duly relieved the French in the new sector on
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5920 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
port could not be worked for military require- execution has hope of restoring the situation.
ments at short notice. A certain amount of Weygand reports French VII Army is advanc-
rations and small arms ammunition was sent ing successfully and has captured Peronne,
by air up to 23rd May, but from then onwards Albert and Amiens. While realising fully
it became impossible for aircraft to land. On dangers and difficulties of your position which
23rd May therefore, on the advice of the Q.M.G., has been explained to Weygand it is essential
I decided to place the B.E.F. on half rations. that you should make every endeavour to
Dunkirk, though its water supply was co-operate in his plan. Should however
destroyed, remained available for unloading situation on your communications make this
supplies till 26th May, but constant air raids at any time impossible you should inform us
imposed a well nigh unbearable strain on the so that we can inform French and make
stevedore battalions. However, they remained Naval and Air arrangements to assist you
at duty until, in the end, all the quays and cranes should you have to withdraw on the northern
were put out of action. Thereafter supplies coast."
could only be landed on the beaches. Lighters It will be noted that, according to the telegram
arrived to embark troops loaded with a portion General Weygand informed the Prime Minister
of supplies, ammunition and water, and these that Peronne, Albert and Amiens had- been
were unloaded and distributed by Corps. The recaptured. It later transpired that this in-
delivery of supplies to Corps was maintained, formation was inaccurate.
albeit irregularly, up till 30th May when the The Weygand plan, as it came to be known,
last convoy went forward from the supply depdt was for a counter offensive on a large scale.
on the beach at La Panne. From the north the French ist Army and the
By 20th May all the General Hospitals had B.E.F. were to attack south-west at the earliest
been cut off from the forward area and possible moment with about eight divisions
improvised arrangements had to be made for and with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting
the evacuation of casualties. Some of the the British right.
Casualty Clearing Stations had to be diverted The newly formed Third French Army Group
from their normal function and used as Hospitals. was reported to be organising a line on the
Hospital ships continued to berth at Dunkirk Somme from Amiens to Peronne with a view to
till the night 3ist May/ist June and casualties attacking northwards.
were evacuated to them by road and by rail.
Ambulance trains were running as late as 26th A new cavalry Corps was assembling south of
May. the Somme near Neufchatel and was to operate
* on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, in
Further proposals for an attack Southwards. 'touch with the British Armoured Division on
38. On 23rd May the French ist Army their left.
pushed forward some elements southwards I fully appreciated the importance of attacking
from Douai. On the same day, 5th and 5oth early before the enemy could bring up his
Divisions, which had attacked two days before, infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced.
were themselves being attacked on the Scarpe The 5th and 5oth Divisions were on this day
and had already lost most of their tanks through (23rd May) still closely engaged with the enemy,
mechanical wear. and 2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions, would not be-
come available for a further 48 hours, since the
The threat to their rear was increasing hourly French and the Belgians> though they had
and they were thus unable to make any further arranged their relief, could not complete it
advance or to assist the French, except in so far earlier. The ammunition immediately available,
as they were able to engage troops who might - to the B.E.F. .was of the order of 300 rounds
otherwise have threatened the right flank of per gun and with communications cut with the
the French advance. The French approached main base, the prospect of receiving any further
the outskirts of Cambrai meeting with little supply was remote.
opposition but withdrew later on being attacked
by dive-bombers. The French light mechanised divisions and
our own armoured units had already suffered
On the same day I received a copy of a serious losses in tanks which could not be
telegram from the Prime Minister to M. Reynaud, replaced. Such information as I. had received
which read as follows:— of the Belgian cavalry did not lead me to take
" Strong enemy armoured forces have an optimistic view of the prospect of their
cut communications of Northern Armies. being able to engage, at short notice, in a battle
Salvation of these Armies can only be obtained forty miles away and on French soil.
by immediate execution of Weygand's plan. Experience had already shown the vital
I demand that French Commanders in North importance of close co-ordination of the allied
and South and Belgian G.Q.G. be given most armies in any operation. General Billotte had
stringent orders to carry this out and turn been appointed the co-ordinator at the con-
defeat into victory. Time vital as supplies ference at Mons on I2th May, but in practice,
are short." the measure of co-ordination fell far short of
I was not sure whether the situation which what was required if the movements of the
was developing for the allied armies in the three allied armies were to be properly controlled.
north could be accurately appreciated except Except for the issue of orders to retire from
on the spot. I therefore telegraphed to Sir the Dyle (obtained only after I had sent Major-
John Dill asking him to fly over that day. General Eastwood to General Billotte's head-
The next day, however (24th May), the Prime quarters to represent my views), I received no
Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and written orders from the French First Group of
General Weygand in Paris, and I received the Armies, though at the meetings between
following telegram from the Secretary of State General Billotte and myself which took place
describing that conference :— from time to time, we always found ourselves
" Both are convinced that Weygand's plan in complete agreement. Unfortunately, how-
is still capable of execution and only in its ever, General Billotte had been seriously.-and.
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SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 JULY, 1947 3317
APPENDIX III TO P.O. DOVER'S DESPATCH
Summary of Aircraft Data concerning R.N.
Naval Aircraft Employed Enemy Aircraft Destroyed by Ships' fire off
Squadron No. 801") Dunkirk
Y' Skuas" (between O3oo/27th May and 20oo/ist June)
No. 8o6J
Squadron No. 815 "| 27th May 4
Y" Swordfish " 28th „ 3
No. 825J 2Qth „ 4
30th „ Nil*
Squadron No. 826 " Albacore " 3ist „ ii
These aircraft were the only available British ist June 13
" dive bombers," the R.A.F. possessing none
at the time. TOTAL 35
These squadrons operated under the orders
of Coastal Command and carried out attacks on In addition over the same period 21 others
tanks, transport, batteries, gun emplacements were heavily damaged by ships' fire and seen
and enemy positions in the Calais and Dunkirk in distress but not seen to crash definitely.
areas as well as attacks on E-Boats.
In spite of their relative inadequacy for the Notes.—* On 3oth May flying conditions were
bad and few enemy aircraft operated.
purpose the " Skuas " were also detailed for After ist June evacuation proceeded
fighter-escort of ships. only between evening dusk and dawn.
APPENDIX IV TO OPERATION " DYNAMO "—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
Co-operation of the French Navy
(a) The following French warships and other vessels wearing the French flag were employed
evacuating French troops from Dunkirk harbour, and on the last three nights, from the beach
i£ miles eastward from Dunkirk :—
Destroyers (9) BRANLEBAS INCOMPRISE SIROCCO
BOUCLIER BOURRASQUE CYCLONE
FLORE FOUDROYANT MISTRAL
Avisos (4) AMIENS BELFORT ARRAS AMIRAL MOUCHEZ
Fast Motor Boats ... 3
Sub Chasers 3
Auxiliary Minesweepers 6 „
Small Cargo Vessels ... 3 or 4 carrying munitions to Dunkirk returning with troops.
Trawlers, Drifters and other small craft. 167 concentrated from the French coast between
Boulogne and Cherbourg, and employed mainly off the beach. - In addition the French mail
packets COTE D'ARGENT, COTE D'AZUR, NEWHAVEN and ROUEN were transferred to
the orders of the Vice-Admiral, Dover, and were employed as required side by side with the British
personnel vessels.
(b) The French losses included :—
Destroyers : BOURRASQUE and FOUDROYANT sunk by bomb, and SIROCCO by torpedo.
CYCLONE badly damaged by torpedo, and MISTRAL by bomb.
Trawlers, etc. : EMILE DESCHAMPS and DUPERRE, the drifter PIERRE MARIE and
15 other small craft were sunk, including the Dutch yacht DEMOG I under French orders.
French packet: COTE D'AZUR sunk by bombs before her first trip.
(c) Covering patrols, mainly in the Dyck, were provided by the two small cruisers LEOPARD
and EPERVIER, and when not employed evacuating troops, the four avisos acted as escorts
along " X " Route.
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| Fast Motor Boats: | 3 | ||
| Sub Chasers: | 3 | ||
| Auxiliary Minesweepers: | 6 | ||
| ate of | French troops in | disembarked in U.K. | Total per day French and Brit sh |
| isembarkation in U.K. | Carried by French vessels. | Total by French and British vessels | Troops disembar! U.K. (excdg. ambilce. traffic). |
| 8 7th May | Nil | Nil | 3373 |
| " | Nil | Nil | 13,948 |
| 9 11 0 | 655 MiL | 655 | 38,843 |
| " 1 | 5,444 | 8,616 | 48,474 |
| " | 4,032 | 14,874 | 58,312 |
| st June | 2,765 | 35,013 | 60,203 |
| " | 905 | 16,049 | 31,427 |
| " | 4,235 | 19,803 | 27,011 |
| " | 2,349 | 26,989 | 26,995 |
| " | 140 | 1,096 | 1,096 |
| sides TOTALS | 20,525 | 123,095 | 309,682 |
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| 3 of | French troops in | disembarked in U.K. | Total per day French and British |
| embarkation U.K. | Carried by French vessels. | Total by French and British vessels | Troops disembarked in U.K. (excdg.amblce. traffic). |
| 1 May | Nil | Nil | 3373 |
| " | Nil | Nil | 13,948 |
| " | 655 | 655 | 38,843 |
| 11 | 5,444 | 8,616 | 48,474 |
| " | 4,032 | 14,874 | 58,312 |
| ; June | 2,765 | 35,013 | 60,203 |
| " | 905 | 16,049 | 31,427 |
| 11 | 4,235 | 19,803 | 27,011 |
| " | 2,349 | 26,989 | 26,995 |
| " | 140 | 1,096 | 1,096 |
| TOTALS | 20,525 | 123,095 | 309,682 ght. |
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APPENDIX 'B' SURMARY OF OPERATIONS ON B.E.F. IN FRANCE FROM 1ST TO 18TH JUNE 1940 1. After the evacuation of the main British Expeditionary Force from Flanders in the first week of June the only British troops remaining in France were the 51st Division, which had been holding 3 sector of the Sarre Front, and the incomplete 1st Armoured Division, which had begun its disembarkation on 20th May and had been rushed up piscemeal in a desperate effort to relieve the sorely tried right flank of the B.E.F. By the 1st June this attenuated Division, which was incomplete when disanbarked and had lost heavily in its first engagement on the Somme, could only muster roughly one third of its quota of tanks. 2. These two formations, the 51st Division and the 1st Armoured Division, the only British fighting formations General Altmayer, commanding Tenth French Army, which held remaining in France, were placed under the orders of the left sector of the Some front from Amiens to the S88. The handling of the British troops, which had been delegated to General Altmayer by General leygand, was co-ordinated and supervisied by a British ilitary Mission at Tenth Army Headquarters. Somme sector was sixteen miles in-extent, an excessive 3. The frontage allotted to the 51st Division on the Fre ch divisions were holding at the time owing to amount, but probably not much greater than that which their many action the Sarre front, and had had & long and arduous On depleted resources. The Division had already been in 4th June the 51st Division Commander was ordered which to carry journey on from the Eastern frontier to its new sector. out the Abbeville bridgshead, for operation an attack the newly on arrived French 31st Division and was 8 placed under as well PS 160 French tanks of was effective co-operation between British notice, however, considerable not a success, ainly owing to the and his orders, reinforcement of French artillery. difficulty The attack, French arranging guns and tanks at such casualties... short and the 51st infantry, Division suffered fairly heavy 4. On the following against the whole front to the day (5th June) the Garmang held launched by the Seventh a powerful and offensive Tenth French Armies, from in an St. exhausted uentin condition, sea. Tenth The The after from too Division 51st wide the Army 12 a days Division front, Commander, front fought of replied to continual was bravely, be when by able that widely this asked movement to but he time resist scattered had was to no relieve and forced effectively. reserves battle, posts. back the available. Division and by Owing German was The holding to infiltration the extent between of its frontago its the division had no depth /in its
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in its defences, had had no time to organize rearward defences, nor any reserves with which to counter-attack. It was forced back to the line of the river Bresle, the next natural obstacle, 15 miles in rear. 5. Meanwhile the 1st Armoured Division was refitting south of the Seine. Its tanks were in poor mechanical condition, owing not only to battle casualties but also to the long road distances they had been forced to cover, and to the lack of opportunity for adequate maintenance. It was in fact in no condition for offensive operations. 6. On the 7th June the Garmans out in & smashing attack with their 5th and 7th Amoured Divisions on the point of junction between the two Corps of the Tenth French Army. This drive was directed from west of Amiens on Rouen and the lower Seine, with the object of splitting the Tenth Army and cutting off its IX Corps between the Saina Estuary and Dieppe. The IX French Corps than comprised the British 51st Division on the extrema left, and then further east the 31st and 40th French Divisions and the 2nd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions. The wh le of this force was completely sundered from the X Corps on its right by the penetration of the German tanks. British base at Rouen, General Sir Henry Karslake, 0.0.0. 7. Meanwhile, owing to the threat developing to the the Lines of Communication, had scraped together an improvised force for its local defence. This force comprised nine infantry battalions of a sort; they out to France for pioneer duties and partly of composite consisted partly of second line Territorial units sent base. They had no war equipment except rifles and & units made up from miscellaneous reinforcements at the never fired before. guns They were without artillery, wans few odd Bren and enti-tank weapons, which they had District, units were of the formation, this transport command heterogeneous thus was Lines misled given complete of and Brigadier the of signal into Communication. collection with t tile thinking equipment. artillery Besuman, of had of Division; that untrained been in and Vary it They charge given was ancillary unfortunately were The $ and the of righting French the placed task ill-aquipped services. orth of under Beauman's holding back so-called line along Division the Rivers Bethung and Andella the covering a Rouen, and had done good work in organizing defence of this position. on While the Cerman of the 7th June, General Weygand personally impressed 8. armoured attack was at its height visited the afternoon Headquarters east of Rouen and the on Tenth Army and on General Evans commanding holding the German attack Armoured on the Seine at all costs as this British General Altmayer, Division, the necessity for was "the decisive battle of the war. /It
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It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine, a cover position would have to be held along. the River Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, there- fore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all) to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line. 9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating the weak British defences on the watershed butween the Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux. Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino. That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen, and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac. 10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly due to the failure or inability of the French High Command to withdraw their left wing while there was still time and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these operations it was becoming clear that the French High Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full retreat. 11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points. which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade, General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on on its right, in a and two newly arrived French its left west of Evreux. /AS
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PRELIMINARY EVENTS CHAP. I 17TH MAY French 9th Army front broken By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹ The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw. These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³ 18TH MAY Allied rail communications severed By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge. During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies' bases. On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F. completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British 1st Corps). Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French; unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle. After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified. I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24. 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25. 3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26. 4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30. 3
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CHAPTER II THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO," 19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940 19TH MAY Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with- A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great be available for maintaining replacements.¹ bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to R.A.F. Component begins return to England The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice- Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England. Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.² Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented. This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be Channel ports the German objective enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30. 2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32. 4
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THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO" CHAP. II General Weygand directing Allied operations During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin), who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war.¹ The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May), now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens, attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations. Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹ R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2 Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely fore- seen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting, which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk. Provision of small craft considered After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats required for transport and ferrying. I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32. 2 R.A.F. Narrative. 3 D.R. 4 Dutch schuyts or coasters. 5
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THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK CHAP. II refugees who got on board. The numbers evacuated by the destroyers con- cerned were approximately :- Keith 180 Vimy ... ... 150 Whitshed ... ... 580 Vimiera ... ... Wild Swan 1955 403 (in two trips) ... ... Windsor ... 600 Venomous ... 500 Total ... 4368 The Venetia, damaged, did not get alongside a quay. During the night 22 23rd May, before the evacuation under fire, the Verity took off two General Officers and some 150 troops. In addition to the Venetia, the Wild Swan, Whitshed, Keith and Venomous all received damage during the evacuation. The Keith lost Captain D. (19) and 7 ratings killed, and had 28 wounded; the Vimy had one officer killed and her Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Comdr. C. G. W. Donald R.N. was seriously wounded and died subsequently ; the Whitshed lost one officer killed and had 12 ratings wounded; the Venetia had 20 ratings killed or missing and 11 wounded; the Commanding Officer of the Verity, Lt. Cdr. A. R. M. Black R.N. was wounded and subsequently died. 23RD 24TH MAY The "Weygand" Plan In the midst of this changing panorama of events, on the 23rd May, General Weygand became Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war". He had, however, previously formulated the ' Weygand plan". This plan contem- plated a counter-offensive on a large scale¹ and, briefly, it consisted of 3 operations:- :- (a) An attack south-westward from the north, by the French 1st Army and the B.E.F., with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting the British right. (b) An attack northward from the line of the Somme, which line the newly formed Third French Army Group was reported to be organising. (c) Operations on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, by a new Cavalry Corps which was assembling south of the river near Neufchatel. On the 23rd May Lord Gort received a telegram from the British Prime Minister to extract:- the French Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, of which the following is an "Strong Salvation enemy armoured forces have cut Armies. gand's plan. of these I Armies can only be obtained communications by immediate of execution Northern of Wey- north Not could feeling sure that the situation armies in the to General be accurately appreciated developing for the Lord Allied Gort telegraphed I Sir John Dill asking him to except fly over on the that spot, day. Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38 10
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THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO" CHAP. II On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again con- ferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris ; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War : "Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹. Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts :- (a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured. (b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹ (c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹ (d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹ (e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹ Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore, Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie. It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity. 24TH MAY The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counter- attack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain - Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out. Fighting troops hold on at Calais In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais. 1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38. 2 T.M. 6213/40. 11
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| Amiens |
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PLAN 1 Soate of Miles 10 5 o 10 20 30 40 N The German break-through on 17th.18th KENT OSTEND ANTWERP DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT BRUGES 18th MAY may 13th MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH R.M. FURNES Yser GAND MALINES GRAVELINES a BERGUES CALAIS SPYKE RIYS R.Senna ALOST WORMHOUTE th F. LOUVAIN YPRES 18MAY Phyle WATTEN COURTRAI MENIN Escaut BRUSSELS 13th MAY CASSEL COMINES BOULOGNE StOMER R.Dendre WAVRE HAZEBROUCK ARMENTIERES P.LYS AIRE MERVILLE LILLE ATH R.Meuse EXOLISH NAMUR StAMAND LA BASSEE R.Sambre VALE CIENNES DOUAI Fscaut RRA R. 18th MAY 18thMAY 13th:MAY CAMBRAI DOULLENS ABBEVILLE R 2.50mm ALBERT DIEPPE PERONNE AMIENS st QUENTINE 18th MAY MEZIERES SEDAN R.Oire Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May: R.Aisne " " " 18th " : German break break-through shewn in blue RMass TSD/HS (655) C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49
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PLAN 2 Scale ofMiles to 5 o 10 20 30 40 N The Allied withdrawal into 18th MAY the Dunkirk KENT GSTEND . 30ᵗMAY BRUGES ANTWERP PANNE perimeter on the + NIEUPORT 23rd MAY 30th May May + 4. FURNES MALINES Yser GAND BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH LINES C GRAVE STATES BERGUES R.Lys ALOST R WORMHOUTE LOUVAIN CHANNEL YPRES COURTRAI Escant R.Dyle WATTE MENIN BRUSSELS . R St. OMER CASSEL COMINES Dandre WAVRE BOULDONE . ZEBROUCK INS ARMENTIERES R. R AIRE MERVILLE ATH LILLE 23rd:MAY Meuse 23rd MAY St. AMAND NAMUR . BASSEE CARVIN . 18th MAY R. Sambre St.POL . VALENCIENNES DOUAI BARRAS Escaut a CAMBRAI OULLENS BEVILLE B ALBERT R.Somme PERONNE him AMIENS StQUENTIN French 10th Arm MEZIERES SEDAN R.Oise Mause The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May. Allied line on 18th Щау French 3rd Army R.Aisne Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May German progress shewn in blue TSD/HS (ESG) C.B.H.16675
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PLAN 2 Scale ofMiles to 5 o 10 20 30 40 & The Allied withdrawal into 18th MAY the Dunkirk KENT GSTEND 30thmay BRUGES ANTWERP PANNE perimeter on the NIEUPORT 23rd MAY + 30th May May + + x FURNES GAND MALINES LINES Yser BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH C SAYKER BERGUES R.Lys ALOST a WORMHOUTE LOUVAIN CHANNEL YPRES COURTRAI R.Dyle WATTE MENIN BRUSSELS . R St. OMER CASSEL COMINES WAVRE BOULDONE . Dandre ZEBROUCK IVS ARMENTIERES R. AIRE LALT MERVILLE ATH LILLE 23rd:MAY Meuse 23rd MAY . St. AMAND NAMUR BASSEE CARVIN . 18th MAY R Sambre St.POL VALENCIENNES DOUAI ARRAS R.Escaut CAMBRAI DOULLENS BEVILLE B ALBERT Somme PERONNE AMIENS him St.QUENTIN French 10th Army MEDIERES SEDAN R.Oise RMause The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May Allied line on 18th Щау French 3rd Army R.Aisne Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May German progress shown in blue TSD/HS (E56) C.B.H.16675
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Page 8. s OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940 PART II - FOREIGN WARSHIPS POLISH BLYSKAWICA FRENCH AMIENS DILIGENTE MARCEAU AMIRAL MOUCHEZ EPERVIER MISTRAL ARRAS FLORE M.T.B. 24 BELFORT # FOUDROYANT SIMOUN BOUCLIER IMPETUEUSE SIROCCO # BOURRASQUE INCOMPRISE T. 112 BRANLEBAS LEOPARD T. 113 CYCLONE T. 143 DUTCH NETHERLAND MOTOR-BOAT M 74 # Sunk
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Page 8. LIST OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940 PART II - FOREIGN WARSHIPS POLISH BLYSKAWICA FRENCH AMIENS DILIGENTE MARCEAU AMIRAL MOUCHEZ EPERVIER MISTRAL ARRAS FLORE M.T.B. 24 BELFORT # FOUDROYANT SIMOUN BOUCLIER IMPETUEUSE # SIROCCO # BOURRASQUE INCOMPRISE T. 112 BRANLEBAS LEOPARD T. 113 CYCLONE T. 143 DUTCH NETHERLAND MOTOR-BOAT M 74 # Sunk
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Operation Dynamo Map — Movement Logs
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Movements recorded for Amiens during the evacuation period, as plotted on the Operation Dynamo map.
| Departed | Route | Arrived | Troops | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Jun 1940, 23:00 | Cherbourg → Dover | 2 Jun 1940, 10:35 | — | NMM 940.542.1 1940 Orde vol i, page 48 |
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