Aire

Details

' SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941
  Carvin, and on the following day isgth Infantry        near Maulde on the front of ist Division a
  Brigade of the same division joined the force.         number of enemy had crossed the river dis-
  On 2ist May I27th Infantry-Brigade rejoined the        guised as refugees, but had been detected and
  42nd Division and the sector from Millonfosse          driven out with the bayonet. The Corps Com-
  to St. Amand was handed over to the French.            manders all felt that they could hot how hold
     Already on 2oth May, I had ordered Major-           on for more than .twenty-four hours. We
  General Curtis, Commanding 46th Division, to           discussed a withdrawal to our old frontier
  take command of the sector of the canals between       defences, where advantage could be taken of the
  Aire and Carvin. General Curtis' force was             existing blockhouses and trenches, and of tha
  known as Polforce, and was to.consist of four          anti-tank ditch. This move would have little
  battalions - of 46th Division, 25th Infantry           effect on the French on our right since it would
  Brigade of 5.oth Division (in line between La          pivot on the junction point, where the Escaut
  Bassee and Carvin) and one field battery,              crossed the frontier, but "would seriously affect
  together with a number of engineer and other          the Belgians, who now held the line of the
  units o'f G.H.Q. troops which had been moving         Escaut from Audenarde to Ghent and of the
  northwards and .were collected on the Canal.          canal from Ghent to the sea at Terneuzen.
  It had originally been intended that part of this         I had also to consider the pressing need to
  force should hold St. Pol, Prevent and Divion,        stiffen the defence of the canal line westwards to
  but the railway trains in which were the remain-      Gravelines and to form a new reserve to replace
 ing three battalions of 46th Division failed to        the divisions now committed to counter-attacks
 reach that town in time and remained south of          southward from Arras.
 the Somme. The defence of these localities south          A provisional decision was therefore reached
 of the Canal had therefore to be abandoned.            to withdraw to the frontier defences on the night
     Further to the north-west the defence of the       of 22nd/23rd May, details being left until I had
 canal line was being organised by Brigadier            reached agreement with the French and the
 C. M. Usher, Commander of X Lines of Communi-          Belgians.
 cation Sub-area. On 22nd May he reported that             General Weygand had visited General Billotte
 the enemy had already reached the left bank of         during the day and the latter indicated that an
 the river Aa between Gravelines and St. Omer.          attack was being planned for the following day
 23rd Division had been ordered to move to this         (22nd May), northwards from the direction of
 area and its leading battalion (6th Green Howards)     Roye, with the object of closing the gap. At
 arrived at Gravelines. Brigadier Usher therefore       8 p.m. on 2ist May I went to Ypres where in
 held the right bank of the river from St. Omer to      the Burgomaster's office I met H.M. the King
 Gravelines with this battalion and five batteries      of the Belgians and General Billotte. There
 of heavy artillery used as infantry, in conjunction   were also present General Van Overstraeten,
 with certain French troops of the Secteur             General Champon, the head of the French
 Fortifie des Flandres.                                Mission with Belgian G.Q.G., General Pownall
    The front of Macforce was covered by the           and others.
 French, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, who were still            I explained the situation which was developing
 in their quadrilateral on the line of the Escaut      on the Escaut about Audenarde, and the diffi-
 and the Sensee. Here, however, information            culty of maintaining positions there since the
 was frequently lacking and could only be obtained     water in the river was so low as no longer to
 by reconnaissance.                                    form an obstacle. It was then agreed that on
    Thus, by 22nd May, the canal line was occupied     the night of 22nd/23rd May the Escaut should be
in the sense that the whole of the length of 85        abandoned and that the Allied armies should
miles from the sea at Gravelines to Millonfosse        occupy a line from Maulde northwards to
 (West of St. Amand) was divided into sectors          Halluin, thence along the Lys to Courtrai and
 for each of which a British commander was             Ghent.
responsible. The total strength of the troops              I discussed the possibility of reserves. It
 on the Canal line did not on this day exceed          appeared that the available divisions of the
 10,000 men, and the number of anti-tank               French ist Army were all too tired to take part
 weapons was barely adequate to cover all the          in offensive operations in the immediate future.
 crossing places: certainly there could be no          It was therefore agreed that the French should
 question of being able to keep an effective           take over a further sector of the defensive
 watch against small parties of infantry crossing      positions northwards from Maulde, so that the
the canal between the bridges. The barges,             2nd and 48th Divisions could be withdrawn into
however, had almost all been moved away or             reserve on leaving the line of the Escaut. The ,,
 at any rate to the bank furthest from the enemy,      French took up these positions on 22nd May.
.and bridges were fast being prepared for              On the north, 44th Division on withdrawal
demolition.                                            from the Escaut were to hold the sector Halluin- -
                                                       Courtrai, but it was hoped that a Belgian
2ist May—The Situation on the Belgian Front.           formation would relieve them on the night of
   35. On 2ist May at 4.45 p.m. I met the three        23rd/24th May.
Corps Commanders. I told them what had                     When these moves were complete the Allied
happened on the southern flank and how, in             line would run slightly west of north to Halluin,
-order to take the initiative and encourage the        and then almost at right angles, north-eastwards
French ist Army to do likewise, I had gone to          along the Lys. It was evident that sooner or
the length of committing practically the whole         later the Belgian army would have to swing
of my reserve.                                         back to a line in rear, pivoting on their right
   From the Corps Commanders I learned that            of Halluin. Accordingly at the end of the
the line was thinly held and that attacks had          conference General Billotte asked the King of
taken place at several points. At Petegem on           the Belgians whether if he were forced to with-
the front of 44th Division the enemy had secured       draw he would fall back on to the line of the
a bridgehead 1,000 yards deep on a front of            Yser. His Majesty agreed, though evidently
3,000 yards, and at the junction with the French       with some regret, that no alternative line existed.


Details

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941                                   5921
as it turned out, fatally injured in a motor             These moves left only four divisions on the
accident returning from the conference which he      frontier defences and made'it possible to with-
and I had attended at Ypres on the night of          draw the headquarters and Corps troops of
2ist May. General Blanchard succeeded him in         3rd Corps for employment on the Canal line
command of the French First Group of Armies,         where they were badly needed. This was done
and presumably succeeded to the function of          at 4 p.m. on 23rd May, leaving ist Corps with
co-ordination although this was never officially     42nd and ist Divisions and 2nd Corps with
confirmed.                                           3rd and 4th Divisions.
                                                         2nd, 44th and 48th Divisions tcame under
out                                                  3rd Corps and that night made a' march west-
of three different nations, and that I personally    wards. I had decided to employ 2nd and 44th
could not undertake any measure of co-ordina-        Divisions on the Canal line facing west, but their
tion in the forthcoming operations as I was          move required a farther twenty-four hours to
already actively engaged on my Eastern and           complete.
Southern fronts and also threatened on my                Meanwhile the canal defences required stiffen-
Lines of Communication.                              ing as much as possible. And accordingly,
   Nevertheless, I saw General Blanchard and         Polforce temporarily assumed control of the
proposed to him that to implement our part of        whole front between St. Omer and Raches,
the Weygand plan, we should stage an attack          and two regiments of 2nd Armoured Recon-
southwards with two British divisions, one           naissance Brigade were placed under its com-
French division and the French Cavalry Corps.        mand. Polforce also undertook the responsi-
So far as we were concerned the attack could         bility for demolitions as far north as Watten
not take place till the 26th at the earliest owing   including no less than 43 bridges.
to the.reliefs which were in progress, and the           The sector eastward from Raches was now
need to assemble 5th and 5oth Divisions. I           handed over to the French, the British
also asked General Blanchard to enquire from         demolition parties being left on the bridges at
G.Q.G. how such an operation could be syn-           the disposal of French 3rd Corps.
chronised with the attack from the line of the           Macforce, now comprising four field batteries,
Somme which was said to be in process of             half an anti-tank battery and one battalion,
preparation. These negotiations, as will be seen,    withdrew from the line Carvin-Raches on
were later continued by Sir Ronald Adam on           23rd May and was moved to a rendezvous in
my behalf. I emphasised, both to the Secretary       the. eastern end of the Forest of Nieppe where
of State and'to General Blanchard, that the          it was joined by Headquarters and one. regiment
principal effort must come from the south, and       of ist Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade.
that the operation of the northern forces could      i39th Infantry Brigade (46th Division) continued
be nothing more than a sortie.                       to hold the sector from Carvin to Raches until
   I never received any information from any         26th May.
source as to the exact location of our own or           .The situation on the canal line deteriorated
enemy forces on the far side of the gap; nor         during 23rd May and the enemy established
did I receive any details or timings of any          bridgeheads at Aire, at St. Omer (which seems
proposed attack from that direction.                 to have changed1hands twice during the day)
                                                     and near Watten. His tanks were reported as
 zyrd May—Further development of the Canal line.     harbouring in the forest of Clairmarais, and
    39. On 23rd May the organisation- was con-       during the day his armoured fighting vehicles
 tinued of " stops " behind the Canal line.          came within three miles of Hazebrouck. ,By
    At Hazebrouck, where the organisation of         the evening, however, these movements nad
 defences had been begun on 2 ist May by the         been checked and steps taken to keep. the
 staff of the Major-General R.A. at G.H.Q.           enemy out of the Forest of Nieppe.
 the garrison was now about 300 strong and             . The enemy had also been active that day on
 included eighteen French light tanks and some       the canal line at Be'thune, where they had been
 Belgian machine gunners.                            driven off and had then moved towards Carvin.
    Cassel was occupied by i3/i8th Hussars, less     Here the defenders had been reinforced by
 one squadron, and on the same afternoon (23rd)      further artillery under C. R. A. 2nd Division
 Brigadier Usher's force took over the defence of     (Brigadier. C. B. Findlay), and the crossings
 Bergues.                                            were firmly held.
    On the night of 22/23rd May the withdrawal-          On 23rd May Calais was finally isolated. Its
 to the frontier defences had been carried out.      garrison; had been reinforced under the orders
 The French had taken over the sector northwards     of the War Office, by 3oth Infantry Brigade
 from Maulde and the right boundary of the           (Brigadier C. Nicholson) and 3rd battalion
.B.E.F. was now Bourghelles-Seclin both inclu-       Royal Tank Regiment—a cruiser tank regiment.
 sive to the French.. This change of boundary did    I had intended to move the latter within the
 not however affect the dispositions which the       canal line, but it was already too late-. After
 B.E.F. had taken on the Canal line by which         two attempts they were driven back into Calais,
 the rear of the French positions was protected.     with the. exception of three tanks which
    On the left of the B.E.F. the Belgians, who      eventually reached Dunkirk by way of Grave-
 had previously agreed to relieve the 44th           lines. The remainder of the gallant defence
 Division after withdrawal to the Lys on the         of Calais was conducted under the orders of the
 night of 23rd/24th May, ordered one of their        War Office. It-was finally concluded on the
 divisions to occupy the sector Halluin-Courtrai     night of 26/27th May.
 on the night of 22nd/23rd May. 44th Division            Information received at this time indicated
 was concentrated in G.H:Q. reserve on the           that two enemy armoured divisions were
 morning of 23rd May.                                converging on Calais and two more,- supported
    On the right, 2nd and 48th Divisions passed      by a motorised. S. S. (Schutz-Staffel) division,
 through the French on the night of 22nd/23rd        on St. Omer. A fifth armoured division appeared
 Mav and also concentrated in G H.O reserve.         to he mnvincr rm


Details

5922          SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 17 OCTOBER, 1941

2qkh May. Preparations for counter attack and            the Admiral du Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose
    strengthening of canal defences.                     command included Boulogne, Calais and
    40. During 24th May, I had simultaneously            Dunkirk. Under his authority the command
to prepare for a counter-attack southwards on            of military forces in these areas was assumed on
the 26th and also to press forward with the              24th May by General de Corps d'Arme'e Fagalde,
strengthening of the canal line.                         commanding the French i6th Corps which up
    To make the detailed arrangements for the            to now had been fighting on the left of the
counter-attack I appointed the Commander of              Belgian Army.
the 3rd Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald                The French defences of Dunkirk were based
Adam, who, on my behalf, continued negotia-              on the peace time organisation of the Secteur
tions with General Blanchard, and with the               Fortifie des Flandres, and extended only as
Commander of the French 5th Corps, General               far as the Belgian frontier. They comprised
Altmeyer.                                                an inner and an, outer sector, the inner on the
    The final plan was for a counter attack with         line of the old Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence
three French and two British divisions under             by Bergues to the frontier and so to the sea;
the command of General Altmeyer. As a                    the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer
first stage, on the evening of 26th May, bridge-         thence by Cassel and Steenvoorde to the
heads were to be established south, of the               frontier. General Fagalde had at his disposal
Scarpe, and the main attack was to start the             certain regional troops in numbers equivalent
following morning, with the objective Plouvain—          to a weak division, who were located in the
Marquion—Cambrai. Sir Ronald Adam with                   outer sector from Grayelines to the Forest of
three divisions (two British and one French)             Clairmarais and whose dispositions had been
was to advance east of the Canal du Nord, and            roughly co-ordinated with those of Brigadier
General Altmeyer with two French divisions               Usher. About this time the 68th French
to the west of the Canal du Nord, his right being        Division arrived at Dunkirk from Belgium and
covered by the French Cavalry Corps. This                took over the inner sector.
attack was never carried out for reasons which              On the 24th and 25th May the British posts
will presently appear.*                                  on the river Aa were taken over by the French,
    On the same day, I issued orders to dissolve         who also began to operate the inundations,
the various improvised forces on the Canal               which formed part of the defence scheme of
line, and their units were absorbed by the               Dunkirk and extended each side of Bergues and
 formations in the areas of which they now were..         as far as the Belgian frontier north of the
 I appointed Major-General Eastwoodj to take             Bergues—Furnes canal.
 command of the defences on the Canal line,               2$th May—Attacks on the Canal Line and on
and he assumed command early on 25th May.                        the Belgian Army.
    The position on the Canal line was consider-              42. On 25th May, enemy activity intensified.
 ably strengthened -during 24th May. 44th                  Two enemy Corps were reported to be attacking
 Division began to move into the line between             the French in the area Denain—Bouchain ; the
the forest of Clairmarais and Aire, with 2nd               enemy was also across the canal at St. Venant,
 Division on its left between Aire and La Bassee,          and was developing the bridgeheads between
 and 4&th Division (lately Polforce) from La              that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, whilst
 Bassee to Raches. It was not till the evening             further north the situation on the river Aa was
 however that 2nd and 44th Divisions gained                still obscure.
 contact with the enemy and for most of the day               At about 7 a.m. on 25th May, news was
 the defence of the sector still remained under            received that in the late evening of 24th May
 the Commanders of Macforce and Perforce.                  the enemy had attacked the Belgian 4th Corps
    Fighting of a somewhat confused character              on the Lys with a force reported to be of four
 went on for most of the day in and south of               divisions, supported by tanks. The attack
 the Forest of Nieppe, and the enemy also began            penetrated to a 'depth of i| miles on a front of
 heavy bombing and shelling of Cassel. The                 13 miles between Menin and Desselghem.
 remainder of Macforce, which included field                  It was fast becoming a matter of vital
 and anti-tank artillery, was therefore sent               importance to keep open our line of communica-
 to reinforce the i3/i8th Hussars.                         tion to the coast through a corridor which was
     48th Division (with under its command part            hourly narrowing. It was no longer possible
 of 23rd Division in the area Gravelines—St.               to count on using the main road Estaires—
 Omer) was ordered to send one "infantry brigade         • Cassel—Dunkirk, while the news which had
 to Dunkirk and one to Cassel and Hazebrouck.              just been received made it certain that before
  I45th Infantry Brigade completed its relief              long, the whole area east of the Yser canal
 of the improvised garrisons of the two latter             would be in the hands of the enemy, since there      <•
 places on 25th May, but General Thome found               was, in fact, no satisfactory defensive position
 that the French had already made complete                 between the Lys and the Yser canal. There
 dispositions for Dunkirk, and had informed                seemed, therefore, to be a serious risk of the
 the British Base Commandant. He therefore                 Belgian right becoming separated from the
 decided to send I44th Infantry Brigade to                 British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army
 Bergues and Wormhoudt. He established his                  being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather
  H.Q. at Bergues, which he- rightly regarded as           than in a westerly direction. I considered it
 the vital point of defence.                               vitally urgent to prolong the British front
The French reinforce Dunkirk.                              without delay northwards to Ypres, along
                                                           the old Ypres—Comines canal, now practically
  41. The local defences of Dunkirk, in                    dry, and round Ypres itself to the line of the
accordance with French practice, were under                Yser canal.
   * See pars.. 43.                                           As an immediate step, I2th Lancers were
   f Major-General T. R. Eastwood had recently             sent off early on 25th to .watch the left flank of
arrived in France to take command of a division, and,      2nd Corps on the Lys, and gain touch with the
pending a vacancy, was attached to the Staff of G.H.Q.     right flank of the Belgians.


Details

Details

17.
'Dell
Leonard Travers,
Able Seaman a D/JX.133219, H.MS. Glengowe
Able Seaman James Wallis, C/SSX.27313, H.M.S. Keith.
Able Seaman Edwin George Webster, C/JX.142167, H.M.S. Kingfisher.
Able Seaman George John Woodger, C/J.45802, H.M.S. Keith.
Able Seaman Frederick William Jacobs, C/J.100758, R.F.R., B.23901,
H.M.S. Malcolm.
Able Seaman James Kidd, R.F.R., D/SSX.13321, H.M.S. Jaguar.
Able Seaman Frederick James Slack, C/J.93546, R.F.R., B.21781, H.M.S.
Crested Eagle.
Able Seaman George Tilbury, c/ss.7850, R.F.R., B.17336, H.M.S.
Crested Eagle.
Able Peaman Richard Philip Smith, R.N.V.R., БЕЗДХХЗЛАЙ MD/X.1950,
H.M.S. Codrington.
Signalman Harold Oscar Carter, C/SSX.17317, H.M.S. Locust.
Signalman Charles Raymond Craig, D/JX.141848, H.M.S. Bideford.
Signalman Harry Guy, C/JX.150713, H.M.S. Calcutta.
Signalman Eric Ernest Roden, C/J.103654, H.M.S. Locust.
Signalman Stanley Thompson, C/JX.133505, H.M.S. Kingfisher.
Signalman Leslie David Ball, R.M.V.R.? LD5/X.3548, H.M.S. Codrington.
Signalman James Stanley Duffy, R.N.N.R.A,C/TDX.1412,
Signalman Ronald Henry Walters, R.N.V.R., C/LDX.4178.
queen of Thanet.
Signalman John Albert Williamson, R.NV.R., LD/X.4036, H.M.S. Glenaven
Stoker First Class Jack Chadwick, D/KX.81834, HLM.S. Jaguar.
Stoker First Class Samuel Comben, P/K.62179, H.M.S. Vimy.
Stoker First Class Charles Irvine, C/KX.86537, H.M.S. Sabre.
Stoker First Class William Reginald Gordon Jones, C/KX.92890, H.M.S.
Wolsey.
Stoker First Class Percy William Spray, P/KX.87052, Newhaven Rosa Life Boa
Sick Berth Attendant Eric James Littlewood Gibson, D/MX.56025, Ivanhoe. H.M.S.
Sick Berth Attendant (R) Alfred Bassford, c/x.8080, R.N.A.S.B.R.
Sick Berth Attendant Albert William Keller, R.N.A.S.B.R., D/X.6785,
H.M.S. Havant.
Sick Berth Attendant James Timothy Tomlinson, R.N.A.S.B.R.? P/X.6941.
H.M.S. Vivacious.
Sick Berth Attendant Edward Welch, R.N.A.S.B.R., P/SBR/X.7341, H.M.S. Esk.
Sick Berth Attendant John Yeoman, R.N.A.S.B.R., P/X.7093, H.M.S. Express.
Ordinary Seaman Noel Edward Holmes Berry, D/JX.158456, H.M.S. Jaguar.
Ordinary Seaman Arthur Thomas Burton, P/JX.182142, H.M.S. Portsdown.
Ordinary Seaman Dominic Kenny, D/SSX.30221, H.M.S. Shikari.
Shaw
Ordinary Seaman William Lyons, D/SSX.30211, H.M.S. Shikari. are
Brigana aire

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank
of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut
to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were
made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison
work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once
again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer
and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was
possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors,
for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of
anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no
effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the
canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and con-
sequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too
that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military
requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening
enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last
remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was
abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal
to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an
evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and
in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters
which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after
allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed
the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the
remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names
of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was in-
timated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were
prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the
mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer
vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of
movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off
gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the
and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only
craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was
the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched,
in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition
party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force
guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it
attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being
orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Defences of Dunkirk
It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du
now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the
available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dun-
in these areas to General Fagalde.
kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces
and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on
The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier,
Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the
the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea
voorde to the frontier.¹
the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.²
The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate
Belgian line penetrated
In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, pene-
trating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security
of the British left flank.
It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line
of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was
hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that
before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the
enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the
British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a
northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³
25TH MAY
Enemy pincer attack
On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at
St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire
and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained
obscure.
During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly
direction under enemy pressure.
General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside
as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising
the seriousness of the situation.3
By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to
secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in
held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being
The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One move-
between counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap
the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening
D.R.
3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42.
12

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675